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Abstract
Local authorities play a key role in European Union (EU) governance. They are no
longer simply ‘passive receivers’ of EU policy, but proactively engage at the European
level. This active engagement includes participation in local government transnational
networking (LGTN), an activity which sees local authorities form links with their
counterparts in other countries. The contemporary prevalence of LGTN presents an
interesting empirical puzzle. Local authorities lack the formal competence to engage
beyond their territories. Furthermore, since the financial crisis councils’ budgets have
been restricted. Why, then, are local authorities participating in LGTN when they lack
both the formal competence and the financial resources? This thesis tackles this puzzle.
In particular it explores three broad questions relating to LGTN:
• What is the extent of LGTN?
• Why do local authorities participate?
• What determines effective participation?
By focusing on the local authorities within transnational networks, this thesis makes
an empirical contribution to knowledge and informs a body of literature which has until
now overlooked the perceptions of local actors in EU governance. It further informs
conceptual debates surrounding multi-level governance and local level Europeanization.
This focus is achieved through a cross-national analysis of 14 local authorities in
south-east England and northern France, and adopting a qualitative empirical approach
which draws data from semi-structured interviews, document analysis and participant
observation.
The findings show that LGTN continues to be a prevalent phenomenon and is
therefore an important feature of the EU’s multi-level system of governance. However,
engagement is not uniform. While all local authorities are involved, variation is present
in the number of links councils engage in, the type of networks they target and their
motivations for participation. In all cases, however, engagement in LGTN is driven
by a rationalist logic, as councils seek to achieve individual pre-determined strategic
aims and improve their relative positions. A number of local and external factors are
shown to impact how effectively councils engage in LGTN and, ultimately, explains
why the process of local level Europeanization is marked by differentiation rather than
convergence.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Research focus and relevance
This thesis investigates local government transnational networking (LGTN)1
undertaken by local authorities2 in unitary and centralized polities in the European
Union (EU).
Underpinning this research focus is a recognition that local authorities are
important actors in EU governance. They are directly responsible for the
implementation of around 70 per cent of EU legislation and policy (Briggs, 2010,
p. 12; Klausen & Goldsmith, 1997, pp. 238–239; LGA, 2010; Van Bever, Reynaert,
& Steyvers, 2011a, p. 16). Local government is also the main beneficiary of the EU’s
regional policy, an activity which accounted for a third of the Union’s total budget in
1 The literature uses a variety of terms to refer to this activity, including ‘transnational local
authority networks’ (Benington, 1994) ‘transnational municipal networks’ (Bouteligier, 2013;
Bulkeley, 2005; Bulkeley et al., 2003; Kern & Bulkeley, 2009; Lee & van de Meene, 2012),
‘inter-urban networks’ (Balme & Le Gale`s, 1997; Leitner, Pavlik, & Sheppard, 2002; Payre, 2010;
van der Heiden, 2010), ‘trans-European local authority networking’ (Phelps, McNeill, & Parsons,
2002) and ‘metropolitan co-operation’ (Heeg, Klagge, & Ossenbru¨gge, 2003). This thesis adopts
the term ‘local government transnational networking’ (LGTN) as it encompasses all levels of local
government involved in this activity, regardless of their size, level within the state hierarchy and
whether they are urban or not.
2 A range of other terms are used to refer to local authorities in the literature, including
‘non-central government’, ‘subnational authorities / government’ and ‘sub-central government’.
For consistency this thesis uses the terms ‘local government’ and ‘local authorities’. These terms
are applied universally to refer to all levels of government below that of the central state, and so
make no distinction between so-called ‘regional’ and lower levels.
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2014. More generally, “local and regional authorities are responsible for between 50 per
cent and 70 per cent of public investment in Europe” (Le Gale`s, 2002, p. 91).
The importance of local government is recognized by the EU. As highlighted by
Schausberger (2013, p. 32):
Although EU Member States are under no obligation to choose a particular
model for their institutional structure or for decentralization, it has to be
pointed out that the EU treaties recognize and respect local and regional
self-government, showing that the EU sees local and regional democracy as
one of the foundations of its own legitimacy.
This has led to formal institutional recognition of local authorities at the EU level in
the form of the Committee of the Regions (CoR) (see Ho¨nnige & Panke, 2013; Loughlin,
1996; Warleigh, 1997). The local level has also been actively engaged in the development
and delivery of EU policy—especially regional policy—through the encouragement of
the ‘partnership principle’ (see Bache, 1998; Bauer & Bo¨rzel, 2010; Hooghe, 1996a;
Sodupe, 1999).
Local government itself has undertaken a range of informal external engagement
activities, often collectively referred to as ‘paradiplomacy’ (see Aldecoa & Keating,
1999; Keating, 2000; Lecours, 2002; Stegmann McCallion, 2011). The contemporary
extent of this is such that Briggs (2010) argues foreign policy:
has gone from being the preserve of a closed group of policy-makers and
departments, to a cross-government and cross-society endeavour. Foreign
policy is no longer something that happens within one government department;
it is a national activity and involves actors of different types at the local,
regional, national and international levels.
In the EU, this manifests itself in well over 200 subnational offices in Brussels,
acting as ‘mini-embassies’ for local authorities (Huysseune & Jans, 2008, p. 1; Jans
& Stouhuysen, 2007, p. 209; Tatham, 2010, p. 81; Tatham & Thau, 2014, p. 257). The
number of local authority staff present in Brussels is said to outnumber those employed
by national permanent representations (Tatham & Thau, 2014, p. 258).
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Part of this external engagement activity includes LGTN. This sees local authorities
form links and co-operate with their counterparts in other countries. While it is worth
noting that LGTN is not just a European phenomenon and can be observed globally3,
it is nevertheless most intense in the EU. LGTN provides a way for local authorities to
access EU resources. It also provides opportunities to influence the EU policy process
and a way to come together and share innovative policy ideas and ‘best practices’.
Networks such as Eurocities, the Assembly of European Regions (AER), the Conference
of Peripheral and Maritime Regions (CPMR), Energy Cities and Providing Operational
Links through Integrated Systems (POLIS) are now well established actors in EU
governance. They are joined by a myriad of other local authority networks representing
a diverse range of policy sectors (see Appendix A). In this way LGTN is seen to play a
role in the wider process of European integration (Church & Reid, 1999, p. 644; Ward
& Williams, 1997, p. 444). As argued by Sodupe (1999, p. 58), “there is no doubt that
the activities of these organizations serve to increase interdependence and, as a result,
favour the construction of a united Europe”.
The emergence and proliferation of LGTN in the EU has been charted by scholars
since the 1990s (see Section 2.2.2). Along with broader trends in governance—such as
the hollowing out of the state and the increased role of non-governmental actors—the
presence of LGTN has led to conceptual debates surrounding the nature of the EU
as a ‘multi-level’ or ‘networked’ polity (for example Ansell, 2000; Bo¨rzel, 1997, 1998;
Hooghe & Marks, 2001a). However it also presents an interesting, yet under explored,
empirical puzzle. It is addressing this empirical question where this thesis makes a
contribution to knowledge on LGTN.
3 For example, Bouteligier (2013), Happaerts (2008) and Happaerts, van der Brande, and
Bruyninckx (2011) identify global LGTN operating in the field of sustainable development and
climate change. Hansen (1984) provides a comparative study on the LGTN undertaken by local
authorities in France and Mexico. Casson and Dardanelli (2012) provides an example of a global
bilateral link in that between Kent County Council and Virginia in the United States (US).
Duchacek (1984) and Lecours (2002) discuss the foreign activities of Canadian provinces and US
states, while Hobbs (1994) focuses on US cities.
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1.2 The empirical puzzle
Local authorities in unitary and centralized polities—such as England and France—are
mandated to implement the policies of central governments. They have limited scope to
pursue their own initiatives. They have no statutory duty to engage in activity beyond
their territorial limits (Keating, 1999, pp. 11–12). As a result, local government’s
legal authority and competence to participate in LGTN is questionable (Casson &
Dardanelli, 2012, p. 602). Similarly, from the perspective of the EU, LGTN does not
constitute a ‘formal’ channel for local authorities to interact with it (Blatter, Kreutzer,
Rentl, & Thiele, 2008; Hooghe, 1995). Despite this context, however, LGTN is a fact
of life in contemporary European politics. Identifying why local authorities engage in
LGTN, therefore, warrants further investigation.
This question has taken on additional significance since the impact of the financial
crisis, which has seen local authorities across the EU face austerity and public finance
pressures, limiting their capacity to deliver their statutory responsibilities. A recent
report by the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR) and Dexia
Cre´dit Local (2012, p. 16) shows that central government grants to local authorities
across Europe—including England and France—have reduced. In England, the cuts to
local government have been described by the English Local Government Association
(LGA) as “the worst in living memory” (Bailey, Bramley, & Hastings, 2015, p. 571).
This, compounded by a reduction in local tax revenues, has led to an EU-wide
decrease in local authority budgets since the start of the financial crisis (Davey,
2012, p. 43). One English council leader has proclaimed this adverse financial climate
constitutes “the end of local government as we know it” (Dudman, 2012). This leads
to a question of why local authorities continue to invest in discretionary external
engagement activities—such as LGTN—despite the obvious resource constraints they
face in delivering their core statutory services.
Studying LGTN in this context is therefore both relevant and timely. To address
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this empirical puzzle, this thesis tackles three broad questions relating to contemporary
LGTN4:
1. What is the extent of LGTN? (becomes RQ1)
2. Why do local authorities participate? (becomes RQ2)
3. What determines effective participation? (becomes RQ3)
1.3 Contribution to the existing literature
Despite the importance of local government in wider EU governance and the active
role played by councils, there is a recognition among scholars that the local dimension
to European—and indeed international—politics is often neglected over analyses of the
member states or the institutions themselves (Blatter et al., 2008, p. 469; Briggs, 2010,
p. 5; Guderjan, 2012; Jeffery, 2000; Lefe`vre & d’Albergo, 2007, p. 318; Van Bever et
al., 2011a, p. 13). As Blatter et al. (2008, p. 469) argue, “there remain major gaps,
ambiguities and uncertainties in our knowledge of the foreign activities of sub-national
governments”. This certainly applies to LGTN, with Betsill and Bulkeley (2004, p. 476)
noting that “the role of transnational networks of subnational governments . . . has been
overlooked”, and Payre (2010, p. 263) more recently commenting that it represents “a
kind of ‘black box’ that is only rarely opened”. This thesis therefore seeks to open this
black box. Given the consensus in the existing literature that LGTN is under researched
(Betsill & Bulkeley, 2004, p. 476; Bouteligier, 2013, p. 3; Casson & Dardanelli, 2012,
p. 601; Kern & Bulkeley, 2009, p. 310; Payre, 2010, p. 263), this thesis makes a clear
contribution to knowledge in this under explored area.
Where the local level is the focus of analysis, local authorities are often viewed in a
top–down manner; they are regarded as incidental actors in EU governance or merely
passive receivers of EU policy (Jeffery, 2000, p. 8; Van Bever et al., 2011a, p. 26). This
4 These are formulated into the study’s research questions (RQs1–3), which are discussed in more
detail in Section 1.7.
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lack of attention represents a significant gap in existing European studies scholarship,
particularly as it does not correspond with the empirical reality. As argued by Van
Bever et al. (2011a, p. 27):
[While] local governments in recent years have become more dependent on
Europe in terms of policy implementation and eligibility for funding in absolute
terms, the balance today seems to be in favour of a more active orientation of
local governments’ activities in the EU multi-level system. As a consequence,
it seems of equal importance to tackle the more voluntary aspects of local
governments “adaptation to Europe”.
Given this voluntary ‘active orientation’, the need to view EU engagement by local
authorities from the bottom–up is important. By focusing on the perceptions of local
actors throughout, this thesis addresses this gap in the existing literature on local
government in the EU.
Aside from this, this study makes a number of empirical contributions relating to
the three broad questions set out above.
What is the extent of LGTN?
During the 1990s, the relative novelty of LGTN led Benington and Harvey (1998)
to ask if it was a “passing fashion or new paradigm”. To date, this question
remains unanswered. Existing studies on LGTN have either focused on a handful of
transnational networks (for example Griffiths, 1995; Heinelt & Niederhafner, 2008;
Lee & van de Meene, 2012; Sampaio, 1994; Wise, 2000b, 2000a), or been conducted
as singular case studies of one local authority’s activities (for example Baert, 2010;
Casson & Dardanelli, 2012; Hamedinger, 2011; Payre, 2010; Pichler-Milanović, 2010;
Tosics, 2010)5. While in some cases the literature has provided surveys of the extent of
LGTN—such as the studies on transnational co-operation across the English Channel
(for example Church & Reid, 1995, 1996, 1999; Heddebaut, 2001, 2004; Sparke, 2000;
Thomas, 2006)—this is now too dated to inform an assessment of the current picture.
5 Van der Heiden’s (2010) study of seven EU and Swiss cities is an exception here.
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This thesis therefore addresses this by contributing a contemporary survey of the
extent of LGTN.
Why do local authorities participate?
In trying to account for the presence of LGTN, scholars have sought to uncover what
role it has in EU governance. However, analyses of LGTN tend to focus primarily
on the level of the networks, rather than the actors within them (for example
Bouteligier, 2013; Griffiths, 1995; Heinelt & Niederhafner, 2008; Kern & Bulkeley,
2009; Ward & Williams, 1997). Therefore, while these studies reveal the function
of transnational networks, they do not necessarily account for the motivations held
by those participating. In addition, existing literature on LGTN focuses heavily on
its role in EU regional policy, the allocation of structural funds and engagement in
EU funded transnational projects (for example Benington & Harvey, 1998; Benz &
Eberlein, 1999; Church & Reid, 1996, 1999; Lawrence, 2000; McAleavey & Mitchell,
1994; Pflieger, 2014; Sodupe, 1999). Given the amount of EU funding available to local
authorities, this is to be expected. However this narrow focus has been criticized by
some scholars (John, 2000, p. 881; Kern & Bulkeley, 2009, p. 310), and it potentially
overlooks LGTN in other policy areas which might be important for local authorities6.
This thesis addresses these weaknesses and makes a contribution to knowledge here
by uncovering the motivations held by local authorities participating in LGTN. The
inductive research design adopted does not limit the analysis to individual policy
areas, and so offers a more complete analysis of councils’ engagement than existing
studies have been able to offer.
6 A body of literature on the role of LGTN in environmental and climate change policy goes
someway to address this weakness although arguably still confines itself to one policy area (for
example Betsill & Bulkeley, 2004, 2006; Bouteligier, 2013; Bulkeley, 2005; Bouteligier, 2013; Lee
& van de Meene, 2012; Kern, 2010, 2014; Kern & Bulkeley, 2009; Ward & Williams, 1997).
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What barriers do local authorities face when participating?
The question of local authority’s ‘effectiveness’ in engaging in LGTN remains largely
unexplored by the literature. While some scholarship investigates the effectiveness
of transnational networks themselves (for example Bouteligier, 2013; Heinelt &
Niederhafner, 2008; Lee & van de Meene, 2012; Kern & Bulkeley, 2009), these analyses
rarely extend to the local level. Yet how local authorities perceive the effectiveness
of their LGTN activities is an important factor in their consideration to continue
participation. It is posited that a range of factors contribute to local authorities’
effective engagement. By investigating these factors and their presence among the
councils participating, this thesis makes an empirical contribution to knowledge and
to our understanding of LGTN.
1.4 Defining LGTN
While the existence of LGTN is recognized, it is not consistently defined in the
literature. This makes it necessary to outline what is meant by ‘LGTN’. Sodupe (1999,
p. 62) defines local government transnational networks as:
associations formed between regional entities of different states whose ultimate
purpose is to act as pressure groups in the European institutions, and foster
co-operation based upon common interests, needs and aspirations.
Karvounis (2011, p. 218) expands on this definition, outlining six features which
characterize LGTN:
A) The voluntary character and autonomy of the members of a network.
B) Participation of partners . . . from different countries, having a distinct
legal status.
C) Commitment to common objective(s) . . . and to the preparation of one
or more initiatives.
D) Optional or legal consolidation of the network. In case it is not legally
consolidated, the network ought to be set up according to a Charter of
Commitments signed by each partner.
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E) Observance of the rules of sound economic management and transparency.
F) Respect of the principles of mutual understanding and toleration
among the partners and collective responsibility in the course of the
implementation of an initiative.
Kern and Bulkeley (2009, pp. 309–310) identify three key features of transnational
networks:
1. Members are autonomous and are free to leave or join.
2. They are non-hierarchical, poly-centric and horizontal, and as such can
be regarded as a form of self-governance.
3. Decisions taken by the network are implemented by members.
These features—along with the almost exclusive involvement of local authorities
over other actors—make LGTN a unique feature of EU governance. As argued by
Bulkeley et al. (2003, p. 241), transnational networks on the one hand:
exhibit the characteristics of a social movement, yet on the other by virtue of
their membership, they have a close association with the formal institutions of
government and administration at the local level.
To this end, they might be characterized as “quasi-governmental” (Bulkeley et al.,
2003, p. 241). For clarity, the definition of LGTN adopted by this thesis is as follows:
• Participation in voluntary associations formed of at least two local
authorities from at least two different countries, which can be
characterized by their horizontal and non-hierarchical nature.
This definition means a number of organizations which the literature elsewhere
identifies as cases of LGTN (see Appendix A) are not classified as such for the purposes
of this thesis7. This delimitation aside, the definition adopted still encompasses a diverse
range of transnational activities. To this end, a three-fold classification of LGTN is
advanced in Section 4.1 to aid in the analysis of this activity.
7 For example, the CEMR is not defined here as a case of LGTN as its members are national local
government associations—such as the English LGA—not local authorities themselves (Happaerts,
2008, p. 6; Heinelt & Niederhafner, 2008, pp. 177–179; Kern & Bulkeley, 2009, p. 122).
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1.5 Research approach
Given the nature of the empirical puzzle outlined in Section 1.2 and the gaps identified
in the existing literature in Section 1.3, this thesis seeks to understand engagement in
LGTN from the perspectives of the local authorities involved. To this end an inductive
research design is adopted, utilizing a qualitative empirical approach which is able to
capture the perceptions of local level actors. This includes qualitative semi-structured
interviews with 68 participants—local officers, councillors and others directly involved
with LGTN—an analysis of 117 local authority produced reports and documents,
and participant observation during ten LGTN events. In line with the focus on local
government in unitary and centralized polities, this thesis makes use of a cross-national
case selection, investigating the LGTN activities undertaken by 14 English and French
local authorities8. These methods and the case selection are discussed further in
Chapter 3.
1.6 Conceptual framework
For its conceptual framework, this thesis utilizes the approaches of multi-level
governance (MLG) and Europeanization to analyse LGTN. Both approaches emerged
as part of the ‘governance turn’ in European studies (see Kohler-Koch & Rittberger,
2006), and facilitate the analysis of the EU as an already functioning political system,
rather than trying to explain the process of integration (Bache, 2004b, p. 2; Ladrech,
2010, p. 8).
MLG points to a system of governance where political activity and decision
making is dispersed across multiple territorial levels and between a range of state
and non-state actors (see Hooghe & Marks, 2001a). LGTN is seen as a feature of this
8 Both the United Kingdom (UK) and France are classified as unitary and centralized states
by Lijphart (2012, p. 178), although the UK’s system of asymmetric federalism complicates
this classification somewhat. Nevertheless, while devolution has occurred in Northern Ireland,
Scotland and Wales, England remains highly centralized (Lijphart, 2012, p. 17). This is also the
case in France, despite attempts at decentralization during the 1980s (Lijphart, 2012, p. 180).
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complex multi-level system. The presence of LGTN in the EU, therefore, confirms
its characterization as a multi-level polity. However, MLG only provides a description
of the EU’s political system, limiting its analytical capacity as a concept (Jordan,
2001, p. 201). This thesis overcomes this weakness by also applying a Europeanization
framework.
Europeanization refers to domestic adaptation to the EU. Here participation in
LGTN is viewed as a local authority response to the reality of European integration. In
other words, Europeanization explores participation in LGTN as a process which leads
to MLG. As Kern and Bulkeley (2009, p. 312) argue, “the debate on Europeanization . . .
complements the analysis of the European multi-level system by providing a sense of the
means by which multi-level governance is accomplished”. Applying a Europeanization
framework allows the thesis to explore the extent and differentiation of engagement in
LGTN (RQ1), the directionality of and the underlying logic driving participation in
LGTN (RQ2), and the mediating factors which affect participation (RQ3). Both MLG
and Europeanization are discussed further in Section 2.1.
1.7 Research aims and questions
The overall aim of this thesis is to gain an insight into LGTN from the perspective of
local authorities. Following from the gaps in the literature identified in Section 1.3 and
the desire to address the empirical puzzle outlined in Section 1.2, this study aims to:
• RA1: Identify contemporary examples of LGTN by local authorities in south-east
England and northern France.
• RA2: Establish the rationale, from a local authority perspective, for participation
in LGTN.
• RA3: Identify the factors which determine effective engagement in LGTN.
These research aims (RAs1–3) translate into the following research questions:
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• RQ1: What is the current extent of LGTN in south-east England and northern
France?
• RQ2: What benefits do local authorities seek from their involvement in LGTN?
• RQ3: What factors determine effective engagement in LGTN?
These questions are now further elaborated.
RQ1: What is the current extent of LGTN in south-east England and
northern France?
LGTN has been recognized as a phenomenon emerging from the late 1980s (see
Section 2.2.2), and a plethora of networks have since been identified by scholars
(see Appendix A). However, while the existence of this activity is acknowledged, the
contemporary extent of participation by local authorities remains largely unexplored.
During the 1990s, Benington and Harvey (1998) asked if LGTN was a “passing
fashion or new paradigm”. At the same time Church and Reid (1996, pp. 1300–1301)
argued “debates over the politics of cooperation and networks maybe exaggerating
their importance, since such relationships can be transitory and can lack stability”.
Therefore, this thesis begins its empirical analysis by identifying the LGTN activities
undertaken by local authorities in south-east England and northern France. Doing
this provides an answer to Benington and Harvey’s (1998) question and confirms the
importance of this activity. Furthermore, findings from a body of literature which
investigated LGTN in these areas during the 1990s (for example Church & Reid, 1995,
1996, 1999; Heddebaut, 2001, 2004; Sparke, 2000; Thomas, 2006) are updated with
contemporary empirical evidence.
Two supplementary questions follow. The first concerns how participation in
LGTN has evolved—if at all—over time (RQ1a). Since LGTN was first identified
during the 1990s, the EU has undergone enlargement and seen its policy competences
increase. Local authorities have also had to respond to the pressures of the financial
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crisis and austerity. How has engagement in LGTN changed in this context? The
second sub-question concerns whether participation in LGTN is uniform across local
authorities or marked by heterogeneity (RQ1b). Early studies of local government
engagement in the EU pointed to high degrees of differentiation among councils (for
example Balme & Le Gale`s, 1997; Goldsmith & Sperling, 1997). To what extent does
this continue to be the case, or has there been convergence in local authorities’ approach
to LGTN? These supplementary questions facilitate an assessment of the extent of
local level Europeanization (RQ1a), and its differential impact on local government
(RQ1b). As well as an empirical contribution, therefore, this research question informs
the conceptual debates on local level Europeanization and the status of MLG in the EU.
RQ2: What benefits do local authorities seek from their involvement in
LGTN?
Having assessed the extent of LGTN the thesis moves to address the question of
why local authorities participate. The focus here is founded on the premise that
LGTN is led from the bottom–up, and “has not been a strategy simply imposed
on local government” (Bulkeley et al., 2003, p. 237). By trying to understand why
local authorities participate in LGTN—despite lacking the formal competence and
simultaneously facing financial pressures affecting their capacity to deliver statutory
services—this question tackles the core of the empirical puzzle outlined in Section 1.2.
As explained above, while scholarship has charted the function of transnational
networks, little remains known about the actual motivations of the actors participating.
Therefore assessing this activity from the perspective of the local authorities involved
fills a gap in the existing literature on LGTN.
As with RQ1, two supplementary questions serve to deepen the empirical analysis
by contributing to the conceptual debate on local level Europeanization. Firstly,
what do local authorities’ motivations for engaging in LGTN reveal about the
directionality—top–down, bottom–up or horizontal—of local level Europeanization
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(RQ2a)? This ultimately speaks to the debate surrounding the the nature of
the local government–EU relationship: is it ‘hierarchical’ or ‘co-operative’ (Kern,
2010)? Secondly, following the application of a new institutionalist approach to
Europeanization (Bo¨rzel & Risse, 2003; Hamedinger & Wolffhardt, 2010), what is
the underlying logic driving participation in LGTN (RQ2b)? Do local authorities see
LGTN as a strategic tool or ‘opportunity structure’ to improve their relative positions
(the rationalist explanation), or is it a case of “me-tooism” (Duchacek, 1984, p. 18),
where participation is seen as the ‘right’ thing to do (the sociological explanation)?
RQ3: What factors determine effective engagement in LGTN?
This question focuses on the ‘effectiveness’ of LGTN and investigates the factors
which determine effective engagement. It is rooted in the strategic approach local
authorities take to their LGTN activities (revealed by RQ2), and is founded on the
empirical observation that councils undertake regular assessments of their effectiveness
in securing benefits from LGTN. It further recognizes the differential participation in
LGTN by local authorities (revealed by RQ1), and seeks to understand the factors
which cause this variation. Empirically, this question addresses Bulkeley et al.’s (2003,
p. 248) concern that “to date, there has been no formal evaluation of the effectiveness
of networks”. Indeed, while some studies have touched on the effectiveness of networks
themselves (for example Bouteligier, 2013; Heinelt & Niederhafner, 2008; Kern &
Bulkeley, 2009; Lee & van de Meene, 2012), little remains understood at the local
level.
In line with the rationalist approach, effectiveness here is assessed from the
perspective of the local authorities participating in LGTN. This focuses attention on
a number of factors which affect how well councils participate. Conceptually, a link is
provided to the literature on local level Europeanization, which suggests the presence
of mediating factors accounts for differential engagement of local authorities (de Rooij,
2002; Risse, Cowles, & Caporaso, 2001).
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1.8 Thesis structure
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 summarizes the conceptual and empirical background to this thesis.
While the contribution of this thesis is primarily empirical, the first section briefly
conceptualizes LGTN as a feature of MLG, brought about through the process of
local level Europeanization. An overview of both approaches is provided. This not
only emphasizes the need to employ both concepts together, but also highlights the
usefulness of the Europeanization approach as an analytical tool, providing a means
to assess the directionality of LGTN, its extent and differentiation, and the underlying
logic driving participation. The chapter then provides the empirical background to
LGTN. A summary of the relationship between local government and the EU is given,
before a background to LGTN more specifically is provided.
Chapter 3 outlines the research design and methods employed by this thesis.
It starts by rationalizing two main characteristics of this study’s research design:
its inductive research design and its use of a qualitative empirical approach. The
chapter then discusses the case selection for this thesis, outlining the challenges faced
in determining suitable units of analysis, the adoption of case studies and the 14 cases
selected. The final substantive section of this chapter discusses the data collection
methods employed: document analysis, participant observation and semi-structured
interviews with local officers and councillors.
Chapter 4 addresses RQ1 and therefore contributes a contemporary account of the
extent of LGTN in south-east England and northern France. It starts by advancing a
three-fold categorization of LGTN to aid the analysis of this activity. A background to
LGTN in south-east England and northern France is then provided, firstly discussing
the prevailing context during the late 1980s and 1990s, followed by an account of
the initial transnational links which emerged out of this. The empirical data from this
study is then presented and organized according to the categorization developed earlier.
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The findings show that LGTN remains prevalent among the councils studied; indeed
all councils participate. Links are then made to the debates on MLG and local level
Europeanization. Firstly, the presence of LGTN as a feature of MLG is emphasized.
Secondly, the chapter explores how participation in LGTN has changed since the 1990s
(RQ1a). This shows there has been a general evolution in local authorities’ approach,
marked by an increase in links, a shift from bilateral to multilateral networking and
moves to pursue more inter-regional and thematically focused networks as opposed to
general purpose and cross-border ones. This shows that local authorities have become
increasingly Europeanized. Thirdly, the differential engagement in LGTN is uncovered
(RQ1b), confirming the Europeanization literature’s expectation.
Chapter 5 tackles RQ2 and in so doing addresses the empirical puzzle set out
in Section 1.2. The chapter begins by reviewing existing literature on the benefits
local authorities seek from LGTN. This shows that while scholarship has uncovered
the function of networks, the motivations of the local authorities within have been
largely overlooked. The empirical findings are then presented and structured around
the three main motivations identified in the data: obtaining funding, lobbying and
influence and policy transfer. This is followed by a summary of other motivations
which are also identified, including promoting economic development, enhancing local
authorities’ profile and professional and organizational development. These findings
are then analysed against a Europeanization framework to identify the directionality
of LGTN (RQ2a) and the underlying logic driving participation (RQ2b). In terms
of directionality, this shows that LGTN simultaneously encompasses top–down,
bottom–up and horizontal Europeanization dynamics. In terms of logic, LGTN is shown
to be a case of rationalist Europeanization.
Chapter 6 addresses RQ3 and explores the relatively under researched topic of
the ‘effectiveness’ of LGTN. The chapter begins by conceptualizing effectiveness. This
draws on public administration literature, emphasizing the need to identify the factors
which determine effective networking. It is then argued this needs to be done from
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the perspective of the local actors involved in LGTN. The practitioner and academic
literature are then reviewed. This provides an analytical framework which accounts
for factors determining effective participation in LGTN located both at the level of
local authorities and external to them. This framework is then applied to the empirical
data. The findings show that many of these factors are located at the local level, and so
fall within local authorities’ control. However their presence varies between councils. A
link to the Europeanization literature is made by drawing on the concept of ‘mediating
factors’. This shows that the variation in factors determining effective LGTN accounts
for the differential engagement witnessed in Chapter 4.
Chapter 7 summarizes and concludes this thesis. It begins by returning to the
thesis’s three research questions (RQs1–3) as the foundation of this study’s contribution
to knowledge. These findings are then linked back to the literature on MLG and local
level Europeanization. The limitations to this study are then identified, and it is argued
these provide avenues for future research on LGTN. The thesis concludes by considering
the wider implications of this study’s findings for LGTN in an era of austerity.
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Conceptual and empirical
background
This chapter provides the conceptual and empirical background to this thesis. It begins
by outlining the approaches of multi-level governance (MLG) and Europeanization
(Section 2.1). Both have implications for the study of local government transnational
networking (LGTN); LGTN is seen as a feature of the EU’s multi-level system, come
about through the process of local level Europeanization. As a result it is argued both
approaches need to be utilized to provide a complete analysis of LGTN. The chapter
then outlines the empirical background (Section 2.2). This begins by surveying the
relationship between local government and the EU. The emergence and proliferation
of LGTN more specifically is then charted.
2.1 Conceptual background
LGTN can be characterized as a feature of multi-level governance (MLG) in
the European Union (EU), brought about through the process of local level
Europeanization. That is, LGTN constitutes an adaptive response by local authorities
to the reality of European integration. Furthermore, the presence of LGTN has—among
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other features of EU governance—led to the dispersal of political activity across
multiple levels of government away from central states. Despite being developed
separately, the concepts of MLG and Europeanization are interconnected (Bache,
2008; Kern, 2010; Kern & Bulkeley, 2009). Indeed both emerged out of the so-called
‘governance turn’ in EU studies, which places emphasis on exploring the EU as an
already functioning political system, rather then trying to develop grand theories to
explain the process of integration (see Kohler-Koch & Rittberger, 2006). It is argued
here that both approaches require mobilizing in order to facilitate an analysis of
LGTN9.
This section situates the thesis within this conceptual context. Overviews of both
MLG (Section 2.1.1) and Europeanization (Section 2.1.2) are provided, highlighting
their relevance and implications for the local level and LGTN more specifically. The
linkage between the two concepts is then briefly explored along with the need to employ
both in the analysis of LGTN (Section 2.1.3).
2.1.1 Multi-level governance
MLG developed as a response to the perceived limits of state centric explanations of
European integration10, such as those falling under the intergovernmentalist umbrella
(for example Moravcsik, 1993). As such it rejects the notion that member state
9 Church and Reid (1996, pp. 1301–1303) identify a range of other conceptual approaches which
may be employed to study LGTN. These include institutional approaches (see especially Church &
Reid, 1999), public choice theory, urban regime theory and regulation theory. They also identify
globalization and rescaling of the state approaches which have found application among some
scholars studying the internationalization of cities (for example Bouteligier, 2013; Bulkeley, 2005;
Heeg et al., 2003; Leitner, 2004; Leitner et al., 2002; Leitner & Sheppard, 2002; Payre, 2010;
van der Heiden, 2010). The policy networks approach is also identified by Church and Reid
(1996, p. 1301). While this has been used by some (for example Ward & Williams, 1997), its
suitability for analysing LGTN has been criticized (see Bulkeley et al., 2003, p. 240; Happaerts et
al., 2011, p. 324; Kern & Bulkeley, 2009, p. 313). Attempts to conceptualize LGTN as epistemic
communities (Haas, 1992) or advocacy networks (Keck & Sikkink, 1999) have likewise been
dismissed (see Betsill & Bulkeley, 2004, p. 476; Bulkeley, 2005, p. 880; Bulkeley et al., 2003,
p. 241; Happaerts et al., 2011, p. 324; Kern & Bulkeley, 2009, p. 314).
10 While initially developed to assist in the analysis of the EU, MLG has since found wider
applicability beyond European integration (see Bache & Flinders, 2004; Enderlein, Wa¨lti, &
Zu¨rn, 2010).
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governments have a monopoly on engagement in EU decision making and governance.
It observes a transformation of traditional hierarchical governance, whereby “formal
authority has been dispersed from central states both up to supranational institutions
and down to regional and local governments” (Marks & Hooghe, 2004, p. 15).
Hooghe and Marks (2001a, pp. 3–4)—often credited for being the approach’s
architects—outline three characteristics of MLG. Firstly, “decision-making
competencies are shared by actors at different levels rather than monopolized
by national governments” (Hooghe & Marks, 2001a, p. 3). In other words the
involvement of member states in decision making is not exclusive and their role
is complemented by actors at the supranational and subnational levels who have
independent influence. Secondly, “collective decision making among states involves
a significant loss of control for individual national governments” (Hooghe & Marks,
2001a, p. 4). That is to say where decisions are made between states, EU decision
making processes—such as qualified majority voting—remove the ability for individual
states to retain full control. Finally, “political arenas are interconnected rather than
nested” (Hooghe & Marks, 2001a, p. 4). Subnational actors do not rigidly adhere
to territorial hierarchies—as per the ‘Russian doll’ model—and can operate in other
arenas. This includes the ability for them to ‘bypass’ the national level entirely in
order to directly operate at the supranational level. Distinctions between different
government levels have therefore become blurred (Kern, 2014, p. 113). The specific
impact of MLG on subnational actors is outlined by Hooghe (1995, p. 178):
Subnational units do not need member states to have access to the European
arena. . . . Subnational mobilisation does not erode, but complements the
aggregating role of member states. Hierarchical relationships are weak but
interdependence is high. Actors are linked through networks, which span
several levels and in which each actor brings in valuable resources.
MLG, then, addresses the criticism of the state centric literature on European
integration in that attention is also given to supranational and subnational levels.
However, neither does it assume the demise of the national level (Hooghe, 1995,
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pp. 178–179). Indeed, MLG research often stresses the ‘gatekeeper’ role played by
member state governments in EU policy making (Bache, 1998, 1999).
MLG is further developed by distinguishing between two ideal types: Type I
and Type II (Hooghe & Marks, 2001b, 2003, 2010; Marks & Hooghe, 2004). Type
I MLG describes institutions at various levels of government which have multiple
responsibilities. The boundaries of these jurisdictions do not intersect. In this way
it is similar to traditional federal-like structures, except for the explicit inclusion of
the supranational level. Type II MLG describes more functionally specific institutions
which cross the boundaries of jurisdictional levels. While Type I structures are stable,
Type II structures are often not. As Hooghe and Marks (2003, p. 236) acknowledge,
“there is no great fixity in their existence. They tend to be lean and flexible—they
come and go as demands for governance change”.
LGTN is seen as a feature of this multi-level system (Hooghe & Marks, 2001a; Kern,
2010, 2014; Kern & Bulkeley, 2009). Indeed, Hooghe and Marks (2001a, p. 4) argue
that the ability for subnational governments to operate at the supranational level leads
to the creation of “transnational associations” between subnational actors. Regarding
the two types of MLG, LGTN fits both models. Under the Type I model, formal
hierarchy is challenged by the bypassing role LGTN plays, facilitating direct contacts
between the local and EU levels (Bulkeley et al., 2003, pp. 238–239). Nevertheless,
LGTN is most readily associated with the Type II categorization (Bulkeley et al., 2003).
Indeed cross-border co-operation—itself a form of LGTN (see Section 4.1)—is explicitly
classified as a case of Type II MLG by Hooghe and Marks (2003, p. 238) themselves.
The logic for this classification is three-fold. Firstly, the Type II model accounts for
the horizontal and non-hierarchical nature of LGTN, which transcends the boundaries
of local and national jurisdictions. As Bulkeley et al. (2003, pp. 239–240) put it, they
represent “a new political space or sphere of authority” (see also Bulkeley, 2005; Leitner
& Sheppard, 2002). Secondly, it accounts for the fact that most transnational networks
are functionally orientated, addressing specific policy areas. Thirdly, it acknowledges
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that transnational networks are not permanent, and many come and go11.
It is important to highlight some of the perceived limits to MLG. Jordan (2001,
pp. 201–202) outlines seven criticisms of MLG12, two of which are particularly relevant
to this thesis. Firstly, Jordan (2001, p. 201) argues that MLG “provides a ‘thick’
though compelling, description of contemporary changes in European governance but,
in contrast to standard theories, lacks a causal motor of integration”. In other words
it describes the EU as a form of MLG, but does not explain how this came to be.
For George (2004, p. 113) this criticism is unfair, especially given MLG never set
out to explain the process of European integration. Rather it seeks to facilitate the
understanding of the EU by providing an account of it as an already functioning
political system (George, 2004, p. 113). In line with this, this thesis views MLG as
a characterization of the EU’s political system which recognizes the involvement of
and interactions between actors at different jurisdictional levels; LGTN is seen as a
feature of this system.
The second of Jordan’s (2001, p. 201) criticisms relevant to this thesis is that
MLG “implicitly adopts a somewhat top–down view of subnational authorities, who
are (at least initially) assumed to accept passively power handed down to them from
Brussels/national capitals”. This criticism is based on Jeffery’s (2000) review of MLG
research, which notes that although the role of subnational levels is recognized, the
primary focus remains on EU–member state relations. The result is that subnational
authorities:
are typically portrayed as essentially inconsequential and passive players until
either an incidental by-product of central state–EU interplay provides an
opportunity for mobilization, or a central government decision is taken which
passes decision-making powers down. (Jeffery, 2000, p. 8)
11 These features are explored in more detail in Section 4.5.
12 The seven criticisms against MLG which Jordan (2001, pp. 201–202) makes are: it is an amalgam
of existing theories; it provides a descriptive, not explanatory account of the EU; it overstates
the autonomy of subnational government; it adopts a top–down view of subnational government;
non-governmental subnational actors are excluded; evidence of subnational mobilization is
conflated with evidence of subnational influence; and it ignores the international level. George
(2004) reviews these criticisms, finding they have variable validity.
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Jeffery (2000, p. 8) goes on to note that:
This perspective plays down the possibility that [subnational authorities]
may themselves and from the ‘bottom up’, actively seek to change and
succeed in changing those dynamics in ways which facilitate European policy
mobilization.
Blatter et al. (2008, pp. 464–465) note that where the focus has been on subnational
authorities, too much attention has been given to the vertical relationship between local
government and the EU (Type I MLG), neglecting other forms of local government
European activity, such as LGTN and other ‘horizontal’ links (Type II MLG) (see also
Kern, 2014, p. 115).
These criticisms mean our understanding of MLG in the EU, and the role of
local government in this system, is therefore incomplete. Adopting a Europeanization
framework addresses this by providing an account of the process which leads to MLG.
2.1.2 Europeanization
Studies of ‘Europeanization’ have applied the term in a variety of ways (see Bache
& Jordan, 2006; Featherstone, 2003; Olsen, 2002). Without prejudice to other uses
of the term13, Europeanization is taken here to mean “the domestic adaptation to
European regional integration” (Vink & Graziano, 2007, p. 7). This notion of ‘domestic
adaptation’ is rooted in Ladrech’s (1994, p. 17) early study of France—often cited as
the first to substantively use the concept—in which Europeanization is defined as:
an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to
the degree that EC political and economic dynamics becomes part of the
organizational logic of national politics and policy-making.
A range of definitions have since been offered by other scholars. For example:
13 Olsen (2002, pp. 923–924) identifies five uses of the terms. Firstly, linked to the EU’s external
boundaries and the process of enlargement. Secondly, the development of European-wide norms
and practices contributing a new form of governance. Thirdly, the impact of EU governance on
domestic politics. Fourthly, the exporting of European norms internationally. Finally, the building
of a common European identify. This thesis’s interpretation falls within the third definition.
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a process of change at the domestic level in which the member states adapt
their processes, policies, and institutions to new practices, norms, rules,
and procedures that emanate from the emergence of a European system of
governance. (Bo¨rzel & Risse, 2000)
the reorientation or reshaping of politics in the domestic arena in ways that
reflect policies, practices and preferences advanced through the EU system of
governance. (Bache & Jordan, 2006, p. 30)
Processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalization of
formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing
things’, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated
in the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the
logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures, and public policies.
(Radaelli, 2003, p. 30)
While different, these definitions share a common concern with the impact of the EU
on domestic political systems, specifically how the national level responds and adapts
to Europe. While Europeanization emerged from analyses of national polities, some
scholars have also sought to apply the concept to subnational levels (for example
Benz & Eberlein, 1999; de Rooij, 2002; Goldsmith, 1993, 2003, 2011; Guderjan, 2012;
Hamedinger & Wolffhardt, 2010; John, 2000, 2001; Kern, 2010; Kern & Bulkeley, 2009;
Kettunen & Kungla, 2005; Marshall, 2005, 2006; Murphy, 2007; Van Bever, Reynaert,
& Steyvers, 2011b)14.
While it is important to recognize that Europeanization pressures can emanate from
a broad range of European institutions, many studies remain primarily concerned with
the effect of the EU—as an independent variable—on domestic politics (Bache, 2008,
p. 9; Bulmer & Lequesne, 2013, p. 17; Flockhart, 2010, p. 790; Graziano & Vink, 2013,
p. 39; Olsen, 2002, p. 932; Vink & Graziano, 2007, pp. 11–12)15. This thesis similarly
adopts this approach. The rationale behind these heuristic delimitations—the focus on
14 Another body of literature—while focused on subnational government—is primarily concerned
with the effect of Europeanization on broader territorial and centre–local relations, as opposed
to how local authorities themselves adapt to Europe (for example Bache, 2008; Bo¨rzel, 2001;
Bursens, 2007; Ladrech, 2010).
15 To this end some have suggested “EU-ization” might be a more accurate term (Bulmer &
Lequesne, 2013, p. 17; Flockhart, 2010, p. 790; Radaelli, 2003, p. 27).
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domestic adaptation to the EU —is outlined by Bache (2008, p. 9), who argues that “it
places a boundary around what is already a complex task of empirical research”, and
follows Bulmer and Lequesne’s (2013, p. 18) advice that those employing the concept
of Europeanization should be clear about how they are using it.
Bo¨rzel (2005, p. 47) identifies three questions which the Europeanization literature
attempts to address:
(1) Where does the European Union affect the member states (dimensions of
domestic change)?
(2) How does the European Union affect the member states (mechanisms of
domestic change)?
(3) What is the effect of the European Union on the member states (outcome
of domestic change)?
To these, a fourth can be added:
(4) Why does the European Union affect the member states (the logic of
domestic change)?
The following overview of Europeanization is structured around these questions, with
specific reference to the local level and LGTN where relevant.
Dimensions of domestic change
In assessing where change takes place at the domestic level, scholars often employ
a three-fold heuristic categorization, where Europeanization affects the realms of
‘polity’, ‘policy’ and ‘politics’ (Bache & Jordan, 2006; Bo¨rzel, 2005; Bo¨rzel & Risse,
2003; Graziano & Vink, 2013; Ladrech, 2010). Subnational governments—and the
intergovernmental relations between national and local levels—broadly fall under the
polity dimension. Murphy (2007, p. 293) therefore argues that the wider domestic
response to Europe includes that made by subnational government16.
16 Indeed, a broad interpretation allows “all political actors and institutions within a member
state”—not just national governments—to be included within the scope of domestic politics
(Bulmer & Lequesne, 2013, p. 3).
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The presence of Europeanization processes at the local level is confirmed in a
number of comparative studies (for example Goldsmith & Klausen, 1997; Denters &
Rose, 2005a; John, 2001; Le Gale`s, 2002). As Le Gale`s (2002, p. 96) argues, “European
public policies, rules, procedures, conflict-solving mechanisms, debates, and norms are
now relevant to all cities within the EU”. Denters and Rose (2005b, p. 4) summarize
the impact of Europeanization on local government:
Local authorities may be directly affected by EU policies when these policies
imply rules and regulations that impact upon local government activities, or
when the EU provides local government with new sources of funding for local
programmes. But there are also a variety of indirect effects. The rise of the
EU has in many instances changed the balance of power between central and
sub-national governments. Partly stimulated by EU subsidies, moreover, many
local authorities have also broadened their horizons and become more active
in all sorts of international networks and partnerships.
The impact of the EU on the local level therefore creates a new context of constraints
and opportunities which local authorities adapt to:
Europeanization processes provide a new structure of opportunities for cities
and incentives to engage with other actors to promote their spatial or
sectoral interests through both vertical and horizontal networks. But they also
represent a new structure of constraints, of rules which limit their autonomy
and overlap with national or regional institutions. The EU therefore sets new
parameters within which urban governance modes may be organized and are
encouraged. (Le Gale`s, 2002, p. 96)
Participation in LGTN is therefore seen to constitute part of the adaptive response
to the EU undertaken by local authorities, and is regularly cited as an indicator for
the presence of local level Europeanization (Goldsmith, 2003; Heinelt & Niederhafner,
2008; John, 2000, 2001; Kern, 2010; Kern & Bulkeley, 2009; Le Gale`s, 2002; Payre,
2010; Van Bever et al., 2011a). Indeed, Kern and Bulkeley (2009, p. 328) argue that
participation in LGTN is an “emblematic” part of the Europeanization process.
Mechanisms of domestic change: directionality
Given Europeanization is focused on Europe’s impact at the national level—and
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below—it is an inherently top–down conceptualization of the relationship between the
EU and member states. European policies, processes and practices are seen to be
‘downloaded’ by member states. Indeed early adopters of the concept—the so-called
‘first generation’ of Europeanization studies—followed this reasoning (Bache & Jordan,
2006, p. 19; Graziano & Vink, 2013, p. 38); Ladrech’s (1994, p. 17) initial definition,
for example, is fundamentally top–down. However, seeing Europeanization as a strict
downward process is too simplistic (Bulmer & Lequesne, 2013, p. 20; Ladrech, 2010,
p. 22). As Ladrech (2010, p. 22) argues, “to view a ‘top–down’ approach in isolation
from domestic political dynamics is to miss the empirical reality”. According to Bo¨rzel
(2005, p. 62):
The relationship between the EU and its member states is not a one-way
street. Member states are not merely passive receivers of European demands for
domestic change. They may proactively shape European policies, institutions,
and processes to which they have to adapt later.
In this way member states ‘upload’ their preferences to the EU. This might be done,
for example, to reduce the eventual costs of ‘downloading’ EU policy (Bo¨rzel, 2002,
p. 196). Europeanization can therefore be viewed as a circular process, where member
states feed into the development of policies, practices and norms they will later be
expected to apply (Bulmer & Lequesne, 2013, p. 20); this is captured by Radaelli’s
(2003, p. 20) definition of Europeanization.
In addition to these vertical dynamics, scholars have also identified horizontal
Europeanization processes (Graziano & Vink, 2013, p. 47; Bulmer & Lequesne, 2013,
p. 20). As Graziano and Vink (2013, p. 47) argue:
Europeanization needs to be understood not only as ‘vertical’ processes
(bottom–up versus top–down) but also as a ‘horizontal’ process. Such
horizontal Europeanization results from the fact that, in an integrated
Europe, actors—civil servants, lobbyists, entrepreneurs etc.—increasingly have
cross-border contacts and exchange information and expertise. In such a
conception, Europeanization is not about a Brussels-induced ‘top–down’
domestic adaptation, but rather about change induced by policy learning and
diffusion.
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While the EU is not directly involved in the process of change, it nevertheless provides
a ‘reference point’ for actors to co-operate and share—or ‘crossload’—policies and
practices with each other (Bulmer & Lequesne, 2013, p. 20).
For Pflieger (2014, p. 332), studying the directionality of local level Europeanization
“allows us a wider view of relations between levels of government”. All three directional
dynamics—top–down, bottom–up and horizontal—have been observed at the local
level (Kern, 2010, 2014; Van Bever et al., 2011a). Top–down Europeanization is
often associated with the local level for several reasons. Firstly, like member states,
local authorities must comply with a range of EU legislation, regulatory instruments
and policies. Secondly, local government is responsible for much of the day-to-day
implementation of EU policy, over which they have little say. Thirdly, where local
authorities are able to make decisions of their own, they have to take account of EU
policy—in addition to national policy—to ensure compliance (Van Bever et al., 2011a,
pp. 16–17). Finally, when accessing EU funds, local authorities must abide by the
relevant eligibility rules and conditions set by the EU in order to benefit (Dąbrowski,
2013, p. 1366; Van Bever et al., 2011a, p. 18)17. Local authorities are therefore seen
as “passive policy-takers, rather than active policy-makers in the EU decision-making
process” (Van Bever et al., 2011a, p. 17). Europeanization here is ‘hierarchical’ (Kern,
2010). Pflieger (2014), however, suggests limits to download Europeanization, especially
when accessing EU funds, as the incentives for adaption offered by the EU are not
sufficient enough to trigger change.
This leads to a bottom–up view of local level Europeanization (de Rooij, 2002,
p. 449). Here the EU is seen as a new ‘opportunity structure’ for local government
(Keating, 1999). Through a myriad of individual representation offices in Brussels and
LGTN, local preferences are ‘uploaded’ during the EU policy process (Van Bever
et al., 2011a, pp. 18–20). As noted by Marshall (2006, p. 101), Europeanization
17 Regarding the allocation of EU funds national governments also retain a great deal of control
and the local level’s role is relatively weak (Bache, 1998; John, 2000, p. 886). This remains the
case with the latest programming period (see Huggins, 2014b).
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has taken place as local authorities “have used sub-national offices and thematic
networks to spread their preferences to the EU level”. This bottom–up view also
encompasses uploading best practice policy solutions to a corpus of European
policy knowledge—often through EU-funded projects—which might then be adopted
Europe-wide (Tadesco, 2010). The presence of both top–down and bottom–up dynamics
has led scholars to identify local level Europeanization as a two-way, cyclical process;
local authorities are simultaneously policy takers and policy makers (Schultze, 2003).
Kern (2010) refers to this as “co-operative Europeanization”18.
Kern (2010), Kern and Bulkeley (2009) and Van Bever et al. (2011a) emphasize the
horizontal dimension to local level Europeanization, particularly where local authorities
co-operate with each other across national borders, for example through cross-border
co-operation and LGTN. As explained by Kern and Bulkeley (2009, p. 312), local
authorities “are becoming more Europeanized because they co-operate transnationally,
exchange experience and jointly develop innovative solutions for problems with which
they are similarly confronted”. Policy learning and transfer between local authorities
is a feature of this process (Kern, 2010, 2014).
The boundaries between these vertical and horizontal mechanisms can be blurred
(Van Bever et al., 2011a, pp. 27–28). As will be shown in Chapter 5, this is the case
with LGTN, which features all three dynamics. LGTN is inherently horizontal as
actors interact with each other directly across national borders, rather than through
the EU. LGTN also performs the function of ‘uploading’ policy preferences to the EU.
‘Downloading’ can also be observed; networking and the role of networks in European
governance is actively encouraged by the EU (see European Commission, 2001), and
in the case of accessing EU funds, their membership and organization reflects EU
requirements19.
18 Referred to as “vertical governance” by Kern (2014).
19 The functions of LGTN, the benefits local authorities seek to gain from it and the implications
for the directionality of Europeanization are discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
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Mechanisms of domestic change: the ‘goodness of fit’ and mediating factors
In exploring the process of Europeanization, Risse et al. (2001) advance a ‘three-step’
model (Figure 2.1) which leads to domestic change (see also Caporaso, 2007). The
first step refers to the process of European integration20 itself, which creates a
number of pressures member states are expected to adapt to (Caporaso, 2007, p. 28).
These pressures include implementing and complying with EU legislation, adhering to
European Court of Justice decisions and operating in accordance with European norms
and practices (Risse et al., 2001, p. 6).
European
integration
Goodness
of fit
Mediating
factors
Domestic
change
Figure 2.1: Three-step model of Europeanization (adapted from Caporaso, 2007, p. 28)
The second step refers to the so-called ‘goodness of fit’ between the pressures created
by integration and existing domestic structures. The degree of fit—or misfit—between
the two determines the level of pressure domestic institutions face to adapt. As Risse
et al. (2001, p. 7) argue:
The degree of adaptational pressure generated by Europeanization depends on
the ‘fit’ or ‘misfit’ between European institutions and the domestic structures.
The lower the compatibility (fit) between European institutions, on the one
hand, and national institutions, on the other, the higher the adaptational
pressures.
Two types of ‘misfit’ are identified in the literature: policy and institutional (Bo¨rzel,
2005; Bo¨rzel & Risse, 2003). Policy misfit is where European policies and regulations
challenge those present at the domestic level, effectively creating “compliance
problems” (Bo¨rzel, 2005, p. 50; Bo¨rzel & Risse, 2003, p. 61). Institutional misfit can also
emerge, “challenging domestic rules and procedures and the collective understandings
20 In the first iteration of the three step model by Risse et al. (2001), the term ‘Europeanization’
is used as a synonym for European integration. Radaelli (2000, 2003) argues this is misleading.
European integration refers to the process of supranational political and policy development,
while Europeanization refers to the consequences of this process (Bulmer & Lequesne, 2013,
p. 18).
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attached to them” (Bo¨rzel, 2005, p. 50; Bo¨rzel & Risse, 2003, p. 62). The ‘goodness of
fit’ concept suggests adaptational pressures felt at the domestic level will vary, “since
political, economic, legal, and societal institutions differ among member states, the
degree of adaptational pressures varies as well” (Risse et al., 2001, p. 7).
To suggest there is a causal link between the adaptational pressures generated
through the goodness of fit and the actual adaption undertaken at the domestic level
is too simplistic, however (Risse et al., 2001, pp. 8–9). Indeed, as Ladrech (2010, p. 33)
argues “there is no automatic response to such pressures”. Bo¨rzel and Risse (2003,
p. 63) clarify this, noting that the presence of ‘misfit’:
is only the necessary condition for domestic change. Whether misfits produce
a substantial effect at the domestic level depends on the presence of various
factors facilitating adaptation and serving as catalysts for domestic change.
This is addressed by Risse et al.’s (2001) third step in their model: the presence
of ‘mediating factors’ at the domestic level. Risse et al. (2001, pp. 9–12) identify
five mediating factors which can be divided into structure and agency: multiple
veto points, mediating formal institutions and political and organizational culture
(structural factors), and the differential empowerment of actors and learning (agency
factors). Risse et al. (2001, p. 9) argue that “the presence or absence of mediating
factors is crucial for the degree to which domestic change adjusting to Europeanization
should be expected”. Differences in mediating factors will therefore lead to variation
in Europeanization’s impact.
Research applying Risse et al.’s (2001) three-step model to the local level is scarce.
Nevertheless, the presence domestic level mediating factors is recognized. Kettunen
and Kungla (2005) study Estonia and Finland’s adaptation to EU regional policy,
particularly with the development of a regional tier of administration. Europeanization
is seen to have a limited impact in both cases despite the presence of misfit between
existing regional institutions and the EU’s policy requirements. In Estonia regional
policy remains administered by the central government (Kettunen & Kungla, 2005,
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p. 367). While in Finland regional councils have been established, their creation is better
explained by domestic political factors, rather than EU pressure (Kettunen & Kungla,
2005, p. 373). This leads to the conclusion that “European influences are mediated
by the domestic context and cause different outcomes across countries” (Kettunen
& Kungla, 2005, p. 375). In this case the relevant mediating factors are an existing
regional policy legacy, the number of veto points and interest constellation (Kettunen
& Kungla, 2005, p. 373).
De Rooij (2002, p. 449) also points to the impact of domestic factors—such as
local authorities’ constitutional position and competences—which filter the effects
of Europeanization. However, the impact of these factors is not felt equally by all
local authorities within the same country. This means mediating factors present at
the local level—“for example, money, personnel, location or access to politicians or
officials”—also need consideration (de Rooij, 2002, p. 449). In an analysis of how
actively Dutch local authorities engaged with EU opportunities, de Rooij (2002,
pp. 462–463) found the size of municipalities to be a significant factor, as those which
were larger had greater financial, staff and informational resources to mobilize. In
relation to LGTN, literature has identified a range of factors affecting engagement,
albeit primarily located at the national and network levels (for example Betsill &
Bulkeley, 2004; Bouteligier, 2013; Happaerts, van der Brande, & Bruyninckx, 2010;
Karvounis, 2011; Payre, 2010; van der Heiden, 2010). Baldersheim, Bucek, and
Swianiewicz (2002, p. 128) in particular identify the role of local level “facilitating
factors”, which act as intervening variables affecting the engagement of local authorities
in transnational networks for policy learning21.
Outcome of domestic change: extent and differentiation
Bo¨rzel and Risse (2003, pp. 69–70) make a distinction between three different degrees
of change: absorption, accommodation and transformation. ‘Absorption’ refers to a
21 These factors are reviewed in more detail in Section 6.2.
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low degree of change where European policies and ideas are incorporated into domestic
structures and policies, but without the need for substantial change. ‘Accommodation’
refers to a modest degree of change; while member states adapt to Europe, core features
and the understandings attached to them remain unchanged. ‘Transformation’ covers
instances marked by a high degree of change. Here member states replace their domestic
policies and structures with substantially different ones, also leading to a fundamental
change in core features and the understandings attached to them (Bo¨rzel & Risse, 2003,
pp. 69–70). Bo¨rzel (2005, pp. 58–59) adds two categories to this. In the case of ‘inertia’
no change takes place, usually because member states resist adaptational pressures. In
the case of ‘retrenchment’, change takes place but does not conform to the pressures
emanating from Europe; change is ‘negative’ (Bo¨rzel, 2005, p. 58).
While Europeanization implies member states adapt to and—in a top–down
conceptualization—download European policies, processes and practices, it does not
imply convergence; indeed variation is expected (Bo¨rzel, 2005; Ladrech, 2010; Radaelli,
2003; Risse et al., 2001). This is explained by Risse et al.’s (2001) model outlined above.
The varied ‘goodness of fit’ across member states and differing mediating factors at the
national level means member states respond to Europeanization pressures in different
ways and to different extents. The result is that Europeanization has a differential
impact. As Risse et al. (2001, p. 18) argue: “Full convergence is unlikely . . . This
does not imply that Europeanization has no structural effects. Far from it. It just
simply implies differentiated responses”. This variation was recognized early on in
Europeanization research. Indeed, Ladrech’s (1994, p. 71) analysis highlighted the
need to account for “the distinct nature of the pre-existing national framework which
mediates this process of adjustment”.
Early research on local level Europeanization was primarily concerned with
the extent to which local government had been affected by Europe and become
‘Europeanized’ (Goldsmith, 1993; Goldsmith & Klausen, 1997; John, 2000, 2001). Like
Bo¨rzel (2005), John (2001, pp. 72–73) identified different degrees of Europeanization,
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conceptualized as a ‘ladder’. As local authorities climb, they become more
Europeanized. John’s (2001, p. 72) ladder is made up of nine steps:
A) Responding to EU directives and regulations.
B) Managing European information.
C) Communicating to the private sector and the public.
D) Maximizing EU grants.
E) Facilitating economic regeneration (through D).
F) Linking with other local organizations participating in the EU.
G) Participating in EU international networks and co-operating in joint
projects.
H) Advising the EU on implementation issues.
I) Making the council’s policies more ‘European’.
Steps A to C represent largely compulsory activities and so reflect “minimal”
Europeanization. Steps A to E represent a “financially orientated” form or
Europeanization. The next stage, “networking”, is achieved through steps A to G.
Councils are considered “fully Europeanized” when they adopt steps A to I (John, 2001,
p. 72). Klausen and Goldsmith (1997, pp. 239–242) advance a similar classification,
where local government’s relationship with Europe is either ‘counteractive’, ‘passive’,
‘reactive’ or ‘proactive’.
The results from local level analyses are consistent with the message of
differentiation found in broader Europeanization research (for example de Rooij, 2002;
Goldsmith & Klausen, 1997; Hamedinger & Wolffhardt, 2010; John, 2001; Le Gale`s,
2002). John (2001, p. 79) observes that “local and regional authorities vary in the
way they respond to the EU”. This is also acknowledged by Le Gale`s (2002, p. 98),
who notes that “not all local authorities in Europe have fallen into line overnight with
injunctions from Brussels to follow the norms, policies, and modes of organization that
Brussels wants”. The result is that:
there is no such thing as a Europe of regions or cities in the making; instead we
have a ‘variable geometry’ Europe within which cities and regions sometimes
becomes [sic] actors or systems of action. (Le Gale`s, 2002, p. 110)
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The differentiation of local level Europeanization occurs within, as well as across,
member states. Klausen and Goldsmith (1997, p. 242) observe that “all the EU member
countries have their proactive and counteractive municipalities, as well as their reactive
and passive ones”. In an analysis of French local government Balme and Le Gale`s (1997)
point to the presence of ‘bright stars’ of Europeanization, as well as ‘black holes’. As
discussed above, scholars highlight a number of mediating factors—at national and
local levels—which account for these differences. This is recognized by Le Gale`s (2002,
p. 98), who argues “Europeanization processes affect individuals, organizations, and
institutions within cities, which may adapt, resist, or change”.
This picture of varied engagement extends to participation in LGTN. While Ward
and Williams (1997, p. 456) note that all EU member states have ‘networkers’ they
also identify wide variation in the extent of participation; not every local authority
takes part. Even where local government is engaged, it is possible to make a distinction
between ‘active’ and ‘passive’ actors involved in LGTN (Kern & Bulkeley, 2009, p. 315).
The logic of domestic change
In addressing the question of why member states adapt to Europe, scholars draw on
new institutionalism. Bo¨rzel and Risse (2003) adapt March and Olsen’s (1998) work,
advancing a model where Europeanization either follows the logic of rational choice
institutionalism or sociological institutionalism (see also Bo¨rzel, 2005). Under rational
Europeanization actors follow the ‘logic of consequentialism’. They are goal-oriented,
seeking to improve their position. Europeanization is thus a reaction to potential
opportunities or constraints, and engagement in it is the result of a cost–benefit
analysis, where the cost of becoming Europeanized is more than outweighed by
the benefits it brings. Such benefits might include additional resources, competitive
advantage or reducing the costs associated with Europeanization itself (Bo¨rzel & Risse,
2003, pp. 63–65; Hamedinger & Wolffhardt, 2010, pp. 15–16). The fact actors seek to
pursue their own interests does not preclude them working together, since there is an
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observed resource dependence between them. As Bo¨rzel (2005, p. 52) argues:
As any individual or corporate actor is dependent on others to achieve his or her
goals, actors have to exchange their resources to produce desired outcomes. The
resource exchange is based on the mutual assessment of resources, strategies,
and interests. Actors will engage in strategic interaction using their resources to
maximize influence over outcomes, while trying to become as little dependent
as possible on the others with whom they interact.
Under sociological Europeanization, actors follow the ‘logic of appropriateness’.
Their behaviour is determined by EU rules, norms and preferences which become
internalized through learning and socialization processes (Bo¨rzel & Risse, 2003,
pp. 65–67; Hamedinger & Wolffhardt, 2010, p. 16). As Bo¨rzel (2005, p. 54) argues,
“rather than maximizing their subjective desires, actors seek to ‘do the right thing’
(that is, to fulfil social expectations in a given situation)”.
The potential utility of applying this rational–sociological model to local level
Europeanization has been recognized (Hamedinger & Wolffhardt, 2010). While
not explicitly applying this rationalist–sociological framework, existing research has
touched on some of its themes. Indeed, some scholars view local level Europeanization
as a process of change marked by the learning EU rules and norms, fitting with the
sociological explanation. The final step on John’s ladder (discussed above), for example,
sees Europeanization as:
a more fundamental transformation that goes beyond short-term instrumental
behaviour, whereby local policy-making becomes an aspect of the EU,
and European ideas and practices become transferred to the core of local
decision-making. (John, 2000, p. 882)
This is echoed by Marshall (2005, pp. 676–677) who observes that participation in EU
structural funds has meant English local authorities have “adjusted to European norms
of direct lobbying, partnership working and long-term strategic programming”; as a
result localities are “revisioning” themselves in European terms. Literature focusing
more specifically on LGTN similarly sheds some light on the rational–sociological
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question. Betsill and Bulkeley’s (2004, p. 471) analysis of the Cities for Climate
Protection (CCP) network suggests a more rationalist orientation, concluding that
“local governments most effectively engage[d] with the network are mobilized more
by the financial and political resources it offers”. Likewise Pflieger’s (2014) study of
French cities showed participation in the EU’s City-Vitality-Sustainability (CIVITAS)
programme was a means to achieve pre-existing strategic goals and promote the cities
involved. Van der Heiden (2010, pp. 142–143) similarly finds that cities are rationally
driven and aim to secure competitive advantage vis-a`-vis others22.
Dąbrowski (2012, p. 742) cautions that rational choice and sociological logics of
Europeanization represent “ideal type models”. His own research (Dąbrowski, 2012,
2013) into the impact of EU cohesion policy on local government in Poland shows
that both can occur simultaneously. For example, following a rationalist logic local
authorities may choose to undergo Europeanization processes to access benefits. In this
way applying EU rules and practices surrounding funds was seen as “a necessary evil”
in order to qualify (Dąbrowski, 2012, p. 739). Yet as local actors remained engaged in
EU policy, some of these rules and other EU norms became internalized. In other words
while a local authority may become Europeanized for rationalist reasons, sociological
Europeanization can still take place (Dąbrowski, 2013, p. 1370). Bache (2008, p. 158)
supports this arguing “the process of learning is initially strategic and only becomes
deeper over time”.
However, while recognizing it takes place, both Dąbrowski (2012, 2013) and
Marshall (2005) suggest limits to sociological Europeanization. Marshall’s (2005,
pp. 681–682) findings shows that European norms do not extend beyond councils’
European activities. Dąbrowski (2013, p. 1370) notes that internalization of norms
only took place where there was a good ‘fit’ between those norms and existing local
interests, meaning their impact was limited. This research aside, empirical analysis
22 Although for this reason van der Heiden (2010, p. 134) concludes “interurban networking is most
likely to occur in policy areas on which the competitiveness of the involved city regions is less
directly affected”.
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into the rationalist and/or sociological logic driving Europeanization at the local
level—and especially Europeanization through LGTN—remains limited.
Europeanization or globalization?
Scholars of Europeanization caution the need to distinguish between the EU and
other possible explanations—such as globalization—as the ‘motor’ for domestic change
(Bulmer & Lequesne, 2013, pp. 19–20; Ladrech, 2010, p. 40; Vink & Graziano,
2007, p. 16). This equally applies when researching local level Europeanization, as
local authorities not only face adaptational pressures from the EU, but also from
globalization (Goldsmith, 1993; John, 2001; Le Gale`s, 2002; van der Heiden, 2010)
and broader trends in the restructuring and regionalization of territory (for example
Keating, 2013). To this end a number of scholars have examined participation in
LGTN as a response to the processes of globalization and the rescaling of the state,
rather than Europeanization (for example Bouteligier, 2013; Bulkeley, 2005; Heeg
et al., 2003; Leitner, 2004; Leitner et al., 2002; Leitner & Sheppard, 2002; Payre,
2010; van der Heiden, 2010)23. Furthermore, literature on ‘paradiplomacy’—rooted in
the international relations discipline—points to cases of international engagement by
subnational governments outside of the EU, for example in Canada or the United States
(for example Casson & Dardanelli, 2012; Duchacek, 1984; Lecours, 2002; Mingus, 2006).
Nevertheless, van der Heiden’s (2010) comparative study—which adopts a globalization
perspective—finds LGTN is more intense among local authorities within the EU. Here
Europeanization pressures can be seen to reinforce those created by globalization. As
Bo¨rzel (2005, p. 62) argues, “Europe is not always the driving force but complements
and enhances trends that were already affecting the member states”.
23 These studies tend to have an exclusive focus on LGTN undertaken by cities, as urban areas are
perceived to be ‘nodal points’ of globalization (Bouteligier, 2013, p. 16; Heeg et al., 2003, p. 141;
van der Heiden, 2010, p. 10).
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2.1.3 Linking MLG and Europeanization
Despite being developed in relative isolation from each other, the concepts of MLG
and Europeanization are connected (Bache, 2008; Benz & Fu¨rst, 2002; Karvounis,
2011; Kern, 2010; Kern & Bulkeley, 2009). It is argued here that both concepts need
to be employed in order to provide a complete analysis of LGTN. Indeed, while neither
constitutes a true ‘theory’ of integration (Bulmer & Lequesne, 2013, p. 19; Jordan, 2001,
p. 201), taken together they provide a useful analytical framework to assess LGTN as
a feature of contemporary governance, both at the local and EU levels.
Section 2.1.1 noted one of the criticisms levied against MLG is that it describes
the EU as a multi-level system, but does not explain how this came to be (Jordan,
2001, p. 201). Indeed, while MLG draws attention to the presence of LGTN and
its role in wider EU governance, it does not account for how or why LGTN has
developed. Applying a Europeanization framework addresses this weakness. As Kern
and Bulkeley (2009, p. 312) argue “the debate on Europeanization . . . complements the
analysis of the European multi-level system by providing a sense of the means by which
multi-level governance is accomplished”. Put simply, Europeanization is the process,
while MLG is the end result. By adopting a Europeanization framework the presence
of LGTN—itself a feature of MLG in the EU—is accounted for by characterizing
it as a local authority response to the reality of European integration. Like MLG,
Europeanization is not a theory of integration (Bulmer & Lequesne, 2013, p. 19).
However, as outlined in Section 2.1.2, adopting the approach as an analytical tool
further deepens the assessment of LGTN by exploring aspects of its directionality, the
extent and expected differentiation of engagement and—through the application of new
institutionalism—the underlying logic driving participation.
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2.2 Empirical background
Having explored the conceptual traditions underpinning this thesis, this chapter now
reviews the empirical background to LGTN. This section begins by outlining local
government’s relationship with the EU (Section 2.2.1), before briefly surveying the
emergence of LGTN itself (Section 2.2.2).
2.2.1 Local government’s relationship with the EU
As noted in the previous chapter, local government plays an important role in wider EU
governance which is often overlooked. The purpose of this section is to briefly explore
this relationship in order to contextualize LGTN. Hooghe (1995) points to a number
of channels at the national and European levels—or intra- and extra-state routes
(Happaerts, 2008)—where subnational government participation at the European level
is formally and informally institutionalized (see also Hooghe & Marks, 1996; Hooghe &
Marks, 2001a, pp. 81–92). For Keating (1999) these channels represent an ‘opportunity
structure’ for local authorities, enabling them to engage at the European level.
At the national level, channels to Europe include the need for subnational
government to approve EU treaty amendments, having regional observers attached
to member state permanent representations, participation in Council working groups,
participation in Commission working groups, and European Parliamentary electoral
districts representing subnational entities (Hooghe, 1995, p. 183). However, these
opportunities are not shared uniformly across the whole EU; they tend to favour
federal countries—such as Belgium and Germany—where subnational entities have
constitutional safeguards to ensure their interests are adequately represented.
Channels also exist at the European level. For many, the Maastricht Treaty
represented a new opportunity for local authorities to engage at the European level
(Benington, 1994; Bogdanor, 1992), with Keating (1999, p. 7) commenting that this
was the “high-water mark” for subnational engagement with the EU. Indeed, writing
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at the time, Bogdanor (1992, p. 9) concluded that Maastricht “confirms that the
European Community is in the process of creating a new relationship with sub-national
government”. As part of this relationship, Maastricht introduced the principle of
subsidiarity (Payre, 2010, p. 267), the principle that decisions should be taken at the
closest possible level to the citizen. In practice, however, the subsidiarity principle was
not targeted at local authorities, but rather to reassure national governments that the
EU would not encroach upon member state competences (Bogdanor, 1992, pp. 6–7).
Nevertheless, Maastricht included a number of provisions aimed at strengthening
subnational involvement.
One such provision was introduced in Article 146. This gave member states the
option to send regional representatives to Council meetings instead of national ministers
(Hooghe, 1995, p. 180). So far, however, this has only seen limited use and the
option has only been exercised by the federal states of Austria, Belgium and Germany
(Keating, 1999, p. 7; Keating & Hooghe, 2006, p. 243). Furthermore there are restraints
placed on regional representatives in Council meetings; they can only participate where
constitutional competencies permit them to do so, and they are there only to represent
the member state as a whole, not their individual region (Bauer & Bo¨rzel, 2010,
p. 257; Hooghe, 1995, p. 180; Keating, 1999, p. 7; Keating & Hooghe, 2006, p. 243).
Nevertheless, for Keating (1999, p. 7) this represents “an important breach in the
principle that only national governments are represented in Europe”.
The Maastricht Treaty also established the Committee of the Regions (CoR),
creating a body which formalized subnational interests into the EU’s institutional
architecture (see Loughlin, 1996; Warleigh, 1997). Again, however, there remain limits
to this innovation. Firstly membership to the CoR is determined by member state
governments, not subnational authorities themselves. Secondly, membership of the CoR
is fragmented and divided between those representing ‘regional’ and ‘local’ interests.
Finally, the CoR is only an advisory body and has no powers to block or amend EU
legislation (Benington, 1994, p. 27; Hooghe, 1995, pp. 180–182; Keating & Hooghe,
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2006, pp. 246–247). As a result of these weaknesses the CoR is often regarded as
having failed to live up to expectations. As Bauer and Bo¨rzel (2010, p. 257) argue:
the CoR has disappointed any hopes that it might become a third chamber in
the EU representing subnational territorial interests. As a consultative body, it
lacks real political authority. Moreover, its membership is too diverse to allow
for the formulation of common positions.
Nevertheless, the CoR has led to a shift in how local authorities have engaged at the
European level. As argued by Benington (1994, p. 27), the CoR’s real achievement:
lies perhaps less in the Committee’s formal status and role, than in the fact
that it brings together 189 elected councillors for the regions and localities of
all the member states, and puts them into a direct dialogical relationship with
the European policy process and policy community.
In other words the CoR has exposed local government to the European arena and
EU governance by recognizing local interests in the EU’s institutional architecture
(Bogdanor, 1992, p. 8)24.
The EU’s regional policy, and in particular structural funds, represented another
channel for local government to engage with the EU (Bache, 1998; Bauer & Bo¨rzel,
2010; Hooghe, 1995)25. The structural funds have been part of EU regional policy since
the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) was created in 1975, although
there was no initial role of subnational government save for implementation (Bache,
1998, p. 47)26. This limited role for subnational government continued through the
1980s (Bache, 1998). However, this changed with the 1988 reform. This saw the budget
for structural funds allocation increase from 4.8 per cent in 1975 to 25 per cent of
the EU’s budget by 1993 (Bache, 1998, p. 70). More significantly, the Commission
further emphasized the need to apply the ‘partnership principle’. In other words the
24 For a recent analysis of the CoR’s impact and influence in the EU policy process see Ho¨nnige
and Panke (2013).
25 As will be shown in Section 2.2.2, EU regional policy and the structural funds have also led to
the development of a number of transnational links between local authorities.
26 See Bache (1998) and Bachtler, Mendez, and Wishlade (2013) for backgrounds to the creation of
EU regional policy and its early operation.
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EU, national government and subnational authorities were required to work together in
the design and implementation of regional policy programmes (Bache, 1998, pp. 74–75;
Payre, 2010, p. 267). Bache (1998, p. 70) noted that “partnerships would be established
to oversee the administration of the funds and would require the formal involvement
of subnational authorities for the first time”.
Despite the significant development of the partnership principle, there remained
limits. The involvement of national governments meant that how regional policy
operated was not uniform across the whole EU; national governments tended to
dominate in states with a traditionally weak subnational level (Hooghe, 1995, p. 182;
Hooghe, 1996a; Keating & Hooghe, 2006, p. 250). Indeed analyses by Bache (1999)
and Bachtler et al. (2013) have argued that national governments remain the primary
actors in EU regional policy. This was the case in England with the Audit Commission
(1991, pp. 14–15) observing that the partnership principle:
was heralded . . . as local authorities’ entree to greater influence over the
content of EC regional policy. But, from the local authority’s point of view,
what it has meant in practice is that central government retains the right
of submission, and so can still effectively veto/amend the content of any
Operational Programme.
Furthermore, Keating and Hooghe (2006, p. 250) witnessed a re-centralization of
regional policy since the 1988 reforms, particularly in England and France, where the
role of local actors has become further diminished.
Overall local government’s relationship with the EU through these ‘formal’
channels—both national and European—is uneven, despite the fact that in principle
the opportunities are the same for local authorities across the EU. In reality they tend
to favour subnational authorities in federal countries such as Belgium or Germany
(Hooghe, 1995, p. 184). To address this, local authorities have sought access to Europe
through ‘informal’ channels. Indeed the creation of official institutionalized routes to
the European arena—such as the CoR—if anything seems to have acted as a catalyst
for a number of informal routes being used by local government (Blatter et al., 2008,
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p. 466). These informal channels to Europe seem to address the inequality found in the
formal channels; while there is still differentiation, the inequalities are not as large as
those found with the formal channels (Hooghe, 1995, p. 185).
One informal approach is the use of subnational Brussels offices (Audit Commission,
1991; Bogdanor, 1992; Donas & Beyers, 2013; Hooghe, 1995; John, 1994b, 1994a; Marks,
Haesly, & Mbaye, 2002; Moore, 2007; Rowe, 2011; Tatham, 2008, 2010; Tatham &
Thau, 2014). The number of these offices has grown steadily since the mid-1980s (see
Table 2.1), and by the early 1990s had become “the latest thing in Euro-chic” for
local authorities (Audit Commission, 1991, p. 35). Recent estimates place the current
number of Brussels offices representing local authorities at well over 200 (Huysseune
& Jans, 2008, p. 1; Jans & Stouhuysen, 2007, p. 209; Tatham, 2010, p. 81; Tatham
& Thau, 2014, p. 257)27, and the number of staff employed by these offices is claimed
to outnumber those in national permanent representations (Tatham & Thau, 2014,
p. 258).
Year Approx. no. of offices Source
1985 2 Hooghe (1995)
1988 15 Hooghe (1995)
1993 54 Hooghe (1995)
1995 60 to 70 Ercole, Walters, and Goldsmith (1997); Hooghe (1995)
1996 115 Keating (1999)
2000 167 John (2001)
2003 200 Schultze (2003)
2007 250 to 280 Jans and Stouhuysen (2007); Moore (2008)
2008 226 Huysseune and Jans (2008)
2010 217 Tatham (2010)
2013 297 Donas and Beyers (2013)
Table 2.1: Number of Brussels offices identified in the literature
27 These estimates vary over time and depend on how a single office is measured, for example if they
are recognized by the Brussels–Europe Liaison Office. This makes estimating the exact number
of actors or subnational offices present in Brussels difficult to assess (Tatham, 2010, p. 81).
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Hooghe (1995, p. 186) summarizes the role of these offices as follows:
They provide the Commission and Parliament with regional viewpoints on
issues that concern them; they survey the European scene for upcoming
issues and bring them to the attention of policy-makers in their home
governments; they participate in networks with other regional offices or with
other organisations; they provide a rudimentary welcome service to private
sector actors from their region; and they lobby for a greater voice in EU
decision-making.
Brussels offices thus perform a “two-way function” (Bogdanor, 1992, p. 16). Whereas
bodies such as the CoR or transnational networks—discussed below—attempt to
advance a representative voice on behalf of European local government as a whole,
Brussels offices allow local authorities to pursue their own individual interests (Hooghe,
1995, p. 187).
2.2.2 The emergence of LGTN
Another informal channel to Europe is LGTN. While it is generally accepted that
this activity began to proliferate from the 1980s and through the 1990s (Benington,
1994, p. 31; Bulkeley et al., 2003, p. 236; Happaerts, 2008, p. 4; Karvounis, 2011,
p. 217; Payre, 2010, p. 270; Phelps et al., 2002, p. 212), there is evidence to suggest it
was well established before this. Local authorities have long developed town twinning
links with European counterparts, although such initiatives have been confined to
largely ceremonial and cultural spheres (Benington, 1994, p. 28). However, more
substantive co-operation before the 1980s has been identified. Koch (1974), for example,
identifies LGTN undertaken by the Alsace regional government since the 1960s. Indeed
cross-border co-operation has been a feature of the wider Upper Rhine Valley area since
the 1960s (Beck, 2008, p. 39), while Anderson (2010) and Baycan-Levent, Kundak,
and Gu¨lu¨mser (2008, p. 85) identify cases of co-operation dating well before this.
Payre (2010, pp. 269–270) draws attention to networking between municipalities as
far back as the late 1800s. Nevertheless, “the institutionalization of the EU . . .
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provided a new impetus and focus for trans-national networks of local and regional
authorities” (Le Gale`s, 2002, p. 106). It is in this context of European integration
where contemporary LGTN has proliferated.
Much of the existing literature is primarily concerned with LGTN that is
fundamentally cross-border in nature (Church & Reid, 1995, 1996, 1999; Duchacek,
1984; Lange, 2012; Perkmann, 1999, 2003, 2007). This consists of “the various formal
institutions or compacts and informal networks, which have brought contiguous
subnational authorities into binational or trinational cooperation associations along
and across national borders” (Duchacek, 1984, p. 9). Such cross-border links have long
been encouraged by the Council of Europe (CoE) (Murphy, 1993, p. 111; Sodupe,
1999, p. 63) which has adopted a number of conventions and protocols on cross-border
co-operation (for example CoE, 1980, 1995, 1998). Examples of the cross-border links
identified in the literature include the Working Communities in the Alps28 and the
Working Community of the Pyrenees (Sodupe, 1999, p. 64). From the 1990s, however,
there was a recognition that these cross-border networks were being supplemented
by those that were ‘inter-regional’. In other words “the existence of a border was
no longer relevant”; rather it was shared—often thematic—interests that mattered
(Sodupe, 1999, p. 64).
Several scholars identify a number of such multilateral networks (see Appendix A)29.
As shown in Appendix A, there are an array of networks which span several policy areas.
Some of these networks have broad appeal and can be classified as general or multi
purpose. Networks such as the AER, for example, seek to represent a broad ‘regional’
interest at the European level (Hooghe, 1995, p. 187; Sodupe, 1999, p. 62). However,
thematically focused or geographically limited networks, whose membership is much
more exclusive and usually based on functional characteristics, also exist (Hooghe,
28 There are, in fact, three such working communities, covering the central, eastern and western
Alps (Sodupe, 1999, p. 64).
29 As will be discussed in Section 4.1, LGTN can be categorized into cases of bilateral networking,
multilateral networking and transnational projects.
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1995, p. 187). For example Bouteligier (2013), Ward and Williams (1997) and Kern
and Bulkeley (2009) identify a number of networks operating in climate change and
environmental policy, while Happaerts (2008) identifies several working in sustainable
development policy. Other networks focus on transport policy (Pflieger, 2014), urban
policy (Griffiths, 1995; Sampaio, 1994) and engage in locational politics (Payre, 2010;
van der Heiden, 2010).
Some trends are evident in the literature, such as how engagement in such
multilateral networks has evolved over time. One aspect of this evolution is that
LGTN has become more formalized and now plays a significant part in EU politics.
For example, Payre (2010, p. 263) notes that the Eurocities network has evolved:
from a relatively informal group of ‘second cities’ to an urban interest group
with a presence and voice in Brussels. The network itself has thus been
institutionalized and acquired a central infrastructure.
Another observed trend is a more defined focus on thematic policy areas. Early
networks, such as the AER, had a broad regional agenda, covering several policy areas
simultaneously. Recently however, networks have become more specialized, focusing
on specific policy areas (Ward & Williams, 1997). For example, Happaerts et al.
(2011, p. 329) note how transnational networks focusing on sustainable development
have only recently emerged. However, the broader focused networks have adapted to
this environment, by incorporating sectoral policy areas into their work. An increase
in thematic networks can also be explained by so-called “network-breeding”, where
transnational networks create or sponsor smaller ones to deal with niche policy issues
(Ward & Williams, 1997, p. 462).
Drawing on the structural fund budget, the EU set up a number of ‘community
initiatives’30 in 1988 to facilitate co-operation between local and regional actors through
30 When established, the community initiatives represented 15 per cent of the EU’s ERDF
resources. Unlike the other 85 per cent—which member states retained effective control over—the
Commission was given discretion over the priorities for and allocation of this section of the
structural funds (Bachtler et al., 2013, p. 48).
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part funding joint projects (Hooghe, 1995, pp. 188–189; Rees, 1997; Sodupe, 1999).
The largest of these programmes—Interreg—is said to have played a pivotal role in
developing a number of transnational links through the projects it funded (Church,
2007). Other programmes also existed, such as URBAN which targeted and promoted
co-operation among cities and urban areas (Payre, 2010, p. 268). Indeed, as noted by
Sodupe (1999, p. 67) community initiatives—such as Interreg—have enabled firstly
cross-border co-operation to take place, followed later on by broader LGTN. While
Interreg was initially only targeted at cross-border co-operation, the Commission
launched the ‘C’ strand of the programme in 1996. This facilitated much broader
transnational co-operation, as a shared border was no longer a requirement for project
partnerships (Sodupe, 1999, pp. 72–73). A number of other schemes based on specific
policy sectors were also established, such as RENAVAL for ship building or LEADER
for rural areas (Benington & Harvey, 1999; Hooghe, 1995, p. 188; Le Gale`s, 2002,
p. 107). However, while supporting co-operation, such programmes were initially very
restrictive and only a small minority of local authorities were eligible to participate
(Audit Commission, 1991, pp. 13–14).
While the community initiatives brought together local authorities through
time-limited co-operation projects, the Regions and Cities in Europe (RECITE)
programme funded more permanent networks aimed at sharing expertise between local
areas facing economic restructuring (Hooghe, 1995, p. 189; Payre, 2010, p. 267; Phelps
et al., 2002, p. 212). Examples included MILAN, focused on the motor industry,
EUROCERAM, for the ceramics industry, and DEMILITARIZED for the defence
industry (Phelps et al., 2002, p. 212).
Due to the EU’s role in facilitating many of these links through regional policy
instruments, Hooghe (1995, p. 188) notes that “for most networks, it is often difficult
to determine whether the initiative came from the Commission or from subnational
entrepreneurs”. Likewise van der Heiden (2010, p. 176) argues “the distinction between
bottom–up and top–down networks is increasingly blurred”. Nevertheless, van der
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Heiden (2010, p. 176) argues the fact many networks receive or are targeted towards
obtaining EU funds means “hardly any interurban networks can be labelled as totally
bottom–up, almost all of them have some connections to the EU”. Pflieger’s (2014)
study of the CIVITAS network comes to a different conclusion; despite being set up
and funded by the Commission, the network’s activities, agenda and policy positions
remain driven by the local authorities participating. While in some cases EU support
has been gained, LGTN often pre-dates this. Phelps et al.’s (2002, p. 215) study of the
Edge Cities network, for example, showed how it was in operation three years before
receiving EU support, and when such support was obtained this was only initially
guaranteed for a three year period. This leads Phelps et al. (2002, p. 218) to conclude:
the story of the formation of the edge cities network appears, as in other
examples of EU funded networking, to confirm a level of commitment to
networking even in the absence of such funding.
Overall, Sodupe (1999, p. 78) concludes that EU funding “does not make an altogether
significant contribution to the development of inter-regional co-operation”.
While this leads to the characterization of LGTN as a bottom–up endeavour driven
by local authorities (Bulkeley et al., 2003, p. 237; Payre, 2010, p. 263), its importance
and usefulness to the EU—and in particular the Commission31—should be recognized.
LGTN provides a way for the Commission to address claims of a democratic deficit
and to legitimize its policy proposals (Bulkeley et al., 2003, p. 250; John, 2000, p. 890).
LGTN is particularly advantaged in this situation because networks are made up of
the directly elected level closest to the citizen. They can also be said to aggregate
citizens’ interests, rather than those of other self-interested stakeholders present in
Brussels (Heinelt & Niederhafner, 2008, p. 175; Ward & Williams, 1997, p. 444)32. The
31 Beyond the Commission, Heinelt and Niederhafner (2008, pp. 175–176) note transnational
networks offer a range of benefits to the European Parliament and—to a more limited extent—the
Council of the EU.
32 There remain debates, however, over the democratic credibility of networks in EU governance
(for example Esmark, 2007; Sørensen & Torfing, 2005). Referring to LGTN, Bulkeley et al. (2003,
p. 250) note that it is often hard to assess their democratic credentials as their structure is not
always transparent and the active role of elected officials is not necessarily guaranteed.
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drafting of Commission proposals also requires expert knowledge, something which the
Commission lacks in-house (Heinelt & Niederhafner, 2008, pp. 174–175). LGTN here
offers an opportunity for the Commission to access such expertise, especially as local
authorities have a key role to play in the implementation of EU policy, so are in a good
position to assess the viability of proposals ‘on the ground’ (Heinelt & Niederhafner,
2008, p. 175; Ward & Williams, 1997, pp. 443–444).
LGTN also assists the Commission by providing a way to manage the plethora of
actors operating at the European level. In other words, it helps the Commission to avoid
“lobbying overload” by providing co-ordinated access to pan-European opinion and
expertise (Ward & Williams, 1997, p. 444). Networks can also assist the Commission
in implementing EU policy (Bulkeley et al., 2003, p. 243). Bulkeley et al. (2003)
note how transnational networks can be partners in EU-funded projects aiming to
contribute to EU policy objectives. According to Heinelt and Niederhafner (2008,
p. 176), transnational networks and their members can also act as ‘watchdogs’ on
behalf of the Commission, to make sure policy is being implemented correctly. They
are also seen as a way to mitigate against some of the negative effects of European
integration—particularly the Single European Market—by promoting co-operation to
break down regional disparities, and they are seen to play a role in fostering a common
European identity (Ward & Williams, 1997, p. 444).
The perceived benefits to the EU are such that horizontal transnational networking
is actively promoted and featured heavily in the European Commission’s (2001) White
Paper on European Governance33, as well as the more recent White Paper on Multilevel
Governance by the CoR (2009). In this way, LGTN is seen to have “mutual attraction”
for both local authorities and the EU alike (Ward & Williams, 1997, p. 443), and it
has become ‘incorporated’ and ‘institutionalized’—albeit informally—into wider EU
governance (Bulkeley et al., 2003, p. 236; Ward & Williams, 1997, p. 461).
33 In particular the White Paper (European Commission, 2001) stresses the need to include a range
of actors in policy making, including subnational government (p. 3) and the role networks can
play in achieving the goals of integration (p. 18).
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While LGTN has developed over the last 20 years and became an important feature
of EU governance, it is worth noting that initial legal initiatives to formalize and
institutionalize this form of co-operation were not made by the EU, but by the CoE
(Sodupe, 1999, p. 75). Indeed, a lack of formal legal and administrative systems within
the EU to recognize cross-border co-operation remained a significant barrier (Ercole et
al., 1997, p. 226; Lange, 2012, p. 12). In 2006, however, the EU adopted the European
Grouping of Territorial Co-operation (EGTC) instrument in an attempt to provide a
uniform framework for cross-border co-operation to take place and be given a legal
personality (Lange, 2012). By 2013, there were 45 cases of co-operation utilizing the
EGTC framework (see Figure 2.2), involving around 750 subnational and national
authorities (CoR, 2014, p. 1). Despite this development, however, most cases of LGTN
continue to operate outside of the EGTC framework.
2.3 Summary
This chapter has outlined the conceptual and empirical context of this thesis. It
began by characterizing LGTN as a feature of MLG in the EU, brought about
through the process of local level Europeanization. The approaches of MLG and
Europeanization were reviewed. This showed that while MLG offers a useful description
of the EU’s system of governance, including the presence of LGTN, it does not
account for how this developed or why LGTN emerged. It was argued that adopting
a Europeanization approach addresses this weakness, by conceptualizing LGTN as a
local authority response to the reality of the European integration. In other words,
Europeanization accounts for the process through which MLG is achieved. The review
of the Europeanization literature further highlighted the approach’s usefulness as an
analytical framework to discuss the extent and expected differentiation of engagement
in LGTN, its directionality and—through new institutionalism—the underlying logic
driving participation.
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Figure 2.2: EGTCs in operation as at 2014 (taken from the MOT)
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The empirical context was then reviewed. This showed that local government has
enjoyed a direct relationship with the EU since the Maastricht Treaty. This relationship
manifests itself in a number of formal and informal channels which local authorities
use to access the European level. In terms of formal channels local authorities are
represented through participation in Council meetings, representation in the CoR and
through the application of the partnership principle in EU regional policy. However,
local authorities’ ability to make use of these formal opportunities has been mixed, and
so a number of informal channels—such as subnational Brussels offices—have emerged.
LGTN represents one of these informal channels. Some key trends were noted in the
literature. Firstly, LGTN has proliferated since the late 1980s. Secondly, it has evolved
over time; initial LGTN was cross-border in nature and featured broad general purpose
networks. A shift was witnessed where as LGTN has become more formalized, networks
have also become more thematically focused. Thirdly, the EU has sought to promote
LGTN through various regional policy instruments, although it remains debated as
to whether the EU’s intervention has had an impact. Finally, as well as serving local
government purposes, LGTN also provides the EU with a number of benefits, such
as providing expertise on local policy implementation or offering legitimacy to policy
proposals.
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Chapter 3
Research design and methods
This chapter provides a description of and rationalizes the methods employed in
the study. It firstly discusses the use of a qualitative empirical approach as the
foundation for this thesis’s contribution to knowledge (Section 3.1). It then explains
the cross-national case selection. This includes discussions on the units of analysis
chosen, the use of case studies and the cases themselves (Section 3.2). The three data
collection methods used in this study—document analysis, participant observation and
semi-structured interviews—are then outlined (Section 3.3). The chapter concludes
with brief discussions on language considerations, data analysis and research ethics.
3.1 Overview of method
Section 1.3 highlighted a number of gaps in the existing literature on local government
transnational networking (LGTN) that have informed the study’s overall focus and
main research aims and questions (RAs1–3 and RQs1–3). Chief among the gaps identified
was a lack of knowledge surrounding the perceptions of local actors engaged in this
activity34. For example, while the existing literature provides indications of the function
34 As argued in Section 1.3, research which adopts a ‘local’ focus is notably absent in the literature
on local government and EU in general (Guderjan, 2012; Jeffery, 2000; Van Bever et al., 2011a,
p. 13).
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of transnational networks it does not reveal the motivations held by local authorities
for participating in them. As Bouteligier (2013, p. 71) argues “theoretical assumptions
only give an abstract and simplistic reflection and networks’ initial aims are not always
translated into actuality”. Addressing this gap in our understanding of LGTN therefore
requires an empirical investigation. It further necessitates the use of an inductive
research design, seeking to draw conclusions about LGTN from the empirical findings
rather than testing pre-determined hypotheses (Harrison, 2001, pp. 6–7).
In order to access local perceptions on LGTN this study adopts what John (2006,
p. 75) refers to as an ‘urban political science’ approach. This takes “the city or
locality as the primary focus, and then examine[s] other levels of government as further
elaborations” (John, 2006, p. 75). This allows for an in-depth analysis into the LGTN
activity undertaken by local authorities, drawing on the perspectives of the officers and
councillors involved.
John (2006, 2009, pp. 21–22) highlights two unique features of local government that
need to be considered when choosing between a quantitative and qualitative approach:
‘numerosity’ and ‘propinquity’. Numerosity refers to the multiple occurrences of local
government within a nation state. Propinquity refers to the ‘closeness’ of local actors
to each other, the social processes affecting localities and the impact of their decisions.
Studies that focus on aspects of numerosity are suited to a quantitative approach,
particularly as the large number of cases is conducive to statistical generalization.
Studies focusing on aspects of propinquity are generally suited to a qualitative
approach. The closeness of local actors to the impact of their decisions leads to a focus
on their intentions and perceptions, requiring the use of methods which directly engage
those actors (John, 2006). A similar distinction between quantitative and qualitative
approaches applies when studying networking. Questions around network structure,
cohesion, degrees of centrality and so on lend themselves to quantitative approaches.
Questions around processes, content of interactions, motives and actors’ perceptions
are more suited to qualitative approaches (Bo¨rzel, 1998, p. 255).
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The methods chosen to investigate LGTN are therefore determined by the aims and
research questions of the study and its overriding focus. Here these are particularly
concerned with local actors’ perceptions on LGTN. For Firestone (1993, p. 12)
“qualitative research is best for understanding the processes that go on in a situation
and the beliefs and perceptions of those in it”. Local actors are in a strong position
to give accounts of their networking activities as they are close to the decisions being
made and to the impact of those decisions. In this way, this study capitalizes on the
propinquity of local actors’ involvement in LGTN, further necessitating a qualitative
approach. This focus on actors’ intentions and perceptions also calls for qualitative
approaches to the study of networking. This thesis, therefore, adopts a qualitative
empirical approach, making use of semi-structured interviews, document analysis and
participant observation (see Section 3.3).
3.2 Case selection
3.2.1 Identifying the units of analysis
Establishing a functionally equivalent level of analysis is inherently difficult for
cross-national and comparative studies of local government. This is because
administrative structures, constitutional traditions and local government competences
differ between—and often within—countries (Bauer & Bo¨rzel, 2010, p. 253; Stoker,
2006). Indeed, despite both being unitary and centralized polities (Lijphart, 2012,
p. 178), England and France have very different local government structures in place.
The French system of local government is split into three levels. The re´gions
occupy the highest level and are therefore the directly elected local administrative
unit that is closest to the state. There are 22 re´gions. Below the re´gions there are
96 de´partements35. Below these are over 36,000 communes, ranging from large cities
to small hamlets. Although de´partements fall within the boundaries of re´gions, and
35 These figures do not include the French overseas de´partements and territories.
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communes within de´partements, there is no formal hierarchy between the different
levels (Cole, 2011; Ne´grier & Nicolas, 2011). Complexity is introduced by the fact
different administrative arrangements are in place for the largest French cities and
that the smaller communes often co-operate in associations under the communaute´
system. The presence of several quasi-public local service providers further adds to the
institutional complexity (Stoker, 2006, pp. 497–498).
Compared to France, with three levels applied in a largely uniform way across
the country, the English system is rather more chaotic and, as noted by Martin
(2011, p. 91), “in a state of almost constant change and flux”. It is subdivided
into a mixture of single-tier and two-tier and other sui generis arrangements. In
single-tier areas, one council covers all local authority functions within a given territory.
These so-called ‘unitary authorities’ can cover anything between the area of a small
city to a large county. In two-tier areas, local authority functions are split between
one—usually a county—council and then a number of smaller districts below it.
These different structures are applied inconsistently across England. In addition to
asymmetric administrative structures, local government competences vary between the
two countries36. Illustrations of the two local government structures can be found in
Appendix B.
The asymmetrical administrative structures and varying competences mean
English local authorities have no directly comparable counterpart in France. While
de´partements and counties may be spatially similar, they are markedly different in
terms of competences and their relationship with the centre and other tiers of local
government.
Lidstro¨m (1998) and Stoker (2006) identify a plethora of classification systems
aimed to facilitate the comparative study of local government. However, “there is no
consensus in the literature on the basis for any institutional demarcations” (Stoker,
36 As well as a methodological challenge this causes difficulties for engagement in LGTN itself,
something which will be explored in Section 6.3.3.
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2006, p. 496). Even labels applied to levels of subnational government are not uniform
across different countries. As noted by Rees (1997, p. 388) there is:
wide variation in the nature and role of regions in Europe. For example, regions
have always been powerful in Germany and Austria . . . In other states, such
as the UK, Ireland and Greece, the notion of region has far less meaning and
in some cases not at all. Defining what is a region, beyond determining that it
is a territorial entity, is like determining how long is a piece of string!37
Indeed the European Commission itself has no consistent definition of a ‘region’
(Keating & Hooghe, 2006, p. 248). While it has developed its own classification
of subnational entities—the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics
(NUTS)38—Goldsmith (2011, p. 37) cautions against the use of this in analysis. While
in some cases the NUTS classification corresponds to local government structures—as is
the case with French re´gions and NUTS2 units, for example—in many cases they do not
(Sodupe, 1999, p. 60). There is no single local authority covering the ‘Hampshire and
Isle of Wight’ NUTS2 region, for example. Indeed, some member states have created
regional structures adhering to NUTS boundaries with limited—if any—competence
simply to meet EU requirements on structural funds eligibility (Goldsmith, 2011, p. 37;
Sodupe, 1999, p. 60).
As this study is interested in the motivations of local authorities, units of analysis
are required which represent local authorities as actors in their own right. This study
therefore adopts the approach of focusing on ‘upper-tier’ local authorities. Following
Sodupe (1999, p. 59) this is defined as “a territorial unit immediately below the
sovereign state, which has a system of self-government”, or in Tatham and Thau’s
(2014, p. 262) words “the level of government/administration below that of the state”.
This leads to an analysis of county councils and unitary authorities in England, and
re´gions in France. While these councils may appear radically different in terms of
37 Some scholars even take the term ‘region’ to mean the level above the nation state (for example
Happaerts, 2008).
38 The NUTS system was developed by the EU, mainly to assist in the delivery of regional policy.
Each member state’s territory is divided into three levels—NUTS1 (the largest), NUTS2 and
NUTS3 (the smallest)—which broadly reflect existing administrative structures.
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size, they share a common status in that they are the level of directly elected local
government which is closest to the state. Furthermore, both English counties and
French re´gions are ranked close together on the regional authority index (Hooghe,
Marks, & Schakel, 2010)39. This focus on upper-tier authorities has been successfully
employed by other scholars investigating the role of subnational government in Europe
(for example Blatter et al., 2008; Donas & Beyers, 2013; Marks, Nielsen, Ray, & Salk,
1996; Tatham & Thau, 2014), and this study builds on this tradition.
This approach was vindicated during the research. Indeed, the notion of including
‘upper-tier’ authorities within a broader definition of ‘regions’ is in use by those
taking part in LGTN themselves. Many multilateral networks, such as the Assembly
of European Regions (AER), use this definition in their membership criteria (Sodupe,
1999, p. 60). As one member of multilateral network staff said:
Regions we understand as the level next to the state.40
One English councillor noted:
In the UK we have problems with the word ‘region’ . . . to us we’re a county
but we’re accepted into the Assembly of European Regions because they define
a region as the highest elected body next to the government, so there’s nothing
higher than a county council.41
Of course, smaller spatial units are involved in LGTN alongside their larger
counterparts (Marks et al., 2002). As Casson and Dardanelli (2012, p. 602) argue:
international work is not confined to the largest authorities as councils of all
sizes, from the small district councils to the large metropolitan and county
councils, are engaged in international co-operation.
39 The regional authority index developed by Hooghe et al. (2010) is a measure of the authority
of regional government in 42 countries between 1950 and 2006. It therefore provides a basis to
compare the extent of decentralization in these countries. Local and regional governments are
given a score out of 24 based on characteristics of self- and shared-rule. In 2006 English counties
scored 9.0 whereas French re´gions scored 8.0 (Hooghe et al., 2010).
40 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 30).
41 Interview with English councillor, April 2012 (Int. 01).
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The Commission itself seeks the engagement of all levels of subnational government
(Keating & Hooghe, 2006, p. 248). Again, this was highlighted during the research. As
a member of multilateral network staff noted:
There’s some diversity in terms of who we have as members. We have small
towns, we have big cities, we have counties and the like, so there is some
diversity there from across Europe.42
As recognized by another participant:
in fact it’s surprising sometimes to find that relatively small, what I would
regard as small authorities . . . are quite active in transnational co-operation.
It’s not just perhaps the most obvious bigger players.43
Other networks, such as Eurocities or the European Edge Cities Network44, are founded
on the principle of representing cities and smaller geographical areas vis a` vis larger
regional bodies (Griffiths, 1995; Payre, 2010; Phelps et al., 2002).
To ensure smaller areas were adequately represented, data was also collected from a
small number of participants representing ‘lower-tier’ local authorities in the case study
areas. This approach of including lower levels of subnational government alongside
upper levels in analyses of LGTN has also been employed in other studies (for example
Church & Reid, 1995, 1996, 1999).
3.2.2 Case study approach
This thesis makes use of case studies to address the research aims and questions. This
section outlines this approach and the cases selected. Yin (2009, p. 18) defines a case
study as:
an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth
and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between
phenomenon and context are not clearly defined.
42 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 23).
43 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 26).
44 See Baycan-Levent et al. (2008); Griffiths (1995); Payre (2010) and Sampaio (1994) for an
overview of the Eurocities network. See Phelps et al. (2002) for an overview of the Edge Cities
Network.
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The emphasis in case study research is therefore both on the actual phenomenon being
investigated—in this instance LGTN—and the context or setting in which it is situated
(Robson, 2002, p. 179; Yin, 2009, p. 18). For this reason case studies are particularly
suited to the aims of this research; LGTN is a ‘contemporary phenomenon’ situated
within a ‘real-life context’ of local government activity, as well as the wider processes
of multi-level governance (MLG) and local level Europeanization. Furthermore, the
boundaries between LGTN and the context in which it occurs are blurred. Indeed RQ3
seeks to identify the factors determining the effectiveness of LGTN; administrative,
institutional and cultural contexts are all factors which can affect local government
activity (Cole & John, 2001, p. 1).
Adopting the case study approach also allowed the research to be conducted
with limited resources. It was not feasible to investigate LGTN at a wider scale in
sufficient detail to address the research aims and provide insightful answers to the
research questions. The use of case studies therefore allowed an in-depth investigation
of LGTN within the confines of the chosen cases. The flexibility of the case study
approach also allowed for the use of multiple methods of data collection. This means
the study does not have to rely on interviews alone, but can use other sources—such
as documentation and participant observation—to triangulate findings and reinforce
validity (see Section 3.3).
Case studies can serve different purposes. Stake (2005, pp. 445–447) distinguishes
between three types of case study: intrinsic, instrumental and collective. Intrinsic case
studies focus on achieving an understanding of the case itself. Instrumental case studies
are used to provide insight into a wider phenomenon. Like instrumental case studies,
collective case studies seek to understand a wider phenomenon, but employ several
cases. This thesis follows the collective case study approach by adopting a cross-national
case selection of local authorities (see Section 3.2.3).
Despite the advantages of case studies, they are often criticized. One of the major
criticisms levied against them is that by focusing on a single or limited number of cases,
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they do not allow for wider generalization through sample-to-population extrapolation
or analytic generalization (Firestone, 1993; Yin, 2009, p. 15). Yet generalization is not
the aim of this study. Rather it aims for ‘transferability’45, defined by Lincoln and
Guba (1985, p. 124) as:
a direct function of the similarity between two contexts . . . If Context A
and Context B are ‘sufficiently’ congruent, then working hypotheses from the
sending originating context may be applicable in the receiving context.
In order for the research to achieve this and to be applicable elsewhere, it is necessary
for the analysis to consider and report on the context as well as the phenomenon under
investigation in detail. As Firestone (1993, p. 18) argues:
while transfer of findings from one case study to another is done by the reader,
the researcher has an obligation to provide a rich, detailed, thick description
of the case.
Using case studies allows this.
Case studies have been employed by other scholars investigating LGTN (for
example Adshead, 2002; Benington & Harvey, 1998; Church & Reid, 1995, 1996, 1999;
Salskov-Iversen, 2006). However, many are limited to analyses of a single case (for
example Baert, 2010; Casson & Dardanelli, 2012; Payre, 2010; Pichler-Milanović, 2010;
Tosics, 2010) placing limits on the transferability of their findings. To address this
concern and ensure the study’s findings have a broader applicability, this thesis makes
use of a cross-national case selection, drawing data from 14 cases.
3.2.3 The 14 cases
This thesis draws its cases from two areas: south-east England and northern France. It
was initially envisaged that the whole English Channel area would be the focus of the
study. However, while there are only five upper tier authorities occupying the French
45 Or ‘case-to-case transfer’ (Firestone, 1993).
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coast of the Channel, this increases to 16 in England. Therefore, to avoid a heavy
focus on English councils, the English cases are restricted to those authorities on the
Channel coast in south-east England. Table 3.1 identifies the local authorities whose
LGTN activity was studied, and Figure 3.1 illustrates their geographical location.
South-east England Northern France
Kent County Council Conseil re´gional du Nord-Pas de Calais
Medway Council Conseil re´gional de Picardie
East Sussex County Council Conseil re´gional de Haute-Normandie
Brighton and Hove City Council Conseil re´gional de Basse-Normandie
West Sussex County Council Conseil re´gional de Bretagne
Hampshire County Council
Portsmouth City Council
Southampton City Council
Isle of Wight Council
Table 3.1: Local authorities researched as part of the study (ordered geographically east to west)
A number of factors motivate the choice of these cases. Notwithstanding the
administrative and structural differences outlined above, local authorities in south-east
England and northern France have much in common. Many of these similarities
are mapped out by Bule´on and Shurmer-Smith (2008) and Turbout (2013)46.
History in the two areas is largely “shared” and interconnected. Both areas face
similar policy challenges, especially regarding maritime issues and the environment.
Geographically, both are peri-urban in nature. Furthermore—as with local government
across Europe—local authorities in both areas are moving towards more collaborative
and networked ways of working (Cole & John, 2001, p. 1), and are increasingly “pushed
towards internationalization” (Payre, 2010, p. 260).
46 Bule´on and Shurmer-Smith’s (2008) volume Espace Manche: un monde en Europe / Channel
Spaces: a World Within Europe was itself the output of local authority co-operation as part
of the Espace Manche Development Initiative (EMDI) transnational project. This co-operation
continued until 2013 as part of the Channel Arc Manche Integrated Strategy (CAMIS)
transnational project, where much of Bule´on and Shurmer-Smith’s data is kept up to date through
an online Cross Channel Atlas, available at: http://atlas-transmanche.certic.unicaen.fr/.
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Figure 3.1: The 14 cases
Yet, there are also differences. As already noted, administrative structure varies
between the two countries. In addition bureaucratic culture is different, as are
the relationships between politicians and officers, along with their respective roles.
Consequently, the selection of cases from south-east England and northern France
allows the comparison of approaches to LGTN by local authorities operating in different
institutional and cultural contexts, yet in response to very similar policy challenges.
There is also a well established tradition of local government co-operation between
authorities in south-east England and northern France (Barber, 1997; Bule´on &
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Shurmer-Smith, 2008, pp. 174–175; Church & Reid, 1995, 1996, 1999; Heddebaut,
2001, 2004; Sparke, 2000; 2006). This means the level of LGTN in this area
warrants investigation. Indeed, post-war civic and cultural twinning links are extremely
prevalent (see Figure 3.2). More substantive links, in the form of bilateral co-operation
agreements between authorities, were developed from the late 1980s. This activity was
led by Kent County Council and the Conseil re´gional du Nord-Pas de Calais—two of
the councils examined in the study—mainly in response to the building of the Channel
Tunnel and the creation of the single European market (Barber, 1997, p. 20; Church
& Reid, 1995, p. 298). The signing of co-operation accords continued throughout the
late 1980s and the 1990s and eventually multilateral co-operation in the Channel area
was institutionalized in the form of a number of networks, including the Arc Manche
(Poussard, n.d.). This context of co-operation is discussed further in Section 4.2.247.
Figure 3.2: Cross-Channel twinning links (taken from the Cross Channel Atlas)
47 Another motivation was researcher convenience. John (2009, p. 22) argues that the propinquity of
local government allows research to take place “out of one’s back door”, taking advantage of the
researcher’s proximity to the cases they are studying. This is further identified as an advantage
to the study of LGTN by Ercole et al. (1997, p. 227), who note it is easier to access data when
the researcher is in close proximity to the activity.
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Selecting cases in both England and France also allows the gathering of
cross-national data. This has a number of advantages. Firstly, as LGTN by its
very nature involves local authorities from several different countries, an approach
which only investigates participation by local authorities in one country would fail to
adequately capture the inherently ‘transnational’ character of this activity. Secondly,
Betsill and Bulkeley (2006, pp. 152–153) speculate that LGTN is affected by factors
within states such as national legislation or administrative structures. By gathering
data from both English and French local authorities the impact of these different
national contexts on LGTN can be assessed (contributing to RQ3). As noted by Cole
and John (2001, p. 2) “there is a long tradition of Anglo–French comparison”, especially
of local government. While this thesis does not adopt a strict comparative method, the
analysis of cross-national data yields valuable insights and sheds light on wider trends.
As Cole and John (2001, p. 4) argue:
In so far as they represent distinctive traditions within the EU, Anglo–French
comparisons make sense; good Anglo–French comparisons allow for the
examination of similar policy challenges in specific contexts. When common
trends appear in the case of France and England, it is likely they will have a
more general validity across EU states.
Thus by focusing on cases from these two countries, the results of the research and its
conclusions and recommendations have relevance and applicability beyond the cases
studied, thus ensuring the transferability of the research.
3.3 Data collection methods
To ensure validity this study practices ‘triangulation’: the process of “using different
data and methods to uncover the same results” (Harrison, 2001, p. 83). Indeed, while
interviews comprise the majority of data collected in this study, document analysis
and participant observation are also employed. At least two data sources contribute to
each of the study’s research questions, ensuring the overall analysis relies on no single
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source of data48. Table 3.2 summarizes how each data source was used to address the
study’s main research questions. Triangulation assists as each data collection method
has inherent strengths and weaknesses, as outlined in Table 3.3. Each of these data
sources are discussed in detail below49.
Research question Data collection
methods used
Chapter in
thesis
RQ1: What is the current extent of LGTN in
south-east England and northern France?
Document analysis,
internet searches,
interviews.
Chapter 4
RQ2: What benefits do local authorities seek to
gain from their involvement in LGTN?
Document analysis,
interviews.
Chapter 5
RQ3: What factors determine effective
engagement in LGTN?
Document analysis,
interviews, participant
observation.
Chapter 6
Table 3.2: Research questions and data sources
3.3.1 Document analysis
117 local government policy documents, strategies and committee reports produced by
local authorities studied are collected and analysed as part of the study (see Appendix
C). These documents are obtained from council websites using a number of keyword
search terms (see Appendix D)50. The search was broadly limited to a ten year period
between 2001 and 201151, although documents outside this time frame were included if
48 Triangulation is also practised by interviewing several categories of participants, for example local
government officers and multilateral network staff, and active and retired staff (see Section 3.3.3).
49 In places, data has also been supplemented with perspectives appearing in trade magazines
and journals, such as Government Gazette, Europolitics or EU Observer Magazine: Regions &
Cities. A body of practitioner literature has also been used (for example Aitken, 2008b; Audit
Commission, 1991; Bogdanor, 1992; Clifton, 2008; Handley, 2006; Iacopini & Klemm, 2009; LGA,
2010; MOT & CoE, 2006).
50 In some cases interview participants provided additional documents, and where relevant these
have been included in the analysis.
51 This ten year period is selected as it is immediately prior to the interview fieldwork being carried
out. It also covers the start of the financial crisis, so ensures the findings are relevant to the
empirical puzzle outlined in Section 1.2.
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Research
method
Strengths Weaknesses
Document
analysis
Contents unaffected by research
process.
Potential bias in favour of
document’s purpose.
Identified potential interview
participants.
Only likely to contain information
authors are happy to share.
Assisted development of
interview questions and
preliminary coding scheme.
Written for a purpose other than
the research.
Identified cases of LGTN and
justification for participation.
Unobtrusive.
Documents freely available.
Participant
observation
Observe activity in its real life
setting.
Researcher might impact
observed activity.
Reveals information not discussed
by interviewees or
documentation.
Difficult to determine if observed
event is typical of activity in
general.
Can assess impact of wider
context on activity.
Reliant on researcher’s
interpretation of activity.
Reveals information interviewees
not aware of.
Limited access.
Interviews Appropriate for focusing on
participants’ perspectives.
Potential impact of interviewer
bias.
Ability to capture information
not within documents or other
sources.
Participants could distort
information due to memory lapse
or altering accounts.
Direct contact with participants. Time and resource intensive.
Can follow up and probe
responses for more detail.
Can tailor question wording and
order to participant’s context.
Table 3.3: Advantages and disadvantages of data collection methods
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it was felt appropriate. Documents were mostly retrieved during January and February
2012.
Unlike interviewing participants, the collection of data from documents is
unobtrusive; documents are freely available and can be accessed and analysed without
contacting participants. Furthermore the content of documents remains unchanged
from when they are created and it is not altered in response to being researched
(Robson, 2002, p. 349). These documents therefore provide a useful means for
triangulating data retrieved through interviews (Robson, 2002, p. 352) and are thus an
important method for ensuring the validity of the conclusions drawn from the study.
Additionally, the document analysis serves five purposes specific to this study. Firstly,
it identifies cases of LGTN, thus contributing to RQ1. Secondly, these documents—in
particular the committee reports—provide insight into how local authorities justify
their participation in LGTN, thus addressing RQ2. Thirdly, they identify several actors
who were involved in LGTN, thereby contributing to an initial purposive sample
for interviews. Fourthly, their content can inform the development of the interview
questions. Finally, document analysis aids the development of a preliminary coding
scheme which will be used as the starting point for analysing the interview data (see
Section 3.3).
While using documents provides a number of benefits to the study, it is recognized
that there are limitations. Firstly, documents are written for a specific purpose and not
for the research (Robson, 2002, p. 358). Indeed committee documents, for example, are
usually written by local officers to be presented to councillors at formal committee
meetings and it is important to acknowledge that these documents are written with
this audience in mind. Furthermore committee documents often seek permission to
undertake work or—particularly in the case of scrutiny committee documentation—are
being presented to justify LGTN activities. Information in these documents is therefore
presented in support of each report’s recommendations. Documents are also publicly
available, so it is likely they would only include information their authors are
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comfortable disclosing to the public. To mitigate against these limitations, data from
documents is not used in isolation, but rather in conjunction with other sources
(participant observation and interviews).
3.3.2 Participant observation
Ten networking events involving local authorities in the case study areas were attended
(see Table 3.4). These events allow for the direct observation of LGTN. Rather than
being a passive observer, the researcher followed Harrison’s (2001, p. 81) advice,
supporting observations with conversations and discussions with those involved.
Observation provides a number of benefits. As noted by Robson (2002, p. 310)
it is an “appropriate technique for getting at ‘real life’ in the real world”. In this
way it allows LGTN to be observed within its real world context and enables an
assessment of how that context might influence networking activities (contributing
to RQ3) (Harrison, 2001, p. 81). Observation additionally allows the researcher to
collect data first-hand rather than relying solely on interview participants and local
government documentation. As well as assuring the researcher of the accuracy of
the data being collected, it yields information which interview participants may not
wish to—or cannot—discuss. Observation also overcomes instances where interview
participants may not be fully aware of certain activities or situations, or be unsure
of answers (Harrison, 2001, p. 81). It consequently provides a way to “look beyond
the ‘public’ and ‘official’ versions of reality” (Burns, 2000, quoted in Harrison, 2001,
p. 87) offered by documentation and interviews, and therefore provides a useful means
of triangulation. Additionally, events observed frequently involved practitioners from
local authorities outside of the 14 cases. Observation therefore provides an opportunity
to test the transferability of research findings in different contexts.
While observation brings benefits, weaknesses are recognized. According to Robson
(2002, p. 311) “there is a major issue concerning the extent to which an observer
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affects the situation under observation”. This situation—known as ‘reactivity’—makes
it difficult to assess if what is being observed is a typical reflection of the activity
(Harrison, 2001, p. 81). Getting access to observe activities and events presents another
challenge (Harrison, 2001, p. 82; Robson, 2002, p. 311). Indeed, the small number of
events observed reflects the limited opportunities the researcher was given to attend as
an external observer. As with the document analysis, these weaknesses are mitigated
by ensuring data collected through observation is not used in isolation.
3.3.3 Semi-structured interviews
Interviews are used to collect the bulk of the data for this study. Qualitative interviews
are a useful and appropriate method for studies which focus on phenomena from
participants’ perspectives (Robson, 2002, p. 271). By interviewing those involved in
LGTN, an in-depth understanding into the rationale for participation, difficulties
encountered and characteristics of effective networking can be gained. Crucially,
interviews capture perspectives which would not be present in other sources of
information such as documentation (Harrison, 2001, p. 94). Interviews also allow direct
contact with participants, providing opportunities to follow up responses to questions or
probe for more detail (Robson, 2002, pp. 272–273). Interviewing has successfully been
applied to other studies on LGTN (for example Benington & Harvey, 1998; Church &
Reid, 1996, 1999; Lawrence, 2000; Payre, 2010; Pflieger, 2014; Salskov-Iversen, 2006;
van der Heiden, 2010). This study therefore builds upon these previous successes.
A number of limitations with interviewing are acknowledged. From a practical
perspective, Robson (2002, p. 273) highlights the resource and time intensive nature
of setting up and conducting interviews. Richards (1996) also argues the success of
interviewing is dependent on the researcher’s practical application of the method in
the field52. The reliability of data provided by interviewees can also be questioned; for
52 Further details about the practical execution of interviews in the field are discussed in more detail
in Huggins (2014a).
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example participants may have memory lapses or may distort information to portray
themselves or their organization more positively (Harrison, 2001, pp. 94–95). Harrison
(2001, p. 96) also points to the effect the interviewer might have on the interviewee,
highlighting the need to phrase questions in such a way to avoid participants being led
in their answers. Again, this is mitigated against by ensuring interviews are not used
in isolation and triangulating results with data gathered through document analysis
and participant observation.
Participants
A non-probability sampling method is used to select participants. Two sampling
approaches are used: purposive and snowball. A purposive approach is used to identify
actors with direct experience of LGTN. These actors are either situated within the local
authorities studied or have direct experience of those local authorities’ LGTN activities
as members of staff working for multilateral networks, national associations or Interreg
joint technical secretariats (JTSs). These participants are identified primarily through
the document analysis and internet searches, in addition to drawing on the researcher’s
existing contacts. Secondly, a snowball approach is used, where participants are asked
to identify others who are potentially relevant for the study. Snowball sampling is
particularly suited to this research as LGTN is characterized by the relationships
between actors. Indeed, this approach was particularly useful for identifying several
participants.
Participants fall into four broad categories, outlined in Table 3.5. It is important
that both administrative and political representatives of the 14 local authorities are
included, as both play a role in LGTN. While a range of local officers and councillors are
interviewed in south-east England, it is much harder to access French local politicians.
Indeed, requests to interview French politicians were either refused, referred to local
officers or ignored. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, English proficiency is
lower among French politicians than it is amongst local officers, limiting the number of
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Participant category Number of participants
Local government administrative staff / local officers 34
Local government politicians / councillors 10
Transnational network and Interreg JTS staff 17
Others 7
Total participants 68
Table 3.5: Participant categories
politicians who would be able to be interviewed in English. Secondly, French politicians
have less free time to be interviewed, partly as a result of the practice of the so-called
‘cumul des mandats ’, or holding multiple public offices. Thirdly, the more hierarchical
nature of French local government means senior politicians refer to local officers within
the authority. To address this, every opportunity was sought to engage with French
politicians while observing the networking events outlined in Table 3.4.
While this study is primarily interested in local perceptions of LGTN, it also
included staff of multilateral networks, as well as those working for Interreg JTSs and
other national associations. These participants are able to offer a broader picture of
the topic. They are also well placed to identify instances of local authorities engaging
effectively in LGTN, so can assist in addressing RQ3. Additionally, participants who
have direct experience of LGTN, but are no longer active—for example retired local
government staff—are also included as they are able to share their experiences without
any organizational constraints. This variety of participants provides additional and
insightful perspectives and also serves as a means of triangulation, again ensuring
validity (see Appendix E for a profile of participants and interview information).
Interview questions and format
Interviews were conducted in what Robson (2002, p. 270) defines as a ‘semi-structured’
format. That is, an interview that:
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has predetermined questions, but the order can be modified based upon the
interviewer’s perception of what seems most appropriate. Question wording
can be changed and explanations given. (Robson, 2002, p. 270)
This approach allows a core set of questions to be asked while providing the flexibility
for specific areas of interest to be explored if they arise. This semi-structured approach
also allows question wording to be tailored to participants. This is useful as participants
refer to ‘transnational networking’ in different ways, for example “European partnership
working”, “European links” or simply “co-operation”.
Questions posed to participants (see Appendix F) are developed from the study’s
research questions. In line with the study’s inductive research design “spontaneous
and rich descriptions” are sought, as advocated by Kvale (1996, p. 130). Questions are
therefore posed to illicit in-depth open-ended responses. This is essential in ensuring
participants’ perspectives are captured. Other than changing the wording and order
of questions as a response to a participant’s context, questions remain the same
throughout the fieldwork and all questions are asked to all participants. This addresses
the concerns outlined above, regarding the reliability of data provided by interviews or
the impact the researcher has on participants’ responses (Harrison, 2001, pp. 94–95).
In some cases additional questions are posed to clarify certain responses or to explore
an area of interest in more depth.
Face-to-face interviews are preferred as they allow a rapport to be built with
participants. They also allow in-depth answers to be obtained; while telephone
interviews allow the same questions to be asked, “answers to open questions tend
to be shorter and the whole interview procedure tends to proceed more briskly than
in the case of face-to-face interviews” (Thomas & Purdon, 1994). In some cases travel
costs were too prohibitive or travel arrangements were unfeasible. In these instances,
telephone interviews were offered instead as it was felt it was more important to
include these participants and their perspectives rather than exclude them. Telephone
interviews were also offered as a compromise when participants were unwilling to meet
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face-to-face.
The majority of interviews took place on a one-to-one basis, as was preferred.
However, in five cases participants from the same organization requested they be
interviewed together. This was particularly the case with French local officers. Again,
while this was not ideal, it was felt it was more important to include these participants
in the study rather than exclude them.
Overall this study draws on 63 interviews conducted with 68 participants. Four
of these interviews were carried out by telephone and the rest were face-to-face.
Interviews were conducted between April and December 2012.
Pilot interviews
Following van Teijlingen and Hundley’s (2001) advice, two pilot interviews were
conducted to test the suitability of the questions and interview approach, and to
highlight practical problems which may have been encountered. Two participants who
no longer had a direct day-to-day role—but still an arm’s length interest—in LGTN
were selected. This meant that if the interviews were unsuccessful, the quality of data
from key participants would not be compromised. The pilot interviews were successful
and given the insights offered by these participants this data is included in the analysis
with the main interviews.
The interview process
Once the initial purposive sample had been gathered, potential participants were
contacted by email, asking if they would be willing to participate in the study (see
Appendix G for a sample invitation). Follow-up contacts were made if there was no
reply. Invitations sent to potential participants based in France included a French
translation. All contacts made and interviews arranged were recorded in a database to
aid with organization and to ensure an audit trail.
Participants were sent a confirmation letter and information sheet outlining
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what the study was about, what information would be gathered, confidentiality and
anonymity issues, participants’ roles and how the results would be disseminated (see
Appendix H). Some participants requested to see the interview questions in advance.
In these cases, participants were given a copy of the interview schedule, but informed
wording, structure and questions might be altered depending on issues raised during
the interview.
Most interviews took place in participants’ offices or meeting rooms within their
organization. In a few cases participants preferred to meet on ‘neutral ground’ and
interviews were arranged to take place in a local cafe´. Where possible interviews
were audio recorded53. This provided a number of advantages. Firstly, it meant a
permanent record of the interview could be kept. Secondly, as noted by Kvale (1996,
p. 160), recording allows the researcher to focus on the actual interview and topic
being discussed. Overall, 55 of the 63 interviews were recorded. During all interviews,
notes were taken and made on a form which structured the notes against specific
questions (see Appendix I). This form also ensured participants were asked the same
set of core questions. Interviews lasted on average 30 minutes. Following the interview,
participants were sent a letter of thanks (see Appendix J).
Audio recorded interviews were later transcribed. While many computer aided
qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) packages have functionality to code
and analyse audio files directly, transcription to a written format is still preferred.
It provides a written record of the interview which can not only be analysed, but
participants can also receive a copy to check and confirm it. Transcription was carried
out by the researcher. While this was time-consuming the decision was influenced
by Kvale’s (1996, p. 160) argument that “rather than being a simple clerical task,
transcription is itself an interpretive process”. Indeed, as Wainwright and Russell (2010,
53 In some cases this was unfeasible because of too much background noise, despite efforts to ensure
interviews took place in a distraction-free location. In one case the recording equipment failed to
operate. Telephone interviews were also not recorded. In all of these cases data was captured in
the form of detailed notes.
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p. 3) note, the transcription process immerses researchers in their data by listening to a
recording, writing it out, and re-reading it. This arguably heightens sensory interaction
with the data.
Participants were sent a copy of the transcript, asking them to check it for errors
or misinterpretations and to confirm it. As well as reducing the risk of transcription
errors, this confirmation process reassured participants that they were not going to be
misinterpreted or misrepresented. In some cases participants requested changes, either
to correct a transcription error or to express a point more clearly. All amendments to
transcripts were clearly highlighted54 (see Appendix E for interview information).
3.4 Language considerations
English is not the first language of several participants, including some working in
English local authorities. This required careful consideration as language can play an
important role in the dynamics and effectiveness of LGTN (Kern & Bulkeley, 2009,
p. 317; Lawrence, 2000, p. 68; van der Heiden, 2010, p. 133)55.
The use of translation services was considered, however their high cost makes this
unfeasible. Furthermore, Birbili (2000) notes that there are significant methodological
challenges involved when using interpreters and even in collecting data in different
languages. In light of the potential cost and challenges involved using interpreters, all
interviews are conducted in English. Participants are therefore selected who can speak
a sufficient level of English. Documents analysed are also predominantly in English,
although some French documents are included.
Initial concerns that this approach would lead to a lack of data from French local
authorities proved unfounded, although this had an impact on the number of French
politicians interviewed (see above). Many participants note that the language barrier
54 Where detailed notes were taken instead of a recording, these notes were typed out and sent to
participants for their confirmation instead.
55 Many participants also noted this when discussing their experiences. This is explored in
Section 6.3.3.
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is less of a difficulty than it used to be and most transnational networks operate
exclusively in English (see Section 6.3.3). Indeed, the lower number of interviews
arranged with participants from French local government is more attributable to two
factors other than language. Firstly, there are only five French cases compared with
nine in south-east England. Secondly, the more hierarchical and closed bureaucratic
culture of French local authorities means only one or two officials—usually a head of
service or department—are appointed to be interviewed on behalf of all staff contacted
in the organization.
3.5 Data analysis
Reviews of the literature (contained within Chapters 4, 5 and 6) lead to the development
of a preliminary coding scheme. This scheme allows interviews and documents to be
analysed using what Saldan˜a (2009, p. 120) calls a ‘provisional coding’ method. Data
is coded using a predetermined scheme, which is based on the review of literature and
the researcher’s a priori knowledge. As data is analysed, codes are “revised, modified
or expanded” (Saldan˜a, 2009, pp. 120–121); although there is a predetermined scheme
it is flexible enough to react to the data being analysed.
Throughout the analysis a CAQDAS package was used to assist in the organization
and coding of data56. It was fully recognized that CAQDAS only serves as an
organizational aid to qualitative data analysis and cannot replace the researcher who
is still required to code, interpret and analyse the data (MacMillan & Koenig, 2007,
p. 181; Saldan˜a, 2009, p. 22).
56 The software used was Dedoose.
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3.6 Ethical considerations
Full attention was given to the Economic and Social Research Council’s Framework
for Research Ethics (2010) to ensure the research was legitimate, credible and that
participants took part voluntarily on the basis of informed consent. Additionally, careful
consideration was given to Kvale’s (1996, pp. 119–120) five questions relating to the
ethics of interviewing:
• “What are the beneficial consequences of the study?”
• “How can the informed consent . . . be obtained?”
• “How can confidentiality . . . be protected?”
• “What are the consequences of the study for the participating subjects?”
• “How will the researcher’s role affect the study?”
These issues were outlined in an ethics report, which was assessed and given a
favourable ethical opinion by the University of Portsmouth’s Faculty of Humanities
and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee before any data was collected (see
Appendix K for the ethics report and favourable opinion).
One area given consideration was confidentiality and anonymity. Confidentiality
cannot be guaranteed as in many cases there is only one officer and one councillor per
local authority working on LGTN. This would mean it would be obvious who will have
participated in this study. Furthermore, in order to address RQ3, participants were
asked to provide details of how they feel their authorities apply best practice when it
came to their participation in LGTN. This data also has the potential to inform and
improve local authorities’ engagement. For these reasons, results are therefore not made
confidential, although interviews were anonymized. This was clearly communicated
before informed consent was obtained, and no participants refused to be interviewed
on this ground57.
57 This supports John’s (2009, p. 22) claim that local politicians and officials are much more open
and willing to be interviewed compared with their national counterparts.
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Chapter 4
The contemporary extent of local
government transnational
networking
While the presence of local government transnational networking (LGTN) in the
European Union (EU) is widely acknowledged—and numerous examples have been
identified by the literature (see Appendix A)—little remains known about the true
extent of this activity. This is particularly the case in south-east England and northern
France. While a body of literature identified cases of LGTN in the English Channel
region during the 1990s (for example Church & Reid, 1995, 1996, 1999), a lack of recent
empirical evidence limits our contemporary understanding of this activity. To address
this gap in the literature, this chapter draws on document analysis, interviews and
website searches to contribute a contemporary empirical account of LGTN carried out
by local authorities in the case study area. In doing this it addresses the first research
aim of this thesis:
• RA1: Identify contemporary examples of LGTN by local authorities in south-east
England and northern France.
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And answers the first research question:
• RQ1: What is the current extent of LGTN in south-east England and France?
Two supplementary questions serve to deepen the analysis here:
• RQ1a: How has participation in LGTN evolved—if at all—over time, and what
does this say about the extent of local level Europeanization?
• RQ1b: Is participation in LGTN uniform across all authorities or marked by
differentiation?
Addressing RQ1 is relevant as—in addition to addressing a lack of contemporary
empirical evidence—it reveals the significance of LGTN. When LGTN was first
observed by scholars in the 1990s, Benington and Harvey (1998) asked if it was a
“passing fashion or new paradigm”. Similarly, Church and Reid (1996, pp. 1300–1301)
drew attention to its unstable nature, noting that if it failed to sustain itself
its importance may have been overstated. By revealing LGTN’s current extent,
this chapter answers Benington and Harvey’s (1998) question, and underscores its
importance in contemporary European governance.
This chapter shows that LGTN has not only remained a prevalent phenomenon
in south-east England and northern France, it also has increased in intensity since
the 1990s. Two key patterns characterize this overall finding. Firstly, the way local
authorities have approached LGTN has evolved. Where in the 1990s bilateral and
cross-border networks dominated, now multilateral and wider inter-regional networking
is the norm. Secondly, while all local authorities are involved, there is marked variation
in the extent of their engagement and in their approach.
As well as addressing RQ1 and contributing a contemporary empirical account of
LGTN to the literature, these findings serve to contextualize the later discussions on
the motivations of local authorities participating in this activity (Chapter 5), and
the factors affecting effective engagement (Chapter 6). These findings further make
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a contribution to the debate on the extent and expected differentiation of local level
Europeanization, and to the nature of MLG in the EU. An overall increase in the
extent of local level Europeanization is observed, but still marked by differentiation
and heterogeneity. While LGTN confirms the presence of MLG in the EU, its impact
is not uniform, leading to a “ ‘variable geometry’ Europe” (Le Gale`s, 2002, p. 110).
This chapter is structured as follows. To assist the analysis of LGTN, it first
contributes a three-fold categorization of the forms of transnational co-operation
local authorities engage in (Section 4.1). To contextualize the contemporary empirical
analysis, the chapter then provides a background to the networking activity undertaken
by local government in south-east England and northern France during the late 1980s
and 1990s. This surveys both the prevailing context and cases of LGTN present at that
time (Section 4.2). The empirical analysis of contemporary LGTN is then presented
and structured according to the categorization developed earlier (Sections 4.3 and 4.4).
This confirms the continued engagement of local authorities in LGTN. Two overriding
patterns of engagement are then identified and provide a link to the debate on local
level Europeanization: that local authorities’ approach to LGTN has evolved since the
1990s and that their engagement in the activity continues to be marked by variety
(Section 4.5).
4.1 Categorizing LGTN
According to Benington (1994, pp. 31–32):
There seems to be no end to the number or variety of transnational local
authority networks which are being spawned within the European Community,
and the limit may not be reached until the acronyms run out!
Indeed the networks identified in the existing literature (see Appendix A) demonstrate
this. In order to make sense of the diversity of LGTN, this thesis advances a three-fold
categorization which captures the empirical reality of this activity.
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Attempts to categorize cases of LGTN have already been undertaken by scholars.
Benington and Harvey (1994) proposed a four-fold categorization where transnational
networks were either ‘peak’, ‘spatial’, ‘thematic’ or ‘sectoral’ (see also Ward &
Williams, 1997, p. 441). Peak networks are pan-European associations, with a broad
membership. Spatial networks reflected co-operation within distinct geographical
boundaries. Thematic networks brought together actors around specific policy areas.
Sectoral networks reflected shared economic interests. Ward and Williams (1997, p. 441)
are critical of this categorization for two reasons. Firstly, it does not account for the
fact that cases of LGTN often fall into two or more categories. Secondly, while it is
descriptively helpful, it does not necessarily assist in understanding networks. Sodupe
(1999) offers a two-fold categorization of networks: those which are representative
and those which are functional. Like Benington and Harvey’s (1994) categorization,
however, this also cannot account for those cases where networks undertake both
representative and functional activities simultaneously. Other typologies have been
developed which focus on territorial scope—whether European or international—and
policy specialization (for example Bulkeley et al., 2003). Others attempt to categorize
transnational networks according to their dedication to particular policy areas (for
example Happaerts, 2008; Happaerts et al., 2011), but these are limited to those areas
of policy, so cannot account for the broader range of LGTN activities local authorities
engage in. Crucially, however, these existing attempts at categorization do not reflect
how local authorities themselves view participation in LGTN.
Given the limitations of existing attempts to capture the range of LGTN, this
thesis contributes its own classification to the literature. Based on previous cases
and on contemporary empirical evidence gathered in this thesis, it is posited that
LGTN can be disaggregated into three categories, determined by the number of local
authorities involved and whether or not the networking activity is time limited. These
are: ‘bilateral networking’, ‘multilateral networking’ and ‘transnational projects’ (see
Table 4.1). This builds on similar distinctions made by some scholars studying LGTN
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Category Description
Bilateral networking Involves two local authorities, each in different countries.
Multilateral networking Involves three or more local authorities located in at least two
different countries.
Transnational projects Involves at least two local authorities in at least two different
countries. Unlike bilateral and multilateral networking
co-operation in transnational projects has a fixed life-span and
aimed at aching specific policy outcomes and deliverables.
Table 4.1: Categorization of LGTN
(for example Karvounis, 2011, p. 217; Keating, 2000; Kern, 2010; Kern, 2014, p. 115;
Lefe`vre & d’Albergo, 2007, p. 319). Crucially, the categorization advanced here builds
on these earlier attempts as it is founded in the perceptions of local actors who are
involved in LGTN. Indeed, such distinctions were regularly made by participants
during interviews, showing local government itself applied this categorization to their
own networking activities58.
Bilateral networking
Bilateral networking involves two local authorities, each in a different country59. These
bilateral links differ from the more traditional twinning links which aim to build civic
or ceremonial ties, and were largely set up during the post-war years to facilitate
cultural exchange60. Rather they are underpinned by a commitment to co-operate
on certain issues or in particular areas of policy, usually in economic or commercial
fields (Heddebaut, 2001, pp. 62–63). These links can be between local authorities on
58 Interview with English local officer, May 2012, and French regional officer, August 2012 (Int. 12;
Int. 36). This categorization was further made during a presentation of Manchester City Council’s
European activity made by a local councillor at the Fusing Localities panel discussion in November
2013 (Obs. 10), suggesting it can be transferred to other contexts outside of the case study areas.
The councillor spoke of Manchester’s involvement in LGTN and broke down their activities by
participation in multilateral networks—particularly Eurocities—direct bilateral links with the
cities of Lille, France and Tampere, Finland, and transnational projects with European partners
funded by the URBACT programme.
59 Baycan-Levent et al. (2008) use the term ‘sister cities’ to refer to such links.
60 Town twinning and sister city links are often omitted from other studies for this reason (for
example Ercole et al., 1997, p. 219). This study also excludes such twinning links.
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either side of a national frontier—known as ‘adjunct twinning’ (Ercole et al., 1997,
p. 225)—or between authorities further apart. In other words geographic contiguity is
not a requirement. Often a partnership agreement or co-operation accord—signed by
the political leaders of both local authorities—formalizes this form of LGTN and sets
out the areas of collaboration, although this is not necessary in all cases.
Multilateral networking
Multilateral networking refers to groups of three or more local authorities. Instead
of co-operating directly with each other, local authorities are usually members of
LGTN organizations, operating under a transnational ‘brand’. Through these networks,
local authorities are linked to several others in Europe who are also members61.
Multilateral networks can be further categorized as cases of ‘cross-border regions’
or ‘inter-regional co-operation’ using Perkmann’s (2003) typology62. Cross-border
regions are cases of geographically contiguous co-operation, often formed along either
side of national borders. Inter-regional co-operation refers to long-distance, often
non-contiguous, co-operation (Perkmann, 2003, p. 158)63. Multilateral networks may
be further sub-categorized into ‘general / multi purpose networks’ and ‘thematically
focused networks’ (Donas & Beyers, 2013, p. 528; Keating, 1999, p. 8; Kern & Bulkeley,
2009, p. 316). General and multi purpose networks offer co-operation on a broad range
of policy areas and seek to represent their members as subnational authorities; examples
include the Assembly of European Regions (AER). Thematically focused networks are
61 The terms ‘peak associations’ (for example Hooghe, 1995; Perkmann, 2003) or ‘trans-regional
associations’ (for example Donas & Beyers, 2013) are also regularly used in the literature to
describe such networks.
62 A similar distinction is made by Sodupe (1999) and Ercole et al. (1997).
63 Within inter-regional co-operation Perkmann (2003, p. 158) makes a further distinction between
‘inter-regional and inter-urban co-operation’ and ‘peak associations’. The first of these categories
is used to define networks established by individual or groups of localities. While some of these
continue to form permanent networks, many disband after funding or support is withdrawn.
Peak associations refers to forms of organized network usually based on membership which seek
to represent their members’ interests at a European level and provide a platform for exchanging
knowledge and expertise. While most multilateral networks that councils participate in may be
categorized as peak associations, the boundaries between the two are often blurred, making it
difficult to differentiate between them (Perkmann, 2003, p. 158).
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instead organized around specific policy areas, which are sometimes very narrow and
specialized; for example the Airport Regions Conference (ARC) or the Network of
European Regions Using Space Technologies (NEREUS).
Multilateral networks usually have a secretariat co-ordinating the work of the
network and managing its membership. A membership fee is also sometimes levied.
Additionally, local authorities may have to meet certain eligibility criteria, such as a
minimum population size64. The membership of these networks varies. Some, such as
the Four Motors network65, are relatively small while others are extremely large; the
AER, for example, has a membership of around 250.
Transnational projects
The third category, transnational projects, differs from bilateral networking and
multilateral networks as the co-operation is time limited and established to achieve
specific deliverables in the form of a collaborative project. While these projects are
often temporary, they nevertheless bring together local authorities from different
countries and operate across national borders meaning they can be considered as cases
of LGTN (Bulkeley, 2005, p. 876; John, 2000, pp. 888–889; 2001, pp. 87–88). Indeed
the term ‘networking’ was used by participants and local authorities themselves during
the research to refer to this activity. As with multilateral networking, local authorities
are linked to others in Europe who also participate in the project66. These projects are
often—although not always—directly supported by the EU through various funding
programmes designed to promote co-operation, such as Interreg or URBACT. While
the purpose of the network is to implement the project, co-operation usually starts
well before this while the project proposal is developed and bidding for funding takes
64 Eurocities, for example, applies a minimum population rule (Brighton & Hove City Council,
2008b; Heinelt & Niederhafner, 2008, p. 179; Payre, 2010, p. 266).
65 The Four Motors network, between Catalonia, the Rhoˆne-Alpes, Baden-Wu¨rtemburg and
Lombardy, aims to promote investment and economic development in these industrialized
European regions. See Borra´s (1993) and Murphy (1993) for a fuller discussion of this network.
66 As well as local government, project partners can also include a variety of other local actors such
as universities, civil society organizations, local businesses and so on.
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place.
As will be demonstrated below, the boundaries between each of these categories can
be blurred. For example, a temporary partnership to deliver a transnational project
might develop into a more lasting bilateral or multilateral network. Nevertheless, this
categorization provides a useful framework to analyse cases of LGTN, both in historical
(Section 4.2.2) and contemporary (Section 4.3) contexts.
4.2 Background to contemporary LGTN
As identified in Chapter 2, LGTN by European local authorities—including those
in south-east England and northern France—largely rose to prominence during the
late 1980s and 1990s. This was facilitated by a number of contextual factors, some of
which were unique to the English Channel region. This section provides an overview
of this context (Section 4.2.1) and the LGTN activity which developed in south-east
England and northern France during this time (Section 4.2.2). This discussion serves
to contextualize the empirical evidence on the contemporary activity by these councils,
which will be discussed in Section 4.3.
4.2.1 The 1980s and 1990s context
Before providing an overview of early LGTN undertaken by councils in the case study
area, it is necessary to highlight a number of contextual factors. Indeed as Church
and Reid (1995, p. 298) argue, the development of LGTN in south-east England and
northern France was “a clear policy response” to wider events happening at the time.
The construction of the Channel Tunnel is considered to be one of the major
contextual factors, presenting both opportunities and challenges. This was particularly
the case for Kent and Nord-Pas de Calais which, as will be shown, pioneered LGTN
in south-east England and northern France. On the one hand the tunnel could bring
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economic benefits. Both regions were in economic decline. Nord-Pas de Calais was facing
rapid decline in its coal mining and engineering industries. Kent also faced industrial
decline, compounded by poor performance in its traditional agriculture sector and
seaside resorts (Sinclair & Page, 1993, p. 480; Thomas, 2006, p. 16; Vickerman, 1998,
p. 175). The tunnel thus provided an opportunity to restructure the economy in these
lagging regions. However, there was a fear that the resulting high speed link would lead
to a ‘corridor effect’, whereby the regions would be bypassed in favour of larger economic
centres and national capitals (Heddebaut, 2001, p. 62; Sinclair & Page, 1993, p. 479;
Sparke, 2000, p. 198; Vickerman, 1998, p. 179)67. Indeed Vickerman’s (1998) analysis
suggests the Channel Tunnel had very little positive impact on Kent’s economy as most
investment was attracted to London instead. Co-operating was thus seen as a way to
capitalize on the opportunities and address the challenges that the tunnel brought.
Indeed, Sparke (2000, p. 195) argues that it was the “anticipated infrastructural link
that served as the major catalyst for . . . cross-border cooperation”. Luchaire (1992,
quoted in Heddebaut, 2004, p. 71) likewise saw Anglo–French co-operation as “the
natural child” of the tunnel.
As discussed in Section 2.2.2, the development of community initiative funding
programmes facilitated a number of transnational links (Rees, 1997; Sodupe, 1999).
Interreg was one such programme. It aimed to promote cross-border co-operation by
providing part funding for collaborative projects involving partners from more than
one country. However, Interreg was initially only available for regional co-operation
across land borders. Through the framework of their bilateral co-operation agreement,
Kent and Nord-Pas de Calais embarked on an intensive lobbying campaign to be
deemed eligible for Interreg I support. Their main success was persuading their
respective national governments and the European Commission that the Channel
67 As noted by Heddebaut (2001, p. 62) the Channel Tunnel’s primary function “is to connect
networks (road and rail) between [the] capitals Paris, London and Brussels”. Heddebaut (2001,
p. 61) also argues that the Channel Tunnel actually reduced the number of connections between
Kent and Nord-Pas de Calais, as competition with the ferry companies led to a concentration of
routes between Dover and Calais at the expense of other routes between the two regions.
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Tunnel constituted a land border between the two regions (Barber, 1997, p. 20;
Church & Reid, 1999, p. 646). Indeed, as Sinclair and Page (1993, p. 479) note, “by
reducing the significance of the boundary between Kent and Nord-Pas de Calais, the
Tunnel provided the rationale for the establishment of the UK’s first Transfrontier
Development Programme”. Consequently, the Transmanche Region became the first
Interreg programme to cross a maritime border, as well as the first programme in
Great Britain (Church & Reid, 1999, p. 646; Sparke, 2000, p. 203).
Having seen the success of Kent and Nord-Pas de Calais, other local authorities
in south-east England and northern France lobbied for their inclusion in the next
programme. Given the highly competitive process and a lack of central government
support (Church & Reid, 1995, p. 303), many of these attempts were unsuccessful.
However the wider geographical scope of the Interreg II programme (1994–1999)
meant the county of East Sussex and the French de´partements of the Somme and
Seine-Maritime were eligible to participate under the so-called Rives-Manche area, in
addition to a new programme between Kent and Nord-Pas de Calais (Church & Reid,
1996, p. 1308).
More broadly, the completion of the Single European Market in 1993 was another
important contextual factor. This effectively removed economic barriers and, like the
Channel Tunnel, had the potential to bring significant economic benefits (Church &
Reid, 1995, p. 298). Significant growth was expected, particularly through the transport
links between Kent and Nord-Pas de Calais (Casson & Dardanelli, 2012, p. 603).
However, while administrative and economic barriers were removed, geographical
barriers—namely the Channel itself—still persisted (Heddebaut, 2001, pp. 61–62).
Again, co-operation was seen as a way to capitalize on opportunities and address
challenges.
LGTN therefore developed in response to these contextual factors; it was a reaction
to a new political reality brought about through closer transport links and European
integration (Church & Reid, 1999, p. 646). Sparke (2000) frames this new reality as a
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series of ‘geographical imaginations’: ‘infrastructural’, based on the Channel Tunnel
and new transport links, ‘Eurocratic’, based on EU programmes such as Interreg
designed to promote co-operation, and ‘entrepreneurial’, based on the economic identity
of a new cross-border region. The impact and potential opportunities of this ‘new
reality’ overrode marked administrative, geographical and economic differences between
south-east England and northern France (Church & Reid, 1995, p. 302), not to mention
the often opposing ideological and cultural foundations of their leaders (Barber, 1997,
p. 20; Church & Reid, 1996, p. 1305). As Sparke (2000, p. 196) observed, co-operation:
developed in the context of a highly uneven and divided social, political,
and economic geography, marked by a long history of disconnection and
division . . . Thus, the initial plans for cross-channel cooperation were made
by very different areas with contrasting regional identities, policy-making
environments, and economies, and with few common understandings of
regional interdependence.
4.2.2 Early examples of LGTN
Existing literature has charted the development of LGTN by councils in the English
Channel region during the 1990s. In particular, Church and Reid (1995, 1996, 1999)
provided comprehensive research into several cases of cross-border co-operation in this
area68. The emergence of this networking activity is now summarized.
Early examples of bilateral networking
From the late 1980s a number of cross-border bilateral agreements were signed by
councils on either side of the English Channel (Bule´on & Shurmer-Smith, 2008,
p. 174)69. According to Church and Reid (1996, p. 1303) the co-operation agreement
68 Other studies include Bule´on and Shurmer-Smith (2008); Heddebaut (2001, 2004); Sparke (2000);
Thomas (2006) and Wise (2000a, 2000b). Barber (1997) and King (2009) supplement these with
practitioner accounts. Most of these studies focus on the relationship between Kent and Nord-Pas
de Calais.
69 The first cross-Channel bilateral agreement actually dates from 1971 between Devon County
Council and the de´partement of Calvados. This was followed by a tri-lateral agreement between
Somerset County Council, Dorset County Council and the Manche de´partement in 1984. However,
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between Kent and Nord-Pas de Calais (Kent County Council & Conseil re´gional du
Nord-Pas de Calais, 1987) was the first of its kind between English and French local
authorities. This agreement established the so-called ‘Transmanche Region’ which
provided a framework for co-operation between the two authorities in the areas of
strategic planning, economic development, training, cultural and artistic exchange,
tourism and joint promotional campaigns (Barber, 1997, p. 20). This was targeted at
each authority’s coastal areas (Church & Reid, 1996, pp. 1303–1304; Heddebaut, 2001,
p. 64)70.
Hampshire’s agreement with Basse-Normandie followed in 1989. Following the
Kent–Nord-Pas de Calais example, this accord formalized co-operation in certain policy
areas; namely transportation, tourism, technology, research and training and education
(Hampshire County Council & Conseil re´gional de Basse-Normandie, 1989). Another
co-operation agreement, between East Sussex and Haute-Normandie, was signed in
1993 (East Sussex County Council & Conseil re´gional de Haute-Normandie, 1993).
This trend of bilateral co-operation continued across the Channel through the 1990s.
By 1996, 11 such agreements were in place between local authorities in England and
France along the Channel coast (Poussard, n.d.)71. Table 4.2 lists these bilateral links
which were present between the local authorities studied.
While cross-border co-operation was the main focus, a small number of links
further afield were also made. For example Bretagne signed a co-operation agreement
with Saxony in Germany (Conseil re´gional de Bretagne & Freistaat Sachsen, 1995).
Similarly, East Sussex signed accords with Veszpre´m in Hungary (East Sussex
County Council & Veszpre´m Megye O¨nkorma´nyzata, 1996) and Kreis Pinneberg in
Germany (East Sussex County Council & Kreis Pinneberg, n.d.). In all cases, bilateral
such agreements did not become widespread until the late 1980s and early 1990s (Bule´on &
Shurmer-Smith, 2008, p. 174; Poussard, n.d.).
70 For a fuller discussion of the Kent–Nord-Pas de Calais link and the development of the
Transmanche Region during the 1990s see Barber (1997) and Church and Reid (1995, 1996,
1999).
71 Not including the multilateral Arc Manche network, which is discussed below.
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Bilateral cross-border links
Kent County Council & Conseil re´gional du Nord-Pas de Calais.
East Sussex County Council & Conseil re´gional de Haute-Normandie.
East Sussex County Council & Conseil ge´ne´ral de la Somme.
West Sussex County Council & Conseil re´gional de Haute-Normandie.
Hampshire County Council & Conseil re´gional de Basse-Normandie.
Conseil re´gional de Picardie & Essex County Council.
Conseil re´gional de Bretagne & Cornwall County Council.
Table 4.2: Bilateral cross-border networking in the case study areas during the mid-1990s (Bule´on &
Shurmer-Smith, 2008, p. 175; Poussard, n.d.-a)
accords were established to focus co-operation between local autorities in specific, yet
substantive, policy areas, usually surrounding economic development. This marked a
departure from the traditional town twinning links, which merely fostered culutral
and civic exchange.
Early examples of multilateral networking
While this bilateral networking proliferated, multilateral networking also began
to emerge. Towards the west of the case study area Hampshire, Bretagne,
Haute-Normandie, Basse-Normandie and Picardie were involved in the Atlantic Arc
Commission, which also included members from the rest of the UK and France, Ireland,
Spain and Portugal. The formation of this network, during the late 1980s, was a
bottom–up endeavour by the local and regional authorities involved, and seen as a
way to counteract the adverse effects of peripherality and perceived centralization in
European Community decision making (Wise, 2000b, p. 866)72. The Isle of Wight was
a member of a similar body known as the Islands Commission while Nord-Pas de Calais
was a member of the North Sea Commission. All of these commissions came under the
umbrella of a wider multilateral network, the Conference of Peripheral and Maritime
72 For a fuller discussion on the Atlantic Arc Commission during the 1990s see Poussard (1997) and
Wise (2000b, 2000a).
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Regions (CPMR), which had a membership from across Europe.
A similar—although not under the umbrella of the CPMR—network is the Arc
Manche, formed in 1995. By 1997 it included all the northern French re´gions along with
Kent, East Sussex, West Sussex, Hampshire and the Isle of Wight on the English side73.
As with the Atlantic Arc Commission, the initiative to form the Arc Manche came from
the local and regional authorities involved and was seen as a way to complement the
existing bilateral links between many of its members, working on the assumption that
a larger grouping of authorities would be in a better position to achieve their aims
(Church & Reid, 1999, p. 650). Its main policy concern was around maritime issues
and seeking to influence European policy regarding the Channel area (Barber, 1997,
p. 22)74. It received no external funding and relied mainly on the voluntary support of
officer time from member authorities (Church & Reid, 1999, p. 650).
Towards the east of the case study area, Kent and Nord-Pas de Calais joined the
Belgian regions of Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels-Capital in 1991 in a network under
the name of ‘Euroregion’. While this was a development on the existing bilateral
Transmanche Region between Kent and Nord-Pas de Calais, the Euroregion aimed
to complement this relationship rather than replace it (Barber, 1997, p. 21; Church
& Reid, 1995, p. 301; 1996, p. 1305; 1999, p. 647). With a secretariat in Brussels,
the work of the Euroregion focused on economic development, strategic planning
and transport, the environment, exchange of expertise and promoting the Euroregion
(Barber, 1997, p. 22; Thomas, 2006, p. 14). As with the Arc Manche, the Euroregion was
not significantly funded and was resourced by staff time from the authorities involved
(Church & Reid, 1999, p. 647). While the Euroregion was foremostly composed of the
local and regional authorities concerned, it also sought to involve other local actors, such
73 This was before the 1998 local government re-organization in the UK, so the unitary authorities of
Brighton and Hove City Council, Medway Council, Portsmouth City Council and Southampton
City Council did not exist in their current form at this time.
74 For a fuller discussion of Arc Manche during the 1990s see Church and Reid (1999). The role of
LGTN in lobbying and influencing the EU is explored in detail in Section 5.3.
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as chambers of commerce, universities and the private sector (Barber, 1997, p. 22)75.
While these examples of LGTN involved regional and county level local authorities,
there were also cases involving lower tiers of local government. The Transmanche
Metropole involved the local authorities of Caen, Le Havre and Rouen in France and
Southampton, Portsmouth, Bournemouth and Poole in England. This multilateral
network built upon existing national networks between these cities (Church & Reid,
1995, pp. 302–303). Although it was formed around a “loose” economic accord (Church
& Reid, 1995, p. 303), its aim was to promote co-operative ventures and thus bid for
support under the EU’s Interreg programme (Church & Reid, 1996, pp. 1307–1308)76.
While this was not initially successful, it did nevertheless highlight the impact Interreg
had on LGTN77.
Early examples of transnational projects
Interreg led to the development of a number of transnational links. The Interreg I
programme between Kent and Nord-Pas de Calais (1990–1993) led to 68 projects
between local actors, many involving local authorities. This in turn led to several
long-standing partnerships between these actors, many of which continued well beyond
the life of the programme itself (Barber, 1997, p. 21). This was the same case under
wider Interreg II Rives-Manche programme which—as with the initial Kent–Nord-Pas
de Calais Interreg I programme—stimulated cross-border co-operation between a
variety of local actors in south-east England and northern France (Church & Reid,
1996, p. 1309). While many local authorities were engaged in LGTN before they were
75 For a fuller discussion of the Euroregion during the 1990s see Barber (1997); Heddebaut (2001,
2004) and Thomas (2006).
76 Church and Reid (1995, pp. 302–303; 1996, p. 1307) also note that the UK cities involved in
the Transmanche Metropole were motivated by a desire to promote their own local identities
and, as local government re-organization had yet to take place, were looking for a way to
counteract county council policies they did not agree with. This was confirmed by one of the
study’s participants who worked for one of the councils concerned at the time (Interview with
former English local officer, July 2012 [Int. 38]).
77 For a fuller discussion of the Transmanche Metropole during the 1990s see Church and Reid
(1995, 1996).
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eligible for Interreg support, Church and Reid (1995, p. 304) argue that it was the
prospect of EU funding which often “provided the catalyst” for co-operation, whether
this was participating in joint projects or co-ordinating lobbying efforts78.
Summary
This section has provided an overview of LGTN undertaken by local authorities in
south-east England and northern France during the 1990s. During this period local
authorities proactively built bilateral links with their cross-border colleagues and
these links were gradually supplemented with emerging multilateral networks involving
several authorities. The Interreg programmes, and the gradual increase in the eligible
areas for support, also served as a catalyst to co-operation, facilitating a number of
transnational projects between English and French local authorities. Rees (1997) shows
this facilitation role applied across western Europe at the time. The overlapping and
complementary cross-border links operating across the Channel which developed led
to what Church and Reid (1995, p. 302) called a “complex organizational context”.
Additionally, it demonstrated local authorities’ ability to be dynamic and flexible in
their approach to LGTN while remaining committed to co-operation (Church & Reid,
1999, pp. 647–648).
While LGTN proliferated, the literature focused mainly on the cross-border links.
Indeed, many of the examples noted above are identified as ‘cross-border regions’ by
Perkmann (2003)79. This is despite evidence that wider inter-regional networking was
also present at this time80. Indeed Church and Reid (1999, p. 651) mention Brighton’s
78 For a fuller discussion of the development of the Interreg programmes in south-east England and
northern France during the 1990s see Church (2007).
79 Those specifically identified by Perkmann (2003, pp. 161–162) as cross-border regions involving
local government in south-east England and northern France are the Kent–Nord-Pas de
Calais bilateral link, the Euroregion, the Atlantic Arc Commission, the Arc Manche and the
Rives-Manche area.
80 Evidence does exist in the literature at this time of wider inter-regional networks, such as
Eurocities (see Griffiths, 1995; Sampaio, 1994) or the Four Motors (see Borra´s, 1993; Murphy,
1993). However, no reference is made to the involvement of local government in south-east England
or northern France, with the exception of McAleavey and Mitchell’s (1994) examination of RETI.
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involvement in four multilateral networks81. This was further confirmed by interview
participants who had experience of LGTN during the 1990s and who were able to
offer examples, such as Southampton’s involvement in the Telecities82 and Smartcities
networks83. This focus on cross-border co-operation may be as a result of Church
and Reid’s (1995, p. 305) assertion that it is the “most explicit” form of LGTN.
An exception is McAleavey and Mitchell’s (1994) examination of the Association of
European Regions of Industrial Technology (RETI) network, which involved Nord-Pas
de Calais along with other local and regional authorities from across Europe (see also
Benington & Harvey, 1998; Lawrence, 2000). RETI formed out of the Objective 2
lobby and sought to make the case for continued support for regions with declining
industry84.
Nevertheless, this heavy focus on cross-border networking as opposed to wider
transnational activity represents a shortcoming in existing scholarship. A lack of
contemporary literature on LGTN in the English Channel region represents another.
As will be shown below, LGTN has evolved since the 1990s; it has increased in intensity
and moved beyond geographical contiguity. The existing literature is therefore unable
to contribute an understanding of the current extent of LGTN undertaken by local
authorities in south-east England and northern France85. To address these gaps, this
chapter now presents a contemporary analysis of this activity.
81 These were the Medium Sized Cities Commission, the Co-ordinated Action for Seaside Towns
Network (COAST), HELIOS and Telecities (Church & Reid, 1999, p. 651).
82 See Go¨tzel (2002) and Serra (2005) for a discussion on the Telecities network.
83 Interview with former English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 38).
84 RETI also provided a forum to discuss and exchange ideas between its members. For a fuller
discussion of the Objective 2 lobby and RETI during the 1990s see McAleavey and Mitchell
(1994) and Lawrence (2000).
85 Thomas’s (2006) analysis of the Euroregion is an exception to this, although it is focused largely
on the Euroregion’s activity and context during the 1990s.
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4.3 Overview of LGTN: 2001–2011
The empirical data gathered for this study reveal a number of general findings relating
to local government’s contemporary participation in LGTN. Altogether the 14 councils
studied were involved in 302 transnational links between 2001 and 2011. These links
are summarized in Table 4.3 and visualized in Figure 4.1. Visualizations for individual
councils are included in Appendix L86.
The visualization of this activity and the summary of links illustrate a number of key
points. Firstly, LGTN remains prevalent in south-east England and northern France
and continues during a period marked by austerity and public finance pressures. This
reinforces the relevance of the empirical puzzle discussed in Section 1.2. The number
of links varies between councils. For example in England, Kent is by far the most
active with 47 links, while Portsmouth has only eight. Similarly in France, Nord-Pas
de Calais has 34 links while Picardie only has 13. Nonetheless, all of the councils studied
participated in LGTN in one form or another. Overall, councils were involved in an
average of just over 20 transnational links87. In both countries the authorities closest
to international borders—Kent and Nord-Pas de Calais—have the most links. This
suggests geographical proximity to a border may affect the level of participation in
LGTN88.
Secondly, some councils often prefer participating in certain forms of LGTN as
opposed to others. For example, Bretagne prefers participating in multilateral networks
as opposed to bilateral networking or transnational projects. Medway Council, on the
other hand, favours transnational projects, while bilateral networking forms a large
proportion of East Sussex County Council’s activity.
86 These visualizations were carried out using social network analysis software. Transnational links
engaged in by the councils in the case study areas were entered into this software which then
visually mapped them. The purpose here was to visualize the prevalence of LGTN rather than
to carry out any quantitative social network analysis.
87 The average (mean) number of links for a council in south-east England was 21.11 and in northern
France was 22.4.
88 Although Chapter 6 reveals a diverse range of factors account for this variation.
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Kent County Council 4 5 38 47
Medway Council 1 0 26 27
East Sussex County Council 5 1 9 15
Brighton and Hove City Council 1 5 13 19
West Sussex County Council 2 6 4 12
Hampshire County Council 1 8 16 25
Portsmouth City Council 1 0 7 8
Southampton City Council 4 6 12 22
Isle of Wight Council 0 4 11 15
Conseil re´gional du Nord-Pas de Calais 3 11 20 34
Conseil re´gional de Picardie 2 4 7 13
Conseil re´gional de Haute-Normandie 4 4 11 19
Conseil re´gional de Basse-Normandie 4 7 10 21
Conseil re´gional de Bretegne 3 13 9 25
Totals 35 74 193 302
Table 4.3: Summary of transnational links participated in by local authorities in south-east England
and northern France, 2001–2011
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Figure 4.1: Visualization of LGTN activity undertaken by local authorities in south-east England and
northern France, 2001–2011
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Thirdly, Figure 4.1 illustrates the complexity of LGTN. Different councils were often
members of the same networks. For example, all the councils studied except Medway
and Portsmouth were members of the Arc Manche network. Similarly Hampshire, the
Isle of Wight and all the northern French re´gions have all been members of the CPMR.
These mutual links also applied beyond the councils studied. For example, while
Basse-Normandie had formed a bilateral relationship with Tuscany in Italy, they were
further linked through their mutual membership of five other multilateral networks89.
Tuscany’s membership of these networks meant it also had indirect links with all the
other northern French re´gions along with Hampshire, the Isle of Wight and West
Sussex, and several other local and regional authorities elsewhere in Europe outside of
the case study area. These overlapping links were regarded by some local authorities as a
way to further reinforce co-operation90. In many cases, pre-existing bilateral networking
led to further co-operation in the form of transnational projects, sometimes involving
other partners too. The most illustrative example of this is the bilateral link between
Kent and Nord-Pas de Calais and the resulting participation in transnational projects
this led to; between 2001 and 2011 these two councils participated in 11 mutual projects
along with four mutual multilateral networks (see Figure 4.2).
On other occasions multilateral networks themselves are involved in projects which
their members are participating in. This confirms earlier observations by Benington
(1994, p. 31) and Ward and Williams (1997, p. 462) that such networks often act
as a sponsor or incubator for sub-networks. For example the REALM project91 led
by Hampshire County Council has the support of the AER, of which Hampshire
is also a member. The AER has also developed direct links with other multilateral
networks, for example the Arc Manche, the Assembly of the European Regions
89 The networks linking Basse-Normandie and Tuscany are the CPMR, GMO-free Regions Network,
AREFLH, AREPO and ERRIN.
90 Interview with French regional officer, August 2012 (Int. 36).
91 The REALM project (Regional Adult Learning Multipliers and the Europe 2020 Flagship
Initiatives) aimed to better connect adult learning in European regions with EU policy
development. Further information is available at: www3.hants.gov.uk/realm.htm.
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Figure 4.2: Mutual transnational links between Kent and Nord-Pas de Calais
Producing Fruit, Vegetables and Plants (AREFLH), the European Regions Research
and Innovation Network (ERRIN) and NEREUS (AER, 2012a, 2012b). This trend of
networks interacting with each other has been identified elsewhere in the literature
(Bulkeley et al., 2003, p. 247)92. The AER’s—and other networks’—overlapping links
with local authorities, transnational projects and other multilateral networks is an
illustration of how complex LGTN has become (see Figure 4.3). Further complexity is
introduced by the fact multilateral networks and transnational projects sometimes also
involved non-local authority members. Multilateral networks such as Eurocities and
NEREUS include business partners, while ERRIN involves local and regional research
establishments and universities.
Fourthly, as expected, there is a degree of overlap between bilateral links,
multilateral networks and transnational projects. In some cases bilateral networking
92 While networks co-operate, they also compete with each other for limited resources and members
(Bulkeley et al., 2003, p. 247).
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Figure 4.3: Direct links developed by the AER
provides the foundation for wider multilateral networks. For example, the bilateral
links between Kent and Nord-Pas de Calais, and West Sussex and Haute-Normandie
ultimately led to the creation of the Euroregion and the Arc Manche respectively.
As noted above, bilateral links have also led to transnational projects. In other
cases permanent multilateral networks have been born out of seemingly temporary
transnational projects; the Promoting Operational Links through Integrated Systems
(POLIS) network is one example of this93, as is the Energy Cities network (Kern &
Bulkeley, 2009, p. 317).
While Table 4.3 and Figure 4.1 show the links case study councils engaged in
between 2001 and 2011, they do not account for how the level of participation changes
over time. As will be demonstrated in the following sections, the level of engagement
with LGTN is in a constant state of flux. As one French regional officer stated:
93 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 23).
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it’s a kind of wave, it’s always changing.94
An English local officer similarly observed that:
a lot of local authorities have had peaks and troughs of interest in
engagement.95
This instability has been observed elsewhere in the empirical literature, with van der
Heiden (2010, p. 150) noting that “many of these international interurban networks
disappear as quickly as they emerged”. These cases are considered in this analysis as,
in the words of Handley (2006, p. 23), “it is not necessary to dismiss a partnership
simply because it has been inactive in recent years”96.
The above analysis shows not only that LGTN remains prevalent, but also that
this activity is characterized by complexity and overlapping relationships operating at a
European level. While complex, the diversity of links present provides local government
with a degree of flexibility to pursue specific networking opportunities in line with a
local authority’s context or strategic objectives97. Having provided an overview, LGTN
is now discussed in more detail, following the categorization advanced in Section 4.1.
4.4 Contemporary LGTN in detail
4.4.1 Contemporary bilateral networking
Many local authorities in south-east England and northern France have continued their
involvement in the bilateral networks formed since the late 1980s. In addition new ones
have been formed. Indeed, while the number of bilateral links differs from council
to council, all of the local authorities studied except one—the Isle of Wight—have
94 Interview with French regional officer, September 2012 (Int. 50).
95 Interview with English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 08).
96 This fluctuation is accounted for in Section 5.7.2 which shows that local authorities would cease
engagement where LGTN no longer served their interests.
97 This strategic approach is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
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participated in bilateral networking with European counterparts98. These are outlined
in Table 4.4. In most cases a co-operation agreement forms the basis of these bilateral
links, which usually focuses co-operation on specific policy areas (for example Conseil
re´gional de Basse-Normandie & Hordaland Fylkeskommune, 2013; Conseil re´gional de
Basse-Normandie & Regione Toscana Consiglio Regionale, 2005; East Sussex County
Local authority Bilateral links
Kent Ba´cs-Kiskun (Hungary), Nord-Pas de Calais (France), Pas-de
Calais (France), West Flanders (Belgium)
Medway Dunkirk (France)
East Sussex Haute-Normandie (France), Kreis Pinneberg (Germany),
Seine-Maritime (France), Somme (France), Veszpre`m,
(Hungary)
Brighton and Hove Aalborg (Denmark)
West Sussex Haute-Normandie (France), Tolna (Hungary)
Hampshire Basse-Normandie (France)
Portsmouth Caen (France)
Southampton Kaliningrad (Russia), Kalisz (Poland), Le Havre (France),
Rems Murr-Kreis (Germany)
Isle of Wight No bilateral links present
Nord-Pas de Calais Flanders (Belgium), Kent (UK), Wallonia (Belgium)
Picardie Thu¨ringen (Germany), Trencˇin (Solvenia)
Haute-Normandie East Sussex (UK), Lower Saxony (Germany), Pomerania
(Poland), West Sussex (UK)
Basse-Normandie Bremen (Germany), Hampshire (UK), Hordaland (Norway),
Tuscany (Italy)
Bretagne Saxony (Germany), Wales (UK), Wielkopolska (Poland)
Table 4.4: Bilateral networking between councils studied and other European local authorities,
2001–2011
98 It is also worth noting that some of the councils studied have engaged in bilateral networking
beyond Europe. In south-east England, for example, Kent County Council has built a link with
Virginia in the US (see Casson & Dardanelli, 2012) (Interviews with English local officer, May
2012, and English councillor, May 2012 [Int. 04; Int. 05]), and Southampton City Council with
Qingdao in China (Southampton City Council, 2007b). Similarly in northern France, Nord-Pas de
Calais has bilateral links with regions in Brazil, Morocco, Mali and Senegal, and Haute-Normandie
has links with Madagascar and Algeria (Interviews with French regional officers, September 2012
[Int. 50; Int. 61; Int. 62]). These links are not included in this study as it is primarily concerned
with European LGTN.
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Council & Conseil ge´ne´ral de Seine-Maritime, 1996)99. In some cases, however, a formal
agreement is not present and co-operation exists on an informal basis.
Among the bilateral links that are present are the more obvious cross-border ones,
for example between Kent and Nord-Pas de Calais or between Nord-Pas de Calais
and Wallonia. As discussed, many of these formed during the late 1980s and early
1990s. While most of these links have continued, new cross-border relationships have
been established, for example between Kent and the de´partement of Pas-de-Calais,
or between Bretange and Wales (Conseil re´gional de Bretagne & Welsh Assembly
Government, 2004; Kent County Council & Conseil ge´ne´ral du Pas-de-Calais, 2005).
Also during this period, French re´gions sought to re-affirm some of their existing
bilateral links, usually through joint declarations or renewed co-operation agreements
(for example Conseil re´gional de Bretagne & Freistaat Sachsen, 2005; Conseil re´gional
de Picardie & Freistaat Thu¨ringen, 2003, 2007, 2009).
Bilateral networking has also been sustained through joint working. This takes a
number of forms. For example the leader of Kent County Council and the president
of the Pas-de-Calais de´partement participate in an annual meeting to establish a
programme of work for the forthcoming year100. Another example is the case of the
Hampshire–Basse-Normandie bilateral link, where each council takes it in turns to host
an annual delegation from the other101.
Additionally councils now participate in bilateral networking beyond their
traditional cross-border and historical ties. This is particularly the case with local
authorities in central and eastern Europe. Examples include links between Kent
99 Other examples of bilateral co-operation agreements include East Sussex County Council and
Conseil re´gional de Haute-Normandie (1993); East Sussex County Council and Kreis Pinneberg
(n.d.); East Sussex County Council and Veszpre´m Megye O¨nkorma´nyzata (1996); Hampshire
County Council and Conseil re´gional de Basse-Normandie (1989); Kent County Council and
Ba´cs-Kiskun County General Assembly (2004); Kent County Council and Conseil ge´ne´ral
du Pas-de-Calais (2005); Kent County Council and Conseil re´gional du Nord-Pas de Calais
(1987); Conseil re´gional de Bretagne and Freistaat Sachsen (1995); Conseil re´gional de Bretagne
and Województwo Wielkopolskie (2005a); Conseil re´gional de Bretagne and Welsh Assembly
Government (2004).
100 Interview with English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 04).
101 Interviews with English local officers, July 2012 and September 2012 (Int. 21; Int. 45).
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and Ba´cs-Kiskun in Hungary, Bretagne and Wielkopolska in Poland, and Picardie
and Trencˇin in Slovenia102. This confirms Church and Reid’s (1996, p. 1304) earlier
observation that experience through initial cross-border links encourages wider LGTN,
often with authorities further afield. Again, in many cases co-operation agreements
formalize these relationships (for example East Sussex County Council & Veszpre´m
Megye O¨nkorma´nyzata, 1996; Kent County Council & Ba´cs-Kiskun County General
Assembly, 2004; Conseil re´gional de Bretagne & Województwo Wielkopolskie, 2005a),
although not in all.
While the evidence suggests the number of these bilateral links has increased since
the 1990s, participants stated the level of interest and engagement in these links varies
over time. One participant noted:
those alliances have already been formed and they ebb and flow, so there’ll be
swathes of time when they’re not doing anything at all and it’s just a notional
partnership.103
For example, the link between Kent and the re´gion of Nord-Pas de Calais has become
less active over the previous few years, in part because preference had been given
to developing a link with the de´partement of Pas-de-Calais. However, there was once
again interest to re-establish it104. It was also noted that Basse-Normandie’s links with
Tuscany and Hampshire were not currently in use, despite them being active in 2006105.
The West Sussex–Haute-Normandie link has also recently become inactive106.
In some cases bilateral networking was not actively pursued. For the relatively
new English unitary councils this was because there was no tradition of bilateral
102 A link between East Sussex County Council and Veszpre´m in Hungary has existed since the
mid-1990s (East Sussex County Council & Veszpre´m Megye O¨nkorma´nyzata, 1996).
103 Interview with English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 11).
104 Interview with English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 04).
105 Interview with French regional officer, August 2012 (Int. 37) and personal communication
with French regional officer, July 2013. This is confirmed on a recent map produced by
Basse-Normandie which describes their co-operation agreements with Hampshire and Tuscany
as “coope´ration en veille” or ‘co-operation on standby’ (Conseil re´gional de Basse-Normandie,
2014).
106 Personal communication with English local officer, July 2013.
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co-operation or civic twinning, as had developed with the older county councils during
the 1990s. One local officer from a unitary council commented:
As a relatively new council, unitary authority, which was set up in 1997 we
don’t have traditional town twinning links, we don’t have that background
. . . So our approach has always been around networks and multilateral links
rather than bilateral links, we found that’s the way we want to go.107
Other councils, such as Medway, preferred to co-operate with European local
authorities on a case by case basis through transnational projects rather than being tied
into working with a limited number of authorities through co-operation agreements108.
4.4.2 Contemporary multilateral networking
All councils studied, except Medway and Portsmouth, participated in multilateral
networks109. These links are outlined in Table 4.5. These multilateral networks can
be sub-categorized into cases of cross-border regions and inter-regional networks (see
Table 4.6). While the focus during the 1990s was on membership to cross-border
networks such as the Euroregion or the Arc Manche, the contemporary empirical
evidence indicates that most local authorities have become members of wider
inter-regional networks and that these networks are far more prevalent than their
cross-border counterparts. This supports the argument that local government’s
approach to LGTN has gradually evolved from the initial bilateral networking
developed from the late 1980s, to the multilateral cross-border networks of the
mid-1990s, to the wider inter-regional networks of the present day.
The categorization between cross-border and inter-regional networks also illustrates
the wide variety of policy areas covered by the multilateral networks local authorities
107 Interview with English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 12).
108 Interview with English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 40).
109 Sometimes there were different levels of membership for networks. For example most councils
studied were full members of the Arc Manche, however East Sussex and the Isle of Wight were
only ‘associate members’. This study does not make a distinction in such cases as regardless of
membership level, councils are still engaged in the network.
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Local authority Multilateral networks
Kent Arc Manche, EU Straits Initiative, European Network of High
Speed Regions, Euroregion, MOT
Medway No participation in multilateral networks
East Sussex Arc Manche
Brighton and Hove Arc Manche, CIVITAS Network, Eurocities, European Cities
Tourism Network, Eurotowns.
West Sussex AER, ARC, Arc Manche, Dynamo Regions Network, POLIS,
PURPLE
Hampshire AER, Arc Manche, Atlantic Arc Commission, CIVITAS
Network, CPMR, Dynamo Regions Network, POLIS,
TransChannel Partnership Network
Portsmouth No participation in multilateral networks
Southampton AMRIE, Arc Manche, Energy Cities, Eurocities, Maritime
Cities Network, POLIS
Isle of Wight Arc Manche, CPMR, Islands Commission, Dynamo Regions
Network
Nord-Pas de Calais Arc Manche, CPMR, EGTC Flandre–Dunkerque–Coˆte d’Opale,
ERRIN, Eurometropole Lille–Kortrijk–Tournai, European
Network of High Speed Regions, Euroregion, GMO-free
Regions Network, MOT, North Sea Commission, PURPLE
Picardie AER, Arc Manche, CPMR, ERRIN
Haute-Normandie Arc Manche, CPMR, Dynamo Regions Network, GMO-free
Regions Network
Basse-Normandie Arc Manche, AREFLH, AREPO, Atlantic Arc Commission,
CPMR, ERRIN, GMO-free Regions Network
Bretagne AER, Arc Manche, AREFLH, AREPO, Atlantic Arc
Commission, CPMR, EARLALL, ERRIN, GMO-free Regions
Network, NECSTouR, NEREUS, NPLD, nrg4SD
Table 4.5: Membership to multilateral networks by councils studied, 2001–2011
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Cross-border regions Inter-regional networks
Arc Manche AER
Atlantic Arc Commission AMRIE
Eurometropole Lille–Kortrijk–Tournai ARC
Euroregion AREFLH
EGTC Flandre–Dunkerque–Coˆte d’Opale AREPO
North Sea Commission CIVITAS Network
TransChannel Partnership Network CPMR
Dynamo Regions Network
EARLALL
Energy Cities
ERRIN
EU Straits Initiative
Eurocities
European Cities Tourism Network
European Network of High Speed Regions
Eurotowns
GMO-free Regions Network
Islands Commission
Maritime Cities Network
Mission Ope´rationnelle Transfrontalie`re
NECSTouR
NEREUS
NPLD
nrg4SD
POLIS
PURPLE
Table 4.6: Categorization of multilateral networks according to Perkmann’s (2003) typology
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are members of. Indeed most multilateral networks can be considered as ‘thematically
focused’ rather than general or multi purpose (see Table 4.7). This represents another
departure from the activity of the 1990s, where early examples of LGTN—such as
the Arc Manche and the Euroregion—predominantly facilitated co-operation in a
number of different policy areas simultaneously rather than specialize in one field.
Local authorities can therefore choose from a portfolio of European transnational
networks to suit their local circumstances and in line with their strategic aims or
priority policy areas110. Indeed, local authorities are aware of this diversity, observing
“that the Brussels regional scene has well developed networks” covering several niche
areas of policy (SEERA, 2005b).
In some cases councils played a role in establishing some of these networks. West
Sussex and Haute-Normandie, for example, led on the development of the Arc Manche
network111. West Sussex also—with North Holland—established the ARC112. Bretagne
played an important role in the establishment of the Atlantic Arc Commission and
the related CPMR (Wise, 2000b, p. 865; Wise, 2000a, p. 866)113. In other cases local
authorities play an important role in the strategic leadership of some of these networks.
For example Bretagne held the vice presidency of the European Association of Regional
and Local Authorities for Lifelong Learning (EARLALL)114, Basse-Normandie was
on ERRIN’s board, Hampshire has been a member of the AER’s presidium115 and
Brighton and Hove twice held the presidency of the Eurotowns network116. While these
leadership roles frequently change, they further indicate the importance of LGTN to
local government.
As with bilateral networking, the level of involvement in multilateral networking
changed over time; local authorities regularly leave networks and join new ones. For
110 This strategic approach to LGTN is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
111 Interview with English councillor, April 2012 (Int. 02).
112 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 09).
113 Interview with French regional officer, August 2012 (Int. 36).
114 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 10).
115 Interview with English local officer, September 2012 (Int. 45).
116 Interview with English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 12).
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General / multi purpose networks Thematically focused networks
AER AMRIE
Arc Manche ARC
Dynamo Regions Network AREFLH
EGTC Flandre–Dunkeraque–Coˆte d’Opale AREPO
Eurocities Atlantic Arc Commission
Eurometropole Lille–Kortrijk–Tournai CIVITAS Network
Euroregion CPMR
Eurotowns EARLALL
Mission Ope´rationnelle Transfrontalie`re Energy Cities
TransChannel Partnership Network ERRIN
European Cities Tourism Network
European Network of High Speed Regions
EU Straits Initiative
GMO-free Regions Network
Islands Commission
Maritime Cities Network
NECSTouR
NEREUS
North Sea Commission
NPLD
nrg4SD
POLIS
PURPLE
Table 4.7: General purpose vs. thematically focused multilateral networks
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example the Isle of Wight withdrew from the CPMR in 2005 (Isle of Wight Council,
2005). Hampshire County Council withdrew from the same network in 2012117. West
Sussex County Council left the Arc Manche network in 2011 (West Sussex County
Council, 2011), and it had also left the ARC118. This is not to suggest local authorities
are cutting their links, however. For example, while West Sussex had earlier left the
AER, it immediately sought other opportunities to form new links at a European level
(West Sussex County Council, 2000). Similarly, Brighton and Hove City Council left
the Eurotowns network in 2008 but then sought membership of the larger Eurocities
network as it was felt this would better serve the council’s interests (Brighton & Hove
City Council, 2008b). This trend of constantly reviewing membership to networks is not
new, having been identified by Church and Reid (1999, p. 651) during the mid-1990s.
Networks also fluctuate in terms of how active they are. The Arc Manche was cited
by many participants as an example of a network which regularly ebbed and flowed in
terms of activity. As one former English local officer stated:
Arc Manche fluctuated in terms of its strengths . . . started off strongly and
then there was a bit of a die down in activity in the late 1990s and then there
was a bit of a relaunch in the early 2000s.119
While this relaunch led to a renewed declaration of co-operation between the Arc
Manche members (Arc Manche, 2003), participants on both sides of the Channel noted
the network was recently in a lull of activity120. Nevertheless, there was interest in
reviving it again121. Indeed, local politicians were invited to discuss Arc Manche activity
during two cross-Channel forum events in Southampton in September 2012 and Caen
in March 2013122.
Multilateral networks also come and go. Indeed some networks which existed during
117 Interview with English councillor, July 2012 (Int. 25).
118 Interview with French regional officer, September 2012 (Int. 49).
119 Interview with former English local officer (Int. 29).
120 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 11; Int. 22; Int. 45; Int. 49).
121 Interviews with French regional officer, September 2012, and Interreg staff May 2012 (Int. 22;
Int. 49).
122 Participant observation, cross-Channel forums, September 2012 and March 2013 (Obs. 3; Obs. 6).
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the 1990s no longer do. For example the Transmanche Metropole had been operating
“in a low key manner” since it was unable to secure Interreg II funding (Church
& Reid, 1999, p. 649) and is now no longer active123. Even some of the networks
which local authorities participated in between 2001 and 2011 appear to be—as of
September 2014—disbanded, for example the Dynamo Regions network or the Alliance
of Maritime Regional Interests in Europe (AMRIE). The Euroregion, involving Kent
and Nord-Pas de Calais, is another example of a network no longer operating, having
become effectively dormant since 2003 (Thomas, 2006, p. 14), and ending in 2004
(Kent County Council, 2010a). Other networks appear to have undergone a re-branding
exercise, for example the European Cities Tourism Network is now known as ‘European
Cities Marketing’124.
4.4.3 Contemporary transnational projects
Participation in transnational projects forms the majority of LGTN activity undertaken
by local government, accounting for 193 links across the 14 councils studied. As already
noted, these networks involve a range of governmental and non-governmental actors.
As one participant highlighted:
one of the fundamental conditions of Interreg is to involve, to try to achieve
a form of triple-helix partnerships, which means public sector, private sector
and academic sector.125
As with bilateral and multilateral networking, the level of participation varies
between councils, but has increased overall since the 1990s. One explanation is the
expansion of eligible areas for Interreg and other EU funding programmes. Under the
123 Interview with former English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 38).
124 Another example of this is RETI, which changed its name from the Association of Traditional
Industrial Regions of Europe to the Association of European Regions of Industrial Technology.
According to McAleavey and Mitchell (1994, p. 245) this was “an attempt to dispel the image of
smokestack skylines conjured up by the concept of traditional industry in an effort to recruit as
many regions as possible”. The engagement and disengagement in LGTN is explored further in
Chapter 5, which argues it is a result of local authorities’ strategic approach.
125 Interview with former English regional officer, June 2012 (Int. 27).
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Interreg III programme (2000–2006) the number of eligible areas across the EU was
reduced. This meant the Transmanche area between Kent and Nord-Pas de Calais
and the Rives-Manche area between East Sussex, the Somme and Seine-Maritime
were merged into one programme (Church, 2007). While the eligible area for the
cross-border programme stayed largely the same between Interreg II and Interreg
III, local authorities across south-east England and northern France could now
access funding through the North West Europe transnational programme created
under the new ‘B’ strand of Interreg. This covered all of the UK, Ireland, Belgium,
Luxembourg, and included areas in northern France, western Germany and the south
of the Netherlands (Bule´on & Shurmer-Smith, 2008, p. 174). The eligible areas for
cross-border Interreg funding were further increased under Interreg IV (2007–2013),
and now covers the whole Channel area (see Figure 4.4)126. The introduction of the
URBACT programme in 2002 provided another opportunity for urban areas to bid for
funding for transnational projects. Local authorities are also able to access a range of
other EU funded programmes127.
However, while it is assumed such programmes promote LGTN (Church, 2007;
Church & Reid, 1995, 1996; Rees, 1997), the empirical evidence here points to a
more nuanced picture. While Interreg offers financial support and a framework for
transnational projects to take place—and participants recognized this—it is not the
only way local authorities can engage in this activity. East Sussex, for example,
participated in a range of transnational projects with French colleagues that were
independent of EU funding programmes128. Furthermore, as the above background
to LGTN (see Section 4.2.2) shows, local authorities were collaborating well before
Interreg and other EU programmes were available to them. Indeed, one member of
126 The expansion of the eligible area was largely brought about by the lobbying action of undertaken
by the Arc Manche network (Interview with Interreg staff, September 2012 [Int. 64]).
127 These included for the 2007–2013 programming period: the Interreg IVa
France–Wallonie–Vlaanderen programme, the Interreg IVb North West Europe programme, the
Interreg IVb Atlantic Area programme, Interreg IVc, the Life Environment programme and
several others.
128 Interview with English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 13).
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Figure 4.4: Interreg IVa programmes covering south-east England and northern France (Cross Channel
Atlas)
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Interreg staff noted that the majority of project bids they received were based on well
established pre-existing partnerships, which long outdated the Interreg programmes129.
Generally speaking, participation in transnational projects was higher among
local authorities in south-east England than it was in northern France. The English
councils participated in an average of 15.11 projects, whereas the French regions only
participated in an average of 11.4130. This was also highlighted by staff working for the
Interreg programmes, with one observing:
There is a different participation . . . In France, maybe, what we found more
in terms of participation, it’s a more strong participation of non-government
organizations. In the UK there is a big presence of counties, for example . . .
whereas in France it’s much more open to civil society somehow.131
This difference can be attributed to the different approaches English and French
local authorities take to transnational projects, especially those part-funded by the
EU. Generally speaking, English local authorities frequently participated directly in
transnational projects as partners and lead partners132, while French local government
preferred to take on a facilitation role, encouraging local stakeholders to participate
rather than take part themselves133. This was confirmed by one French regional
officer who referred to the regional council’s role as “building bridges” between EU
regional policy and local stakeholders134. Nonetheless, there were still differences
between councils within England and France. In particular local authorities who had
no experience of previous Interreg programmes before their expansion across the entire
English Channel—such as West Sussex or Bretagne—were less likely to participate135.
129 Interview with Interreg staff, September 2012 (Int. 64).
130 Mean averages.
131 Interview with Interreg staff, September 2012 (Int. 63).
132 Although this was not the case in all English local authorities studied. One English local officer
noted they spend 80 to 90 per cent of their time supporting project bids to organizations external
to the council, in a similar way to the French model (Interview with English local officer, May
2012 [Int. 13]).
133 Interviews with French regional officers, August 2012 and September 2012 (Int. 37; Int. 46; Int. 50;
Int. 65; Int. 66).
134 Interview with French regional officer, September 2012 (Int. 50).
135 Interview with Interreg staff, May 2012 (Int. 22).
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Where local authorities are involved in transnational projects, many are based
on existing bilateral relationships or membership to common multilateral networks.
Indeed, Interreg staff saw transnational projects as a way to build upon existing links
and produce something tangible out of them136. However, in some cases local authorities
preferred not to depend on these pre-existing relationships, instead choosing project
partners on a case by case basis. Medway is an example of this. As one participant
explained:
All our European projects have got all different partnerships . . . when we
develop a European project, we always accept any partner from the eligible
area, from any organization. We don’t refuse a partner because we haven’t
worked with them, we’re always open to it. That’s maybe different to some
organizations who like existing partnerships over ten years.137
The subjects and policy areas covered by transnational projects are diverse.
Accordingly these projects often involve other actors besides local government, for
example universities, charities, local businesses and a range of others. The number
of partners also varies from project to project, as does the policy focus. Table 4.8
illustrates this diversity and provides an overview of a small number of example projects
illustrating this diversity.
4.5 LGTN, MLG and local level Europeanization
As the preceding analysis has shown, engagement in LGTN has continued through
the 2000s. The continued presence of LGTN, and with it the recognition that local
authorities actively engage beyond their borders and mobilize at the European level,
serves to reinforce claims that the EU can be viewed as a multi-level polity. Section 2.1.1
outlined how LGTN could by characterized as a feature of Type II MLG in particular.
The empirical evidence presented in this chapter confirms this characterization. Three
136 Interview with Interreg staff, September 2012 (Int. 64).
137 Interview with English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 40).
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4. Extent of transnational networking
features are indicative of the Type II model: it describes functionally specific governance
arrangements, these arrangements transcend jurisdictional levels, and they are marked
by flexible designs which can come and go according to demands (Hooghe & Marks,
2003; Marks & Hooghe, 2004). On all three counts, LGTN fits this model, and confirms
it as a feature of MLG more generally. Firstly, LGTN by its very nature clearly
transcends both local and national borders.
Secondly, the majority of networks identified were functionally specific. This
was particularly clear with multilateral networks, where most focus on thematic
policy areas such as aviation policy, maritime policy, research and innovation
or agriculture (see Table 4.7). Many general purpose multilateral networks are
also functionally orientated, albeit often focusing on several thematic policy areas
simultaneously. This is particularly evident in cases of cross-border co-operation,
where cross-border policy challenges necessitate a joint and functional cross-border
response. It was also shown that multi purpose networks have set up policy specific
sub-groups and specialized thematic forums. This functionally specific orientation
can also be observed in other categories of LGTN. The accords used to establish
bilateral networking focus co-operation on specific policy areas. For example, it
was observed that the Kent–Nord-Pas de Calais link was focused on strategic
planning, economic development, training, cultural and artistic exchange, tourism and
joint promotional campaigns, while the Hampshire–Basse-Normandie link focused on
transportation, tourism, technology, research and training and eduction (Barber, 1997,
p. 20; Hampshire County Council & Conseil re´gional de Basse-Normandie, 1989).
Transnational projects seek to deliver very specific policy goals and deliverables (see
examples in Table 4.8).
Finally, as observed throughout this chapter, LGTN does not remain static and
local authorities take a flexible approach to their engagement. While a general
increase in participation has been observed, it has also been witnessed that local
authorities disengage and that networks come and go. Transnational projects, for
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example, are temporary by their very nature and co-operation in this form of
networking usually ceases once the project’s aims have been achieved. Instability
was also observed with cases of bilateral and multilateral networking. A number of
bilateral networks have become less active (for example the Kent–Nord-Pas de Calais,
Basse-Normandie–Tuscany, and West Sussex–Haute-Normandie links). In some cases
individual local authorities have withdrawn from multilateral networks (for example
West Sussex withdrawing from the AER and the Isle of Wight withdrawing from the
CPMR) and a number of multilateral networks, such as the Transmanche Metropole,
the Dynamo Regions network and AMRIE, have been disbanded entirely.
Two supplementary questions serve to shed light on more general patterns of
engagement in this activity and make the link between the empirical analysis and
local level Europeanization. Firstly, how has participation in LGTN evolved—if at
all—over time, and what does this say about the extent of local level Europeanization
(RQ1a)? Secondly, is participation in LGTN uniform across all local authorities, or
marked by differentiation as identified in previous MLG analyses and as expected
by the Europeanization literature (RQ1b)? These questions are now discussed with
reference to the above findings.
4.5.1 An evolving approach to LGTN
The first supplementary question (RQ1a) seeks to identify how patterns of
contemporary participation in LGTN compare with earlier engagement by local
authorities. When compared to the 1980s and 1990s examples of LGTN identified
by the early literature (see Section 4.2.2), the empirical analysis in this chapter (see
Sections 4.3 and 4.4) points to an overall evolution in local government’s approach.
That is to say local authorities have not continued to engage in LGTN in the same
way they did in the 1990s. Three key trends characterize this evolution: an increase
in engagement, a shift from bilateral to multilateral partnerships and move from
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cross-border to wider inter-regional co-operation.
Firstly, there has been a marked increase in participation in LGTN since the 1990s.
This is most evident with engagement in transnational projects, of which 193 examples
were identified. This can partly—although not exclusively—be explained by the
gradual expansion of the eligibility area for EU regional policy programmes—such as
Interreg and URBACT—which have sought to promote cross-border and inter-regional
co-operation through co-financing projects. As noted in Section 4.4.3, this was
complemented by pre-existing bilateral and multilateral networks, which provided a
basis for the development of project partnerships, and in turn facilitated the rapid
growth in transnational projects. Participation in both bilateral and multilateral
networks has also increased. As shown in Section 4.4.1, local authorities capitalized
upon the 2004 enlargement of the EU by developing bilateral links with authorities
in central and eastern Europe (for example Kent and Ba´cs-Kiscun, Bretagne and
Wielkopolska, and Picardie and Trencˇin). Similarly, while LGTN was a relatively new
phenomenon at the beginning of the 1990s, by the late 1990s the number had increased,
facilitated in part by established networks ‘breeding’ smaller ones covering niche policy
areas (Ward & Williams, 1997, p. 462). Local authorities began to recognize through
the 2000s that the range of multilateral networks and the policy areas they covered
had increased, and so provided more opportunities for engagement (SEERA, 2005b).
Secondly, local authorities have shifted their focus from bilateral to multilateral
partnerships. This was already witnessed during the 1990s as initial bilateral networks
developed from the late 1980s led to early multilateral partnerships such as the
Transmanche Euroregion (following the initiative of the Kent–Nord-Pas de Calais link)
and the Arc Manche (following the initiative of the West Sussex–Haute-Normandie
link). This trend has continued through the 2000s, and across the cases studied
participation in multilateral forms of LGTN now outweigh cases of bilateral networking
(74 versus 34, see Table 4.3). The fact that many bilateral links have become less active
over time (for example Kent and Nord-Pas de Calais, Basse-Normandie and Tuscany,
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and West Sussex and Haute-Normandie) is a further illustration of this. The large
number of multilateral networks identified elsewhere in the literature (see Appendix
A) shows this is a trend affecting wider European LGTN.
Thirdly, while the 1990s was characterized predominantly by cross-border
networking—marked by geographical contiguity—contemporary LGTN moves beyond
this and is more ‘inter-regional’ in character as local authorities pursue links with their
counterparts further afield. This applies to all three categories of LGTN observed:
bilateral networking, multilateral networking (see Table 4.6) and transnational projects.
Part of this is a result of local authorities pursuing more thematically focused
transnational networks—such as the ARC, ERRIN and POLIS—which do not place
requirements on the needs for partners to share geographical proximity with one
another. Again, the diversity of policy fields represented by networks identified
elsewhere in the literature (see Appendix A) illustrates this trend had affected LGTN
beyond the councils studied.
Overall, the increased level of engagement in LGTN witnessed here suggests
local authorities have become increasingly Europeanized since the 1990s. Indeed,
all of the councils studied have made it to the sixth and seventh steps—out of
nine—on John’s (2001, pp. 72–73) ladder of Europeanization (“linking with other
local organizations participating in the EU” and “participating in EU international
networks and co-operating in joint projects” respectively). Similarly all councils fall into
Klausen and Goldsmith’s (1997, pp. 239–242) category of ‘proactive’ local authorities.
This increased Europeanization—indicated by increased engagement in LGTN—is
unsurprising given that adaptation to Europe is triggered by the process of integration
itself (Caporaso, 2007; Risse et al., 2001). Indeed, as the cases explored in the chapter
show, local authorities have adapted to the ongoing reality of integration. For example,
EU enlargement led to the development of bilateral networks with local authorities in
central and eastern Europe. The EU’s increasing policy competence has led to a number
of specialist policy-specific multilateral networks proliferating. And developments in EU
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regional policy—such as the expansion of Interreg eligibility areas—has led to greater
participation in transnational projects.
4.5.2 LGTN and differential engagement
The second supplementary question (RQ1b) seeks to uncover the heterogeneous
engagement by local authorities in LGTN. As discussed in Section 2.1.2, literature on
the process of Europeanization expects differentiated outcomes (Bo¨rzel, 2005; Ladrech,
2010; Radaelli, 2003; Risse et al., 2001). Early studies on French and English local
government engagement with Europe initially confirmed this expectation. Balme and
Le Gale`s (1997), for example, noted that French local authorities could be divided
between those which were “stars” of European engagement and others which could
be considered “black holes”. Variation of engagement across English local government
was also observed in earlier studies (Goldsmith & Sperling, 1997). This variation has
similarly been observed in analyses of MLG more generally (for example Bache, 2008;
Hooghe, 1996b), with Le Gale`s (2002, p. 110) pointing to a “ ‘variable geometry’
Europe”. However, the extent to which this holds true with contemporary LGTN is
contested. Lefe`vre and d’Albergo (2007, p. 318) predict convergence towards more
uniformity in local governments’ approach to international activities. Nevertheless,
while Karvounis (2011, pp. 214–215) claims that the majority of European local
authorities are members of transnational networks, Briggs (2010, pp. 5–6) stresses
variation, noting that “some places build long-term and meaningful partnerships . . .
but for others contact is piecemeal”. The empirical analysis in this chapter is able
to assess these conflicting claims and contributes to a wider understanding of the
differentiation—or otherwise—of LGTN and local level Europeanization.
While there has been an overall increase in LGTN activity, the empirical analysis
presented here points to continued variation. This confirms the expectation of
differentiation held by the Europeanization literature. There are two aspects to this
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variation. Firstly, while all local authorities studied were engaged in LGTN, levels of
participation greatly varied; Kent for example had 47 transnational links between 2001
and 2011, while Portsmouth had only eight (see Table 4.3). While an overall increase
in LGTN suggests local authorities have become more ‘Europeanized’, the impact of
local level Europeanization is not felt equally.
Secondly, local authorities varied in how they engaged in LGTN. Councils held
varying preferences regarding the type of transnational networks they participated
in. Bretagne, for example, favoured participation in multilateral networks, while
Portsmouth and Medway did not pursue this activity at all. Contrastingly, East
Sussex placed great emphasis on bilateral networking, while for many others (Medway,
Brighton and Hove, Hampshire, Portsmouth, the Isle of Wight and Picardie) this only
formed a small—or sometimes no—proportion of their overall LGTN activities. To
this extent Handley’s (2006, p. 4) observation that LGTN offers a number of flexible
options for local authorities to develop partnerships with their counterparts abroad is
confirmed.
In comparative perspective, participation in LGTN was similar in both south-east
England and northern France and authorities in both areas have increased their level
of engagement since the 1990s. Indeed, councils in both areas continue to take part in
a variety of links. While there is variation, this occurs predominantly within national
borders, rather than across them. This suggests the presence of a number of mediating
factors present at the local level affect the level of participation (de Rooij, 2002), rather
than national contexts. These factors go some way to account for the varied engagement
in LGTN and impact of local level Europeanization, and will be explored further in
Chapter 6.
One area where national differences were observed, however, was participation in
transnational projects, which was generally lower among the French councils. Data
from interviews identified the root cause of this being that French re´gions preferred
to adopt a ‘facilitation’ role, encouraging local stakeholders to participate in projects.
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This was different from the approach of English councils, who would themselves actively
participate as project partners.
Leve`vre and d’Albergo’s (2007, p. 318) prediction that local authorities will adopt
a more uniform approach to international activities is—for now at least—not borne
out. Indeed, while participation in LGTN has continued and indeed increased since
the 1990s, the local authorities studied continue to adopt differing approaches and
rates of participation vary. This finding resonates with other studies on local level
Europeanization and MLG, which emphasize varying degrees of engagement—both
across and within countries—by local government at the European level (Bache, 2008;
Hamedinger & Wolffhardt, 2010; Hooghe, 1996a; Le Gale`s, 2002; Tatham & Thau,
2014).
4.6 Summary
As noted in Section 2.2.2, LGTN in the EU has become increasingly prevalent since the
late 1980s. However, a systematic review of the extent of this activity remained largely
absent from existing literature. Studies on the extent of LGTN in south-east England
and northern France were dated (for example Barber, 1997; Church & Reid, 1995, 1996,
1999; Sparke, 2000) and did not account for the contemporary picture. This chapter
has addressed these gaps and therefore made a contribution to the literature here
by presenting a contemporary empirical analysis of the activities of local authorities
in south-east England and northern France. In doing this it has addressed the first
research question of this thesis:
• RQ1: What is the current extent of LGTN in south-east England and northern
France?
The analysis in this chapter has confirmed that councils in south-east England and
northern France continue to engage in LGTN. Indeed, all 14 local authorities studied
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were involved. In this way, LGTN remains a prevalent phenomenon in south-east
England and northern France. Returning to Benington and Harvey’s (1998) question
set out at the start of this chapter, the findings show that LGTN fits the ‘new paradigm’
characterization, rather than being a mere ‘passing fashion’. Indeed, the fact LGTN
has continued through a period of public finance pressures demonstrates its significance
in contemporary European governance, and further reinforces the need to tackle the
empirical puzzle outlined in Section 1.2.
Two supplementary questions (RQ1a and RQ1b) were able to shed light on a number
of emerging patterns and serve to elaborate the overall finding of this chapter. Firstly,
the approach local authorities take to LGTN has evolved since the 1990s. Not only have
they increased the level of engagement, they have also changed how they engage. While
the late 1980s and 1990s were marked by engagement in bilateral networks, multilateral
partnerships now dominate. Furthermore councils have shifted their attention from
predominantly cross-border and general purpose networks to those which are more
inter-regional and thematically focused. The networking activities identified elsewhere
in the literature (see Appendix A) broadly confirms this pattern Europe-wide. Secondly,
while engagement in LGTN remains prevalent, it is marked by variation between the
authorities studied. Differences are present in both the extent to which local authorities
engage in LGTN and the approach they take, for example by favouring one category
of networks—bilateral, multilateral and transnational projects—over others.
Applied to a Europeanization framework, these findings make two contributions to
the literature. Firstly, the continued prevalence of LGTN among all councils studied
shows that they have all undergone Europeanization processes, and an increased level
of engagement demonstrates the intensity of local level Europeanization has increased.
Secondly, although the level of Europeanization has increased overall, its impact
has not been uniform across all local authorities and is marked by variation. This
confirms assumptions held by the literature, that Europeanization does not equate to
convergence and differentiation is to be expected.
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The continued engagement in LGTN by local authorities further highlights the
contemporary relevance of the empirical puzzle this thesis seeks to address (see
Section 1.2). In particular it leads to two key questions. Firstly, why do they
participate? Secondly, what accounts for the variation of engagement observed? These
questions are taken up and addressed in the following two chapters.
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Chapter 5
Local motivations for transnational
networking
The continued prevalence of local government transnational networking (LGTN)
identified in the previous chapter reinforces the need to address the empirical puzzle
identified in Section 1.2. Local authorities in unitary and centralized polities often
lack the formal competence to engage beyond their local borders. Given this context,
identifying why local government chooses to engage in this activity warrants further
investigation. This question has gained added importance in the contemporary context
of austerity and public finance pressures. As the previous chapter showed, LGTN has
continued despite these pressures. This leads to a question of why local authorities
continue to invest in this activity despite the difficulties they face to deliver their core
statutory services. This chapter investigates this. In so doing it addresses the second
research aim of this thesis:
• RA2: Establish the rationale, from a local government perspective, for
participation in LGTN.
And answers the second research question:
• RQ2: What benefits do local authorities seek from their involvement in LGTN?
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By addressing this question, this chapter contributes a response to this empirical puzzle.
Two supplementary questions facilitate a link to the local level Europeanization
literature:
• RQ2a: What do local authorities’ motivations for engaging in LGTN reveal about
the directionality of local level Europeanization?
• RQ2b: What is the underlying logic driving participation in LGTN?
At the heart of this analysis is a recognition that LGTN is driven by local
authorities. In the words of Bulkeley et al. (2003, p. 237) it “has not been a strategy
simply imposed on local government”. It is developed and led by local government
itself (Payre, 2010, p. 263). Despite this, however, Section 5.1 shows that much of the
existing literature focuses on the level of transnational networks themselves, overlooking
the actors within (for example Bouteligier, 2013; Heinelt & Niederhafner, 2008; Kern
& Bulkeley, 2009; Ward & Williams, 1997). The case selection and methods adopted
by this thesis (see Chapter 3) directly addresses this limitation. By focusing on 14
local authorities and gathering rich empirical data directly from local authorities
and individuals involved in LGTN, the perceptions of a range of local actors are
accessed. This chapter therefore offers an empirical contribution to the literature on
motivations for participation in LGTN, by complementing our existing understanding
of the function of transnational networks with knowledge of the motivations held by
those participating.
This chapter shows that local authorities engage in LGTN for a diverse range of
reasons. Three motivations in particular are consistently stated among all councils:
obtaining funding, lobbying and influence and policy transfer. These are often
supplemented with a range of other motivations. In all cases, local authorities were
motivated to participate in response to a number of perceived contextual factors.
However, while seeking benefits from LGTN, local authorities are also aware of the
potential limits.
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While making an empirical contribution to knowledge, this analysis also engages
in the debate on local level Europeanization in two ways. Firstly, in relation
to directionality, LGTN is not merely a horizontal form of Europeanization, but
contains top–down and bottom–up dynamics too. Secondly, this chapter contributes
a new institutionalist analysis of local level Europeanization (Bo¨rzel & Risse, 2003),
something currently lacking in the existing literature (save for Dąbrowski, 2012, 2013).
Here, the motivations local authorities have for engaging in LGTN confirm the process
of local level Europeanization to be a rational response, rather than a sociological one.
This chapter is structured as follows. Existing literature on the motivations local
authorities have for engaging in LGTN is first briefly summarized (Section 5.1). The
empirical data is then presented. This highlights the motivations of obtaining funding
(Section 5.2), lobbying and influence (Section 5.3) and policy transfer (Section 5.4).
A range of other motivations are also identified (Section 5.5) and a number of
general conclusions are then presented (Section 5.6). This chapter’s findings are
then discussed within a Europeanization framework, highlighting the simultaneous
top–down, bottom–up and horizontal directional dynamics of LGTN and the rationalist
logic driving participation (Section 5.7).
5.1 Motivations for engagement in LGTN:
dominant themes in the literature
From a practitioner perspective, a handbook published by the Local Government
Information Bureau (LGIB) (Handley, 2006, pp. 6–8) outlines several benefits local
authorities and their communities can expect from participation in LGTN:
• Improving service delivery and problem solving.
• Increasing global and European awareness.
• Accessing EU funding.
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• Staff . . . [and] . . . Member development and training.
• Promoting tolerance and increasing understanding.
• Promoting stronger community partnerships.
• Enhancing youth activities.
• Promoting community well being.
• Public awareness and learning.
• Education.
• Economic and business development.
• Making a global difference.
Many of these motivations have been identified elsewhere in literature, and are briefly
summarized below138.
Obtaining funding
Engaging in LGTN to obtain funding is one motivation identified in the literature
(for example Betsill & Bulkeley, 2004; Karvounis, 2011; McAleavey & Mitchell, 1994;
Pflieger, 2014; Phelps et al., 2002; Ward & Williams, 1997). This is most often linked
to European Union (EU) regional policy programmes, which, as stated earlier, usually
offer co-finance for transnational projects. While participation in LGTN itself might
not directly lead to obtaining funding, it does cultivate contacts and awareness of
various funding opportunities, such as EU programmes, among those local authorities
participating (Payre, 2010, p. 277; Phelps et al., 2002, p. 213). Many EU programmes
require transnational partnerships to be eligible for funding, so transnational networks
play another role here, providing their members with a ready-made network of
potential partners who may be willing to collaborate in order to bid for an EU-funded
project (Bulkeley et al., 2003, p. 245). Indeed Phelps et al. (2002, pp. 220–221) show
how the Spanish city of Getafe used the Edge Cities network as a platform to involve
themselves in EU-funded project bids.
138 In line with the provisional coding method adopted during the data analysis, the motivations
identified in the literature here formed the basis of a preliminary coding scheme which was used
to analyse the empirical data gathered.
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Lobbying and influence
The use of transnational networks to lobby and influence the EU is another motivation
identified in literature (for example Bulkeley et al., 2003; Happaerts, 2008; Happaerts
et al., 2011; Heinelt & Niederhafner, 2008; Hooghe, 1995; Karvounis, 2011; McAleavey
& Mitchell, 1994; Payre, 2010; Phelps et al., 2002; Sørensen, 1998; Ward & Williams,
1997). Indeed, the multi-level governance (MLG) thesis suggests that as competences
shift from the national to the European level, local authorities wishing to mobilize
their interests will equally shift their attention from the national to the European
level (Hooghe, 1995, p. 179). LGTN is seen to provide a means for local authorities to
collectively access and influence the EU, something which would be difficult to achieve
individually. As noted by Phelps et al. (2002, p. 212), “local authorities quickly realized
that lobbying for EU funding or to influence policy has more effect when done as a
representative grouping rather than as an individual authority”. Indeed the primary
aim of many multilateral networks, such as Eurocities, is to lobby the Commission and
other EU institutions on behalf of their members (Payre, 2010, p. 265).
However, while local authorities are drawn to LGTN for the potential to influence
policy, it is hard to assess the actual impact of this activity on EU policy development.
Bulkeley et al. (2003, p. 249) note that:
although there is anecdotal evidence to suggest [transnational networks] are
beginning to influence policy formulation at the level of the EU, there is little
in the way of empirical evidence to indicate the extent to which this might be
occurring.
John (2000, p. 890) agrees, arguing that there is little evidence of subnational
government influencing decisions, and their impact is likely to be confined to
legitimizing EU policy.
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Policy transfer
Policy transfer is defined as:
the process by which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements,
institutions and ideas in one political system . . . is used in the development
of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another
political system. (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000, p. 5)139
This motivation for LGTN is identified by several scholars (for example Baldersheim
et al., 2002; Baycan-Levent et al., 2008; Betsill & Bulkeley, 2004; Bouteligier, 2013;
Bulkeley et al., 2003; Happaerts, 2008; Happaerts et al., 2010, 2011; Karvounis, 2011;
Kern, 2014; Kern & Bulkeley, 2009; Lee & van de Meene, 2012; Marsden, Frick, May,
& Deakin, 2011; Payre, 2010; Phelps et al., 2002; Salskov-Iversen, 2006; Van Bever et
al., 2011a). A number of networks are seen to fulfil this role. The primary aim of the
Cities for Climate Protection (CCP) network, for example, is to facilitate the sharing
of policy information among its membership (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2004, p. 478). This
is also the case for the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group (Lee & van de Meene,
2012). Eurocities, in addition to lobbying the EU, also offers its members opportunities
to share best practice (Payre, 2010). As noted by Baycan-Levent et al. (2008, p. 86):
Eurocities provides a platform for its member cities to share knowledge and
ideas, to exchange experiences, to analyse common problems and to develop
innovative solutions, through a wide range of forums, working groups, projects,
activities and events.
Policy transfer is seen as a resource for councils lacking in-house expertise in certain
policy areas, such as climate change (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2004, p. 478). It can also be
used by local authorities to validate their approaches to policy or to make sure “what
they are doing is right” (Payre, 2010, p. 266). In some cases this recognition serves to
promote localities as policy leaders within their own national contexts and to strengthen
their positions vis-a`-vis national governments; Lausanne used its participation in the
Energy Cities network as a way to influence domestic relations with the Swiss federal
139 Rose (1991, 2005) uses the term ‘lesson-drawing’.
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government, for example (van der Heiden, 2010, p. 71). LGTN also serves to legitimize
particular interpretations of policy or courses of action at the local level (Betsill &
Bulkeley, 2004, p. 487; Pflieger, 2014, p. 341).
Policy transfer can go both ways. For example, Happaerts et al. (2011, p. 334)
points to Wallonia’s desire to be not only a ‘learner’ but also a ‘teacher’. In this
way local authorities use policy transfer to showcase areas where they are innovative.
Indeed, Lyon is shown to proactively promote its role as an innovator in high speed
rail (Payre, 2010, p. 277). The sharing of knowledge through LGTN—and the building
of collective expertise—is also seen to have a positive effect on lobbying success as
“expertise becomes a resource for representing interests” (Payre, 2010, p. 267). Policy
innovators also have the opportunity to shape norms of ‘good governance’ in a range
of policy areas (Bulkeley, 2005, p. 895).
LGTN facilitates policy transfer in a number of ways. For example presentations
at conferences and events, study visits, case studies hosted on networks’ websites,
databases of best practice and benchmarking activities are all methods recognized
to promote policy innovation (Bouteligier, 2013, p. 84; Bulkeley et al., 2003, p. 244;
Happaerts et al., 2010, p. 134; Kern & Bulkeley, 2009, p. 332; Phelps et al., 2002,
p. 213). Multilateral networks may also offer formal recognition or ‘awards’ for the
adoption of best practice akin to ‘peer pressure’ (Bulkeley et al., 2003, pp. 245–246;
Kern & Bulkeley, 2009, p. 332), and participation in LGTN may in itself be an
indicator of best practice in particular policy areas (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2004).
Enhancing a local authority’s profile
Promoting a local authority’s profile abroad constitutes another motivation (for
example Payre, 2010; Pflieger, 2014; Phelps et al., 2002). As argued by Payre (2010,
p. 263), LGTN provides a local authority with the opportunity to “distinguish itself
from an old-style town council and acquire a more modern image”. Many transnational
networks perform this role. Indeed participation in Eurocities is regarded by some
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scholars as an indicator of prestige for major cities (Griffiths, 1995, pp. 215–216;
Payre, 2010, p. 271). Some networks—particularly those focused on thematic policy
areas such as climate change—offer a form of accreditation, international recognition
or ‘seal of approval’, which further adds “political kudos” for those involved (Betsill &
Bulkeley, 2004, p. 483; Pflieger, 2014). For Phelps et al. (2002, pp. 214–215), the need
to increase the profile of a locality is bound in the logic of economic competitiveness;
local authorities want to make themselves stand out and distance themselves from their
rivals in order to attract investment.
For others the desire to promote a local profile is linked to regional identity
and politics. Indeed regions seek to promote their own culture—and sometimes
language—as distinctive from that of their host countries (Keating, 1999). This is
supported by Happaerts (2008, pp. 14–15) and Happaerts et al. (2011, pp. 332–333),
who note that Flanders and Wallonia were driven to LGTN to pursue ‘identity
politics’; in other words promoting their respective identities both nationally
and internationally140. These regions sought international support, recognition and
legitimacy for their national aspirations and to improve their autonomy within the
state. Happaerts (2008, p. 16) supports this view, arguing that Flemish participation in
a number of transnational networks was a means to pursue its foreign policy objective
of putting “Flanders on the international map and to gain a political voice in the
international arena”141.
In some cases this profile raising is targeted at a domestic audience. Payre (2010,
p. 276) notes how, when hosting the Eurocities conference, Lyon marketed itself to its
residents as “capital of Eurocities”. It is also a way to enhance a locality’s position
within the state or in relation to their neighbours. Phelps et al. (2002, p. 219) argue
Croydon’s participation in the Edge Cities network was determined by its proximity
140 This was also a key benefit sought by the Basque Country’s involvement in LGTN (Happaerts
et al., 2010, p. 139).
141 The ultimate goal of this activity may be separatism or secession from the nation state, as is
the case with Que´bec (Duchacek, 1984, p. 18; Lecours, 2002). This is sometimes labelled as
‘protodiplomacy’ (Aguirre, 1999).
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to London and had “its origins in longer and more firmly locally held beliefs in the
borough’s being a city in its own right”.
By enhancing a local authority’s profile through playing an active role in LGTN,
a number of positive knock on benefits can be expected, such as greater access to EU
decision making. As argued by Payre (2010, p. 276):
the more a city makes a name for itself in a transnational network and
acquires a position in its burgeoning structure, the greater access it has to
the supranational authorities”.
Increased profile through participation in the City-Vitality-Sustainability (CIVITAS)
network provided a means for politicians in French cities to locally legitimize local
transport policies and justify spending on public transport at a time of austerity
(Pflieger, 2014, p. 341).
Promoting economic development
Studies focused on the globalization of cities stress the need for local authorities to
engage in LGTN to promote local economic development (for example Baycan-Levent
et al., 2008; Heeg et al., 2003; Payre, 2010; Phelps et al., 2002). As noted above,
promoting economic development is linked to enhancing a local profile through the
process of competitive advantage and locational politics (Church & Reid, 1999; Phelps
et al., 2002; van der Heiden, 2010). Linked to this are efforts to increase tourism
by using LGTN to enhance a locality’s international credentials or their European
‘brand’. This goes some way to explain Barcelona’s and Birmingham’s engagement in
Eurocities, for example (Payre, 2010, p. 273).
Bypassing national government
The literature often refers to the use of LGTN by local authorities to ‘bypass’ the
national level (for example Bulkeley, 2005; Bulkeley et al., 2003; Duchacek, 1984;
Leitner & Sheppard, 2002; Ward & Williams, 1997). As noted by Duchacek (1984,
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p. 16):
subnational leaders and their publics often oppose the center on the grounds
that it is unwieldy, big, over-bureaucratized, dehumanized, and above all,
distant and unfamiliar with where the local and regional shoe pinches.
Engaging abroad is therefore seen as a way to overcome the dominance of the centre
in these situations. For Leitner and Sheppard (2002, pp. 509–510) LGTN provides:
new political spaces for localities. By creating space for cooperation . . . and by
operating across the boundaries of territorially based political systems, such
networks present participating cities with the opportunity to challenge extant
state structures and relations.
This is especially true where national and local interests do not align. For example, the
presence of many English local authorities participating in transnational networks is
seen as a result of the “oppositional stance of the UK national government” (Ward &
Williams, 1997, p. 457). Indeed, Bulkeley et al. (2003, p. 237) assert LGTN may be seen
by local authorities “as an opportunity to subvert centralisation strategies of the state
in order to manufacture a stronger mandate to represent the interests of localities”.
It is claimed the EU itself promotes LGTN for this very reason. As van der Heiden
(2010, p. 181) argues, “the EU has an incentive to strengthen urban areas and their
interlinkages in order to bypass the national state”. Nevertheless, van der Heiden’s
(2010, pp. 171–174) own analysis presents a more mixed picture here, noting that in
only one case (Lyon) out of seven is LGTN targeted at bypassing the state with a
view to acting against the national level.
Other motivations
A number of other motivations are also identified by the literature. Karvounis (2011)
observes that LGTN can be used by local authorities as a tool to develop the skills
of their staff and politicians. Benington (1994) and Casson and Dardanelli (2012,
p. 607) note LGTN serves to promote the profile of local politicians at a European level.
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What motivations are important to local government?
The above summary of themes present in the existing literature demonstrates the
variety of motivations which exist for participating in LGTN. Yet scholars disagree
over what the most important benefits are. Betsill and Bulkeley (2004, p. 490), for
example, argue that policy transfer has limited significance compared to financial and
political resources. Overall, however, the literature highlights variation in motivations
for engaging in LGTN. Research by Happaerts (2008) and Happaerts et al. (2010, 2011)
demonstrates this, showing that the regions of Flanders, Wallonia, the Basque Country
and North-Rhine Westphalia participated in the same transnational networks but for
different reasons. Phelps et al.’s (2002) study of the Edge Cities network also showed
that different local authorities sought different benefits from participation; Croydon
pursued an enhanced profile, while Getafe was focused on opportunities to exchange
best practice and participate in EU-funded projects. Baldersheim et al.’s (2002, p. 127)
study of central and eastern European local authorities also points to variation in
motivations.
This variation further reinforces the need to explore the motivations of individual
local authorities involved in LGTN. Existing research, however, has yet to tackle this
directly. Of the studies that exist, most focus on the function of transnational networks.
Heinelt and Niederhafner (2008), for example, investigate the role of Eurocities and the
Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR) as platforms to lobby the
EU. Kern and Bulkeley (2009) and Bouteligier (2013) focus on a range of transnational
networks with an environmental and climate change policy remit, and their role as
facilitators of policy transfer. As a result of this focus, local motivations for engagement
in LGTN remain largely unexplored142. The empirical findings now presented, therefore,
address this gap in the literature and make a contrition to knowledge on LGTN.
142 Van der Heiden’s (2010) study of seven EU and Swiss cities, and Payre’s (2010) investigation of
Lyon are exceptions here.
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5.2 LGTN for obtaining funding
While the exclusive focus in the existing literature on LGTN for obtaining funding has
been criticized by some scholars (Kern & Bulkeley, 2009, p. 310), this study reveals it
is nevertheless one of the main motivations local authorities held for participation in
LGTN. This was cited in a number of European and international strategies produced
and adopted by local authorities (Brighton & Hove City Council, 2007c; Conseil
re´gional de Bretagne, 2011; East Sussex County Council, 2000; Kent County Council,
2007c; Medway Council, 1999; Southampton City Council, 2007b; West Sussex County
Council, 2001, 2002b, 2006a). Local officers and councillors also stated during interviews
that obtaining funding was a motive143. This was often explicitly stated, for example:
In a rather naked way I’d say well look, we want some money out of Europe
and if it can help us acquire money then that’s good.144
I would say that the mainstay of the council’s European work has been through
European funded activities and activities relating to trying to get European
funding.145
This section outlines the context behind this motivation identified by local authorities,
the benefits sought from it and the role of LGTN. It also highlights some of the
limitations identified by local authorities when seeking funding this way146.
5.2.1 Identified contextual factors
Local authorities noted that in seeking funding, they were responding to a
number of contextual factors. The recession and its impact on local government
finances—particularly in England—led many local authorities to seek external funding,
143 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 01; Int. 04; Int. 15; Int. 24; Int. 25; Int. 43; Int. 46;
Int. 48; Int. 50; Int. 57; Int. 60; Int. 61; Int. 65).
144 Interview with English councillor, April 2012 (Int. 01).
145 Interview with English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 24).
146 This analytical framework is also adopted for the discussion of the lobbying and influence and
policy transfer motivations.
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mainly from EU funded programmes. From 2009 local government committee reports
began to stress the economic climate and the importance of this for obtaining funding
to mitigate against budgetary pressures. For example:
The last year has continued to be dominated by heavy pressure on public
funding and budgetary reductions within the County Council. Whilst this
might have made it more difficult for KCC to maintain an outward-looking
focus and international profile, the importance of this activity . . . has, if
anything, increased. (Kent County Council, 2011)
Interreg IVa is a priority funding stream for the city council . . . In the current
economic climate and following the reduction of national and regional bidding
opportunities, this EU funding programme has become increasingly important
as a source of external income. (Brighton & Hove City Council, 2012)147
The economic climate was similarly acknowledged by participants, for example:
One of the main things with the recession is to find other sources of funding,
so there is a need for going through a European project.148
Local officers in south-east England also made direct references to cuts facing local
authorities’ central government grants149. As emphasized by one:
[the need to obtain funding is] absolutely key, particularly in light of increasing
central government reduction in funding.150
Another officer explained:
there was going to be a very high level of cutbacks in local government across
the board. In crude terms it’s in the order of 20 to 25 per cent of cuts and
savings. So any form of money that you can bring in to assist what you’re
doing began to be recognized as, well actually if there are pots of money out
there to be accessed to enable us to do what we want to do, then it’s got to be
worth exploring. So in some ways we had a renewed interest in Europe because
of that.151
147 Other examples of committee documentation referring to the economic climate include Brighton
& Hove City Council (2011); Kent County Council (2009a) and Portsmouth City Council (2010).
148 Interview with English local officer, August 2012 (Int. 53).
149 Interviews with English local officers, May 2012, July 2012 and August 2012 (Int. 08; Int. 40;
Int. 48; Int. 51).
150 Interview with English local officer, August 2012 (Int. 48).
151 Interview with English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 08).
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Both countries’ positions as a net-contributor to the EU budget was also seen
as a contextual factor. Participants felt that cross-border and transnational funding
programmes provided a means for returning some of the investment made through
member state contributions152. This situation was recognized by both English and
French authorities. As argued by one former officer, now working for a multilateral
network:
there is money there potentially which we may as well have, it’s our money,
it’s gone in as a contribution.153
In this way local authorities felt they should be:
maximising the benefits of UK membership of the European Union (West
Sussex County Council, 2006a).
In light of this, local government recognized the availability of a wide range of
schemes and co-operation programmes, such as Interreg and URBACT. Through these
initiatives, local authorities could expect to receive up to 50 per cent funding for various
projects providing they worked with partners in other European countries154. Yet, while
EU funding was available, it was also felt that this was extremely competitive, with
several other local authorities and other bodies bidding for limited resources. This was
particularly the case since the 2004 enlargement of the EU. Councils recognized this
competitive environment in official documentation, for example:
The competition in Europe for funding allocation is getting fiercer, for a
number of reasons:
• UK authorities are getting cleverer at submitting bids and submitting more
bids.
152 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 18; Int. 26; Int. 51; Int. 70).
153 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 26).
154 The rules of individual programmes are often more specific about the number, nature and
nationality and geographical scope of partners required. For example the Interreg IVa strand
of programmes focus on cross-border co-operation, limiting partnership to eligible localities
either side of national borders (see Figure 4.4 for an illustration of this) while the Interreg IVc
programme promotes wider inter-regional partnerships from any EU member state.
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• With accession to the European Union of the Central and Eastern European
Countries, competition for funding will intensify. The new accession countries,
with their comparatively poorer economic status, will disadvantage the more
aﬄuent counties such as West Sussex. (West Sussex County Council, 2001)155
Indeed, as noted by one English councillor:
there are far more countries in Europe, I think these pots of funding are
dwindling away because there are many many more people after that money.
A) because they’ve not got money within their own country to look for; and B)
because there are more countries now involved in the European Union, which
makes it really a lot more competitive than it was a few years ago.156
5.2.2 Overview of obtaining funding and benefits sought
An assessment of this context, including the availability of EU funds, led all of the local
authorities studied to pursue funding and take advantage of this opportunity. Indeed in
two cases (Brighton & Hove City Council, 2007c; Southampton City Council, 2007b)
the timescales of local European strategies were deliberately aligned to match the
2007–2013 period adopted by EU regional policy programmes.
While funding was a motive for both English and French local government, it
was given greater attention by English councils, as was evidenced in interviews. This
heavy focus on funding was also observed by participants external to English local
government. As one French local officer observed:
If I speak about the British, I think they . . . see the EU as an opportunity to
get funds.157
One member of Interreg staff, who had previous experience working in English local
government, similarly observed:
When I was on that side, a lot of it was about what type of funding, or how
much funding can we bring into the area to do what we want.158
155 This is also recognized in reports by Brighton & Hove City Council (2005) and Kent County
Council (2007c).
156 Interview with English councillor, September 2012 (Int. 60).
157 Interview with French regional officer, July 2012 (Int. 44).
158 Interview with Interreg staff, September 2012 (Int. 47).
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The heavy focus given to funding by English local government compared with their
French counterparts did not mean, however, that funding was not considered important
by French local authorities. Indeed a number of French participants noted it is a key
motivation for their engagement in LGTN159.
Funding was important to local government for a number of reasons. Obtaining
funding through LGTN provided local authorities with additional resources to
undertake work already planned. As one participant argued:
it’s about bringing in additional resource to deliver what we are attempting to
do.160
In this way there was a clear emphasis on securing such funding in order to deliver
pre-existing strategic priorities, and funding was only sought where such a contribution
could be made161. In cases where local authorities had already committed funding—or
received funding from national or regional sources—for priority projects, EU funding
was seen as a way to further increase and complement this. This would increase the
budget of a project and thus the scope and quality of work a local authority could
undertake. The prospect of increasing a project’s budget was viewed as an advantage
by many local authorities, with one Interreg facilitator noting:
the way I try and persuade people to get involved is to say ‘well look, what
funding do you currently have to do something, and in fact you could double
that funding by working with a European partner’, so you might have a great
scheme in place but you could double the amount of money you get for doing
that and tackle that challenge by working with European partners. So normally
that’s quite an attractive offer.162
While EU funding can contribute to priority projects, there was also a recognition
that it could pay for work councils wanted to do, but could not otherwise afford163.
159 Multiple interviews with French participants (Int. 46; Int. 50; Int. 57; Int. 61; Int. 65).
160 Interview with English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 08).
161 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 04; Int. 08; Int. 21; Int. 24; Int. 29; Int. 43; Int. 45;
Int. 52; Int. 53; Int. 58). This supports Pflieger’s (2014, p. 339) analysis, which noted the
acquisition of EU funds by French cities merely accelerated pre-existing projects which would
have been undertaken regardless of whether EU funding was obtained or not.
162 Interview with Interreg staff, June 2012 (Int. 20).
163 Interview with Interreg staff, May 2012 (Int. 22).
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For example, the Isle of Wight faced significant coastal erosion and landslip problems
which the council would be unable to address with its own limited resources. The EU
funding which the council received allowed it to undertake a number of studies into
these risks164.
As well as contributing to priority projects, some English local authorities saw EU
funding as a means of income generation, whereby it contributed to councils’ core
budgets. Indeed, one of the headings in Kent County Council’s (2007c) international
strategy made it clear they:
must maximise the benefits to Kent of income generation opportunities.
Local officers also highlighted the need to secure income for the council165, with one
explicitly stating that EU funding was sought:
to supplement the council’s ever-dwindling core funding.166
In some cases councils set themselves targets to achieve specific amounts of funding
(Kent County Council, 2007b; Medway Council, 1999, 2002).
EU funding was also seen to have direct employment benefits for councils167.
Medway Council, for example, sought EU funding to employ project officers to oversee
several European projects and funding bids (Medway Council, 2002). The Isle of Wight
164 Interviews with English local officer, May 2012, and former English local officer, May 2012
(Int. 08; Int. 29). Examples of such projects include FRANE (Future Risk Assessment as a New
European Approach to Landslide Hazards) funded by the Commission’s Civil Protection financial
instrument, IMAPS (Integrated Management of Risks and Environmental Factors for Sustainable
Development of Peripheral Port Areas) funded by the Interreg IIIc programme, MESSINA
(Monitoring European Shorelines and Sharing Information on Near Shore Areas) funded by the
Interreg IIIc programme, OIKOS (Originating Innovative methods to learn and teach Knowledge
in the field of earth and natural sciences derived from an Original and combined use of application
Software) funded by the Leonardo da Vinci programme, PROTECT (PRediction Of The Erosion
of Cliffed Terrains) funded by the Fifth Framework programme and RESPONSE (Responding
to the risks from climate change) funded by the Life programme (Isle of Wight Council, 2013).
Further information about transnational research projects involving the Isle of Wight Council
can be found at: http://www.coastalwight.gov.uk/research.htm.
165 Interviews with multiple English local officers (Int. 08; Int. 14; Int. 39; Int. 48).
166 Interview with English local officer, August 2012 (Int. 48).
167 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 08; Int. 22; Int. 29; Int. 51).
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Council was able to use EU funds to employ specialist coastal officers168.
As a result of the availability of EU funding available to councils and the benefits
it brought, participants felt that such opportunities were important to take up. In the
words of one:
Needless to say EU funding, usually about 50 per cent, was also something
that could not be ignored. So there is money there so why wouldn’t we want
to be out there bidding for it?169
Local officers felt that funding was a particularly attractive motivation for local
politicians170. Indeed it was usually the prospect of securing funding which made
councillors support LGTN. As noted by one participant:
Well the thing that makes councillors decide to do this is that they can raise
money. They wanted to access European funds, that is the bottom line really.171
Staff working for multilateral networks similarly confirmed this, for example:
it’s important that elected leaders and mayors can show that they’re bringing
back more money than they’re spending.172
Beyond councillors, obtaining funding provided an easy way to justify participation
in LGTN. The acquisition of external funding was itself a visible benefit and
quantitative figures of funding received are easily understood. As one participant
argued:
When you are involved in a project with ERDF grant, it’s easy to understand
that half of your budget is co-financed.173
168 Interviews with English local officers, May 2012 and August 2012, and former English local officer,
May 2012 (Int. 08; Int. 29; Int. 51).
169 Interview with English local councillor, June 2012 (Int. 32).
170 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 04; Int. 08; Int. 15; Int. 21; Int. 24; Int. 29; Int. 34;
Int. 38; Int. 43; Int. 51).
171 Interview with former English local officer, June 2012 (Int. 34).
172 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 06). This echoes one of Dąbrowski’s
(2012, p. 735) findings, where the local electorate assesses local politician performance by the
amount of funding they brought in.
173 Interview with French regional officer, September 2012 (Int. 46).
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Another participant noted that bringing EU money in was a:
very visible source of how European and EU work can benefit.174
As a result, figures and tables outlining the amount of secured funding were often
used in local government documentation. Reports to scrutiny committees, for example,
regularly report information in this way, as demonstrated in Figure 5.1175. In some
cases whole reports were dedicated to outlining how much funding had been achieved,
produced both by local authorities (for example Conseil re´gional de Basse-Normandie,
2012; Conseil re´gional de Bretagne, 2012) and joint technical secretariats (JTSs) of
European funding programmes (for example Interreg IVa 2 Seas, 2012; Interreg IVa
France–Channel–England, 2012; Interreg IVc, 2009).
Figure 5.1: Example of funding results displayed in a committee report (Kent County Council, 2011)
174 Interview with English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 24).
175 Figure 5.5 also illustrates how the amount of funding secured through LGTN can be reported
by local government in committee documentation. Other examples include Brighton & Hove
City Council (2006); Conseil re´gional de Bretagne (2011); East Sussex County Council (2000);
Hampshire County Council (2005b); Isle of Wight Council (2004a); Kent County Council (2007c,
2007b, 2008, 2009b, 2010b, 2011); Portsmouth City Council (2010); Southampton City Council
(2005, 2007b, 2007a), and West Sussex County Council (2001).
147
5. Local motivations for transnational networking
5.2.3 The role of LGTN in obtaining funding
Local authorities felt LGTN was essential for obtaining funding. As stated by one
participant:
I don’t think we need to lie or whatever, partnership working equals funding
opportunities.176
As already discussed, many EU programmes required the involvement of project
partners from different European countries. This was recognized in several strategic
documents and committee reports produced by councils and by several participants.
Multilateral networks—such as those identified in Chapter 4—were seen to provide
members with a ‘ready-made’ network of contacts and other localities who were
potentially willing to participate in joint projects and bid for funding. The Arc Manche
network, for example, was seen in this way, providing the:
Provision of a ‘ready made’ partnership to access EU funds to support practical
projects of common interest. (Brighton & Hove City Council, 2003)177
Furthermore, as highlighted by West Sussex County Council (2006a):
Most EU funding can only be accessed via partnerships comprising two or
three different countries. Therefore networks as as the Assembly of European
Regions, POLIS, Airport Regions Conference, the Channel Arc Assembly178,
and others . . . provide an ideal platform from which to access EU funding.
The role of such multilateral networks in facilitating project partnerships for funding
bids was highlighted by several participants179. As noted by two:
We can also imagine that we can also make links between the Interreg projects
and the European networks, because it helps to find partners if you already
have contacts or you know some people.180
176 Interview with English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 40).
177 Indeed, members of the Arc Manche network fall within the eligible areas of the Two Seas
and France (Channel) England Interreg IVa cross-border programmes, as well as the wider
transnational programmes such as Interreg IVb North West Europe.
178 Referring to the Arc Manche network.
179 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 01; Int. 12; Int. 18; Int. 19; Int. 24; Int. 36; Int. 43;
Int. 44; Int. 61).
180 Interview with French regional officer, August 2012 (Int. 36).
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by being members of the AER . . . we’re making the contacts so if we want to
make a bid for project funding, we have immediately got partners.181
Multilateral network staff themselves also recognized this role182. As one claimed:
As a member of Eurocities . . . you’ve got a ready-made network for creating
partnerships, transnational partnerships to run projects.183
Multilateral networks focusing on specific policy areas were seen as particularly
useful for finding potential partners with similar policy priorities184. For example:
through specific or thematic networks, you know which regions can work with
you on which specific subjects.185
Sometimes we can build projects together with regions that we have met within
a network. It’s the case with ERRIN for example. ERRIN is also a very good
tool for us to build R and D projects.186
Consequently it was felt that participation in multilateral networks made putting
together partnerships and bidding for funding a lot easier and quicker, as well as limiting
some of the risks involved:
a big part go our participation in Eurocities is to get to know certain cities
that have the same interests and priorities as ourselves, and you’ve got that
ready-made link so when a big opportunity comes up you’re not rushing to get
to know the partner, or signing up with a partner you’ve never met. You have
that link and understanding, and it makes for a high quality project.187
Bilateral partnerships were also seen to play a similar role in fostering relationships
which would lead to potential joint funding bids. As noted in Section 4.3, Kent
and Nord-Pas de Calais’s link led to 11 joint EU funded transnational projects (see
181 Interview with English councillor, April 2012 (Int. 01).
182 Interviews with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 06; Int. 30; Int. 33).
183 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 06).
184 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 12; Int. 19; Int. 24; Int. 29; Int. 36; Int. 53).
185 Interview with French regional officer, August 2012 (Int. 36).
186 Interview with French regional officer, July 2012 (Int. 19).
187 Interview with English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 12).
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Figure 4.2). The link between Portsmouth and Caen was also seen as important
to assist in developing joint projects which would be eligible for European funding
(Portsmouth City Council, 2009a, 2009b)188. This bilateral link led to the MONC
project, for example189. Involvement in transnational projects themselves was also seen
to be a self-perpetuating process, whereby participation in one led to opportunities
for participation in others. For example, as acknowledged by Brighton and Hove City
Council (2008a):
Once a city has been a partner on one CIVITAS bid, it can lead on another.
As such, participation in the CIVITAS programme opens up an opportunity
for Brighton & Hove to access further funding.
It was felt LGTN could also assist in obtaining funding by providing technical
support to navigate the complexities of many EU funding programmes. Local
officers and councillors realized that multilateral networks provided information about
forthcoming funding opportunities as well as advice on submitting bids and increased
profile among the core funding bodies such as the European Commission or Interreg
JTSs190. In the words of one participant:
it’s not as clear cut as join the AER you will automatically get funding, but
it is you will get to be seen and known.191
Again, multilateral networks recognized the role they had to play in supporting local
government to access EU funds. For example:
there’s also a very utilitarian motivation which is about the money, that by
participating in Eurocities . . . you get from your peers in other cities and from
the things you attend, you get the connections within the Commission and
188 Interview with English local officer, August 2012 (Int. 53).
189 The MONC (Mysteries of Our Neighbour’s Culture) project—which aims to foster transnational
links between schools and promote cultural exchanges—is an example where bilateral co-operation
between Portsmouth City Council and Caen led to a successful Interreg funding bid (Portsmouth
City Council, 2009b). Further information about the project is available at: www.caen.fr/monc/
portsmouth/projet.htm.
190 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 01; Int. 08; Int. 25; Int. 50; Int. 53).
191 Interview with English councillor, April 2012 (Int. 01).
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the understanding of how the programmes work and you stand a much better
chance of bringing in resources.192
LGTN also assisted in addressing the increasingly competitive nature of EU funds.
Local authorities felt that as a result of increased competition for EU funds there
was a need to co-operate with these countries. This motivated the development of a
number of bilateral partnerships between the case study local authorities and those in
central and eastern Europe, as discussed in Chapter 4 (Conseil re´gional de Bretagne &
Województwo Wielkopolskie, 2005a; East Sussex County Council & Veszpre´m Megye
O¨nkorma´nyzata, 1996; Kent County Council & Ba´cs-Kiskun County General Assembly,
2004). Indeed, the co-operation accord between East Sussex and Veszpre´m states:
We will seek jointly to take advantage of appropriate opportunities to seek
funding, particularly from the European Union. (East Sussex County Council
& Veszpre´m Megye O¨nkorma´nyzata, 1996)193
As one participant explained:
I could see that structural funds in Europe were gradually going to shift
towards helping eastern Europe, because that’s where the money was needed,
and if we as a British county wanted to go on receiving we need to have links
with them so we could do joint projects with them.194
The prospect of securing funding by working in partnership with central and eastern
European local authorities therefore explains the shift observed in Chapter 4 from
cross-border bilateral networking to wider ‘inter-regional’ bilateral networking.
192 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 06). The role of LGTN to support
accessing EU funding has been noted elsewhere beyond the case study area. Smets (2013, p. 65)
notes how Croatian regions have sought bilateral partnerships with regions elsewhere in Europe
to gather information about effective project applications and other aspects of the structural
funds.
193 Similar references to seeking funding are present in the co-operation agreements between Kent
and Ba´cs-Kiskun (Kent County Council & Ba´cs-Kiskun County General Assembly, 2004) and
Bretagne and Wielkopolska (Conseil re´gional de Bretagne & Województwo Wielkopolskie, 2005a).
194 Interview with former English local officer, June 2012 (Int. 34).
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5.2.4 Perceived limits to obtaining funding through LGTN
While funding was sought, local authorities placed a number of caveats on the ability
for them to achieve this through LGTN. Firstly, in order to achieve high levels of
funding significant upfront investment had to be made. For example, as noted by Kent
County Council (2007b)195:
the County Council should be seeking to secure EU funding into Kent of some
AC100 million over the next few years . . . However, in order to achieve this
target, KCC will also need to invest significant resources, in particular to
the process of project facilitation, as well as to strengthened communication,
awareness-raising and partnership working.
Participants likewise reflected that funding was only achieved where investment had
been made in staff resources. In the words of two participants:
Well West Sussex always had a big European team. It started out I think
around 2000 and had a big European team and I think that actually paid off
because they got a lot of European funding in.196
Certainly when I think about regions like Lower Normandy, they have four or
five Interreg officers who just trawl everywhere looking for projects that they
can participate in, that’s a useful way of bringing in more funding.197
The other form of investment required to bid for European funding is to provide
so-called ‘match funding’. EU programmes usually only provide 50 per cent co-financing
with the project partners expected to contribute the rest. As one Interreg facilitator
emphasized:
It’s a purely practical thing. If the organization doesn’t have the match in
place then they just can’t do the project. Simple as that.198
195 See also Kent County Council (2010a).
196 Interview with former English local officer, June 2012 (Int. 18).
197 Interview with English local officer, September 2012 (Int. 45).
198 Interview with Interreg staff, June 2012 (Int. 20).
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Providing match funding was difficult for councils in both south-east England and
northern France, particularly in light of the public finance pressures facing local
government in the current economic climate199. This was confirmed in a recent survey
of English councils by the Local Government Association (LGA) (2011), which showed
that over two-thirds were not confident about the availability of match funding.
Consequently the amount of EU funding sought by local government was limited.
Indeed in most cases where European funding came into a locality it was not received
by the actual local authority. As highlighted by one participant:
the money that we brought in, which in total would have been millions into
the county, mostly didn’t go to the county council, it only went to the county
council if the county council ran a project . . . Most of the projects we did we’ve
got to find 50 per cent and whatever the European programme was put up 50
per cent. That’s why . . . in the county as a whole we had a lot of projects,
but the council as such had very few because they couldn’t afford to fund the
matching funding.200
This was particularly the case with the French regional councils who—as already noted
in Section 4.4.3—preferred to encourage local stakeholders to participate in European
projects, rather than directly participate themselves.
As a consequence of the investment required in terms of staff resources and match
funding, and the fact that most of the time funding does not come directly to local
authorities, it was felt that there was no overall financial return:
you don’t make money. That misconception that you make money, you
don’t.201
Indeed, participants felt that obtaining EU funding was only worth pursing if additional
benefits beyond the funding itself could be sought. It was felt that simply ‘chasing’ EU
funds to reap financial gains alone would not work, lead to unsuccessful projects and
199 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 13; Int. 16; Int. 20; Int. 34; Int. 39; Int. 46; Int. 48;
Int. 69).
200 Interview with former English local officer, June 2012 (Int. 34).
201 Interview with English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 43).
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wasted effort202.
It was recognized that the benefits of obtaining EU funding were ephemeral by
nature, being limited to the duration of the project being funded203. One local officer
noted that there was a danger of councils falling into a ‘self-perpetuation trap’, whereby
the local authority employed staff and built the funding into their core budget, only
for this funding to run out within two or three years, putting further pressure on the
council to bid for more funding as a way of maintaining staffing and budgetary levels204.
Another limitation recognized by local authorities was that accessing EU
funding—even with the assistance of LGTN—is onerous. A number of local officers
and councillors recognized the difficulties involved in bidding for EU funds205. Among
the difficulties present in bidding for EU funds, the administrative burden and a high
risk of a bid being unsuccessful were the greatest barriers. As cautioned by East Sussex
County Council (2000):
The complexity of applying for funds and the uncertainty of the outcome can
often deter hard-pressed staff from devoting time to bids.
As similarly observed by one participant:
Other departments don’t do European funding at all, not interested at all.
If you mention Interreg they seem to run away . . . People are worried about
audit, retention and recording and the bureaucracy that goes with European
funding. We’ve had one or two audits and they were fine but it’s a lot of work.
Some colleagues have actually said there’s no point going for Interreg if you
don’t go for really big amounts of money because there’s so much work in
delivering the project, also all the claims and paperwork that you need to keep
and produce, it’s very time-consuming.206
Other participants also recognized that bidding for EU funding was a lot of effort for
little gain. As one observed:
202 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 08; Int. 41; Int. 43 Int. 54; Int. 58; Int. 69; Int. 70).
203 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 23).
204 Interview with English local officer, August 2012 (Int. 51).
205 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 13; Int. 43; Int. 48; Int. 60).
206 Interview with English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 13).
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You know it’s hundreds of thousands but it wasn’t millions, and yet the work
that was put in you’d think you were bidding for millions.207
Again, this was found in the LGA (2011) survey, as well as a separate survey
commissioned by the Assembly of European Regions (AER) (2011), with several
respondents highlighting the administrative rules as too complex and burdensome, and
that there was a need for greater simplification in applying for and administering EU
funds. This was also brought up during a United Kingdom (UK) national government
consultation on the administration of the 2014–2020 structural funds (BIS, 2012,
p. 5)208.
It was felt that applying to EU programmes was not worth the effort given that other
schemes were less burdensome and often paid more, especially for smaller organizations
with limited resources209. This was particularly the case in France, where national and
regional funding schemes were more readily available than in England. As argued by
two French regional officers:
Another difficulty is for small organizations that don’t have human resources,
sometimes they don’t understand why find European money if regional money
is more easy to have?210
You received one funding from the state, so why do you bother with the
multiple funding? And you have to do a lot of control and have to justify
every time what you do. A lot of organizations are quite afraid.211
Additionally in France, local authorities were less accustomed to the processes of
building partnerships and bidding for funding (Payre, 2010). For this reason French
207 Interview with English councillor, June 2012 (Int. 32).
208 The 2014–2020 EU funding programmes have additional checks applied to them designed to
make sure funding is well spent. These are macro-economic conditionality, the need for a member
state’s to match EU budget rule—arguably something local and regional government has no
control over, and as such has been strongly contested—and ex ante conditionality, or withholding
a proportion of funding until the project is successfully completed and delivering results meeting
EU objectives. These additional checks are likely to present further administrative barriers to
accessing EU funding.
209 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 13; Int. 32; Int. 37; Int. 46; Int. 61).
210 Interview with French regional officer, September 2012 (Int. 46).
211 Interview with French regional officer, September 2012 (Int. 65).
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local authorities—and other eligible local stakeholders—were more likely to pursue
national and regional funding schemes rather than access EU programmes212.
5.3 LGTN for lobbying and influence
Another aim regularly stated in strategic documentation was lobbying EU institutions
and influencing EU policy (Brighton & Hove City Council, 2007c; Kent County Council,
2007c; West Sussex County Council, 2001, 2002b, 2006a)213. This was further confirmed
during interviews with local officers and councillors from both England and France214.
As noted by two participants:
I have really understood why we take part in it . . . and the opportunity to be
able to influence European politics is chief among those.215
let’s say the main goal, especially now because of this negotiation period, it’s
the lobbying work.216
This section surveys this motivation.
5.3.1 Identified contextual factors
As with funding, local authorities identified a number of contextual factors which led
them to seek influence in EU policy. Chief among these was the impact of EU legislation
on a wide range of local government policies (see Briggs, 2010, p. 12; Kern, 2014, p. 116;
212 Interview with French regional officer, August 2012 (Int. 37). Many of the French re´gions
employed staff to promote EU funding programmes among local stakeholders. Interreg joint
technical secretariats (JTSs) have also employed regional ‘facilitators’ in northern France and
south-east England to promote their programmes to local authorities and other local actors.
213 This motivation was also outlined in various committee reports (East Sussex County Council,
2001b; Hampshire County Council, 2002, 2005a; Isle of Wight Council, 2002d, 2004a, 2005; Kent
County Council, 2007b, 2010a; Southampton City Council, 2005; West Sussex County Council,
2003a, 2007).
214 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 08; Int. 19; Int. 21; Int. 24; Int. 32; Int. 34; Int. 37).
215 Interview with English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 21).
216 Interview with French regional officer, July 2012 (Int. 19). This participant was referring to
the negotiations for the 2014–2020 European Structural and Investment Funds. This context is
outlined on page 163.
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Klausen & Goldsmith, 1997, pp. 238–239; Van Bever et al., 2011a, p. 16). As recognized
in one LGA (2010) report:
Almost all council services are affected by EU laws in one way or another
. . . whether it’s EU legislation on energy efficiency, equalities, procurement,
recycling, waste and working hours, it is by and large councils that implement
it.
This situation was recognized by the local authorities studied, which generally
estimated between 70 and 80 per cent of EU legislation directly impacted their work:
As a practical concern, 70% to 80% of European legislation can be said to
directly impact on the work of local authorities. (Kent County Council, 2007c)
European legislation sets an increasing context for the County Council’s work.
Local government implements approximately 70% of policy and legislation
that emanates from Brussels, for example waste directives on the recycling
of fridges, cars and batteries, transport policies on cleaner fuels, business
regulations on part-time worker’s rights or the opening up of services to
competition. (West Sussex County Council, 2006a)217
Participants likewise highlighted this during interviews218. In this way, local authorities
saw themselves as implementers of EU legislation, and this justified their role in seeking
to influence such legislation. As argued in one report aimed at local government: “if
local authorities are, of necessity, concerned with policy implementation, they ought to
be systematically involved in the policy-formation process” (Bogdanor, 1992, p. 18).
However, despite this role, local authorities felt left out of the decision-making process:
Local authorities are primarily seen as implementers and enforcers of EU policy
and legislation, but in spite of this have traditionally had a weak voice in the
EU decision-making process. (West Sussex County Council, 2006a)
There was a feeling among councils that their opinions on policy came at the expense
of national government preferences. As recognized by two participants:
217 The impact of EU legislation on local services is also outlined by the (Isle of Wight Council,
2005).
218 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 10; Int. 18; Int. 21).
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the European Commission often overlooks regions and local authorities, they
talk to member states, but not to local authorities.219
There’s also the issue of perceived democratic deficit if you like. If you look at
how the European Union’s set up, whereby the Parliament aside . . . you’re then
purely in the grip of national government who attend obviously the Council of
Ministers.220
While it was recognized that national government had more influence in EU
policy-making, local authorities felt that there were occasions when local and national
interests were not aligned. This was particularly the case for England and France,
where local government operates in centralized systems with little legislative capacity
of their own. Referring to the UK government’s seat in the Council, one participant
noted:
in some cases, probably in many cases, those interests will align quite nicely
with what goes on at a local level, but there will be some cases where they
might not . . . there’s a need for local authorities to do it themselves, to go
out there and press its own case where those incidents are not aligned with
national government.221
A French regional councillor made a similar remark at a conference, noting that
Bretagne and its interests were largely ignored by the central government in Paris
(Tanburn, 2013, p. 36)222. Indeed, participants from both countries were able to
highlight a number of examples where the national government position differed from
that of local authorities (East Sussex County Council, 2001c; Isle of Wight Council,
2004a; Kent County Council, 2007b, 2008, 2009a)223.
Local authorities felt they were better placed to inform discussions on EU policy
due to their closeness to citizens, something seen as an advantage by the Commission
(Heinelt & Niederhafner, 2008, p. 175). As emphasized in one report:
219 Interview with former English local officer, June 2012 (Int. 18).
220 Interview with English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 11).
221 Interview with English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 11).
222 Participant observation, Europeanising devolution conference, May 2013 (Obs. 7).
223 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 34; Int. 37; Int. 38).
158
5. Local motivations for transnational networking
It is important that local government continues to be recognised as a legitimate
actor in European affairs. It is the level that delivers key services to residents,
business and the voluntary sectors and as such is in a favourable position to
provide input to the EU institutions on how European policies and legislation
work on the ground. (Isle of Wight Council, 2004b)
As similarly argued by a member of multilateral network staff:
What is very important for your analysis on the last question is about the
big difference between the national level and the other levels, and I mean here
regional and/or local level, is that we are concrete, pragmatic, we know the
key players, we know also what are the needs of the local and regional SMEs,
what are the needs of citizens, what are the problems in the regions, what are
the potentials. So, I don’t know if a national state knows it better.224
As identified in Section 2.2, the EU is open to local government involvement in the
policy process (for example Bulkeley et al., 2003; Goldsmith, 1993; John, 2000; Heinelt
& Niederhafner, 2008; Ward & Williams, 1997). Indeed Bogdanor (1992, p. 10)—in
an early report aimed at local authorities—notes that, in comparison to national
governments, the EU:
is both more complex and more open to a range of different influences.
This offers excellent opportunities for local authorities, both collectively and
individually.
This was recognized by the local authorities studied, who felt that although national
governments remained influential, the EU was becoming more receptive to local opinion
and that this presented an opportunity to become involved:
there is a growing recognition at all levels that local government must be more
effectively engaged in policy debates at an earlier stage in order to ensure
robust EU policies and legislation. (West Sussex County Council, 2006a)
Whist in the past the European Institutions have tended to negotiate at
National government level, the last few years have seen an increased desire
to consult with (and listen to) local and regional government as this is seen as
being closer to the citizen. (Isle of Wight Council, 2005)
224 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 35).
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An observable steady increase in the number of local and regional Brussels offices
supports this (Rowe, 2011, pp. 6–7). Events such as the annual EU Open Days also
served to reinforce the perception that the EU is attune to local needs and open to
influence. During these events, the EU invites thousands of local actors to Brussels every
year to attend workshops hosted by the European Commission and the Committee of
the Regions (CoR), and to interact directly with EU officials225.
While the EU appeared to be receptive to local input in the policy process, councils
recognized that they were unable to have an impact on EU policy individually given
their relatively small size and limited resources. Many participants highlighted the
competitive environment in which EU lobbying takes place and felt they were likely
to be ‘drowned out’ if they acted alone226. As noted in Section 2.2.1, several local
authorities have established representation offices in Brussels. The number of individual
local and regional authorities with a fixed presence in Brussels was recently estimated
at 297 (Donas & Beyers, 2013, pp. 535–536)227, with Ebels (2012, p. 12) suggesting
there are 1,500 individuals engaged in lobbying in Brussels on behalf of subnational
government. In addition, local and regional authorities were operating alongside a
plethora of other organized interests, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
and corporate groups. As recognized by West Sussex County Council (2006a):
Brussels is a crowded arena, with thousands of local authorities, organisations,
businesses and governments trying to put their point of view across. The
voice of a single local authority can easily get lost, therefore partnerships and
alliances are strategically important.
This led to the assessment that:
225 Participant observation, EU open days, October 2012 and October 2013 (Obs. 4; Obs. 9).
226 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 01; Int. 11; Int. 12; Int. 18; Int. 19; Int. 34; Int. 36
Int. 44).
227 Donas and Beyers’s (2013) estimate is based on a broad definition of local and regional authorities
involved in regional offices, partial and national associations and multilateral networks. The EU’s
official transparency register—as at October 2013—only records 119 entities. However, local and
regional governments are not obliged to register and the quality of data on this register has been
questioned (see Greenwood & Dreger, 2013).
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As individual councils, we will be ineffective and overwhelmed by others who
act collectively. (West Sussex County Council, 2003b)
At the root of this was a perceived ‘capacity’ problem among councils; compared to
other interests operating in Brussels, individual local authorities were under-resourced
and unable to dedicate the same amount of staff time. As conceded by West Sussex
County Council (2006a):
The County Council is response for a whole range of services that actually
have a European dimension but unfortunately we neither have the resource or
the capacity to engage in every single policy debate that interests us.
5.3.2 Overview of lobbying and influence and benefits sought
The ultimate goal of lobbying action was to raise awareness of local and regional issues
at a European level and to make sure these concerns were addressed in EU policy
making228. For the Isle of Wight Council (2004a), their primary aim was:
promoting the Isle of Wight’s interests within the European Union.
And West Sussex County Council (2007) spoke of the need:
to ensure that potential legislation reflects the needs and concerns of local
government and residents.229
Local authorities often sought to influence specific policy areas, reflecting their own
thematic priorities. Bretagne’s priority was to influence EU maritime policy230. Kent
and Nord-Pas de Calais, for example, wanted to influence cross-border rail policy to
228 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 02; Int. 04; Int. 11; Int. 14; Int. 16; Int. 17; Int. 26;
Int. 30; Int. 35).
229 This is also mentioned in other local government documents (Brighton & Hove City Council, 2003,
2005, 2007b; East Sussex County Council & Conseil ge´ne´ral de Seine-Maritime, 1996; Hampshire
County Council, 2005a, 2006; Isle of Wight Council, 2002b, 2002d, 2004b; Kent County Council,
2008, 2010a; West Sussex County Council, 2000, 2001, 2002b, 2003a, 2004a, 2006b).
230 Interview with French regional officer, August 2012 (Int. 36).
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improve local rail connections to the Channel Tunnel (Kent County Council, 2008;
King, 2009, pp. 95–96)231.
Both the European Commission and European Parliament were the key
institutional targets most frequently cited by councils (Brighton & Hove City Council,
2007c, 2008b; Isle of Wight Council, 2002c, 2004a, 2004b; West Sussex County Council,
2002b, 2003a)232. The Commission, as proposer of EU legislation, was seen as the
venue to make local voices heard during the drafting of legislation to ensure proposals
considered by the Council and Parliament already reflected local interests. Local
government sought to raise awareness among members of the European Parliament
(MEPs) and encourage the adoption of local government sanctioned amendments.
While the Parliament and Commission were by far the main focus for local government
lobbying, the CoR and Council were also cited as targets (Isle of Wight Council, 2004a,
2004b)233.
Beyond the EU institutions, local government also used European lobbying
to influence businesses234. Kent and Nord-Pas de Calais’s desire to improve rail
connections—and specifically to reintroduce services to and from Ashford station—for
example, meant it had to influence Eurostar rather than the EU institutions (Kent
County Council, 2008; King, 2009, pp. 95–96)235. Additionally, lobbying was sometimes
undertaken to influence national government policy (Brighton & Hove City Council,
2007c; East Sussex County Council & Conseil ge´ne´ral de Seine-Maritime, 1996; Kent
County Council, 2011; Isle of Wight Council, 2004b; West Sussex County Council,
231 Interviews with English local officers, May 2012 and July 2012, (Int. 04; Int. 14). As shown in
Section 4.2.1 the Channel Tunnel led to a corridor effect, whereby regional transport links lost
out to direct connection between London, Brussels and Paris (Heddebaut, 2001, p. 62; Sinclair
& Page, 1993, p. 479; Sparke, 2000, p. 198; Vickerman, 1998, p. 179).
232 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 12; Int. 17; Int. 19; Int. 21; Int. 23; Int. 26; Int. 33;
Int. 34; Int. 36; Int. 44; Int. 45).
233 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 17).
234 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 04; Int. 09; Int. 14).
235 Interview with English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 04). This was pursued through the European
Network of High Speed Regions, and was also a key aim of the bilateral relationship between
Kent County Council and the de´partement of Pas-de-Calais (Kent County Council & Conseil
ge´ne´ral du Pas-de-Calais, 2005).
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2002b, 2006a)236.
One area of policy which almost all councils sought to influence was European
funding allocations (Brighton & Hove City Council, 2003, 2005, 2007b; Conseil re´gional
de Bretagne, 2011; Conseil re´gional de Haute-Normandie, 2012; East Sussex County
Council, 2000, 2001b; Hampshire County Council, 2005a; Isle of Wight Council, 2002c,
2002a, 2004a, 2004b; Kent County Council, 2007c, 2007b, 2008, 2009b, 2009a, 2010a;
Southampton City Council, 2005; SEERA, 2004; West Sussex County Council, 2002b,
2004b, 2004a, 2006a)237. Indeed, during the course of the fieldwork the 2007–2013
cohesion policy programming period was coming to an end and negotiations for the
new 2014–2020 round of European structural and investment funds—accounting for
approximately one third of the EU budget—were under way. Several local authorities
were actively involved in this process. Kent, for example, saw influencing the debate
on the future of EU funding as a key priority238. One report (Kent County Council,
2010a) listed “Securing Kent’s Competitive Position in Future EU Funding Regimes”
as a corporate objective, and it was clear that they were actively involved in trying to
influence the decision from an early stage:
The programmes for which Kent is currently eligible . . . end in 2013. The
Commission’s Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion of October 2008 signalled
the start of the debate on the future of EU regional policy and European
Funding for the new programming period 2014 – 2020. Having coordinated a
Kent response to the Green Paper a key objective for IAG239 will be to ensure
that Kent continues to be eligible for EU support under any future funding
regime. (Kent County Council, 2010a)
236 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 04; Int. 12; Int. 14; Int. 29; Int. 30; Int. 31).
237 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 02; Int. 04; Int. 06; Int. 08; Int. 11; Int. 12; Int. 17;
Int. 19; Int. 29; Int. 34; Int. 44).
238 Interviews with English local officers, May 2012 and July 2012, and English councillor, May 2012
(Int. 04; Int. 05; Int. 14).
239 “IAG” refers to the International Affairs Group, the department within Kent County Council
responsible for European and international affairs, including LGTN.
163
5. Local motivations for transnational networking
5.3.3 The role of LGTN in lobbying and influence
LGTN was seen by local authorities as an important means to achieve their influencing
goals; many councils saw lobbying as one of the primary purposes of multilateral
networks. For example:
the Arc Manche is essentially a political lobbying group; that’s what it is.240
CPMR and the Islands Commission are primarily political lobbying
organisations. (Isle of Wight Council, 2005)
This role was also acknowledged by multilateral network staff themselves, with many
describing lobbying activity as their ‘raison d’eˆtre’241:
Eurocities is a platform . . . for the mayors to Europe’s biggest cities to
influence European policy, to influence the European institutions. That’s our
purpose.242
of course we try to defend the interests of our member regions. And how do
we do that? Lobby action.243
Indeed, this is evident in the strategic documents produced by many multilateral
networks. A key strategic objective for the AER (2013), for example, is:
To promote the role of regional governance at European level and to
mainstream regional interests into national and European policy making.
a) Providing information on and promoting regional interests in Europe.
. . .
d) Cooperating with European institutions and representing regions in the
European decision-making process.
And for the European Association of Regional and Local Authorities for Lifelong
Learning (EARLALL) (2011) is:
240 Interview with English councillor, April 2012 (Int. 02).
241 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 06; Int. 23; Int. 26; Int. 30; Int. 33; Int. 35).
242 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 06).
243 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 35).
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Seeking to bring regional perspectives to the European debate of Lifelong
Learning and trying to influence it.
A graphic by the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions (CPMR) (see Figure 5.2)
provides an illustration of how this multilateral network acts as “a representative voice”
and takes on the role of a “negotiator” for its local and regional members, not only
to the EU but national governments too (CPMR, 2013). One member of multilateral
network staff noted their local authority members placed great importance on lobbying
activity, asking them to give it greater emphasis in their strategic plan244.
Figure 5.2: CPMR graphic illustrating how they represent their members’ interests (taken from CPMR,
2013)
While engagement in LGTN for the purpose of lobbying was often seen in relation to
multilateral networks, participants also highlighted the role of transnational projects245.
Projects often led to research studies, the results of which could then go on to form an
evidence base for lobbying action. As argued by one participant, transnational projects
offered:
244 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 35).
245 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 04; Int. 08; Int. 24; Int. 47).
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prestige in terms of trying to influence, I think, policy. For instance, if you’ve
got a project on environmental or climate change and it’s seen at a European
level that it’s good practice, etc., they can actually then influence the European
policy on that.246
For example, the Isle of Wight used several transnational projects with partners in a
similar situation to conduct a number of collaborative studies. These results went on
to provide evidence to support their lobbying activities on environmental and coastal
management policy247. Southampton City Council’s role in a number of port related
transnational projects led to a body of best practice knowledge which then went on to
inform EU maritime policy. As noted in one report:
EU Maritime Commissioner Joe Borg welcomed this network248 as a key
interlocutor for the EU, particularly with the publication of the Green Paper
on Maritime Policy on the same day. He congratulated Southampton City
Council on the success of the project in not only sharing best practice between
cities, but providing useful input for EU policy-making on maritime affairs.
(Southampton City Council, 2006)
Indeed, one of the outputs of the NEW EPOC project was a position paper in response
to the EU’s consultation on a common maritime policy (Southampton City Council,
n.d.-b).
LGTN assisted local authority lobbying aspirations in a number of ways. Firstly,
multilateral networks based in Brussels were seen as an important tool for so-called
‘horizon scanning’ or ‘intelligence gathering’. This involved closely following EU policy
developments and providing information to their members at an early stage249. As
highlighted by one member of multilateral network staff:
246 Interview with Interreg staff, September 2012 (Int. 47).
247 Interview with English local officer, May 2012, and former English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 08;
Int. 29).
248 Referring to the NEW EPOC (reNEWing Economic Prosperity for pOrt Cities) transnational
project. This brought together 11 European cities and sought to jointly assess the impact
of globalization, technological developments, increased competition and climate change on
medium-sized port cities, identifying ways that the economic, social, cultural and environmental
well-being could be maintained for the future (Southampton City Council, n.d.-a).
249 This is also seen as a key role for many local and regional Brussels offices (Brighton & Hove City
Council, 2007c; Isle of Wight Council, 2002d; Conseil re´gional de Picardie, n.d.) (see also Marks
et al., 2002; Murphy, 2011; Rowe, 2011).
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We try to focus on lobbying in Brussels, looking at what’s coming up, what
new policies are emerging.250
Having access to this information at an early stage was seen as a necessary component
in effective lobbying; information was needed in advance in order to mobilize support
and influence change before any policy was adopted:
Early information on new proposals is . . . beneficial to assess the likely impact
on local services and, where possible, to influence changes before they are
enacted. (Isle of Wight Council, 2005)
To this end multilateral networks usually provided their members with regular briefings
and communications outlining Commission consultations or other emerging policy
developments251.
Secondly, LGTN helped mitigate against the competitive context surrounding EU
lobbying. As already noted, individual councils felt they could be drowned out, so it
was felt necessary to combine forces and form larger groupings in order to compete in
this environment. For example:
[If we] promote this idea on our own, it will not be enough, so we have to build
coalitions and we try to work with other regions of Europe.252
Working together on . . . European issues offers us a greater ability to influence
and react to the issues facing us than we can achieve individually. (Isle of Wight
Council, 2004a)
LGTN was therefore a way for individual councils to pool their limited resources in
order to compete with other interests present and to ensure a sufficient ‘critical mass’
to be heard by the EU institutions. As one participant explained:
you wouldn’t be able to orchestrate it all yourself. It would take oodles and
oodles of time, so you go to this facilitator, this broker, this clearing house
that is a policy network that can bring together and buy in bulk.253
250 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 26).
251 Horizon scanning is also used to give local authorities advance warning of legislation they will be
required to implement. This motivation is explored in more detail in Section 5.5.3.
252 Interview woth French regional officer, July 2012 (Int. 19).
253 Interview with English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 11).
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Thirdly, LGTN was seen as advantageous because lobbying positions developed
by networks of local authorities were considered much more representative of a wider
body of European local government than those of individual councils254. This was not
lost on local government, who recognized that large multilateral networks—such as the
AER and CPMR—were extremely representative of local and regional government as
a whole, making them influential:
the CPMR is held in some regard by Brussels as a body representing 149
regions from 27 states, it carries a degree of authority and weight. (Isle of
Wight Council, 2004c)
the CPMR is quite well respected and thought of by the European Commission
and I do think they take note of what CPMR says because the CPMR
represents almost every coastal region round the European sea board, so it
is an influential network.255
Multilateral networks themselves were aware of this, with one member of staff noting
that a key benefit for their members was:
the force of being able to say ‘we are within a network that represents 150-odd
regions across the EU’. That gives added gravitas quite clearly to the kind
of force that you have have with respects to the messages you are looking to
push.256
It was felt this representative characteristic of LGTN was particularly welcomed by
the EU institutions. Indeed, as highlighted by McAleavey and Mitchell (1994, p. 238),
the Commission has long preferred to deal with groups who could claim they were
representative of a wider body of actors, rather than be seen to listen to—and thereby
favour—single actors. As identified by Heinelt and Niederhafner (2008) the Commission
relies on this representative characteristic of networks to legitimize policy proposals.
Again this was recognized by local government:
254 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 01; Int. 11; Int. 17; Int. 29; Int. 35; Int. 36; Int. 44).
255 Interview with former English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 29).
256 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 17).
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CPMR is a strong and quite an important network. There’s about 160
members, which are other regions, so when you have a common position in
this kind of network, I think it’s something quite important at the EU level,
even in front of the Commission and other EU institutions, because you are
not representing only yourself, but you have been discussing and finding a
common position for quite a broad territory in Europe that the network is
representing.257
I think that the European Commission, for example, has to see that the
network is not only an office in Brussels, it has to see that there is something
behind and you’re not showing off, and that you represent all the local
authorities.258
Some participants viewed this in more simplistic terms around convenience; the
Commission did not have the time or resources to consult every local authority
individually so representative multilateral networks provided an opportunity to interact
with the subnational level more efficiently:
the Commission likes to only have one person to talk to in a very specific field,
they like to have one association representing all the local authorities and it’s
easier to talk to them in that case. They don’t want all the regions to come up
to discuss with them, they want only one actor to come up and say ‘I represent
all the local authorities in Europe’.259
if you’re a guy like Barroso who’s only got 360 days in his year like you and
I have, he’s got to think well my time is precious, . . . he’s not going to have
time to go to every county in England or de´partement in France. He’s got to
find an assembly.260
Fourthly, local authorities felt multilateral networks specializing in specific sectoral
policy fields were held in high regard by the EU institutions because of their policy
knowledge, and that this led to enhanced opportunities to access the policy process. As
already noted, this also applied to transnational projects delivering research in specific
policy fields. Networks which shared policy knowledge and best practice among their
members were often regarded as ‘experts’ by the EU261. This meant they were often
257 Interview with French regional officer, August 2012 (Int. 36).
258 Interview with French regional officer, July 2012 (Int. 44).
259 Interview with French regional officer, July 2012 (Int. 44).
260 Interview with English councillor, April 2012 (Int. 01).
261 The sharing of best practice and policy transfer is discussed in Section 5.4.
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invited to feed their expertise into policy development. For example:
there are other networks in Brussels representing cities and regions, but I
think it’s fair to say very few, if any of them, have the same knowledge
and expertise as POLIS on transport matters, because we are focused on
transport . . . we’re really going into detail, into the heart of the matter, so we’re
often consulted by the Commission on policy initiatives, we often invited to
stakeholder consultations which are related to transport . . . we are considered
by the European Commission as being one of the key stakeholders.262
In particular the Islands Commission is from time to time invited to collaborate
with the European institutions on matters requiring expertise in island issues.
(Isle of Wight Council, 2005)
Local authorities were very much aware that multilateral networks and their expertise
were seen as a resource to EU policy makers:
I say to people you mustn’t always see yourself as supplicant, you’re always
begging, you must see yourself as a resource that the people on the inside of
the institutions need you as much as you need them.263
Indeed multilateral network staff pointed to their involvement in Commission expert
groups and other advisory committees264. Participation in such groups was seen as an
opportunity to promote networks’—and thus their members’—interests. As noted by
one participant:
we’re part of committees and what’s really important for us is, I mentioned
one committee which is ERTRAC265, there are other committees similar to
that which come up with recommendations for research priorities and this
really provides us with an opportunity to influence the work programmes for
projects that are going to be published later on, to make sure they respond to
the needs of our members.266
The scale and diversity of interests represented in Brussels posed important
questions from the Commission’s perspective, namely:“who speaks for whom, on what,
262 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 23).
263 Interview with former English local officer, June 2012 (Int. 34).
264 Interviews with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 17; Int. 23; Int. 33; Int. 35).
265 Referring to the European Road Transport Advisory Council.
266 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 23).
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and how representative are they” (Goldsmith, 2011, p. 45). Thus the representativeness
and expertise offered by multilateral networks all added to the ‘credibility’ of
local government lobbying efforts, something participants regularly cited as a key
determinant of success267. As a result of this credibility, many multilateral networks
were offered a unique position and direct access to the EU policy process, as recognized
by one participant:
They do a hell of a lot of good some of them. They provide the first rough
drafting of something that eventually becomes a directive many years ahead.268
5.3.4 Perceived limits to lobbying and influence through
LGTN
While local authorities engaged in LGTN hoping to influence the EU policy process,
they also highlighted the potential limits to this activity. The largest was a perception
that the benefits of lobbying were often seen as intangible and hard to quantify269.
Indeed, as the Audit Commission (1991, p. 34) recognizes, “lobbying in Brussels usually
requires the greatest expenditure for the least discernible effect”. This led to some local
authorities—and English participants in particular—questioning the value of trying to
lobby the EU policy process. As stated by one participant:
the more broader lobbying and policy type work within Europe, thinking about
these sort of groupings like Eurocities or SELP, those sorts of things which are
a bit broader and woollier in terms of what they’re doing, they’re more about
lobbying and trying to influence Commission policy and feed into those sorts
of things. I think there’s a bit of a political reluctance to engage with those . . .
where do you see the value, where do you see the return in something like that,
the political niceties of influencing some Commission DG or whatever is seen
as something that is you know ‘what’s it actually doing, what’s it delivering
in terms of an output?’270
267 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 01; Int. 06; Int. 17; Int. 23; Int. 29; Int. 35; Int. 44).
268 Interview with English councillor, July 2012 (Int. 25).
269 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 01; Int. 04; Int. 08; Int. 14).
270 Interview with English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 08).
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Given the preference of councillors to reap financial benefits and secure budgetary
contributions, one English local officer was wary that lobbying activity:
won’t appear on my own budget sheet bottom line.271
Indeed the impact of lobbying is not as easily quantifiable as funding. As a result
committee reports had to present lobbying successes in the form of qualitative case
studies (for example Figure 5.3). This information was harder to interpret than the
quantitative outlines of funding achieved (as illustrated in Figure 5.1).
Local actors also recognized that lobbying strategies were also not always successful.
For example Hampshire County Council attempted to influence the boundaries of
Interreg programmes so they would be eligible for funding under the Atlantic IVb
programme. Despite their membership of the high profile CPMR and Atlantic Arc
Figure 5.3: Example of lobbying displayed as qualitative case studies (Kent County Council, 2009a)
271 Interview with English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 14).
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Commission networks they were unsuccessful272. Similarly the Isle of Wight’s attempt
to obtain Objective 1 status was also unsuccessful, despite membership of the CPMR
and Islands Commission273. Indeed, in the case of lobbying for EU funding the Audit
Commission (1991, p. 44) cautions it is usually determined:
on the basis of objective criteria and indicative allocations set for 3–5 years,
and so only affected at the margins by lobbying.
This supports research by other scholars (for example Bomberg & Peterson, 1998;
McAleavey & Mitchell, 1994) who suggest that there are limits to local government’s
ability to effectively lobby the EU institutions.
5.4 LGTN for policy transfer
The third main motivation for participation in LGTN emerging from this study was
policy transfer. In both documentation and interviews this was often discussed using the
language of “best practice” or “innovation”. As with other motivations discussed so far,
policy transfer was cited regularly in European and international strategies (Brighton
& Hove City Council, 2007c; Kent County Council, 2007c; Medway Council, 1999;
Southampton City Council, 2007b; West Sussex County Council, 2002b, 2006a)274.
This was also confirmed as a main motivation by local authority participants275.
The frequency at which policy transfer appeared in both documents and interviews
demonstrated that it was regarded as at least as important as funding and lobbying.
Indeed some participants felt it was the most important motivating factor driving
participation in LGTN:
272 Interview with English local officer, September 2012 (Int. 45).
273 Interview with English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 08).
274 It was also discussed in a variety of other council documentation (Brighton & Hove City Council,
2006; Hampshire County Council, 2005a; Kent County Council, 2008, 2010a, 2011; West Sussex
County Council, 2003a).
275 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 01; Int. 02; Int. 04; Int. 05; Int. 12; Int. 14; Int. 18;
Int. 21; Int. 24; Int. 25; Int. 29; Int. 32; Int. 34; Int. 36; Int. 38; Int. 40; Int. 43; Int. 45; Int. 46;
Int. 48; Int. 52; Int. 53; Int. 58; Int. 59; Int. 60; Int. 67).
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I think it’s better than money to exchange best practices with our colleagues
from French local authorities, but also from our colleagues of Europe.276
Well the most important benefit is best practice.277
Staff working for multilateral networks also highlighted policy transfer as a key
motivation for local authorities to engage in LGTN278. This section now explores this
motivation in detail.
5.4.1 Identified contextual factors
Local authorities highlighted two main contextual factors surrounding their policy
transfer activities: public finance pressures and the need to respond to a constantly
evolving policy environment. As discussed in Section 5.2.1, local authorities are acutely
aware of the financial pressures facing them and sought to offset a reduction in
central government grants by accessing EU funding. However, achieving efficiencies in
existing policy delivery is also seen as a way to mitigate against this situation. Indeed,
participants recognized the potential savings and efficiencies that could be made by
applying innovative policies found elsewhere279.
Secondly, as already demonstrated in Section 5.3.1, local authorities regard
themselves as implementers of a wide range of European policy. While councils seek to
influence EU policy there would nevertheless come a point where they would have to
implement it in whatever form it takes. Participants felt that responding to EU policy
was often difficult for local authorities, either because the policy expectations and
targets set were extremely challenging280, or because policy developed at a rate where
local authorities found it difficult to keep up. In this context councils recognized that
they could not know everything in a given policy area281. As noted by one participant:
276 Interview with French regional officer, September 2012 (Int. 46).
277 Interview with former English local officer, June 2012 (Int. 18).
278 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 10; Int. 17; Int. 23; Int. 30; Int. 33).
279 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 01; Int. 02; Int. 26; Int. 45; Int. 59).
280 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 26).
281 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 02; Int. 05; Int. 11; Int. 38).
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you can’t possibly know everything and in a fast changing world things are
always changing.282
This perception of a challenging and constantly evolving policy environment applied
not only to EU policy but national and sometimes local policies too (Brighton & Hove
City Council, 2008a).
In addition to this, many local authorities recognized that the policy challenges they
faced were inherently transnational in nature. Several participants referred to the policy
challenges presented by the English Channel—such as coastal erosion, maritime safety,
international trade and environmental protection—noting that many of these issues
did not stop at local administrative or even national boundaries283. As highlighted by
one participant:
The issues on the coast are of course of common interest to Belgian, English
and French people . . . of course the regional level or the national level is not
always the best area to deal with some problems or issues. It’s often easier to
use the functional areas where the problems are really based, and I think that
is the idea of having a strong European policy and being involved in Interreg
projects and programmes.284
Finally, there was a feeling that only so much could be learnt from local or national
colleagues as they were all operating in largely the same legislative environment and
within the same bureaucratic culture. As Rose (2005, p. 4) argues, “looking outwards
offers policymakers fresh thoughts, whereas looking within your organization is likely
to tell you what you already know”. Political leaders in particular felt opportunities
to learn from national counterparts were limited. This was particularly the case for
Brighton and Hove, England’s only Green Party led council. As noted by one councillor:
there are lots of forward thinking places where Greens are in power of some
sorts and I think that’s especially relevant to the only Green administration in
the UK, where unlike other administrations in the UK we don’t have other
Green administrations in the UK to look to, whereas if you’re a Labour
282 Interview with English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 11).
283 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 01; Int. 02; Int. 49; Int. 50; Int. 52; Int. 61; Int. 70).
284 Interview with French regional officer, September 2012 (Int. 61).
175
5. Local motivations for transnational networking
administration or a Tory administration, or even a Lib Dem administration in
the UK, there will be at least one other that you can work with and see what
they’ve managed to achieve and how they’ve managed to achieve it, where as
here we can’t. So it’s especially important to us to look to European Greens, or
even just European administration who maybe aren’t Green but have similar
stances on some things.285
5.4.2 Overview of policy transfer and benefits sought
Overall the benefit sought from policy transfer was to identify ‘new’ ideas or practices
which could be applied locally. Sharing best practice assisted councils in improving
existing service delivery (Brighton & Hove City Council, 2005; Kent County Council,
2010a). As two participants argued:
It all links into improving our offer of services, would be the overall heading
I’d go for, or just improving our services generally.286
exchanging ideas and learning about what other regions are doing and you can
take that back into your own day to day service delivery, so it has a direct
benefit there in terms of being able to improve the offering of services that
you’re charged to do.287
As with lobbying, councils often focused their policy transfer activities in certain
thematic policy areas, often reflecting their own strategic priorities. As already
noted, Brighton and Hove sought policy transfer with other Green-led authorities288.
Southampton wanted to learn how to make best use of its port facilities (Southampton
City Council, n.d.-a, 2003, 2006). Bretagne’s interest in maritime policy meant they
sought policy transfer opportunities in this field289.
Policy transfer was also seen as a two-way process, with opportunities for local
government to impart their own policy knowledge or expertise to others in Europe290.
285 Interview with English councillor, September 2012 (Int. 60).
286 Interview with English local officer, September 2012 (Int. 45).
287 Interview with English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 11).
288 Interview with English councillor, September 2012 (Int. 60).
289 Interview with French regional officer, August 2012 (Int. 36).
290 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 04; Int. 07; Int. 12; Int. 14; Int. 17; Int. 26; Int. 29;
Int. 30; Int. 36; Int. 38; Int. 41; Int. 43; Int. 44; Int. 59; Int. 67).
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As highlighted by one participant:
it’s not one-way, we have a great deal to offer them as well.291
This was often seen as a way for local authorities to promote their own strengths,
innovations and examples of best practice among their European peers. Kent County
Council (2011), for example, speaks of:
opportunities to showcase local initiative and market expertise.
One French regional officer felt that policy transfer allowed their authority:
to show that on certain topics we are maybe more adept and maybe have best
practices to share, to disseminate in Europe.292
Some councils also made reference to more altruistic motives, whereby they were able
to impart their policy knowledge and experience to help other local authorities across
Europe293. One participant claimed their authority was:
networking and exchanging ideas and information and disseminating what we
were doing for the benefit of others. That’s a rather more philanthropic things,
but equally we felt that if we could exchange ideas with places facing similar
problems then that could be a benefit to everyone.294
This altruism and showcasing of best practice and policy expertise all sought to enhance
a local authority’s profile among their European colleagues295. Indeed as one participant
stated:
we’re often looking to be working with what we may see as best in class. So
identifying who are the players who really have something to offer us or who
we can offer something to.296
291 Interview with English councillor, September 2012 (Int. 59).
292 Interview with French regional officer, July 2012 (Int. 44).
293 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 25; Int. 26; Int. 29; Int. 38; Int. 41; Int. 45).
294 Interview with former English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 29).
295 Promoting a local authority’s profile is discussed further in Section 5.5.2.
296 Interview with English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 14).
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This was also recognized by multilateral network staff:
they want to showcase what they do and continue to be at the forefront of what
they do. So a city like Barcelona or Amsterdam or London will be participating
for a number of reasons, one of which is because they want to be seen as a
leading practice in a certain policy field.297
5.4.3 The role of LGTN in policy transfer
Because of the limitations of finding best practice nationally (see Rose, 2005), there was
a perception that going abroad and working in partnership provided more opportunities
for learning something new298. As noted by Kent County Council (2007c):
Best practice sharing and benchmarking, an integral component in the
development of successful services, is greatly enhanced by strong international
partnerships.
Participants perceived that certain European colleagues were experts in solving
particular policy problems; one participant, for example, saw Dutch local government
as leaders in traffic management299. This meant that transnational policy transfer
was particularly useful for local officers charged with implementing and administering
local government policies. Participants also recognized that administrative structures,
bureaucratic rules and legislation were also different in other countries, and that this
also increased chances of finding fresh policy ideas. As noted by two:
Obviously we could work with other UK partners, but the fact that those EU
partners work in different legal frameworks and contexts, that sometimes gives
us another, different perspective on things.300
For example, if you have a group of people working in the field of physical
disability and you go and see another service in Rotterdam that works in a
297 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 06).
298 Interview with English local officer, July 2012, and LGA representative, May 2012 (Int. 11;
Int. 31).
299 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 26).
300 Interview with English local officer, August 2012 (Int. 58).
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different way with the different, you know, the context of the arrangement
is different there and the funding is different, the way staff are organized is
different and I feel there is real benefit to be gained from seeing how things
work in different places, almost going out of your normal comfort zone. I think
it can provide opportunities for innovation.301
The role of networks in facilitating policy transfer and learning has long been
recognized (see Benz & Fu¨rst, 2002; May, 1992), and LGTN is no different. As Lee and
van de Meene (2012, p. 203) argue, policy transfer:
is inherently relational; it is dependent on the interactions among different
actors. Transmunicipal networks provide a site for potential policy learning
which can be transferred to individual cities.
This was not lost on the local authorities studied, which placed great emphasis on the
role LGTN played in policy transfer and the benefits it could bring to local service
delivery. Indeed many local authorities saw participation in multilateral networks as a
way to facilitate this. As noted by Southampton City Council (2005):
Southampton City Council also values working in partnership with other
European cities and regions and is a member of several networks including
Eurocities, POLIS, the Maritime Cities Network, and Energie-cities. These act
as a channel for . . . sharing expertise and peer review/learning opportunities
which help the City Council to develop the expertise and knowledge of its staff
and to improve its services.
This was not lost on multilateral networks themselves, with one member of staff
claiming their organization’s main function is:
really about facilitating networking, so that means providing the means for
our members to exchange experience, to transfer knowledge.302
Policy transfer was also a component of many bilateral networks and featured heavily
in co-operation accords between councils. For example, Kent’s agreement with the
Hungarian county of Ba´cs-Kiskun had an action to:
301 Interview with English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 24).
302 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 23).
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develop joint projects and best practice exchanges to mutual benefit in fields
such as tourism, e-government, innovation, education and culture. (Kent
County Council & Ba´cs-Kiskun County General Assembly, 2004)303
LGTN was seen to help policy transfer in a number of ways. Firstly, as already
shown, networking put authorities in contact with other like-minded councils with
which they could exchange policy ideas. Multilateral networks in particular saw this
as one of their primary roles304. This was further enhanced with multilateral networks
dedicated to specific policy areas; the Promoting Operational Links through Integrated
Systems (POLIS) network, for example, was able to bring together councils interested
in sharing information about transport policy, while the Network of European
Regions for a Sustainable and Competitive Tourism (NECSTouR) brought together
councils wanting to exchange tourism policy ideas305. The larger and multi purpose
networks—such as the AER or Eurocities—organized themselves into a number of
policy specific forums or sub-groups to facilitate policy exchange in thematic areas306.
Secondly, LGTN was able to put local officers and councillors from different local
authorities directly in touch with each other. Such direct contacts allowed for the details
of policy to be discussed. Local officers and councillors were often brought together
through large conferences—usually organized by multilateral networks—or smaller but
more thematically focused workshops, either organized by multilateral networks or as
part of transnational projects307. Local officers and councillors felt these gatherings
were valuable opportunities to share policy ideas308, and the prospect of being able to
303 Other bilateral agreements where policy transfer is a component include East Sussex County
Council and Kreis Pinneberg (n.d.); East Sussex County Council and Veszpre´m Megye
O¨nkorma´nyzata (1996); Hampshire County Council and Conseil re´gional de Basse-Normandie
(1989) and Kent County Council and Conseil re´gional du Nord-Pas de Calais (1987).
304 Interviews with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 06; Int. 09; Int. 10; Int. 23; Int. 30;
Int. 33; Int. 35).
305 Interviews with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 23; Int. 33).
306 For example, the AER has three policy-focused committees: Economy and Regional Development,
Social Policy and Public Health, and Culture, Education, Youth and International Co-operation
(AER, 2013). Eurocities operates six thematic forums: culture, economy, environment, knowledge
society, mobility, social affairs (Eurocities, 2013).
307 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 09; Int. 23; Int. 30).
308 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 09; Int. 29; Int. 59).
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participate in such events was emphasized in local government committee reports. For
example, as justified in a report on Brighton and Hove’s application to join Eurocities:
Membership of Eurocities will give opportunities for staff and Councillors
to attend forums, be involved in policy development and exchange of ideas.
(Brighton & Hove City Council, 2008b)
Multilateral network staff also recognized the value of these gatherings to their
members. As highlighted by one:
It’s at the working group meetings where you really have the in depth
discussions on the topics you have on the agenda and you can see straight
away those that are really enthusiastic and those really learning from it.309
These conferences and workshops also provided a venue for local authorities to showcase
their own best practice or policy experience among European peers. As highlighted by
one participant:
We try and ensure as well that we don’t just go as a participant, but where
possible we offer up a presentation or a case study so we’re profiling Brighton
and Hove as a city. So for example at the most recent culture forum in Utrecht
last month a council officer presented Brighton Fuse, a local creative industries
project to the Eurocities culture members and we got a lot of interesting
inquiries from that, so that’s profiled at a EU level.310
Thirdly, LGTN supported study visits, where representatives from one local
authority would visit another to see how policy was implemented on the ground.
Such study visits also allowed for staff exchanges and peer review activities to take
place, both regarded as important tools for policy transfer (Brighton & Hove City
Council, 2007c, 2007b; Kent County Council, 2007b, 2008, 2009a; West Sussex County
Council, 2003a)311. Local authorities recognized the role multilateral networks played
in sponsoring or brokering these exchanges. As noted by one participant:
309 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 23).
310 Interview with English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 12).
311 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 18; Int. 21; Int. 27; Int. 40; Int. 45). Transnational
staff exchanges also played a role in staff professional development, another benefit sought from
LGTN. This is discussed in Section 5.5.4.
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the opportunity to peer review what they do and learn lessons from other
regions is also very valuable. There’s the example of promoting youth
employment project that children’s services recently did with the AER, where
they peer reviewed the approach to youth employment with other regions from
Croatian and Portugal.312
Study visits, staff exchanges and peer review activities were also a strong feature
of bilateral networks. For example, Hampshire and Basse-Normandie engaged in an
annual study visit to exchange best practice examples as part of their bilateral accord
(Hampshire County Council & Conseil re´gional de Basse-Normandie, 1989)313.
Fourthly, LGTN allowed local authorities to pool their limited resources—including
budgets, knowledge and expertise—in order to solve mutual policy problems more
effectively314. This pooling of resources to enable policy transfer was at the heart of
several transnational projects. For example many projects sought to pool knowledge
resources by building joint databases, benchmarking tools or ‘toolkits’ to help inform
local policy development (Brighton & Hove City Council, 2011; Kent County Council,
2009b, 2011; SEERA, 2007; Southampton City Council, 2003, 2005). One example
of this was the EMDI project315 which built a cross-Channel atlas (see Bule´on &
Shurmer-Smith, 2008; Turbout, 2013) compiling data from the project partners to
provide evidence to assist councils along the English Channel to develop policy.
Pooling resources in transnational projects also allowed for joint policy research to
be undertaken at a reduced cost to the individual partners. Multilateral networks also
undertook policy research for their members, again reducing the costs to councils316.
LGTN therefore meant ‘economies of scales’ could be realized when developing local
policy. As emphasized by one participant who had experience of working in several
312 Interview with English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 21).
313 Interviews with English local officers, July 2012 and September 2012 (Int. 21; Int. 45).
314 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 02; Int. 20; Int. 26; Int. 27; Int. 30; Int. 36; Int. 40;
Int. 49; Int. 52; Int. 59; Int. 61; Int. 67; Int. 70).
315 The EMDI (Espace Manche Development Initiative) project involved all the northern French
re´gions along with the Isle of Wight, Kent and West Sussex and a number of universities.
This co-operation continued until 2013 as part of the Channel Arc Manche Integrated Strategy
(CAMIS) project, where much of the atlas data is kept up to date through an online Cross
Channel Atlas, available at: http://atlas-transmanche.certic.unicaen.fr/.
316 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 09; Int. 10).
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projects, one of the main reasons for taking part was:
research, where you can find things out you wouldn’t normally do or you
couldn’t afford. We’ve got a new project where a council in Scotland says ‘I’m
on my own, I cannot afford to procure electric vehicles for logistics, but if we
can actually do this together with London and some places in Holland and in
Germany and in Luxembourg and get a big package of procurement we might
actually save costs there’.317
Finally, LGTN provided a way to share information on and solve transnational
policy problems. Numerous transnational projects operated on this basis. One example
is the CAMIS project which aimed to develop a common strategy for the English
Channel. One of many outputs was the Fe´camp declaration (CAMIS, 2013) which
sought to provide a uniform and co-ordinated local response to the risks of shipping
incidents and maritime pollution, something which affected local authorities in both
England and France, but which could not be addressed through the efforts of individual
councils. The CAMIS project worked around this by exchanging policy ideas between
local authorities in working groups and cross-Channel forums318.
5.4.4 Perceived limits to policy transfer through LGTN
Again, while clear benefits were sought from policy transfer through LGTN, local
authorities were aware of a number of limitations. As with lobbying, participants felt
the benefits were hard to measure and quantify319. As a result, the impact of policy
exchange was sometimes intangible. As highlighted by one participant, policy transfer
led to:
lots of those sorts of things that you can’t particularly put your finger on
everything without trolling through loads of papers.320
317 Interview with former English regional officer, June 2012 (Int. 27).
318 Participant observation, cross-Channel forums, September 2012 and March 2013 (Obs. 3; Obs. 6).
319 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 02; Int. 04; Int. 24; Int. 63).
320 Interview with English councillor, April 2012 (Int. 02).
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Like lobbying, the results of policy transfer could only be reported as qualitative case
studies (see Figure 5.4) which, as already discussed, do not have the same impact as
quantitative results used to report funding successes.
Local authorities also recognized that while the scope for policy transfer was large
and that going abroad opened up numerous opportunities to see best practice in action,
applying those lessons locally was difficult. As emphasized by one participant:
I think for me what’s important is always to link that transnational level to
the local level, so yes a lot of knowledge, ideas are generated through the
exchanges, but we always need to bring that down to the local level to see how
you can actually transfer any of that knowledge.321
Councils felt they were often constrained by their own willingness to learn and engage
in policy transfer activities, sometimes because they were not used to working with
others322. As one participant admitted:
We are not used to as staff in French local government, we’re usually not used
to think to build projects together, to learn from other areas in Europe.323
While observing how policy was implemented in a different context was seen as
advantageous because it increased chances of finding innovative policy solutions, it was
also recognized that the differences in legislative frameworks, bureaucratic culture and
staff working practices could be so great that it simply was not possible to apply a
policy locally in the same way it was done abroad324. This raises questions about the
fungibility of ideas learned through policy transfer. As de Groot and Dibley (2008,
p. 32) point out:
The limitations of spreading English experience of ‘what works’ in local
government improvement have to to be acknowledged. It is not possible to
321 Interview with English local officer, August 2012 (Int. 58).
322 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 25; Int. 26; Int. 37; Int. 38). This is further supported
by Phelps et al. (2002, p. 221) who note “it appears that the concept of . . . partnerships has yet
to take root in the French setting in quite the same way as, for example, in Britain”.
323 Interview with French regional officer, August 2012 (Int. 37).
324 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 25; Int. 26; Int. 37; Int. 38)
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Figure 5.4: Example of policy transfer activities displayed as qualitative case studies (Kent County
Council, 2009a)
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simply transfer domestic approaches and techniques into different cultures,
regimes, governance and politics.325
As noted by two participants:
I used to argue that we could learn from best practice, exchanging ideas about
how you run things . . . problem was they’re all working in completely different
legislative frameworks, it’s very hard to learn from each other.326
You also have the inter-cultural approach to contend with, because sometimes
it is not very easy. We have different cultural approaches, especially between
France and the United Kingdom. So the way people work is very different.327
These limitations identified by local authorities give weight to Benz and Fu¨rst’s
(2002, p. 24) claim that while networks facilitate policy transfer and learning, they
can also impede it. Consequently, some local authorities held back from stating policy
transfer was their primary objective for LGTN. Local officers and councillors from
Kent County Council, for example, noted that policy transfer was only a minor part of
their transnational activity and was only actively pursued if it could bring real tangible
benefits to the organization328.
5.5 Other motivations for LGTN
While obtaining funding, lobbying and influence and policy transfer were the
most frequently stated motivations given by local authorities, a number of
other aims were also emphasized. These were promoting economic development
(Section 5.5.1), enhancing a local authority’s profile (Section 5.5.2), horizon scanning
(Section 5.5.3), aiding professional development (Section 5.5.4) and improving
325 This echoes a similar argument made by Nelles (2012, p. 8) who argues that “the quest for best
practices is futile . . . it is unreasonable to expect that success in one jurisdiction can be translated
directly to success in another. Because contexts differ so greatly, no one solution will fit every
regional situation”.
326 Interview with former English local officer, June 2012 (Int. 34).
327 Interview with French regional officer, September 2012 (Int. 61).
328 Interviews with English councillor, May 2012, and English local officers, May 2012 and July 2012
(Int. 04; Int. 05; Int. 14).
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organizational development (Section 5.5.5). These are now briefly discussed in turn
to illustrate the diversity of additional benefits sought from LGTN.
5.5.1 Promoting economic development
Several local authorities engaged in LGTN in order to promote their localities’ economic
development and this featured in a number of local government European strategies
(Kent County Council, 2007c; Medway Council, 1999; Southampton City Council,
2007b)329. This was also stated by several participants from both English and French
local authorities330.
Most efforts centred around supporting locally-based businesses—particularly small
and medium enterprises (SMEs)—by helping them to take advantage of European and
international opportunities331. As noted in one Kent County Council (2010b) report,
there was a need to develop:
a county-wide programme of support to help Kent’s SMEs to ‘internationalise’
their business and trade activities.
The ‘internationalization’ of local businesses was seen as important for their economic
well-being. As recognized by another Kent County Council (2010a) report:
businesses that engage in international activities have a tendency to show
better rates of productivity, growth and profitability.
To this end Kent participated in a number of transnational projects—such as Two Seas
Trade332—which aimed to identify markets and other opportunities for local businesses
329 Other documents citing economic development as a motivation for LGTN include Brighton
& Hove City Council (2003, 2005, 2006, 2007a, 2011); East Sussex County Council (2004);
Hampshire County Council (2002, 2005a, 2011); Kent County Council (2007b, 2008, 2009b, 2010a,
2010b); Medway Council (2002) and Southampton City Council (2003, 2005, 2006).
330 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 04; Int. 05; Int. 08; Int. 13; Int. 14; Int. 15; Int. 24;
Int. 25; Int. 32; Int. 37; Int. 38; Int. 39; Int. 46; Int. 48; Int. 53; Int. 68).
331 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 04; Int. 08; Int. 14; Int. 25; Int. 41; Int. 53).
332 The Two Seas Trade project, funded under the Interreg IVa Two Seas programme, supported
SMEs in Kent, Flanders and the south-west of Holland to trade within these regions, and
developed an online ‘toolkit’ to aid local businesses to trade internationally. See: www.2seastrade
.eu.
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abroad333.
Local authorities also sought to secure inward investment, often by attracting large
multinational companies to their locality. Medway Council (2002), for example, sought
to be:
A Prime Location for European Business.
Kent, Nord-Pas de Calais and Portsmouth also highlighted the importance of
attracting big business to their areas334. Local authorities felt that by supporting local
business to internationalize and attracting international business to the local area, job
creation could be supported. Promoting tourism was another aspect of local economic
development that local authorities sought to achieve through LGTN, again because
it had the potential to lead to local employment335. This also led to participation
in a number of transnational projects—such as the Liberation Route Europe project
involving Hampshire and Basse-Normandie (Hampshire County Council, 2011)336—and
multilateral networks with a tourism focus, such as NECSTouR337.
Often, local government sought to capitalize on their local infrastructural assets.
East Sussex, Portsmouth and Southampton, for example, highlighted the importance
of their ports for promoting international links and wider economic growth338. As
emphasized by one English councillor:
the other reason I think is important is the commercial port, that anything we
can do through our links to improve the viability of the commercial port are
of great value to the city.339
333 Interview with English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 04).
334 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 04; Int. 61; Int. 68).
335 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 05; Int. 14; Int. 37; Int. 48).
336 The Liberation Route Europe project aims to connect sites of importance to the liberation
of Europe during World War Two across northern Europe. In doing this it seeks to increase
tourism and visitor numbers to the sites involved (Hampshire County Council, 2011). See:
www.liberationroute.com.
337 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 33).
338 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 13; Int. 15; Int. 24; Int. 68).
339 Interview with English councillor, December 2012 (Int. 68).
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This led to local involvement in a number of port-related transnational projects
(Brighton & Hove City Council, 2011; Southampton City Council, 2006)340.
Participants from Kent and Nord-Pas de Calais stressed the need to capitalize on their
transport links—as well as their geographic proximity to international borders—in
order to promote economic development341.
As with previous motivations discussed, local authorities were aware of the difficult
economic context they operated in. In this context there was a need for councils to
support local businesses and employment to ensure the wider economic well-being of
the local area. As justified by Kent County Council (2009b):
The current economic downturn makes it vital to . . . focus international work
on activities which support business and job creation.
Local authorities also linked to European-wide economic recovery plans, hoping to
capitalize on these opportunities:
The last year has been dominated by the global economic recession which
was reflected at the launch at the end of 2008 of the Commission’s European
Economic Recovery Plan. The Plan set out a range of financial, legislative
and other policy measures aimed at supporting businesses, accelerating
procurement procedures and simplifying the implementation of EU Structural
Fund programmes. (Kent County Council, 2008)
Against this backdrop, however, it was felt that local businesses and SMEs lacked the
capacity to engage internationally—even where infrastructure and geography might
be favourable—and were thus failing to make the most of opportunities for economic
development. As highlighted in one Kent County Council (2010a) report:
There is a perception that the business community in Kent has, in general,
not engaged in international activity despite the County’s ‘gateway’ location.
340 Interviews with English local officers, May 2012 (Int. 13; Int. 24).
341 Interviews with English local officer, May 2012, and French regional officers, September 2012
(Int. 04; Int. 61; Int. 62).
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A recent figure from a BSK342 report suggests, for example, that only 8% of
Kent companies are involved in exporting.
Councils, then, felt they had to support local companies to internationalize and often
saw themselves as ‘facilitators’ for local businesses343. This is further supported by
local government’s statutory duty to ensure the economic health of their local area. As
recognized by Medway Council (2002):
Section 2 (1) (a) of the Local Government Act 2000 gives the Council the power
to undertake actions which it considers are likely to achieve the promotion or
improvement of the economic well-being of its area.
French participants also noted they were empowered to promote their local economic
development344. Indeed, local authorities regularly used this legal mandate to justify
participation in LGTN.
LGTN was able to assist local economic development in a number of ways. Primarily
local authorities used transnational projects to support their economic development
activities; these projects not only provided finance to support infrastructural
development and wider job creation—demonstrating a link between obtaining funding
and promoting economic development—but they also provided opportunities for local
businesses and other organizations to engage beyond their locality, thus contributing
to their ‘internationalization’. As already noted in Section 5.2.3, multilateral networks
also provided a ‘ready-made’ network of potential project partners willing to take part
in economic development related transnational projects.
Through bilateral and multilateral networking—and the use of contacts made
through this—councils were able to support local businesses by undertaking ‘trade
missions’ to other localities345.
342 Referring to Business Support Kent. This is a social enterprise supported by Kent County Council
which provides support and funding to local businesses in the Kent area. See: www.bsk-cic.co
.uk.
343 Interview with former English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 38).
344 Interview with French regional officer, August 2012 (Int. 37).
345 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 03; Int. 04; Int. 31).
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5.5.2 Enhancing a local authority’s profile
Increasing the profile of a local authority was another motivation behind LGTN,
as was stated in a number of local authority documents (Brighton & Hove City
Council, 2005, 2007c, 2008b; Hampshire County Council, 2002, 2005a; Isle of Wight
Council, 2004a; Kent County Council, 2007c, 2008, 2010a; Medway Council, 2002, 2003;
Southampton City Council, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007a, 2007b). This was also confirmed
by participants346. Local authorities felt there was a degree of prestige to be had when
engaged in LGTN, particularly in high profile multilateral networks. In the words of
one participant:
I would say a certain amount of . . . kudos for the council. It’s getting your
name out there and being seen as an active and good council.347
The CPMR was one such network which could offer councils this ‘kudos’348. The same
applied to participation in transnational projects, particularly if a council had an
important role such as lead partner. As observed by one participant:
I would say there are a lot of . . . organizations that want to be a lead partner
because it gives them some kind of weight . . . It also gives the organization
prestige where they can go out and they can see they’re getting involved in
international European conferences, part of the European network, etc.349
Central to this profile raising was a desire to be visible and to promote the local
authority on a European level. As noted by one French regional officer:
We can also talk and present what we have been doing in Brittany to
other regions, it’s also a way to make the promotion of our territory, of our
stakeholders, of our policies maybe. I think this can be a benefit.350
346 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 05; Int. 06; Int. 12; Int. 17; Int. 24; Int. 30; Int. 33;
Int. 36; Int. 37; Int. 38; Int. 43; Int. 44; Int. 45; Int. 47; Int. 54; Int. 58; Int. 60; Int. 67).
347 Interview with English local officer, September 2012 (Int. 45).
348 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 17).
349 Interview with Interreg staff, September 2012 (Int. 47).
350 Interview with French regional officer, August 2012 (Int. 36).
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This promotion of localities at a European level regularly took place at showcasing
events in Brussels, where representatives from other European localities, multilateral
networks and EU institutions were invited. One example of this was an event jointly
hosted by the French re´gions in Brussels351.
Local authorities felt that increasing their profile had a number of knock-on benefits,
often linking to other motivations behind LGTN. It was believed, for example, that it
would lead to greater economic development. As justified by Brighton and Hove City
Council (2005):
Such partnership working could help promote the profile of Brighton and
Hove at the international level, helping to maximise the economic benefits
by encouraging tourism and inward investment.
Raising a council’s profile was also seen to increase lobbying success as it led to being
invited to take part in the EU policy process352. Hampshire, for example, was invited
to contribute to a number of expert groups and attributed this to their profile raised
through membership to multilateral networks such as the AER and CPMR (Hampshire
County Council, 2005a). A European profile additionally helped obtaining funding as
it often led to being invited to participate in transnational projects and a number of
associated activities353.
LGTN was also seen to aid the profile of local politicians. As highlighted by two
members of multilateral network staff:
engaging in international work in a network like this . . . means that you
can build the international profile both of your city and of course yourself
personally if you are the mayor of that city participating.354
from a politician point of view they want to play in the major league and some
of them want to give themselves an international background in their CV.355
351 Participant observation, French regions networking event, July 2012 (Obs. 1).
352 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 05; Int. 06; Int. 44).
353 Interview with English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 43).
354 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 06).
355 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 09).
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5.5.3 Horizon scanning
As discussed in Section 5.3.3, LGTN played a role in so-called ‘horizon scanning’, a
form of intelligence gathering to help local authorities target their lobbying activities.
However, horizon scanning went beyond this and was also important to ensure local
authorities were adequately prepared to implement EU policy and highlight potential
funding opportunities.
In order for councils to successfully adapt and to implement the large amount
of EU policy, they felt it was necessary to maintain a watch on potential legislative
developments in Europe. As highlighted by one participant:
it’s not just about funding and the policy. There’s also the legislation that you
need to be aware of, so at an early stage in the process being aware of new
waste legislation or procurement, the impacts it could have.356
This early awareness gave local authorities time to adapt to EU policy and make sure
processes were in place before any legislative deadlines. Indeed for Kent County Council
(2007c) early awareness meant that:
Officers and Members can better understand emerging trends and new issues
likely to affect the County, and ensure Kent can adapt and be proactive in its
response.
The importance of these horizon scanning activities in preparing local government for
EU policy is illustrated by the number of documents in which it is highlighted as a
motive (Brighton & Hove City Council, 2007c, 2007b; East Sussex County Council,
2000, 2001a, 2001b; Hampshire County Council, 2002, 2007; Isle of Wight Council,
2002d, 2004a, 2005; Kent County Council, 2007c; Southampton City Council, 2005;
West Sussex County Council, 2001, 2002b, 2003a).
Local authorities also saw horizon scanning as important for identifying and
taking advantage of forthcoming funding opportunities. This was seen as particularly
356 Interview with English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 12).
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important as many funding schemes were competitive in nature and tight deadlines;
having early information thus gave councils more time to prepare bids and find suitable
partners and this increased their chances of success. As noted by Medway Council
(2003):
Advance notice of new EU funding programmes giving more time to Medway
Council to be able to consider and prepare bids if appropriate . . . This service
provides Medway Council with a head start over potential competitors for
funds by providing information in advance of formal publications in the Official
Journal documentation of the European Union. This gives Medway Council
more time to prepare good quality bids and gather appropriate partners.
5.5.4 Professional development
Some local authorities sought to enhance the professional development of their officers
and councillors. Councils saw LGTN as a cheap, but effective, way to achieve this.
Indeed, one of the the benefits sought by Southampton’s engagement in LGTN was:
low cost staff development and training. (Southampton City Council, 2007b)
Similarly, Brighton and Hove City Council (2007c) believed LGTN would:
provide staff, elected members and stakeholders with low cost development
and training.357
Participants too felt engagement provided professional development opportunities358.
In particular, participation in transnational projects was seen as a way to increase
staff skills. Where such skills already existed, participation could add an international
dimension to them. As noted by one participant:
357 Other documents referring to professional development as a motivation for LGTN include
Brighton & Hove City Council (2006, 2008b); Hampshire County Council (2002, 2005a); Kent
County Council (2009b, 2007c); Southampton City Council (2006) and West Sussex County
Council (2003a).
358 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 06; Int. 09; Int. 26; Int. 38; Int. 40; Int. 43; Int. 47;
Int. 54; Int. 56; Int. 59; Int. 69).
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I just saw a member of staff who’s been put onto a European project, so it’s
giving her loads more skills, and different skills. But in the field where she’s
already an expert, she does that, but this is adding an extra dimension for
her.359
One of the main skills developed by participating in transnational projects was
project management. Again, where project management skills might already be in
place, participating in transnational projects offered opportunities to enhance the
international dimension of this360.
Staff exchanges with local authorities abroad—often instigated as part of policy
transfer activities—provided another opportunity for professional development. As
highlighted by one participant:
we can exchange staff. It means we send one of our staff into another
organization, they’re going to open their minds to other practices, they’re
going to learn other practices and they’re going to see as well . . . that it can
be done in a different way.361
While there is a clear link with the policy transfer motivation here (see
Section 5.4)—staff exchanges provide a way for policy knowledge to be identified and
brought back to the organization—such exchanges also motivate local government staff
often confronted with having to work with difficult and challenging policies. As noted
by one participant:
it’s a boost to staff morale because it’s a bridge to go and discuss problems
you are finding it difficult to tackle with people elsewhere.362
This was further elaborated on by a member of multilateral network staff:
I think, to me, the personal development aspect . . . both for politicians
and officers is very good. You sit there doing your day job as a planner or
whatever it happens to be, tied up in the regulations and the protocols, and it’s
359 Interview with English local officer, July 2013 (Int. 43).
360 Interviews with English local officer, August 2012, and Interreg staff, September 2012 (Int. 54;
Int. 56).
361 Interview with English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 40).
362 Interview with former English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 38).
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sometimes very enlightening to lift your head up from your desk and actually
talk to someone else who is facing the same problems, same situations and just
say ‘well how are you handling this, what are you doing about the framework
directive, we really don’t know what to do about it, have you decided about
how you’re going to manage it over the next three or four years?’ And that,
again you may not agree, you may not pick up the ideas, but it helps you often
to get around problems which are very difficult, very complex to deal with. So
I think personal development, and I’ve seen perhaps people who are perhaps
not very motivated, have been in the same job for a long time suddenly become
very very engaged in the idea of working with others on a common problem.363
This increased motivation of staff gained through international staff exchanges
meant that LGTN had a positive impact on staff retention. As highlighted by Kent
County Council (2007c):
An example of the types of benefit we can gain can be seen in the operation of
international staff exchanges. These allow us not only to share valuable best
practice, but also aid staff retention by increasing motivation and professional
development.
The same report goes on to say:
Sharing lessons from around the globe develops our collective expertise. Our
international profile can enhance Kent’s reputation as an exciting choice for
the best staff in their field. (Kent County Council, 2007c)
5.5.5 Organizational development
Building on professional development, participants also felt LGTN could bring
wider organizational benefits. One of the main benefits to be gained was greater
inter-departmental co-operation and the removal of internal ‘silos’; this was often an
outcome of working on transnational projects as they required input from several
internal council departments. As noted by two participants, both with former local
officer experience:
We talk about increased co-operation between internal services, so all the
services within an organization need to work together to deliver the project,
363 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 26).
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because of the rules, the different procedures, bit also the different tasks within
the organization.364
I think the other advantage . . . is with every organization such as a county
council where you’ve got, just like the Commission has, little boxes with
different departments, the European stuff which I’ve done has often brought
those departments together because it has to be integrated . . . It actually gets
department A talking to department B . . . so it gets them to talk to other
people within their own organization quite often.365
Indeed local officers interviewed saw one of their main roles as communicating European
issues to departments across the whole organization and helping their colleagues to
overcome departmental barriers366.
5.6 General findings
The empirical data presented above has identified three main benefits local authorities
sought from their participation in LGTN: obtaining funding, lobbying and influence
and policy transfer. A number of other motivations were also identified. In seeking these
benefits, local authorities regularly referred to a range of contextual factors they were
trying to address, such as the adverse economic climate, restricted local budgets and a
competitive policy arena. In this way LGTN presents an ‘opportunity structure’ which
local authorities have used to manage the impact of this context and improve their
overall position. While a range of benefits were sought from LGTN, local authorities
also recognized that there were limits to what it could provide. As will be shown in
Section 5.7, these findings have important implications for how the process of local
level Europeanization is interpreted. Namely, that Europeanization through LGTN
simultaneously encompasses top–down, bottom–up and horizontal directional dynamics
(RQ2a), and that it is rationally driven (RQ2b).
364 Interview with Interreg staff, September 2012 (Int. 47).
365 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 26).
366 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 12; Int. 15; Int. 19; Int. 40). As will be shown in
Section 6.3.1, the presence of intra-council ‘silos’ and a lack of co-ordination across departments
can also negatively affect local authorities’ participation in LGTN.
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In addition to this, a number of more general conclusions can be drawn. Namely:
local authorities sought several simultaneous benefits, the motivations for engaging in
LGTN varied between councils, and motivations changed over time. These are now
briefly discussed.
Firstly, the presence of several motivations shows that councils sought a number
of simultaneous benefits from their engagement in LGTN as opposed to a single
overriding one. The diversity of motivations present in any one council is illustrated
when examining the stated aims of European activity in strategic documents. Brighton
and Hove’s aims, for example, are to:
• develop, and exchange, good practice with international partners and
networks with the aim of enhancing policy development and improving service
delivery.
• attract European and international funding to deliver local priorities.
• influence EU policy and legislation that may impact on the city.
• raise the profile of Brighton & Hove internationally.
• increase global awareness, particularly amongst our young people.
• share information on international activities and opportunities with officers,
elected members, local stakeholders and regional partners.
• provide staff, elected members and stakeholders with low cost development
and training. (Brighton & Hove City Council, 2007c)
Similarly, Hampshire County Council (2005a) sought all of the following benefits:
• profile.
• influence.
• sharing experience.
• learning.
• leadership.
• partnership working.
This supports Betsill and Bulkeley’s (2004, p. 490) conclusion that LGTN needs to
offer multiple benefits to make participation worthwhile for local government367. This
367 Betsill and Bulkeley (2004, p. 484) argue that while the primary benefit of the CCP network
was to exchange information, this alone was not enough to warrant engagement, and that the
additional benefits of financial resources and political ‘kudos’ helped ensure participation by
network members.
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diversity of motivations also reinforces criticisms made by some scholars (for example
John, 2000, p. 881; Kern & Bulkeley, 2009, p. 310) that existing literature is too heavily
focused on the link between LGTN—and indeed other forms of European engagement
by local authorities—and EU regional policy; such a narrow focus overlooks other
motivations for participation.
Secondly, not all of the councils studied participated in LGTN for the same reasons.
While the three main motivations—obtaining funding, lobbying and influence and
policy transfer—were the stated aims of almost all the local authorities investigated,
variation occurred among the other aims. This variation in motivations was also
highlighted by a number of multilateral network staff, Interreg staff and LGA
representatives; participants who were often in a position to observe the motivations of
several councils at once368. This conclusion is supported elsewhere in the literature
(for example Happaerts, 2008; Happaerts et al., 2010, 2011; Payre, 2010; van der
Heiden, 2010). As will be argued in Section 5.7.2, this variation in motivations
suggests a strategic approach to LGTN, where local authorities seek benefits according
to their individual pre-determined strategies. This variation further reinforces the
differentiation of engagement in LGTN, as identified in Chapter 4.
Finally, motivations for participating in LGTN often changed over time. Sometimes
this change occurred as a result of exposure to LGTN itself; the longer a local authority
was involved in a network the more chance it had to be exposed to benefits beyond its
original motivations to join369. As one member of multilateral network staff observed:
their motivation can change over time, maybe when we have a new member
that might just be interested in the projects, but then once they start to see
the useful knowledge sharing within the network they become more active in
that area.370
More often, however, this occurred because of a shift in the strategic priorities of a
368 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 03; Int. 06; Int. 17; Int. 23; Int. 54; Int. 55).
369 Interviews with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 23; Int. 33).
370 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 23).
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council. Again, as argued below, this suggests a strategic and rationalist approach to
LGTN.
5.7 LGTN and local level Europeanization
While the findings presented in this chapter make an empirical contribution to
knowledge by revealing the local authorities’ motivations for engaging in LGTN, they
also inform the debate on local level Europeanization. Two supplementary questions
serve to deepen the analysis here:
• RQ2a: What do local authorities’ motivations for engaging in LGTN reveal about
the directionality of local level Europeanization?
• RQ2b: What is the underlying logic driving participation in LGTN?
These are now addressed in turn.
5.7.1 The directionality of local level Europeanization
The first supplementary question (RQ2a) seeks to identify the directionality of local
level Europeanization. As noted in Section 2.1.2, Europeanization is an inherently
top–down conceptualization of the relationship between the EU and its member states.
However, such a view is too simplistic, and scholars point to the ‘uploading’ function
undertaken by member states, leading to bottom–up and circular flows of policies
and practices (Bo¨rzel, 2005, p. 62). In addition, horizontal Europeanization dynamics
have been observed (Graziano & Vink, 2013, p. 47; Bulmer & Lequesne, 2013, p. 20).
These three directional dynamics—top–down, bottom–up and horizontal—can also
extend to local level Europeanization (Kern, 2010; Van Bever et al., 2011a). The
three main motivations for participation in LGTN identified in this chapter shed
light on the directionality of local level Europeanization, and highlights the need to
move beyond a simplistic top–down conceptualization of this process. Specifically the
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motivations identified show that LGTN displays top–down, bottom–up and horizontal
Europeanization directional dynamics simultaneously.
LGTN is traditionally perceived as a case of horizontal Europeanization (Kern,
2010; Kern & Bulkeley, 2009; Van Bever et al., 2011a). Networks themselves are
horizontal by nature; they are formed of links between local authorities, and while
the EU may act as a reference point for co-operation is is not directly involved. The
policy transfer motivation illustrates this. Local authorities use LGTN to share policy
knowledge and best practices with each other directly; there is no direct vertical flow
of information or policy norms to or from the EU. The role of LGTN in lobbying and
influencing the EU confirms the case of bottom–up Europeanization. LGTN is used
by local authorities as a platform to access the European policy making process and
to feed their preferences into it. It is similarly used by the EU to access local policy
expertise and legitimize legislative proposals. In line with Kern’s (2010) distinction,
LGTN can therefore characterized as a case of ‘co-operative’ Europeanization. LGTN
as top–down Europeanization is illustrated with the case of obtaining funding. Here
transnational networks are often established as a requirement of EU rules and network
membership reflects funding eligibility criteria; Europeanization is ‘hierarchical’ (Kern,
2010).
Consequently, LGTN encompasses both vertical and horizontal relationships
simultaneously (Kern, 2014, p. 115). The presence of all three directional dynamics
highlights the complexity of the relationship local government has with the EU.
5.7.2 The logic of local level Europeanization
The second supplementary question (RQ2a) seeks to understand the underlying logic
driving the process of local level Europeanization and engagement in LGTN. As
discussed in Section 2.1.2, a new institutionalist approach to Europeanization can
illuminate this logic, and explain why local government becomes ‘Europeanized’.
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Following this approach Europeanization can be characterized as ‘rational’ or
‘sociological’ (Bo¨rzel & Risse, 2003). Save for one exception (Dąbrowski, 2012, 2013),
existing literature on LGTN—and local level Europeanization more broadly—has yet
to apply this analytical tool. The following analysis therefore offers a contribution to
existing literature which deepens the understanding of the motivations behind LGTN,
and the process of local level Europeanization.
To briefly recap, under rational Europeanization actors follow the ‘logic of
consequentialism’. They are goal-oriented, seeking to improve their position.
Europeanization is thus a reaction to potential opportunities or constraints, and
engagement in it is the result of a cost–benefit analysis, where the cost of becoming
Europeanized is more than outweighed by the benefits it brings (Bo¨rzel & Risse,
2003, pp. 63–65; Hamedinger & Wolffhardt, 2010, pp. 15–16). Under sociological
Europeanization, actors follow the ‘logic of appropriateness’. Their behaviour is
determined by EU rules, norms and preferences which become internalized through
learning and socialization processes (Bo¨rzel & Risse, 2003, pp. 65–67; Hamedinger &
Wolffhardt, 2010, p. 16).
The empirical data gathered and presented in this chapter confirm participation
in LGTN to be rationally driven. This is for six reasons which are now discussed in
turn: participation is goal orientated, local authorities use LGTN to improve their own
position and secure competitive advantage, participation is based on an assessment of
the context in which local authorities operate, participation is based on a cost–benefit
analysis, there is an awareness of the limits to LGTN, and sociological drivers are
absent.
A goal orientated approach
The data presented above show that councils were goal-oriented, participating in
LGTN to achieve their own strategic aims. This link between a local authority’s aims
and the motivations behind their networking activities is confirmed when analysing
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council-produced documents, many of which highlight how specific benefits of LGTN
assist in achieving specific strategic objectives (Brighton & Hove City Council, 2007c,
2008b; East Sussex County Council, 2000; Hampshire County Council, 2005a, 2008;
Kent County Council, 2007c, 2009b, 2010b; Medway Council, 1999; Southampton City
Council, 2004, 2005, 2007a, 2007b; West Sussex County Council, 2002b, 2003a, 2006a).
Brighton and Hove’s European and international strategy, for example:
aims to contribute to the delivery of the council’s strategic priorities:
the emphasis being on complementing existing or planned council activity.
(Brighton & Hove City Council, 2006)
Participants also stated their authority’s motivations for participating in LGTN were
founded in achieving their wider strategic plan371. As noted by one local officer:
Obviously we’re always working towards our main council strategies and the
various different strategies for different departments and business plans and so
on.372
Further evidence of this strategic approach can be found in committee documentation
seeking approval for participation in transnational networks. Figure 5.5, for example,
shows an extract from a Southampton City Council (2007b) report; the two right-hand
columns directly link transnational projects to specific elements of Southampton’s
community strategy and its corporate plan. In seeking approval to participate in the
‘Supporting Young and Unemployed People in Port Cities’ transnational project373, a
Brighton & Hove City Council (2011) report notes co-operation:
contributes to the City and Employment Skills Plan’s (CESP) 2011–2014
vision, in particular to ‘priority three’ of the plan which seeks to ensure that
local residents are equipped to compete fro jobs in the city’s labour market.
371 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 04; Int. 08; Int. 16; Int. 24; Int. 29; Int. 36; Int. 43;
Int. 51; Int. 53; Int. 56; Int. 57; Int. 58; Int. 67).
372 Interview with English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 24).
373 The Supporting Young and Unemployed People in Port Cities transnational project is part funded
by the EU’s Interreg IVa programme. Its partners includes local authorities and colleges from
Antwerp, Brighton and Hove, Plymouth, Rotterdam and Southampton (Brighton & Hove City
Council, 2011).
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Figure 5.5: Example of aligning transnational projects to strategic priorities (Southampton City
Council, 2007a)
It is important to recognize that councils did not change their behaviour, but rather
maintained their pre-existing goals, seeing LGTN as an opportunity to achieve them.
This mirrors Pflieger’s (2014) findings, which showed French cities strategically engaged
in the CIVITAS programme as a means to achieve existing projects which would have
been undertaken regardless:
At the local scale, the French cities have adopted European programmes so
that CIVITAS financing will strengthen policies already underway locally,
rather than just help to disseminate European Union precepts on the subject”.
(Pflieger, 2014, p. 340)
The variation between councils—both in terms of the extent and type of LGTN
participated in (observed in Chapter 4) and the motivations behind networking
(observed in Section 5.6)—further emphasizes the goal-oriented approach; strategic
objectives vary from council to council, so their reasons for participation in LGTN do
too. This affects which networks local authorities choose to engage with, as they seek
to pursue their own thematic policy interests (van der Heiden, 2010, p. 132)374. As
374 This conclusion is supported by van der Heiden (2010, p. 132), whose analysis of seven cities
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already noted, the Isle of Wight’s participation in the CPMR and Islands Commission
was motivated by their interest in coastal erosion issues375. Basse-Normandie’s large
agricultural sector made participation in the Association of European Regions for
Products of Origin (AREPO) and Assembly of the European Regions Producing Fruit,
Vegetables and Plants (AREFLH) a priority376. The mix of urban and rural areas
across south-east England meant involvement in the Peri-Urban Regions Platform
Europe (PURPLE) network was a priority for a number of local authorities in the
area (SEERA, 2004, 2005a).
Evidence of this policy centric approach can also be found with participation in the
more general / multi purpose networks which often organized themselves into a number
of policy specific working groups, forums and sub-networks. Brighton and Hove, which
had corporate priorities in promoting the digital economy and cultural policy, pursued
its interests through Eurocities’ knowledge society and culture forums377. Hampshire
was able to pursue their interests in education and environmental policy through the
relevant AER sub-groups378.
In cases where there are no pre-existing networks focused on a local authority’s area
of strategic interest, councils often established new ones (van der Heiden, 2010, p. 149).
Bretagne, for example, had a long standing interest in maritime policy and this led to
their leading role in establishing—and continued membership of—the CPMR (Wise,
2000a, 2000b). As explained by a French regional officer:
there is a very strong link between Brittany and this network, because it’s a
maritime network and we are a maritime region.379
West Sussex likewise co-established the Airport Regions Conference (ARC) due to the
shows that the networks participated in reflect each cities’ specific economic interests.
375 Interviews with English local officer, May 2012, and former English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 08;
Int. 29).
376 Interview with French regional officer, July 2012 (Int. 44).
377 Interview with English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 12).
378 Interview with English local officer, September 2012 (Int. 45).
379 Interview with French regional officer, August 2012 (Int. 36).
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strategic importance of Gatwick Airport and aviation policy to the county380.
Van der Heiden (2010, p. 150) notes that:
Establishing new international interurban networks is a costly strategy. The
founding city-regions must commit considerable resources to financing the
project, provide the secretary for the initial phase of the network, and invest
heavily in convincing other city-regions to join it. Because of the fierce
competition for members among interurban networks in almost any policy
field, this is a challenging task.
Given the effort and resources involved, local authorities are only likely to make this
investment and establish new transnational networks if they directly contribute to their
overriding strategic objectives.
The goal-orientated approach by local government is further illustrated by cases
where motivations for participation changed as a result of a shift in local priorities,
usually occurring because there was a change in political leadership381. The Isle of
Wight provides an example here. Before 2005 the council was heavily involved in
lobbying activities—mainly centred around the island’s ‘Objective’ status—and policy
transfer, sharing knowledge with other coastal regions on landslide and coastal erosion
issues as these were key strategic priorities. From 2005 and the election of a new
administration, the council’s strategy shifted away from this and more emphasis was
placed on obtaining funding through transnational projects382. This ultimately led to
the council’s withdrawal from the CPMR and Islands Commission, as the lobbying and
policy transfer advantages these networks brought were no longer seen as important
(Isle of Wight Council, 2005)383.
LGTN as a means to improve positions and competitive advantage
The data show that by engaging in LGTN, local authorities sought to improve their
380 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 09).
381 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 02; Int. 08; Int. 09; Int. 15; Int. 18; Int. 24; Int. 34;
Int. 38).
382 Interviews with English local officers, May 2012 and August 2012 (Int. 08; Int. 29; Int. 51).
383 This further indicates an important role for local political leaders, as will be discussed in
Section 6.3.2.
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own position. Indeed, the motivations outlined above all reflect councils’ desires
to secure benefits for their own organization as opposed to contributing to wider
European policy goals. This, however, draws attention to an interesting conundrum.
The rationalist argument—that local authorities are concerned with improving their
own position—seems to conflict with the inherently co-operative nature of LGTN
(van der Heiden, 2010, p. 142). While in some cases participants referred to altruistic
motives—for example in sharing best practice with other local authorities384—this
was due to the overriding motivation of improving a councils’ profile by promoting
themselves as a policy innovator, or in the words of one participant: “best in class”385.
As was shown in Section 5.5.2, it was felt such an improved profile brought with
it greater success in influencing EU policy, obtaining funding and opportunities
for economic development. This confirms Lefe`vre and d’Albergo’s (2007, p. 312)
speculation that “even some apparently socially orientated international activities
might actually be interpreted as motivated by economic aims” (see also van der Heiden,
2010, p. 150).
While LGTN is an inherently co-operative venture, participants also noted that
they were motivated by trying to secure competitive advantage vis-a`-vis other local
authorities, particularly for limited resources or opportunities such as funding and
economic investment. Indeed, the Audit Commission (1991, p. 32) notes that lobbying
for EU funds “is co-operative in the early stages, . . . But in the later stages it is
predominately a competitive exercise in maximising an authority’s share of allocated
amounts”. Indeed, local authorities viewed other network members as competitors
rather than partners386. For example, Brighton and Hove (2008b) justify participation
in Eurocities by acknowledging the network:
384 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 26; Int. 29; Int. 38; Int. 41; Int. 45).
385 Interview with English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 14).
386 This is despite the term ‘partners’ regularly occurring during interviews when describing other
network members. This finding is further supported by van der Heiden’s (2010, p. 143) empirical
analysis.
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contains Belfast, Birmingham, Bradford, Bristol, Cardiff, Hull, Leeds,
Liverpool, London, Manchester, Newcastle, Nottingham, Sheffield,
Southampton and Sunderland. Whilst these are all potential partners
they are all potential rivals economically within the UK so parity of
information and influence and visibility on a European and international
stage is crucial.
As noted in Section 5.2.1, local authorities were aware of the competitive nature of EU
funding programmes. Medway Council (2003), for example, speaks of the need to have:
a head start over potential competitors for funds by providing information in
advance.
The requirement to work with other authorities through LGTN to ensure early warning
of bids and to have potential partners lined up—and thus to increase the chances of
a successful bid—was similarly acknowledged. The need for competitive advantage in
lobbying was also recognized, with many participants highlighting the potential to
be ‘drowned out’ by other, better resourced, actors in Brussels, including other local
authorities387. As highlighted by one councillor:
We’re trying to make sure that the concerns of Hampshire are not forgotten.
I mean I’m not remotely surprised to discover that . . . councillors from
Manchester might be popping up somewhere, they’re going to push the
interests of Manchester. Or Liverpool, you’ve got Liverpool and Southampton
at war with each other over cruise terminals, well don’t be too surprised at a
meeting where Liverpool representatives are, they’re going to push the interests
of Liverpool . . . we’ve got to be there and fight our own corner.388
LGTN, at the very least, offers a way for local government to ‘level the playing field’
in this competitive environment. Pflieger’s (2014, p. 333) claim that transnational
networks “do not soften competition between cities but accentuate it by offering local
authorities new means to differentiate themselves” is therefore borne out.
387 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 01; Int. 11; Int. 12; Int. 18; Int. 19; Int. 34; Int. 36;
Int. 44).
388 Interview with English councillor, April 2012 (Int. 01).
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Assessing the context
It was observed above that local authorities’ participation in LGTN was in reaction to
a number of contextual factors which acted as potential constraints or opportunities.
For example, local government recognized the restrictive economic climate they were
operating in as a constraint to delivering services and local projects, but saw EU
funded transnational projects as a way to continue their activities despite reductions
in revenue and central government grants. They also recognized the value of making
efficiencies through policy transfer. In this way LGTN was an opportunity structure
which provided local authorities with a way to address the impact of this context. As
highlighted in a Kent County Council (2011) report:
The last year has also, of course, continued to be dominated by heavy pressure
on public funding and budgetary reductions within the County Council. Such
domestic pressures might have made it more difficult for KCC to maintain
an outward-looking focus and international profile. However, the contribution
of EU funding to business priorities and the identification of European
best-practice and collaborative working to improve performance makes this
activity even more important in the current climate.
Similarly, local authorities recognized the large impact EU legislation had on them and
the services they deliver, but also realized that the EU was open to local input when
developing policy, provided credibility and representativeness requirements could be
met.
Cost–benefit analyses and depoliticization
Local authorities engaged in LGTN based on a cost–benefit analysis. This was
particularly evident with the funding motivation, where the potential gain of finance
through EU grants was seen as far greater than the costs associated with networking.
As one English councillor noted:
It’s probably a total cost of £100,000 of our membership of groups and sending
people to various delegations . . . but we want to be sure that we’re receiving in
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return, from one way or another, more than that and normally it’s operating
at many many times. It’s not unusual for us to be collecting something like
£2million a year or so, something like that, in grants from various European
projects.389
Indeed, another councillor remarked that if they stopped investing in LGTN their
authority would in fact be losing over £10million a year in the benefits it brought390.
Committee documentation also rationalized participation in LGTN in cost–benefit
terms, as illustrated in the two right-hand columns of Figure 5.6.
Figure 5.6: Example of funding results represented in cost–benefit terms (Kent County Council, 2007a)
In this way participation in LGTN became depoliticized; some local officers
perceived the level of funding to be so great that they felt it overrode councillors’
political views on LGTN, or the EU more generally391. English Conservative councillors,
for example, were typically viewed as Eurosceptic and thus unfavourable towards
building European links. Nevertheless, they still encouraged participation if funding
could be gained, especially in light of pressure on council resources. For example:
The natural tendency for your true-blue Conservative is to be Eurosceptic,
but that’s weighed against that they as councillors are trying to stretch their
budget and stretch their resources.392
389 Interview with English councillor, April 2012 (Int. 01).
390 Interview with English councillor, May 2012 (Int. 05).
391 Interviews with English local officers May 2012 and July 2012 (Int. 08; Int. 11; Int. 13; Int. 21).
392 Interview with English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 08).
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I would generally say overall a Conservative administration . . . would take the
view that Europe was something that existed. They didn’t particularly want
to deal with it, but if there was money to be had they would have it.393
Councillors themselves referred to the ‘pragmatic approach’ they took to LGTN,
and that party politics was absent from the debate394. This is confirmed in van
der Heiden’s (2010, p. 159) study, which observed that “parties from the left and
right sides of the political spectrum acknowledge the need to engage in international
activities”. This pragmaticism explains why local authorities were able to co-operate
despite the sometimes radically different political ideologies held by their respective
leaders (Barber, 1997, p. 20; Church & Reid, 1996, p. 1305). Indeed one local officer
observed that co-operation was more likely to be hindered by differences in bureaucratic
and working cultures, and that party political differences—internal or external to a
council—were rarely a barrier395.
This cost–benefit calculation also applied to motivations beyond obtaining funding.
In lobbying, for example, local authorities recognized the burden of EU legislation
they had to implement and sought to lower the costs associated with future proposals.
LGTN was thus seen as a low cost method, with the necessary economies of scale for
achieving this. This fits with Bo¨rzel’s (2002, p. 196) explanation of Europeanization,
where uploading local policy preferences—in this case through LGTN—can be regarded
as “an effective strategy to maximize the benefits and minimize the costs of European
policies”. Indeed, there was a feeling among participants that if local government failed
to influence the EU, policy would ultimately be detrimental for them, particularly if
they disagreed with the policy in the first place396:
393 Interview with English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 15).
394 Interviews with English councillors, April 2012, May 2012 and November 2012 (Int. 01; Int. 05;
Int. 67). A similar observation has been made by van der Heiden (2010, p. 69) who noted
Lausanne’s right-wing politicians, who were ideologically opposed to international engagement,
still favoured participation because of the benefits it brought the city. This conflicts, however,
with Payre’s (2010, pp. 273–274) analysis which notes the topic of international engagement was
central to partisan splits in Lyon and featured heavily in city council election campaigns.
395 Interview with English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 21). These barriers are discussed in more
detail in Section 6.3.3.
396 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 01; Int. 11; Int. 40).
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If you look at legislation, often it’s gold-plated, so bells and whistles get added
onto things. If you don’t want those bells and whistles on there, if you don’t
even want the piece of legislation in the first place, then you have to make your
voice heard and explain why that is.397
Furthermore, in undertaking policy transfer councils recognized the potential savings
and efficiencies that could be found by applying lessons from abroad398. In the words
of one councillor:
you could suddenly wake up to all sorts of potential ideas and cost savings,
which is very important these days.399
Applying best practice in waste and recycling was one example area where engaging
in low cost LGTN was seen as advantageous. A member of multilateral network staff
noted that:
You’ve got the government pressurizing you to save money to reduce your
landfill otherwise you get fined, what can you do within your budget constraints
that would enable you to meet targets? Actually looking at better practice in
Europe is a better way of doing it.400
Indeed, locally applying lessons in waste policy learned through LGTN led to savings,
with one participant claiming that as a result:
we’re saving a hell of a lot of money on landfill tax.401
Again, this emphasizes that local authorities are making a cost–benefit analysis when
deciding to engage in LGTN; the cost of participation is outweighed by the efficiencies
gained by applying techniques learnt through policy transfer.
Awareness of limitations to LGTN
As illustrated throughout the above empirical analysis, in undertaking their
397 Interview with English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 11).
398 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 01; Int. 02; Int. 26; Int. 45; Int. 59).
399 Interview with English councillor, April 2012 (Int. 02).
400 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 26).
401 Interview with English councillor, April 2012 (Int. 01).
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cost–benefit analysis, councils were well aware of the limitations to LGTN. For each
of the potential benefits sought participants provided words of caution. In seeking to
obtain funding, for example, local authorities were aware of the significant upfront
investment required to put together a bid and the onerous nature of applying for
and managing EU grants (East Sussex County Council, 2000; Kent County Council,
2007b, 2010a)402. Councils would only pursue it if the likely benefits—financial or
otherwise—would make the effort of administration and meeting eligibility criteria
worth undertaking403. While councils were motivated to participate in LGTN because
of the lobbying and policy transfer benefits, they were equally aware of how such
benefits were hard to quantify404, and that success in these areas was not guaranteed405.
Again this supports the rationalist account; local authorities were willing to engage in
LGTN, but also recognized the limits and would only participate if the benefits made
the effort and risk worthwhile.
Absence of sociological drivers
The empirical data presented provides limited evidence of sociological drivers
motivating participation in LGTN. Like Dąbrowski’s (2012, 2013) research, there was
some evidence to suggest that actors’ behaviour gradually changed as they spent time
participating in networks; local authorities seeking to obtain funding might discover
other benefits such as policy transfer, for example406. Nevertheless, evidence from local
actors suggests any internalization of norms was limited, and once engaged in LGTN,
future participation was not guaranteed. This is confirmed by the fact that when
LGTN no longer met—or even threatened—local authorities’ interests, they withdrew
402 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 13; Int. 18; Int. 32; Int. 43; Int. 45; Int.48; Int. 60).
403 This mirrors Dąbrowski’s (2012, p. 738) finding, where Polish authorities were also aware of the
limitations to pursuing EU funding.
404 Multiple interviews with councillors, officers and Interreg staff (Int. 01; Int. 02; Int. 04; Int. 08;
Int. 14; Int. 24; Int. 63).
405 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 02 Int. 08; Int. 10; Int. 34; Int. 45; Int. 48; Int. 59;
Int. 61).
406 Interviews with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 23; Int. 33).
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or altered their activity accordingly.
A number of examples illustrate this. West Sussex, for example, left the AER as
it felt the network was not adequately representing its voice in Europe (West Sussex
County Council, 2000). Hampshire left the CPMR in 2012 as it found out a number
of other authorities in the network had not paid their membership fees but were still
benefiting from membership. In this case Hampshire felt it was being disadvantaged by
participating in the CPMR, so left407. Hampshire and Basse-Normandie began working
on different policy areas and consequently had divergent priorities. This meant their
bilateral link stagnated, as opportunities for policy transfer became limited408.
Additionally, motivations which went beyond local authority self-interest were
rarely present in the data. For example, only two participants referred to LGTN as
a contribution to the wider European integration process409. The role of LGTN as a
way to secure peace in Europe was only mentioned by one participant410. Similarly,
only one participant explicitly referred to the role of LGTN in making their local
authority become more ‘European’411. While many local authorities used LGTN to
enhance their profile and to promote themselves as ‘European’ or ‘international’
actors, the data presented in Section 5.5.2 showed this was a strategy to secure other
benefits, such as economic investment, influence or funding. Consequently there is
limited evidence to suggest local authorities followed the logic of appropriateness—or
“me-tooism” (Duchacek, 1984, p. 18)—when participating in LGTN.
The rationalist argument presented here finds support elsewhere in the literature.
Ercole et al. (1997, p. 220), for example, argue that networking:
is taking place not only because it is either encouraged by the European Union
407 Interview with English councillor, July 2012 (Int. 25).
408 Interview with French regional officer, August 2012 (Int. 37).
409 Interview with English councillor, April 2012, and multilateral network staff, December 2012
(Int. 02; Int. 70).
410 Interview with LGA representative, April 2012 (Int. 03).
411 Interview with French regional officer, August 2012 (Int. 36).
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or indeed because it is a requirement for funding, but also because many local
governments believe such co-operation to be mutually beneficial.
Similarly Lefe`vre and d’Albergo (2007, p. 317) argue that “the political
internationalisation of intercity relationships occurs as a result of deliberate activities
carried out by actors operating within a city’s political and governance system”; rather
than being “mere leaves in the wind of internationalisation”. Local authorities assess
their context and respond to it according to their strategy (Lefe`vre & d’Albergo, 2007,
p. 317).
5.8 Summary
The previous chapter established that LGTN remains a prevalent phenomenon. This,
however, reinforced the empirical puzzle this thesis set out to explore: why do local
authorities engage and invest in LGTN when they lack the formal competence to do
so, and face limits to their capacity to deliver services in the context of austerity and
public finance pressures? This puzzle warranted a focus on the local level motivations
for engagement in LGTN in order to tackle the second research question of this thesis:
• RQ2: What benefits do local authorities seek from their involvement in LGTN?
By focusing on the motivations of local actors, this chapter has been able to provide an
empirical contribution to the existing literature, which tends to focus on transnational
networks themselves, rather than the perceptions of those within them (for example
Bouteligier, 2013; Heinelt & Niederhafner, 2008; Kern & Bulkeley, 2009; Ward &
Williams, 1997). This focus on the perceptions of the actors within transnational
networks and their agency therefore allows this chapter to make a contribution to
knowledge.
Three main motivations were identified which were common to almost all local
authorities studied: obtaining funding, lobbying and influence, and policy transfer.
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Regarding obtaining funding, local authorities saw LGTN as an opportunity to find
out about funding opportunities available to them and access support to bid for
them. Transnational networks were also able to offer ‘ready-made’ transnational
partnerships—which were usually a requirement for EU funding programmes—thus
reducing the burden of having to find suitable partners and limiting risks associated
with working with unknown partners. Regarding lobbying and influence, local
authorities acknowledged the burden of EU legislation they were required to implement.
While they recognized the EU was receptive to local government’s input when
developing policy, they were also aware of the competitive lobbying environment present
at the European level. LGTN here provided a means to access the EU policy process,
by pooling resources and aggregating local government interests, and presenting local
authorities as ‘credible’ stakeholders in the eyes of EU policy makers. Regarding policy
transfer, local authorities sought to identify and apply best practice or new policy
lessons. LGTN provided a platform for this exchange of policy knowledge to take
place and enabled local authorities to access best practice from abroad. Transnational
networks also provided a way for innovative local authorities to ‘showcase’ their
own best practices. A range of other motivations—such as promoting economic
development, enhancing a local authority’s profile and professional and organizational
development—were also identified, although not all local authorities subscribed to
them. It was shown that local authorities often hold several simultaneous motivations
for participation in LGTN, but that these motivations vary between councils. This
further reinforces the message of differentiation identified in the previous chapter: each
local authority engages in LGTN to a different extent, in different ways and for different
reasons.
Two supplementary questions (RQ2a and RQ2b) allowed these empirical findings to
inform the debate on local level Europeanization. Firstly, regarding the directionality
of Europeanization processes (RQ2a), LGTN was seen to encompass top–down,
bottom–up and horizontal dynamics simultaneously. Secondly, applying a new
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institutionalist framework to Europeanization (RQ2b), participation in LGTN was seen
to be rationally driven, with councils adopting a goal orientated approach, seeking to
improve their own positions and only engaging following an assessment of the context
and after a cost–benefit calculation.
This strategic and rationalist approach to LGTN undertaken by local authorities
raises the question of ‘effectiveness’. Indeed, following the rationalist logic, local
authorities’ continued engagement in LGTN will depend on the perceived effectiveness
of this activity. This question is taken up and addressed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 6
Factors determining effective
engagement in transnational
networking
Having established that local authorities do indeed actively participate in local
government transnational networking (LGTN) (Chapter 4) and explored the
motivations behind and rationalist logic driving this activity (Chapter 5), this thesis
now turns its attention to the issue of perceived ‘effectiveness’.
This follows on from the rationalist approach adopted by councils, as identified in
Chapter 5; how local authorities perceive the effectiveness of LGTN will inform their
continued participation. This focus is further motivated by the observation in Chapter
4, that participation in LGTN varies across local authorities; it seeks to understand
the factors account for this differential engagement. Furthermore—as will be shown in
Section 6.2—this question has been overlooked from the perspective of local authorities,
and the local level factors determining effective engagement in LGTN remain largely
unexplored. This chapter thus offers an empirical contribution to knowledge in order
to address this gap in the literature. In short, this chapter addresses the third research
aim of this thesis:
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• RA3: Identify the factors which determine effective participation in LGTN.
And answers the third research question:
• RQ3: What factors determine effective engagement in LGTN?
In addition to this empirical analysis, this chapter makes three contributions.
Firstly, it advances an analytical framework for the analysis of factors determining
effective engagement in LGTN. This accounts for barriers at both the ‘local’ and
‘external’ levels. Secondly, it shows that most factors affecting successful engagement
in LGTN are situated at the local level, and, therefore, fall for the most part within
local government’s control. Thirdly, by borrowing the concept of ‘mediating factors’
from the Europeanization literature, an account can be provided for the differential
engagement in LGTN witnessed in Chapter 4.
This chapter begins by advocating the need to assess effective engagement in LGTN
from the perspective of local authorities (Section 6.1). Not only does this reflect the
rationalist logic driving participation in LGTN (as argued in Chapter 5), it is also
warranted by empirical reality. The chapter then establishes an analytical framework
to address RQ3 (Section 6.2). This is based on a review of existing practitioner and
academic literature, and draws attention to several factors affecting how successfully
local authorities engage in and secure benefits from LGTN. The chapter then uses
the empirical data gathered in this study to assess these factors with reference to
the 14 councils studied (Section 6.3). The empirical analysis is then linked to the
Europeanization literature by considering how determinants of effective engagement in
LGTN act as ‘mediating factors’ (Section 6.4).
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6.1 Conceptualizing ‘effective’ engagement in
LGTN
The topic of the ‘effectiveness’ of LGTN has largely been overlooked, save for studies
which touch on this as part of broader analyses of networks (see Section 6.2.2 for
a review of this literature). Indeed, as recognized by Bulkeley et al. (2003, p. 248),
“to date, there has been no formal evaluation of the effectiveness of networks”. This
presents a challenge for how the effectiveness of LGTN is to be conceptualized and
assessed.
Studies on the effectiveness of policy networks have been a feature of the public
administration literature since the 1990s412, and owe themselves to Provan and
Milward’s research (Milward & Provan, 1998; Provan & Kenis, 1995; Provan &
Milward, 1995, 2001; Provan & Sebastian, 1998). The model of network effectiveness
developed by Provan and Milward (1995)—and later refined by Provan and Sebastian
(1998)—stresses the role of two main variables: network structure and the context in
which networks operate in (see Figure 6.1). In terms of structure, networks are most
likely to be effective when integrated through a centralized “core agency” (Provan
& Milward, 1995, p. 25), when direct, non-fragmented control is asserted (Provan &
NETWORK
STRUCTURE
NETWORK
EFFECTIVENESS
NETWORK CONTEXT
Figure 6.1: Provan and Milward’s (1995, p. 24) model of network effectiveness, as refined by Provan
and Sebastian (1998)
412 Turrini, Cristofoli, Frosini, and Nasi (2010) and Isett, Mergel, LeRoux, Mischen, and Rethemeyer
(2010) offer full reviews of this literature.
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Milward, 1995, p. 25) and when sub-groups and actors within the network are integrated
(Provan & Sebastian, 1998). In terms of context, the need for a stable and resource-rich
environment is emphasized (Provan & Milward, 1995, pp. 26–27).
As highlighted by Turrini et al. (2010), Provan and Milward’s model has served
as the basis for subsequent public administration scholarship on policy network
effectiveness. Nevertheless, building on this subsequent research, Turrini et al. (2010,
p. 546) further refine the model to include a third variable: network functioning
characteristics (see Figure 6.2). It is under this heading that network management
and steering play a role, both directly and indirectly by impacting on the network’s
structure (Turrini et al., 2010, p. 546).
NETWORK
STRUCTURE
NETWORK
EFFECTIVENESS
NETWORK
FUNCTIONING
CHARACTERISTICS
NETWORK CONTEXT
Figure 6.2: Turrini et al.’s (2010, p. 546) model of network effectiveness
The public administration literature therefore focuses attention on a range of factors
which may act to facilitate or hinder effective engagement in networks. Parallels can
be drawn with the Europeanization literature here. As discussed in Section 2.1.2, this
points to the role of mediating factors in accounting for Europeanization’s differential
impact (Risse et al., 2001). At the local level these mediating factors affect how local
authorities engage in LGTN (Baldersheim et al., 2002), and with the European Union
(EU) more generally (de Rooij, 2002). An examination of the factors which determine
effective engagement in LGTN therefore also illuminates the reasons why engagement
in LGTN differs between councils (see Section 6.4).
There remain two weaknesses with the model advanced by the public administration
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literature, however. Firstly, the predominant focus is on the networks themselves and
their context, rather than the individual actors operating within them. Secondly,
emphasis is placed on structural factors, rather than the agency of individual actors413.
While Turrini et al. (2010) provide some scope to account for agency through the role
of network management and steering, this is primarily concerned with its impact on
wider structural factors and, nevertheless, remains situated at the network level414.
One approach to overcome this is to investigate the perceptions of the individual
actors involved. For example Rowe (2011, p. 12), in a study of subnational Brussels
offices, conceptualizes ‘effectiveness’ as follows:
Fundamentally, effectiveness is where actors achieve the results they set out to
achieve. Which is to say, they meet their targets and deliver results that merit
continued investment.
This approach addresses two of the limitations of the public administration model.
Firstly it focuses on the actors participating within the network, rather than treating
networks as whole, single entities. Secondly, by focusing on the local authorities
involved, it provides scope to investigate the agency of these actors, in addition to
structural factors.
This approach offers two additional advantages for this thesis. Firstly, it conforms to
the rationalist argument presented in Section 5.7.2; continued participation in LGTN is
based on an assessment by local authorities of the benefits they are receiving. Secondly,
it accounts for the varied engagement in LGTN (observed in Chapter 4) and fact that
different authorities have different goals (observed in Chapter 5). This differentiation in
engagement and motivations means local authorities perceive effective participation in
different ways; what is effective for one authority, might not be deemed so for another.
As argued by Phelps et al. (2002, p. 222): “the gains from involvement in inter-authority
networking vary according to the differing expectations of members”.
413 Literature on policy learning in networks has a similar predominant focus on structural factors
(for example Benz & Fu¨rst, 2002).
414 This framework is also limited in that it was developed to assess policy networks, whereas LGTN
cannot be characterized in this way (Bulkeley et al., 2003, p. 240; Kern & Bulkeley, 2009, p. 313).
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Thus—in line with Rowe (2011, p. 12)—the effectiveness of LGTN is here founded
on the perceptions of the local authorities participating. As argued in Section 5.7.2,
councils engage in LGTN based on an assessment of the potential benefits to be
gained. Following this rationalist argument, such benefits will be monitored and the
effectiveness of engagement will be assessed. This is confirmed by empirical evidence.
The councils studied regularly undertook assessments of how successful participation
in LGTN was and if it brought benefits to the organization. Participants highlighted
that there was regular scrutiny of LGTN activities by local authorities to make sure
the benefits being sought were in fact being secured415. As noted by one:
we always have a critical eye to what do these sorts of non-statutory functions
bring to the authority. So we are continually held to account, we report back
through the committee structure in the county council in terms of activities,
and we show where those activities link into corporate plans . . . we have to
show that the work that we’re doing is hitting targets, whether in terms of
bringing direct finance back into the authority or whether it’s hitting objectives
which are stated in those policies and plans.416
Indeed scrutiny committees within councils regularly undertook reviews into LGTN (for
example East Sussex County Council, 2001a; Hampshire County Council, 2002, 2003a,
2003b; Medway Council, 2003; Portsmouth City Council, 2009c; West Sussex County
Council, 2002a, 2003a, 2004a) and requested regular reports outlining the benefits
achieved (Isle of Wight Council, 2003, 2004b; Kent County Council, 2007a, 2008, 2009b,
2010b, 2011). Again, these monitoring activities further support the argument advanced
in Section 5.7.2: that local authorities adopt a rationalist approach to their participation
in LGTN. The regular assessments of effectiveness undertaken by councils demonstrate
their desire to secure and measure the return from their investment in this activity.
415 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 06; Int. 06; Int. 12; Int. 14).
416 Interview with English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 14).
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6.1.1 The difficulties of assessing LGTN outcomes
While local government assesses its engagement in LGTN, it is important to recognize
that there are inherent difficulties to the measurement of benefits received (Casson &
Dardanelli, 2012, p. 609). As Duchacek (1984, p. 14) states:
There is, for example, no yardstick by which we could accurately estimate the
amount of dollars in foreign investment that would result from ‘x’ number of
dollars spent by the state representatives in Frankfu¨rt or Brussels. How also
could one measure the personal interest and political clout of a governor . . .
in conducting a personal micro-diplomacy?
Participants in this study acknowledged that benefits derived from LGTN were not
always tangible, nor easily measurable417. As shown in Chapter 5, while the return
from obtaining funding was easily quantifiable, the impacts of lobbying, policy transfer
and other benefits were not. One participant admitted:
Sometimes it is hard to be sure that we get something back. We spend a lot
of time, a lot of money also, to be involved in these networks and sometimes
we have a hard time to evaluate if we get back enough things in return.418
Indeed one councillor noted that:
it would be hard to say that because we are members of the Assembly
of European Regions we therefore get, as we did get, £15million from the
European life fund, so the direct correlation would be very hard to prove. . . .
a lot of it is, as I say, it’s not specific. You ask yourself, and we actually do
an analysis every time we make a visit and we spend public money, and we
have to say ‘what have you achieved?’ Sometimes it’s difficult to write down
precisely what’s been achieved at a particular meeting, but it’s only after a
number of times of establishing those contacts and easy lines of communication
that suddenly the penny drops into place.419
In this context there was a risk of local authorities assessing their participation in
LGTN based on the financial returns, when, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, many of
417 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 01; Int. 04; Int. 08; Int. 17; Int. 44; Int. 47; Int. 63).
418 Interview with French regional officer, July 2012 (Int. 44).
419 Interview with English councillor, April 2012 (Int. 01).
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the benefits being sought were non-pecuniary in nature420.
A delay between initial participation in LGTN and receiving the benefits from
engagement also made it difficult to readily assess outcomes421. As one participant
explained:
there’s also a time lag between beginning a set of activities in a certain
area and the benefits that you see coming back into the authority. So for
examples coming back to project development, there’s definitely a lag between
an inception meeting where people get together and say they’d like to work
together, between submitting a bid and actually seeing the finance back in . . .
it could be a couple of years before you see the first results of some of those
initiatives.422
Therefore, while assessing the effectiveness of LGTN is important to ensure local
authorities were achieving the benefits they sought, this was inherently difficult.
6.2 Literature review and analytical framework
Having established that the effectiveness of LGTN is to be assessed from the perspective
of the local authorities involved, this chapter now reviews the existing literature on this
topic. As noted above, the public administration literature provides a useful starting
point by focusing attention on the factors which determine effective participation in
networks. The themes identified here will be used to inform an analytical framework
through which the empirical data is examined423.
420 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 04; Int. 06; Int. 15; Int. 21; Int. 38; Int. 43; Int. 44;
Int. 47; Int. 54; Int. 57; Int. 58; Int. 69). Happaerts (2008, p. 17) and Happaerts et al. (2011,
pp. 334–335) also identified this in their study of Flanders’ engagement in the Network of Regional
Governments for Sustainable Development (nrg4SD), which came under threat when they felt
they were no longer receiving tangible outputs from their membership.
421 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 14; Int. 22; Int. 44; Int. 46; Int. 46; Int. 53).
422 Interview with English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 14).
423 In line with the provisional coding method adopted during the data analysis, the factors identified
in the practitioner and academic literatures here formed the basis of a preliminary coding scheme
which was used to analyse the empirical data gathered.
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6.2.1 Themes in the practitioner literature
A body of practitioner literature and best practice guidance has drawn attention to
the effectiveness of LGTN. This literature primarily outlines how local authorities
should engage with transnational networks and which factors determine successful
engagement. This literature includes early guidance published by the Audit
Commission (1991) on how local authorities should respond to and engage with the
EU, alongside more recent publications by the Mission Ope´rationnelle Transfrontalie`re
(MOT) and the Council of Europe (CoE) (2006) on building cross-border co-operation,
by the Local Government International Bureau (LGIB) on developing bilateral
networking (Handley, 2006), and various contributions in a pamphlet on international
engagement published by Society of Local Authority Chief Executives and Senior
Managers (SOLACE) (Aitken, 2008b) (see also Bogdanor, 1992; Clifton, 2008; Iacopini
& Klemm, 2009; LGA, 2010). Given this literature is targeted at a local government
practitioner audience, it provides a useful summary of the perceptions of these actors.
It is now reviewed to identify the main factors local authorities feel determine effective
engagement in LGTN.
6.2.1.1 Local factors: structures
Much of the practitioner literature draws attention to the structures councils should
put in place to ensure successful engagement in LGTN.
The presence of a European strategy
One frequently highlighted factor is the need to have a strategic document which
outlines the objectives for participation in LGTN and European and international
activities more generally (Aitken, 2008a; Audit Commission, 1991; Handley, 2006;
Russell & Walsh, 2008). The purpose of this is to make sure the reasons for engagement
are clearly understood and communicated. As the LGIB guidance on developing
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bilateral networks states: “before entering into a partnership, both sides should have
a clear idea about why they are doing so” (Handley, 2006, p. 9). For the Audit
Commission (1991, p. 19) this “is an unavoidable starting point”.
To this end councils are recommended to adopt a European or international
strategy; a document which sets out the aims and objectives for participation in LGTN,
among other European and international activities. Indeed the Audit Commission
(1991, p. 18) suggests local authorities should “develop a ‘strategy’ based on a
review/audit of its needs”. Likewise the LGIB stresses the need for “a strategy
document [which] should provide clear parameters and inform everyone of what the
partners want to achieve and how they plan to achieve it” (Handley, 2006, p. 10). To
confirm the importance of having such a strategic document in place, Aitken (2008a,
p. 7) argues that the councils which successfully engage internationally are those which
“develop international strategies which are able to target resources and ensure that
outcomes are achieved”.
As indicated, European and international strategies should not just outline the
objectives to be sought from participation in LGTN—and other European and
international activities—but should also offer a ‘methodology’ for how councils should
achieve the goals they seek (Handley, 2006, p. 10). In the words of the Audit
Commission (1991, p. 22), dedicated European strategies should:
generate a set of priorities and time-tabling, telling the authority how much to
invest, and when and where to focus its effort, enabling it to divide its labour
efficiently and effectively.
In other words, a strategy for LGTN should outline the objectives local authorities
seek from participation, which networks are to be targeted, which policy areas are to
be focused on and what resources—human and financial—are to be invested.
European and international strategies should be based on an assessment of local
authorities’ contexts and requirements (Audit Commission, 1991, p. 20). When
developing a strategy for LGTN, it “should not be seen as something additional or
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over and above the work of local authorities, but as an integral part of providing the
best possible public services” (Handley, 2006, p. 15). Councils should therefore link
their European strategies to their broader aims to ensure LGTN complements wider
local government activity and its relevance is understood. As noted by the LGIB:
Linking the partnership’s activities to the authority’s corporate plan and the
community’s priorities should enable the rest of the authority to understand
the relevance of the international activities. (Handley, 2006, p. 9)
Consequently the strategic document itself, and the process of developing it, will
provide councils with ‘confidence’ and ‘focus’ in their networking activities (Audit
Commission, 1991, p. 42).
Selection of appropriate partners and networks
With a strategy in place local authorities then need to select their partners and the
networks they participate in strategically. As emphasized by the LGIB:
There are many elements to consider before getting involved in an international
partnership. Top of the list is choosing the right partner. (Handley, 2006, p. 9)
Again this will be linked to authorities’ aims. For bilateral networking, the LGIB states
councils need to decide whether they should engage with partners who are similar to
them, or work with those who have different characteristics (Handley, 2006, p. 9).
A similar principle applies to targeting funding programmes for financial support.
Local authorities need to carefully select the correct programmes and work with the
appropriate partners to ensure success. The Audit Commission (1991, pp. 16–17)
notes that councils are often in danger of pursuing the main EU funding programmes,
despite not being eligible or only having a limited chance of success.
Resourcing and investment in LGTN
Having to invest extra resources in LGTN is inevitable. There are several aspects to
resourcing. As noted by the LGIB:
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Funding is an important element of international partnerships. However, it’s
not just the budget for visits and activities that requires proper consideration,
but also the human resources needed to manage the links efficiently and
effectively. (Handley, 2006, p. 15)
When budgeting for LGTN, councils not only have to account for membership fees, but
also have to give consideration to costs arising from practical elements such as travel and
accommodation costs, meals and subsistence and gifts (Handley, 2006, pp. 19–21)424.
Staffing is one of the key areas of expenditure on LGTN (Handley, 2006). The
LGIB notes that “if partnerships are to be managed well, it is important to make
a commitment to the staffing levels” (Handley, 2006, p. 15). As already discussed in
Section 5.2, while staffing constitutes an investment, it can lead to a net return when
external funding is sought. In this way the LGIB advises that “staff should not be seen
as a cost, but as an important asset” (Handley, 2006, p. 15).
While there is very little to legally prevent councils from spending their resources
on LGTN, it is nevertheless vital that investment is accountable:
If public money is involved, all expenditure has to stand up to the scrutiny of
local government financial regulations, and all activities have to demonstrate
a clear benefit to the community. (Handley, 2006, p. 15)
Many councils face a difficulty with adequately resourcing LGTN, however. As
highlighted by the MOT and CoE (2006, p. 54):
The main difficulty lies in the fact that having the legal capacity to
initiate a transfrontier activity or make a transfrontier investment does not
necessarily mean local communities and authorities have the financial capacity
to undertake the activity or investment in question. Many authorities have
limited human, financial and material resources for co-operation.
Councils are therefore at risk of operating LGTN activities within a limited budget or
without adequate investment.
424 The Audit Commission (1991, p. 40) in the early 1990s estimated the average annual cost of
participation in a transnational network—including officer and councillor time—to be around
£10,000.
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Internal co-ordination of LGTN
The practitioner guidance recommends the co-ordination of LGTN within authorities
through the appointment of dedicated European officers or departments (Audit
Commission, 1991). In the words of the Audit Commission (1991, p. 22):
One officer/department should be nominated to take this policy lead and to
oversee the implementation of the authority’s plan for Europe.
The purpose of such officers and departments is “to ensure the widest and
highest possible levels of awareness and co-ordination”; such appointments should
not “ghettoize” LGTN within specific departments, but facilitate and co-ordinate
involvement across the whole council (Audit Commission, 1991, p. 22). One of the key
co-ordination roles is the dissemination of information throughout the organization. In
particular, information about LGTN “will need to be actively ‘distributed’ rather than
simply available” (Audit Commission, 1991, p. 26). The number of European officers
or the size of a European department should be based on the authority’s strategy and
their activities, ensuring there is adequate capacity (Audit Commission, 1991, p. 24).
6.2.1.2 Local factors: agency
The factors already identified in the practitioner guidance all relate to the structures
councils should put in place to ensure successful engagement in LGTN. However,
this literature also draws attention to the agency of individual actors within local
authorities. Indeed, as Aitken (2008a, p. 7) argues:
let’s not underestimate the level of political and officer effort and will that is
required to make international development projects work effectively. Building
sustainable partnerships takes time, and a great deal of personal investment.
Leadership and support for LGTN
The LGIB states that “it is vital that partnership activities are supported as widely
as possible” (Handley, 2006, p. 13). A recurring theme among the wider practitioner
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literature is the leadership role played by local politicians and senior council officers
(Aitken, 2008a; Bogdanor, 1992; Handley, 2006; LGA, 2010; MOT & CoE, 2006).
As Aitken (2008a, p. 7) identifies, councils which effectively engage in international
activities, including LGTN:
exhibit strong, innovative political leadership. They also have officers who
believe in the impact local government can have and who continue to champion
the work inside the council.
As further highlighted by the MOT and CoE (2006, p. 60) guidance, “transfrontier
co-operation calls for political support from elected representatives and communities”.
For councillors this support is linked to their wider community leadership role:
Councillors have been elected to serve the community and decide on the way
in which a local authority operates. They therefore have a vital role in guiding
and supporting international work. (Handley, 2006, p. 13)
To ensure this political leadership is present, the Local Government Association
(LGA) recommends that all councils appoint or designate a councillor responsible for
international affairs (Handley, 2006, p. 13). Such political support should be present
among senior politicians, such as council leaders or those in executive positions (Clifton,
2008, p. 18). Political leadership should remain present regardless of the party affiliation
of councillors. As the LGIB notes: “although the balance of political power may change
with elections, international partnerships should remain above party politics” (Handley,
2006, p. 13). Political leadership should therefore be consistent and continuous through
the electoral cycles of local government. To maintain political support, the MOT and
CoE (2006, p. 60) suggest that “elected representatives and deliberative assemblies
should be kept regularly informed and be involved in transfrontier arrangements”.
The duty to local communities is also reflected in the leadership role played by
officers:
Local government practitioners have a commitment, above all, to their citizens
and communities, and this is served through engagement with the wider world.
(Davis, 2008, p. 21)
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As already noted, senior officers have an important leadership and supporting role to
play in addition to that of politicians:
It is also important to enlist the support of chief officers, ensure that the
vision is communicated to all areas of the local authority and that it is spread
to members of staff at different levels. (Handley, 2006, p. 13)
Personal relationships
While the leadership qualities of local politicians was one factor, so too are the personal
relationships they build with their transnational colleagues. The MOT and CoE (2006,
p. 28) state that successful co-operation:
calls, firstly, for elected representatives to know one another well and to enjoy
a relationship of trust so that they can affirm a political commitment to
establishing co-operation.
The LGIB likewise agrees, noting that “the leaders of overseas communities will
almost certainly expect to meet their counterparts” (Handley, 2006, p. 13). In this
way LGTN is often built on the back of the personal relationships and alliances
between local leaders. In addition to building personal relationships with each other,
the LGA (2010, p. 18) advises local councillors to seek links with other key European
politicians, such as Members of the European Parliament (MEPs).
Staff and politicians’ skills and knowledge
Local politicians not only need to display leadership, they also need to be actively
involved in LGTN, making their skills and knowledge an important factor. Furthermore,
the Audit Commission (1991) identifies the importance of the skills and knowledge held
by staff working on international activities and LGTN. Indeed, while investing in staff
and appointing European officers and departments provides a structure to co-ordinate
networking activities, it has to be recognized that such roles require specialist skills
(Audit Commission, 1991, p. 22). Awareness of the EU’s decision-making processes
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and knowing how to lobby effectively are some of the key recommendations contained
in the Audit Commission (1991) report. This, along with a more broader appreciation
of informal ‘Brussels politics’, is also recommended by Bogdanor (1992). The LGIB
asks councils to consider the language skills of their staff and councillors, and whether
additional training is required (Handley, 2006, p. 15).
6.2.1.3 External factors
The structural and agency factors identified so far are all present at the local
level, and thus to a large extent fall within local authorities’ control. However, the
practitioner literature also identifies a range of structural factors beyond the level of
local authorities.
Organization of transnational networks
While local authorities should adopt their own strategies, similar documents should be
adopted by transnational networks to formalize co-operation. With bilateral networking
this should take the form of a co-operation agreement or strategic plan (Handley,
2006, p. 10). Such co-operation agreements are not only necessary for the management
of the network, but are also often required when seeking to obtain funding or to
develop transnational projects from the network. As noted by the LGIB: “almost
all institutional donors require clear evidence of strategic planning” (Handley, 2006,
p. 10). As with internal European and international strategies, this document should
outline objectives, timescales and resources. However, the MOT and CoE (2006, p. 30)
caution against committing to formalized agreements, especially in the early stages
of networking, “since such an agreement is likely to turnout to be overly restrictive
or incomplete”. Nevertheless a ‘technical’ agreement outlining governance rules for
networks does provide clear direction (MOT & CoE, 2006, p. 30). In this way, the
LGIB recommends that:
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The strategy should be regarded as an optional plan to guide daily work
programmes and should remain flexible, as it will inevitably have to respond
to any unforeseen and individual circumstances. (Handley, 2006, p. 10)
While co-operation agreements provide one method of organizing transnational
networks, secretariats provide another, especially for multilateral networks. Indeed
the MOT and CoE (2006) guidance on cross-border co-operation states that a ‘joint
technical team’ should be established to manage the day-to-day activities of the
network. It recommends:
a standing organization . . . with stable resources from the partners’ budgets.
These resources can be used to fund a secretariat and, if possible, a team of
professionals. (MOT & CoE, 2006, p. 61)
The ‘frontier effect’ and national barriers
The ‘frontier effect’ refers to the inherent differences found between local authorities
and their contexts when interacting across national borders. LGTN, by its very nature,
involves co-operating with partners operating in different contexts, exposing councils
to a range of cultural and administrative differences. As noted by the MOT and CoE
(2006, p. 28):
local communities and authorities consequently have to contend with a genuine
frontier effect (legislative differences and differentials in labour costs, land and
property prices and so on), which generates both momentum and tensions in
transfrontier relations.
Participating in transnational networks therefore requires councils “to marry different
legal systems, different modi operandi, different practices and cultures and, in some
cases, different working languages” (MOT & CoE, 2006, p. 60). Working with other
local authorities will inevitably lead to conflict when goals and objective differ between
partners. Indeed the MOT and CoE (2006, p. 32) caution that building consensus
between transnational partners and defining common objectives for transnational
networks “may be a difficult exercise”.
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Reconciling or working around such differences is thus an important prerequisite
for effective LGTN. Yet the difficulty here for local government is that “co-operation
arrangements cannot release local communities and authorities from the legal
framework to which they are subject” (MOT & CoE, 2006, p. 16). In other words, the
ability of councils to work around these transnational barriers is inherently restricted
by structural constraints present at the national level.
Media and public support
Reporting of LGTN and local authorities’ other international engagement activities
in the local media is a potential barrier highlighted by the practitioner literature. As
highlighted by the LGIB:
international links are easy prey for journalists looking for negative news
stories. At the same time good communication with the media, partners and
with the local community are important to make an international partnership
a success. (Handley, 2006, p. 22)
Councils need to therefore proactively manage the media profile of their LGTN
activities to ensure the benefits are communicated (Handley, 2006, p. 22). Indeed,
negative coverage can impact the support offered by councillors, with Aitken (2008a,
p. 6) noting that “politicians are sometimes nervous of the negative publicity that
surrounds involvement in international work”. As highlighted above, such political
support is necessary for successful engagement in LGTN.
6.2.1.4 Summary of practitioner literature
The practitioner literature discussed above has identified a range of factors which
contribute to successful engagement in LGTN. As this literature is aimed at local
authorities it offers a useful initial insight into local government perceptions on the
effectiveness of LGTN.
Given the wide variety of local government in Europe—and indeed within individual
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countries—and the fact each local authority is unique, there cannot be a ‘one size fits
all’ approach to LGTN. As highlighted by the MOT and CoE (2006, p. 59), it is:
very difficult to identify a model that is universally and uniformly applicable,
particularly given that this form of co-operation is still in its infancy, gradually
finding its niche as it adapts to a wide range of geographical and legal contexts.
Nevertheless, the practitioner literature drew attention to a number of common
structural and agency factors present at the local level which can determine effective
engagement (see Table 6.1). This literature also identified a number of structural factors
external to local authorities, such as the organization of transnational networks, the
so-called frontier effect and the role of the media. Nevertheless, the bulk of factors
identified fall into the local level structure–agency categorization outlined above.
Indeed, the presence of these factors at the local level suggests much of the success
of LGTN is within local authorities’ control.
While the practitioner guidance offers best practice advice and highlights a number
of factors which can affect successful engagement, there are limitations to using this
literature as a basis for assessing local authorities’ participation in LGTN. Firstly,
while this guidance draws attention to the factors local authorities feel affect successful
engagement, it lacks detail. Secondly, it does not offer an assessment of how well—or
Structural factors Agency factors
A strategic document outlining objectives
sought from LGTN.
Leadership and support by both politicians
and officers.
The selection of appropriate transnational
partners and networks to engage with.
The development of personal relationships,
especially between local leaders.
Adequate resourcing for and investment in
LGTN.
The skills and knowledge of staff working
on LGTN.
Internal co-ordination of LGTN by
designated European officers or European
departments.
Table 6.1: Local level structural and agency factors determining effective engagement in LGTN
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otherwise—councils have applied this advice or the extent to which these factors are
present425. These limitations provide the rationale for further, more detailed, research
into both the factors affecting successful engagement in LGTN and the extent to which
the best practice guidance has been followed. The empirical data analysis presented
further below addresses these limitations.
6.2.2 Themes in the academic literature
While there are currently few academic studies dedicated to assessing how effectively
councils engage in LGTN, a number of themes identified by the practitioner literature
are nevertheless recognized by scholars. These themes are now explored to further
elaborate those identified in the practitioner literature. As will be shown, most existing
studies focus on factors present above the local level, with limited attention given
to the structures employed by local authorities or the agency of local actors. There
consequently remains a gap in the literature, where local level factors for successful
engagement in LGTN have been overlooked.
6.2.2.1 Local level factors
The role of local level factors in the effectiveness of LGTN is acknowledged in the
existing literature (Karvounis, 2011, p. 231; Payre, 2010, p. 222), but as yet only
received limited attention compared with network level and other external factors
(see Section 6.2.2.2). Indeed, as Bouteligier (2013, p. 159) admits, “local specificities
remain far more important than is commonly assumed”. Despite this, some local level
factors—both structural and agency—are identified by scholars.
The presence of a European strategy
The need to have a clearly stated strategic vision for transnational networking and all
425 The exception to this is the Audit Commission (1991) report which based its guidance on the
findings of a survey of United Kingdom (UK) local authorities. These results are, however, very
dated.
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European and international engagement activities is echoed in the academic literature.
Briggs (2010, p. 19) cautions that without a clear strategic vision, engagement in LGTN
may have negative effects overall:
local transnational links among cities and regions can facilitate targeted
investment and cultural exchange but sometimes distract attention from the
needs of poorer communities.
While most urban areas studied by Lefe`vre and d’Albergo (2007, p. 320) had
written strategies in place, not all did. Furthermore, in those areas with strategies, the
involvement of multiple actors across different policy sectors meant there were several,
often competing, strategies in place simultaneously, rather than a single authority-wide
approach (Lefe`vre & d’Albergo, 2007, p. 320). In van der Heiden’s (2010) study, only
two out of seven cities are identified as having a clear strategy in place: Lausanne
and Stuttgart. In Lausanne’s case this strategy clearly links to the city’s pre-existing
corporate objective (van der Heiden, 2010, p. 68).
The overall importance given to LGTN and European and international engagement
more generally also varies. For example, van der Heiden’s (2010, p. 163) findings
indicate “that local policy-making still prevails over international contacts”.
Internal co-ordination of LGTN
Internal co-ordination is a theme identified by Betsill and Bulkeley (2004). They
identified how the limited involvement of a small set of individuals within councils
meant the wider benefits of LGTN were not felt throughout the organization (Betsill
& Bulkeley, 2004, p. 489). Van der Heiden (2010, p. 162) likewise confirms that “the
international activities on the city-region’s scale are organised in a closed circle of
only a small number of policy-makers”, while in Vienna “EU-related activities are
concentrated on a relatively small branch of units within the political–administrative
system” (Hamedinger, 2011, p. 112). This draws attention to the importance of internal
co-ordination and communication of LGTN activities to ensure effective participation,
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and the need to make sure it is not dependent on, or isolated to, individuals. This is
supported by Karvounis (2011, p. 231) who argued that poor internal communication
within local authorities meant that many local officers and politicians only had a vague
knowledge of the transnational networks their own organization was participating in;
this affected their ability to engage with networks and had a detrimental effect on how
local politicians perceive the value of LGTN.
Studies show that the presence of internal co-ordination structures vary. Van
der Heiden’s (2010) study showed that some cities had dedicated departments to
co-ordinate LGTN (Geneva, Lausanne, Luzern, Lyon and Stuttgart), while others
did not (Bern and Zurich). Even where there was central co-ordination, however,
individual departments often pursued their own engagement activities independently.
Lyon, for example had a well established dedicated department for international
engagement, but there remained no systemic overview or co-ordination of all LGTN
activities across departments (van der Heiden, 2010, p. 106). This often meant
authorities had incoherent approaches with multiple departments pursuing different
aims, often conflicting with the prevailing strategy of the authority, with the individual
departments themselves fearing a centralization of their LGTN activities (van der
Heiden, 2010, p. 158). Balme and Le Gale`s’s (1997, p. 158) study of French cities
noted many had set up specific structures to deal with European engagement, “but
except in a few cases, they are generally unaware of what to do with them”426.
While the importance of co-ordination has been highlighted, many smaller local
authorities often lack the resources to put dedicated departments or officers in
place. German Kreise, for example cannot actively participate due to limits on staff
capacity (van der Heiden, 2010, p. 125). Consequently, the literature suggests active
participation in LGTN favours larger cities over smaller localities (Bulkeley et al.,
2003, p. 244).
426 Pflieger’s (2014, p. 339) study of four French cities showed all had put in place structures to
co-ordinate participation in EU funded transnational projects.
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Leadership and support for LGTN
The need for local political and officer support has also been confirmed in a number of
studies (Baldersheim et al., 2002; Betsill & Bulkeley, 2004; Casson & Dardanelli, 2012;
Happaerts, 2008; Happaerts et al., 2010; Keating, 2000; Lefe`vre & d’Albergo, 2007;
Payre, 2010; van der Heiden, 2010). Indeed, Briggs (2010, p. 6) notes “the importance
of personal political leadership should not be underestimated”. Happaerts (2008, p. 17)
argues participation in LGTN “is considered rather useless if no support is given at
the political level”, with Happaerts et al. (2010, pp. 142–143) concluding that effective
engagement “is correlated with the level of political engagement”, a conclusion also
supported by Lefe`vre and d’Albergo (2007, p. 324). To this end effective networking
requires the presence of “individual political champions” within local authorities
(Betsill & Bulkeley, 2004, p. 481). Baldersheim et al. (2002, p. 134) find the education
and political style of local political leads are important.
Nevertheless, the literature identifies varying levels of political support between
councils. For example, Happaerts et al.’s (2010, pp. 136–137) study of Flanders observed
that it was officers who gave more attention to transnational networks, while politicians
only had a limited interest. This was sometimes to the frustration of other network
members who felt the network was being held back by the lack of universal political
interest among all members (Happaerts et al., 2010, p. 139). In other cases political
support was strong, as was the situation in Lyon and Stuttgart (Payre, 2010; van der
Heiden, 2010). Political leaders in Lyon, for example, not only supported the city’s
engagement in LGTN but sought to “build a career for the city” within networks
such as Eurocities by actively engaging and seeking senior positions within executive
committees (Payre, 2010, p. 275).
While the practitioner guidance recommends continuous political support regardless
of electoral change (Handley, 2006, p. 13), cases examined by scholars suggests
this is not always the case. Indeed the impact of ‘political turnover’ or changes in
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administration are highlighted (Happaerts et al., 2010; Payre, 2010; van der Heiden,
2010). For example, in Geneva mayors only serve one year terms, which van der Heiden
(2010, p. 55) argues:
does not help to establish a coherent strategy on the international level. Hence
several engagements in networks are only followed irregularly.427
Changes in administration also affect network engagement. This explains North-Rhine
Westphalia’s withdrawal of the Network of Regional Government for Sustainable
Development (nrg4SD) (Happaerts et al., 2010, p. 140). The opposite effect was
observed in Lyon and Stuttgart, where new administrations—and in particular new
mayors—were more actively supportive of LGTN and were able to engage more
aggressively (Payre, 2010, pp. 273–275; van der Heiden, 2010, p. 156).
In addition to the role of political leaders, the broader support of councillors
is discussed. For the most part, van der Heiden (2010) reveals that outside of the
executive leadership, political involvement was limited. Indeed he concludes that “the
mayor is the key player in international activities” (van der Heiden, 2010, p. 153).
One exception was Luzern, whose councillors maintained an active role in scrutinizing
LGTN activities (van der Heiden, 2010, pp. 78–80). While the political leadership in
Zurich was supportive of LGTN, there were many opponents among the rest of the
city’s councillors (van der Heiden, 2010, pp. 91–94). Generally, however, the absence
of non-executive councillor involvement is highlighted (Hamedinger, 2011, p. 112).
Betsill and Bulkeley (2004) and van der Heiden (2010) not only stress the role of
political support, but also officers’ enthusiasm and the role of local bureaucrats. Where
enthusiastic officers who were engaged in LGTN departed, for example, organizational
involvement effectively ceased as the benefits from networking brought by those
individuals stopped. This was the case with participation in the CCP network, for
example (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2004, p. 481, pp. 483–484). In Du¨bendorf, participation
427 That said, the lack of coherent political leadership in Geneva has not stopped the city pursuing
LGTN (van der Heiden, 2010, p. 155).
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in the Climate Alliance died down when the responsible officer left and was not replaced
(van der Heiden, 2010, p. 95). These examples highlight the impact of staff turnover
on engagement in LGTN.
6.2.2.2 External factors
Much of the academic literature focuses on individual networks as the level of analysis
and as such identifies factors external to local authorities.
Organization of transnational networks
Studies have explored how transnational networks are governed and what techniques
they use to manage their members and activities (for example Bouteligier, 2013;
Bulkeley et al., 2003; Heinelt & Niederhafner, 2008; Kern & Bulkeley, 2009; Payre,
2010). Indeed, Bouteligier (2013, p. 155) identifies that “even the most horizontal
networks need strategic management, coordination and steering”. A number of themes
are present in this literature, two of which in particular reflect on transnational
networks’ role in lobbying and influencing the EU policy process.
Firstly, how decisions are taken within networks affects their external credibility,
and thus effectiveness in achieving their aims. Heinelt and Niederhafner (2008) compare
the operation of Eurocities and Council of European Municipalities and Regions
(CEMR) and how this impacts on their ability to access EU policy making. Eurocities
is a case of ‘co-ordination’, whereby the network relies upon a membership which
shares common interests and values. By contrast the CEMR operates as a form of
‘co-operation’, where actors agree joint positions, some of which may be against the
interests of some network members. There are limits to both. Networks adopting the
co-ordination model suffer from being too much of a close-knit community. While this
makes it easier for the network to adopt and articulate positions, it also makes it more
exclusive. This threatens claims to broader representativeness, and thus legitimacy and
credibility in the eyes of EU policy makers. While networks adopting the co-operation
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model avoid this problem—as they are usually more representative—they often find
it difficult to reach consensus and adopt positions reflecting all of their members’
competing interests. As Bouteligier’s (2013, p. 124) study of Metropolis showed, “it
is not easy to come to a shared vision when you have 118 cities on board, all with their
own backgrounds”. This often leads to lowest common denominator positions lacking
substance, or seemingly contradictory positions being adopted simultaneously in an
effort to appease all members (Heinelt & Niederhafner, 2008)428.
Secondly, the size and thematic focus of a network is important. Bulkeley et al.
(2003, p. 247) observe a difference between transnational networks adopting growth
strategies—to obtain as many members as possible429—and stabilization strategies,
focusing on maintaining a small number of members. Kern and Bulkeley (2009, p. 316)
and Ward and Williams (1997) observe a wider shift from larger generic networks to
smaller ones which focus on niche policy areas. A similar dilemma to that recognized by
Heinelt and Niederhafner (2008) applies; the larger networks offer representativeness
but are too generic in their scope, whereas the smaller niche ones offer concrete
substance in specific policy areas, but lack a broad representativeness. Another danger
with smaller networks is that there are more of them, and so from the EU’s perspective
it becomes harder to manage a wider range of actors leading to duplication and
overload; something networking is supposed to avoid. This ‘size and scope’ dilemma is
a recurring theme in the literature (for example Hooghe, 1995, p. 190; Keating, 1999,
p. 8; Payre, 2010, p. 265)430.
More broadly, the identity and role of transnational networks can also be
428 Payre (2010, p. 265) notes that Eurocities faced this very dilemma when it was established. While
the founding members wanted to keep the network small so it would be easier to manage and
produce more tangible benefits, they also recognized the need to bring in other members to boost
the network’s representative profile.
429 For van der Heiden (2010, p. 134) there is a clear incentive for networks to compete with each other
and secure more members as increased membership leads to greater revenue from subscriptions
and greater legitimacy through representativeness.
430 A solution to this dilemma which Ward and Williams (1997) observe is the creation of a two-tier
approach; the larger, more generic networks provide overall co-ordination and develop a holistic
‘local’ perspective. Operating alongside are the smaller niche networks which offer input on
thematic policy areas (Ward & Williams, 1997).
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problematic. Bulkeley et al. (2003, p. 241) note that networks regularly perform
multiple functions; they act as non-governmental lobbyists, but their membership
reflects that of a quasi-governmental agency. Moreover many act as commercially driven
businesses in so far as they need to seek funding to maintain their existence. These
multiple roles, it is argued, can conflict (Bulkeley et al., 2003, p. 241).
From the perspective of members, the openness and accountability of transnational
networks “is crucial” (Bulkeley et al., 2003, p. 244). Multilateral networks often require
a membership fee to join, or require prospective members to meet certain conditions.
In some cases small local authorities might face access barriers or financial constraints
limiting their ability to participate.
How networks operate on a daily basis and interact with their membership also
affects their perceived effectiveness. Payre (2010, pp. 270–271) discussed how Eurocities
‘structured’ exchanges between its members to ensure effective policy transfer during
meetings and conferences; its Brussels secretariat performs a similar function outside
of these events. However, while such co-ordinating effects may facilitate the exchange
of policy knowledge—along with enhancing the other benefits of LGTN—there is
a risk that such management of the network can become “coercive” (Payre, 2010,
p. 272). Indeed Payre (2010, pp. 272–273) shows how in the case of Eurocities where
disagreements emerged between the Brussels secretariat and its members. This is
particularly the case with certification and recognition schemes offered for adopting
best practice, which may end up alienating a network’s membership if they are unable
to meet standards (Kern & Bulkeley, 2009, p. 332).
The operating languages of transnational networks is another factor (Kern &
Bulkeley, 2009, p. 317; Lawrence, 2000, p. 68; Phelps et al., 2002, p. 221). Both
Kern and Bulkeley (2009, p. 317) and van der Heiden (2010, p. 133) draw attention
the Climate Alliance, whose working language is German. This placed limits on the
engagement of non-German speaking councils in the network. Lee and van de Meene
(2012, p. 214) likewise find this to be important in the C40 transnational network,
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with policy transfer more likely to take place between those who speak the same
language.
The ‘frontier effect’ and national barriers
Elements of the ‘frontier effect’ are also recognized in the academic literature, with
studies acknowledging that fundamental differences and a lack of commonalities
between authorities participating in networks can cause problems. Phelps et al.’s (2002,
pp. 218–219) study of the Edge Cities network showed that socio-economic differences
between members led to difficulties. Indeed, different local and regional administrations
have different competences and powers, so this might make co-operation difficult to
achieve (Sodupe, 1999, p. 78). As Keating (2000) argues:
It is desirable that regions should have similar structures, competences and
powers. In many cases cooperation have been frustrated because one unit has
extensive legislative, administrative and financial powers, as with the units of
a federation, while another only had municipal status.
Structural factors present at the national level is another theme explored by
scholars. As recognized by Bulkeley et al. (2003, p. 246), transnational networks:
cross the borders of nation-states. This does not mean, however, that the
national context is insignificant and, indeed, it may be . . . crucial for the
achievements of [LGTN].
To this end Keating (1999, pp. 11–12; 2000) suggests national constitutional factors
affect the ability of local government to engage internationally. Belgian regions, for
example, enjoy formal constitutional rights to engage in international affairs on policy
issues where they have authority431. However, in France, the doctrine of national
unity means only the whole state—not parts of it—can be externally represented.
Subnational authorities are supposed to gain permission for European involvement from
the secretariat ge´ne´ral des affaires europe´ennes, part of the prime minister’s office (Cole,
431 Known as the ‘in foro interno, in foro externo’ principle (Happaerts et al., 2011, p. 331).
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2011, p. 325), and the central government set up the De´le´gue aux relations exte´rieures
des collectivite´s locales in an attmept “to try to set up some rules and standards
for action” (Balme & Le Gale`s, 1997, p. 167). In England, despite centralization,
the lack of a codified constitution means local government has felt free to engage
internationally (Keating, 1999, pp. 11–12). While there is no statutory duty for local
authorities to engage abroad, the UK government has not stopped them (Casson &
Dardanelli, 2012, p. 602). Blatter et al. (2008, p. 466), however, show that constitutional
competences and constraints have little impact on whether or not local authorities can
engage internationally. This is supported by van der Heiden (2010, p. 172) who argues
“the state’s structure (i.e. federalism or centralism) does not necessarily influence the
intensity or orientation of city-region’s transnational activities”.
Regardless of constitutional barriers potentially restricting or permitting
engagement in LGTN, broader intergovernmental relations between the local
and national levels also have an impact (Lefe`vre & d’Albergo, 2007, p. 324). Indeed,
the willingness of national governments is one factor (Keating, 2000). As argued by
Sodupe (1999, p. 79), “the attitude of member states is vital for . . . inter-regional
co-operation”. Indeed Bache’s (1998, 1999, 2004a) research on EU regional policy
argues that national governments play a ‘gatekeeper’ role when it comes to subnational
involvement in EU politics. While EU regional policy is supposed to benefit local
and regional areas, analyses have shown how it is often used by member state
national governments as a redistributive mechanism to offset some of the costs of EU
membership to national treasuries (for example Bache, 1999; Bachtler et al., 2013).
Media and public support
The potentially negative attitude of local media and the difficulty in securing broader
public support have also been identified (Briggs, 2010, p. 12; Casson & Dardanelli, 2012,
p. 609; van der Heiden, 2010, p. 160). Even though the benefits of LGTN might be
tangible and readily apparent, securing citizen support is seen as difficult. For example
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Briggs (2010, p. 12) notes that even when trying to secure funding:
Local areas also feel under pressure to show how their international work
relates to the interests of citizens at home which can make the considerable
preparation and groundwork needed for these kinds of bids difficult to justify
publicly.
Because of the perceived negative attitude of local citizens, most local authorities
avoid including them in their transnational networking activities, preferring instead
“to organise their international activities behind closed doors” (van der Heiden,
2010, p. 162). The media is often managed by “keeping a low profile, withholding
information, and communications management, only presenting positive stories”
(Casson & Dardanelli, 2012, p. 609). Hamedinger (2011, p. 112) notes that this has led
to “a deficit concerning a general or public awareness for the European dimension of
urban policies”.
6.2.3 Summary and analytical framework
This section reviewed both the practitioner and academic literature on the effectiveness
of LGTN, and has identified a number of factors which affect successful engagement.
These factors exist both at the level of local authorities and above them. Factors at
the local level fall largely within the control of councils.
Section 6.2.1 showed that many of the factors councils felt determine successful
engagement in LGTN exist at the local level. Section 6.2.2 has shown the existing
academic literature is predominantly focused on factors external to local government,
such as the structure and organization of transnational networks (for example
Bouteligier, 2013; Heinelt & Niederhafner, 2008; Kern & Bulkeley, 2009), or barriers
present at the national level. Furthermore the academic literature has largely
investigated the question of effectiveness from the level of networks themselves (for
example Bouteligier, 2013). Two gaps therefore remain present in the literature. Firstly,
factors and barriers affecting effective engagement in LGTN present at the local level
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have been largely overlooked. Secondly, the perceptions of local actors are similarly
neglected432. The empirical data analysis below is able to address both of these
shortcomings.
The factors identified in the above literature review allow an analytical framework
to be advanced, through which the empirical data can be examined (see Figure 6.3).
This framework moves beyond the model of effectiveness advanced in the public
administration literature (Provan & Milward, 1995; Provan & Sebastian, 1998; Turrini
et al., 2010) (see Section 6.1). While it builds on the tradition of this literature
by recognizing structural factors present at the network level—and more generally
factors external of local authorities—it also accounts for factors present at the level
of individual councils participating in LGTN which affect successful engagement. As
has been shown, these local level factors can be further categorized into the structures
local authorities put in place and the agency of local actors. It is at this local level
where councils have the most control over the effectiveness of their engagement. While
there is inevitably overlap433, this heuristic classification provides a useful framework
through which to structure the empirical data analysis.
LOCAL LEVEL
STRUCTURAL
FACTORS
LOCAL LEVEL
AGENCY FACTORS
EXTERNAL
STRUCTURAL
FACTORS
EFFECTIVE
ENGAGEMENT
+
Figure 6.3: Analytical framework for investigating factors affecting effective engagement in LGTN
432 Van der Heiden’s (2010) study is a notable exception, although it has an exclusive focus on cities.
433 As will be shown, for example, language has both local agency and external structural aspects
to it.
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6.3 Local perceptions on effective engagement in
LGTN
As argued, the perceptions of local actors is important in how local government
assesses the effectiveness of engagement in LGTN and ultimately if participation is
to continue. The qualitative empirical approach and data collection methods adopted
by this thesis—specifically semi-structured qualitative interviews with local government
actors—provides a way to access these local level perspectives (Robson, 2002, p. 271).
As part of the data collection, participants were asked what barriers they faced in
achieving their aims through LGTN. They were further asked to outline ways these
hindrances could be overcome and to identify examples of best practice when it
came to participating in LGTN (see Appendix G). The 68 semi-structured interviews
undertaken thus provide a rich source of data, detailing—from a local government
perspective—how successfully councils feel they engage in LGTN and the factors which
affect this. This forms the bulk of the empirical analysis below. The interview data is
supplemented with an analysis of scrutiny committee reports (East Sussex County
Council, 2001a; Hampshire County Council, 2002, 2003a, 2003b; Medway Council,
2003; Portsmouth City Council, 2009c; West Sussex County Council, 2002a, 2003a,
2004a). These documents review and assess local authority engagement in LGTN, so
provide an additional useful source of local government perceptions on the effectiveness
of this activity and barriers councils face.
6.3.1 Local factors: structures
The presence of a European strategy
The need to have clear objectives for LGTN was recognized by participants, who felt
it was important to clearly define, articulate and understand the benefits sought434. As
434 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 07; Int. 08; Int. 09; Int. 11; Int. 17; Int. 24; Int. 36;
Int. 37; Int. 38; Int. 40; Int. 41; Int. 49; Int. 52; Int. 53; Int. 70).
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noted by one:
it’s quite important to be very clear about your aims and objectives.435
This was further underlined by multilateral network staff. For example:
a member region coming to us, or even a sub-regional member coming to us,
has to be quite clear in its own mind about what its expectations are from us in
terms of how it justifies to itself what it feels are the returns from membership
of an organization such as ours.436
Participants therefore felt that in order to be successful, local authorities had to set
out their goals and what returns they wanted to see before participating in LGTN.
Yet, there was a perception among some participants that many councils did not have
this clear vision, and this affected their ability to successfully engage. As noted by one:
Understanding what you want to get out of it and why is key to this . . . and
too often that’s overlooked, I would suggest, in the local authority context, or
being paid lip service to but it actually doesn’t have any deep roots into the
organization, and that’s where the problems arise.437
Indeed, one member of multilateral network staff onserved that:
Sometimes, some members don’t have a very clear strategic vision themselves.
They are members because they think it’s good. Their strategic vision is
blurred into other issues.438
Indeed, scrutiny reviews conducted by some councils drew attention to a perceived
lack of clarity of objectives and the need to have a strategic vision in place (Hampshire
County Council, 2002, 2003a; Portsmouth City Council, 2009c; West Sussex County
Council, 2003a).
The need to link such a strategic vision to the wider corporate aims of local
authorities was also recognized. This was regularly referred to as “main-streaming”
by participants. As one report explains:
435 Interview with English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 24).
436 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 17).
437 Interview with English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 11).
438 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 09).
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whereby the Council’s European work is not seen as something separate
and distinct from the Council’s other work, but rather exists to support
and enhance the achievement of the Council’s overall priorities. (East Sussex
County Council, 2001a)
However, some participants felt LGTN was seen as an optional ‘bolt on’ rather than a
strategic tool to address council-wide priorities439. As one participant observed:
some people view European work, international work, as an add on to what
they’re doing, but I think it’s all about bringing in and supporting the delivery
of your core priorities . . . it’s about making sure, you know, it contributes to
your existing work place, aspirations and needs.440
While the practitioner literature recommends adopting a European or international
strategy to ensure the goals of LGTN are clearly outlined, the experience of one officer
was that most councils engaging in this activity did not have such documents in place:
many of the organizations will not have a European strategy, so you’re
operating then under a sort of ‘well do you want to do things on the European
front? Where’s your strategy?’ And if you haven’t got a European strategy,
is Europe incorporated into the strategic documents that are held within
corporately, organizationally? And if they’re not even at that level then what
about departments, is Europe actually within the environmental department’s
business plan? Because if it’s not in any of that then someone comes to you
and says ‘we want to get some European funding’, well rather than just saying
we want the funding it has to sit within a broader framework of what you want
to achieve. Where’s your strategy? Where do you want to get to? Because if
you don’t really have that it’s difficult.441
Indeed, the adoption of dedicated European and international strategies was varied
across the councils studied, as illustrated in Table 6.2. In England, Kent, Brighton and
Hove and Southampton had up-to-date strategies in place; as noted in Section 5.2.2
Southampton’s and Brighton and Hove’s were timed to coincide with the EU’s regional
policy programming period (2007–2013). Medway, East Sussex and West Sussex all
had strategies in the past, but these had not been updated and were considered lapsed.
439 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 11; Int. 12; Int. 23 Int. 30; Int. 40; Int. 41; Int. 46;
Int. 47).
440 Interview with English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 12).
441 Interview with English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 11).
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Local authority Status of European / international strategy
Kent Dedicated strategy in place (Kent County Council, 2007c).
Medway Dedicated strategy not up-to-date / lapsed (Medway Council,
1999). New strategy planned but not currently under
development.
East Sussex Dedicated strategy not up-to-date / lapsed (East Sussex
County Council, 2000).
Brighton and Hove Dedicated strategy in place (Brighton & Hove City Council,
2007c).
West Sussex Dedicated strategy not up-to-date / lapsed (West Sussex
County Council, 2001, 2002b, 2006a).
Hampshire No dedicated strategy in place.
Portsmouth No dedicated strategy in place.
Southampton Dedicated strategy in place (Southampton City Council,
2007b).
Isle of Wight No dedicated strategy in place.
Nord-Pas de Calais No dedicated strategy in place.
Picardie Dedicated strategy currently under development.
Haute-Normandie No dedicated strategy in place.
Basse-Normandie Dedicated strategy currently under development.
Bretagne Targets for transnational networking set in departmental
budget plan (Conseil re´gional de Bretagne, 2011). Dedicated
strategy currently under development.
Table 6.2: Status of dedicated European / international strategies adopted by the councils studied (as
of 2012, based on documents and interviews)
Hampshire, Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight had no strategies in place at all. In
France, none of the authorities studied had a dedicated European or international
strategy, although Bretagne had a budget plan which outlined key targets for the
European and international department (Conseil re´gional de Bretagne, 2011).
While some councils did not have an up-to-date strategy document in place,
there was nevertheless a recognition of the importance of having one. To this end
participants from Medway, Picardie, Basse-Normandie and Bretagne noted that such
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strategies were either planned or currently under development442. In other councils
without dedicated European and international strategies, goals of LGTN were often
articulated in other corporate or departmental plans. For example, Nord-Pas de Calais
had a number of so-called sche´mas or policy specific strategies, and LGTN featured
heavily in these443. LGTN also featured as part of the Isle of Wight’s green energy
and tourism strategies, for example444.
Selection of appropriate partners and networks
Again participants recognized the need for local authorities to think carefully about
selecting partners and networks, so not to waste time and resources on ineffective
partnerships. As one participant said:
finding the right partner is a bit of a lottery. So you can spend and waste time,
and therefore money, in discovering that the partner actually is not going to
be very good.445
As shown in the previous chapter, local authorities regularly pursued specific networks
to achieve specific strategic aims.
In terms of bilateral networking, local authorities felt it was more effective to engage
with localities which shared common characteristics with their own446. For example, in
the case of Picardie:
[co-operation] was quite effective with Thu¨ringen because there are some
similarities between our two areas. I would say that they have a problem of
old industry decline and are looking for new industry, new innovative industry
with green technology for example, and it’s also quite a rural area, so the
importance of agriculture and agro-economics. There are others, but these are
two major aspects of the common link between our two regions.447
442 Interviews with English local officer, July 2012, and French regional officers, July 2012 and August
2012 (Int. 19; Int. 36; Int. 37; Int. 40).
443 Interviews with French regional officers, September 2012 (Int. 61; Int. 62).
444 Interview with English local officer, August 2012 (Int. 51).
445 Interview with English local officer, August 2012 (Int. 48).
446 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 11; Int. 34; Int. 37; Int. 38; Int. 65; Int. 68).
447 Interview with French regional officer, September 2012 (Int. 65).
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To this end, councils were conscious that they should only develop links with regions
who shared similar socio-economic and geographical characteristics. As noted by one
participant from Portsmouth:
Every year I get two or three people wanting, ‘wouldn’t it be nice to twin
with us’? Well for what purpose? Some of them are really bizarre. There was
a woman who came to us with this scheme to twin with Rabat or Medina . . .
There’ve been other people who are currently suggesting we should have links
with somewhere in north-eastern Netherlands. Well if we’re going to do twin
links at all it has got to be with one of the parts of Rotterdam because that’s
the type of place we should link with.448
This equally applied to East Sussex who stressed the need to avoid links with urban
areas and instead focus on more rural regions:
we were actually twinned with a Paris suburb which was historical, it was
absolute nonsense because it had nothing in common with East Sussex.
Whereas Seine-Maritime and the Somme, who were our Interreg partners, were
much more like us economically and geographically.449
These geographical and socio-economic similarities had to be complemented with
similar competences between the two organizations involved:
It’s not enough to have geographical similarities or positions, or geographical
distance to the capital, it’s not enough. You need to have similar ways to work
and similar fields to work in.450
For example, while Basse-Normandie and Hampshire were geographically and
economically similar, the differences in the competences between the two councils
involved placed limits on their ability to co-operate effectively. Indeed this was one of
the reasons given for why this bilateral link had become less active in recent years451.
448 Interview with English councillor, December 2012 (Int. 68). In this case it was felt that a
partnership with Rotterdam would be more effective because they shared with Portsmouth
similarities in urban development and its port city status.
449 Interview with former English local officer, June 2012 (Int. 34).
450 Interview with French regional officer, August 2012 (Int. 37).
451 Interview with French regional officer, August 2012 (Int. 37).
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Despite recognizing that bilateral networks should be chosen based on
socio-economic, geographical and administrative similarities, there was a perception
among some participants that this was not always happening. One felt:
it’s more scattergun, they could be more strategic about saying these regions
or these cities we want to work with because they’ve got similar problems with
us. So they don’t actually do this appraisal exercise in quite the thorough way
than perhaps they might do.452
Indeed several participants noted that some local authorities had initially chosen
unsuitable bilateral partners who had little in common with them, and that this
led to what were perceived as ineffective partnerships. As discussed earlier, East
Sussex—again largely rural—had developed a link with a Paris suburb which was
later abandoned453. Southampton’s link with Rems-Murr Kreis in Germany—another
largely rural area—was also criticized as there was little similarity between the two:
it was a totally ridiculous twinning link . . . it was just outside Stuttgart and
there was a group of smallish towns who got together in a Kreis and we tried
to get the exchanges going, but in the end you could just see it was just going
to become a bit social and jolly and all the rest of it, and we didn’t really have
much time for that. So in the end that one fizzled out.454
The same principles applied to participation in multilateral networks and
transnational projects; local authorities had to think carefully about which networks to
participate in, and only engage in those which fit their strategic objectives. Again, there
was a perception that not all councils were adopting this strategic approach. Indeed one
member of multilateral network staff felt councils were at risk of determining network
participation based on cost, rather than what they sought to achieve:
they have not so much budget to go in these networks, so they try to select
the more effective ones, but sometimes the decision is not so good, because
sometimes they say ‘yes we choose this one, it’s not so expensive’. But it’s not
the best criteria.455
452 Interview with English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 11).
453 Interview with former English local officer, June 2012 (Int. 34).
454 Interview with former English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 38).
455 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 35).
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By not giving due consideration to targeting their networking activities strategically,
local authorities were often unnecessarily duplicating many of their transnational links
and wasting limited resources. As noted by one participant:
I sometimes wonder why if you’re a member of Eurocities and you pay AC15,000
a year, why do you need to have an individual representative office as well?456
Engaging in appropriate transnational projects was made difficult by the perception
that Interreg and other EU funding programmes which often facilitated this activity
were not particularly well designed. Indeed it was felt they rarely met the needs of local
communities as priorities for these programmes were often determined at national and
European levels, and councils found it difficult to marry their objectives with those of
the programmes457. As one participant highlighted:
The number of times that you try to align what you want to do with what the
European Commission wants to do, and it doesn’t quite knit.458
It was also felt the eligible areas for Interreg programmes were inappropriate. For
example, the Interreg IVa programmes were supposed to foster close cross-border
co-operation, but the effectiveness of this had been reduced as the eligible area was
progressively increased to cover the whole English Channel and a large part of the
North Sea coast (see Figure 4.4)459. As one participant noted:
I think for a council, especially a council that is so closely geographically linked
to northern France, I think the opportunities or the understanding of what can
be achieved has now been some way diluted by the fact that the range of the
co-operation is not just cross-Channel any more, it’s broader EU wide. And
I’m sure that has its merits, but equally we run from Essex right round to . . .
[Cornwall] . . . It’s so wide and diverse that you actually wonder was it ever
designed to foster better cross-border relationships?460
456 Interview with multilateral network, July 2012, (Int. 06).
457 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 25; Int. 41; Int. 43).
458 Interview with English councillor, July 2012 (Int. 25).
459 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 04; Int. 32; Int. 57).
460 Interview with English councillor, June 2012 (Int. 32).
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The variety of EU funding programmes and overlapping eligible areas also led to
confusion among councils over which schemes they should be participating in461.
Resourcing and investment in LGTN
As discussed in Section 5.2.4, local authorities recognized that securing benefits from
LGTN often required an initial investment (Kent County Council, 2007b, 2010a); this
was particularly the case for obtaining funding, but applied to all benefits sought. In
this way participants felt that adequate investment in LGTN was necessary, and that
the greater the investment, the greater the return462. As two explained:
if you look at the Olympics and the hunt for gold medals, there is a direct
correlation between how much you put into resources and training as to how
much you then get delivered in terms of the medal table at the end. . . . It’s
no different in our world. . . . local authorities need to be in there at the table,
and their resources will determine to what extent that’s going to happen.463
The more you put in the more you get out, and if there are genuine resource
constraints as to how much you can put in, you get less out.464
As one report acknowledged, increased investment, particularly in staff:
will enable an immediate improvement in the quality, range and scale of the
service. (West Sussex County Council, 2003a)
However, while the need for investment was acknowledged, the reality was that—in
comparison to other areas of local authority activity—involvement in LGTN only
accounted for a very small proportion of overall council budgets465. As admitted by
one participant:
461 Interview with English local officer, September 2012, and French de´partemental officer, August
2012 (Int. 45; Int. 57).
462 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 06; Int. 09; Int. 11; Int. 18; Int. 22; Int. 23; Int. 45;
Int. 60; Int. 64; Int. 67).
463 Interview with English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 11).
464 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 06).
465 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 01; Int. 02; Int. 03; Int. 21; Int. 57).
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We operate any of these European and foreign activities on an extremely small
budget.466
While in some cases this was not seen as a hindrance467, in most it was felt the small
investment placed limits on how active a council could be. For example, one French
participant noted that the limited investment made by their authority meant they
could only be involved as ‘partners’ in transnational networks, rather than ‘leaders’468.
Indeed, Interreg and multilateral network staff observed limited investment tended to
be one of the main barriers hindering active engagement in LGTN469.
In line with the practitioner guidance, councils recognized that, when investing in
LGTN, they not only had to budget for staff costs and—in the case of multilateral
networking—membership fees, but also the cost of staff training and travel for
officers and politicians to participate in meetings470. However, there was a perception
among multilateral network staff that most local authorities simply budgeted for the
membership fee, without allocating resources for further engagement. As a result local
authorities were not making full use of their transnational links largely because they
lacked the capacity to fully engage471. As one participant explained:
our membership fee is very low, it’s AC6,000, so it’s quite low. . . . But it
implies the members are active. So if they pay the membership fee, they cannot
necessarily pay the transport to come to meetings. If you don’t come to the
meetings, then it’s not necessarily useful.472
Indeed multilateral network staff noted their organizations could only provide benefits
if their members were actively engaged by participating in meetings and communicating
with the secretariat, something that a limited investment by councils hindered473.
466 Interview with English councillor, April 2012 (Int. 02).
467 One English councillor noted that their council’s investment of £50,000—a small proportion of
its £1.7billion annual budget—in LGTN had achieved an “enormous amount” (Interview with
English councillor, April 2012 [Int. 02]).
468 Interview with French de´partemental officer, August 2012 (Int. 57).
469 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 06; Int. 09; Int. 22; Int. 23; Int. 64).
470 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 09).
471 Interviews with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 06; Int. 09; Int. 10; Int. 23; Int. 26).
472 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 09).
473 Interviews with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 09; Int. 23).
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This limited investment in LGTN also made it difficult to recruit and retain good
quality staff with the necessary skills to co-ordinate participation within councils. As
one participant noted:
I couldn’t keep my staff because I wasn’t allowed to reward them, there’s very
tight pay structures. I’d already got them on the highest pay they could get on
their grades and there was no way I could keep them. The fact that they were
now four years better at what they were doing, they’d done a lot of training,
they’d learnt a lot, they were very good at what they were doing, I couldn’t
keep them. They’d got a better salary elsewhere.474
As already discussed in Section 5.2.4, participation in transnational
projects—particularly those part-funded by the EU—often required local authorities
to commit to a level of match funding. However, in the context of limited investment
in LGTN, councils often found it difficult to mobilize the necessary level of funding475.
The limited investment in LGTN had recently been exacerbated by the financial
crisis, which had led to budget cuts affecting all councils studied476. For example,
Kent faced a budget reduction of 25 per cent477, while Portsmouth faced a 33 per
cent reduction478. French authorities too were affected, although not to the same
extent; Nord-Pas de Calais, for example, faced a budget reduction of five to ten per
cent479. Multilateral network staff identified this as a trend affecting all European local
authorities480.
This situation had a direct impact on the investment councils could make.
Portsmouth’s budget for this activity, for example, was reduced by half481. A
474 Interview with former English local officer, June 2012 (Int. 34).
475 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 04; Int. 13; Int. 16; Int. 18; Int. 20; Int. 21; Int. 22;
Int. 24; Int. 33; Int. 34 Int. 39; Int. 43; Int. 46; Int. 48; Int. 56; Int. 69).
476 See Bailey et al. (2015) for the impact of this in England and Pflieger (2014) for the impact in
France. CEMR and Dexia Cre´dit Local (2012) and Davey (2012) provide a general European
picture.
477 Interviews with Interreg staff, May 2012 and French regional officer, September 2012 (Int. 22;
Int. 61).
478 Interview with English councillor, December 2012 (Int. 68).
479 Interview with French regional officer, September 2012 (Int. 61).
480 Interviews with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 10; Int. 23; Int. 30; Int. 33; Int. 35).
See CEMR and Dexia Cre´dit Local (2012) for a European-wide perspective on local authority
budget pressures following the financial crisis.
481 Interview with English councillor, December 2012 (Int. 68).
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similar situation was observed in all councils studied, as well as local authorities
across Europe482. One indicator of this was the withdrawal of local authorities from
multilateral networks, as they could no longer afford the membership fees483. As
recognized by one member of multilateral network staff:
regions are nowadays faced with a strict, they have to save money, they have
real cuts, cuts in personnel, cuts in everything. So the involvement in such
a regional network is always under very strong pressure . . . they’re cutting
regional networks.484
Another noted that in the current financial climate:
I know it’s almost a holy miracle when I receive a membership fee paid by
some of my members.485
Indeed achieving efficiency savings was the main factor behind the Isle of Wight’s
decision to leave the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions (CPMR), for example
(Isle of Wight Council, 2005). In this way ceasing participation in LGTN provided
a short term method for overcoming budgetary pressures, but this was often at the
expense of the long-term gains it offers.
In both English and French authorities participants drew attention to the fact
that this activity was not a mandatory service which they had to provide. In England
there was no direct statutory requirement to engage beyond their borders486, while
in France it was a case of ‘la libre administration’, where it the decision of the local
political leadership to participate or not and to what extent487. Indeed, as noted above,
482 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 02; Int. 10; Int. 11; Int. 13; Int. 22; Int. 23; Int. 27;
Int. 30; Int. 31; Int. 33; Int. 34; Int. 35; Int. 39; Int. 49; Int. 50; Int. 52; Int. 61; Int. 64; Int. 68).
483 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 09; Int. 35; Int. 37).
484 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 30).
485 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 09).
486 Interviews with English local officers, May 2012 and July 2012, and former English local officer,
June 2012 (Int. 04; Int. 14; Int. 34). Although in England there is no legislation prohibiting local
authorities from international engagement either, something Keating (1999, pp. 11–12) argues has
given local government scope to act. Indeed in some cases local authorities would interpret their
statutory duties to permit international engagement, as was observed with promoting economic
development (see Section 5.5.1) (Medway Council, 2002).
487 Interview with French regional officer, September 2012 (Int. 50).
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even where there was a strategic commitment to participate in LGTN, this was not
always ‘mainstreamed’ into councils’ core areas of activities, reinforcing its status as an
optional area of activity488. This made LGTN an easy target for spending cuts, despite
the benefits it brought. As explained by one participant:
the main objective was to cut spending, and what local government does then,
it only spends the money it must spend, and the European work, although it
brings in money, it’s not mandatory, there’s no duty to do it, there’s no power
to do it.489
Indeed another participant noted that investment in staff focusing on LGTN and other
EU engagement activities was regularly questioned at a political level, particularly
when there were discussions over budget reductions:
There are in the cabinet those who would actually cut, and in fact there were
those who recommended cutting a couple of years ago the money we put into
twinning entirely, so that we’d abandon that whole area. And there are those
who feel that having an EU officer is a luxury, in that that person mat being in
money but in the current stage can we afford things which are EU funded?490
In the context of austerity, therefore, councils tended to purely focus on local
issues and the core, statutory services which they were legally obliged to deliver491.
As highlighted by one participant:
it’s very difficult to explain if there’s money going to a European budget or
a European officer, that is then taken away from adult services or children’s
services. How are you going to explain that to the voter?492
Even without the context of tightening budgets, core services were still regarded as
more important than LGTN by staff and politicians. As two participants noted:
488 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 11; Int. 12; Int. 23 Int. 30; Int. 40; Int. 41; Int. 46;
Int. 47).
489 Interview with former English local officer, June 2012 (Int. 34).
490 Interview with English councillor, December 2012 (Int. 68).
491 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 02; Int. 11; Int. 16; Int. 18; Int. 31; Int. 36; Int. 47;
Int. 62; Int. 65; Int. 69).
492 Interview with former English local officer, June 2012 (Int. 18).
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It is probably difficult to say that all the departments of the region see that
European co-operation is a major thing and the major policy internally. I
don’t think so because we are a regional authority, we have a priority for local
and regional issues, so I think the different internal departments have these
priorities in mind first of all.493
The whole purpose of a council is to deliver services to its local people, and
then we question why the hell do we need to talk beyond our borders?494
This approach of focusing on basic services was not always successful. As discussed
in Section 5.2, LGTN offered the opportunity to secure funding, and councils recognized
that in adverse financial climates this could be used to mitigate against budgetary
pressures. Yet, it required significant up front investment in order to realize a return.
Local authorities therefore faced a choice: to make the up front investment to receive
long term benefits, or to gain the short term savings by not participating in LGTN
altogether, but then not being able to benefit in the long run. As one report noted:
it is an option to stop all international links. It is not a statutory service, so
the Council could decide to stop. This would save money, release resources for
other priorities, and would be a radical outcome . . . However, this would mean
the Council loses access to funding opportunities and to influencing policy.
(Hampshire County Council, 2002)
Internal co-ordination of LGTN
The need to co-ordinate LGTN activities within councils and across departments to
ensure maximum benefit was achieved was similarly recognized by participants495. As
one member of multilateral network staff argued:
It helps when a region or sub-regional organization is well organized in terms
of being able to exploit what we are able to provide, and it doesn’t get blocked
by one person, but it is being fed down to those people who can make the best
use of that information or the opportunities.496
493 Interview with French regional officer, August 2012 (Int. 36).
494 Interview with English councillor, April 2012 (Int. 02).
495 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 17; Int. 19; Int. 23; Int. 34; Int. 38; Int. 43; Int. 47;
Int. 48; Int. 54; Int. 56; Int. 57; Int. 68; Int. 69).
496 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 17).
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Yet, there was a perception among participants that local government was prone to
so-called ‘silo working’, where individual departments worked in isolation rather than
with each other. In the words of one:
To some extent the different departments in local government are very
independent of each other.497
In some cases this meant individual departments were participating in transnational
networks independently, which the rest of the council might be unaware of. Indeed,
when asked to provide an overview of the LGTN activity engaged in by their
organization one participant responded:
To be honest I do think there is work going on which I don’t know a lot about
in the environmental sustainability team here. I think they’ve been involved
in the Interreg type projects, but I don’t know a lot of the detail.498
This made it difficult for LGTN to be adequately co-ordinated across the council as
staff were unaware of all that was taking place. As noted by one participant:
with a big organization like this, trying to keep tabs on all the activity that’s
going on, that’s part of my role, part of the policy officer’s role, just to know
what we’re doing, what we’re accessing, and you can imagine it’s really hard
. . . so you don’t always know everything that’s going on.499
This meant there could be a lack of a co-ordinated, organization wide approach to
LGTN, with individual departments and even staff and councillors seeking separate
benefits500. This was often despite the organizational development benefits LGTN could
bring (as shown in Chapter 5).
The presence of this silo working and poor co-ordination meant the benefits
of LGTN were not being fully capitalized upon and were often confined to single
departments, rather than being felt across the whole organization. For example, horizon
497 Interview with former English local officer, June 2012 (Int. 34).
498 Interview with English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 24).
499 Interview with English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 43).
500 Interview with English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 21).
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scanning information provided by multilateral networks was often not circulated across
the council where it might also be valuable. As noted by a member of multilateral
network staff:
I think within a local authority as well sometimes the information is not
diffused. I mean the information we send out, we send out a lot of information,
which is not disseminated internally as well as it could be.501
This was recognized in one scrutiny review, which recommended better co-ordination
between council departments (East Sussex County Council, 2001a).
As discussed above, the practitioner literature recommends using centralized
European officers or dedicated European departments to co-ordinate participation
and councils recognized the value of this. Indeed local authorities have traditionally
employed such officers or departments and this has been a feature of both English
and French local government since the 1990s (Audit Commission, 1991; Goldsmith &
Sperling, 1997, pp. 99–100; John, 2001, p. 77). Such staff and teams often had corporate
oversight of LGTN and had a strategic position within the authority’s hierarchy.
Their importance was recognized in both scrutiny reports and by participants (East
Sussex County Council, 2001a; Portsmouth City Council, 2009c); as emphasized by
one member of Interreg staff:
You need someone who deals with these kinds of things, you need a department
dealing with international partnerships or EU funding co-operation projects,
for sure, or at least one person who can have an overview.502
Participants, however, felt that the presence of European officers and departments
varied across councils. One noted:
there’s massive disparity between staffing levels. If you compare Brighton and
Kent to us, for example, there’s me on 0.4 of a day doing economic development
funding, which is domestic funding and European funding, and we have a
policy officer who will be going a bit of European funding . . . and then you
501 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 23).
502 Interview with Interreg staff, September 2012 (Int. 54).
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have the Brightons and Kents and Suffolks who have teams of people purely
doing European stuff.503
One councillor admitted that:
Portsmouth has not been very good at this, but some of the major big cities,
the Manchesters, Leeds, Bradfords of this world, have international offices of
some sorts.504
Table 6.3 summarizes the current situation in the councils studied, and draws
attention to this variation. All of the French councils studied had European
departments present, but the picture among English councils was more mixed. Kent and
Brighton and Hove were the only two to have European departments, while Hampshire
has long invested in a single dedicated European officer. East Sussex, West Sussex
and Southampton previous had European departments, but had all closed by 2012.
Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight have never had European departments, nor had
dedicated European officers.
This variation is partly explained by recent austerity measures made by councils.
Indeed the closure of previously well staffed European departments in East Sussex,
West Sussex and Southampton is a direct result of budget cuts in these councils505.
While the French authorities studied still had European departments, they too had
been affected; Nord-Pas de Calais, for instance, reduced the number working on LGTN
in its European team from 15 to one506. It was noted that in the current context and
across Europe:
European officers are few and far between, often seen as a bit of a luxury, and
when they leave the organization they’re typically not replaced.507
503 Interview with English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 43).
504 Interview with English councillor, December 2012 (Int. 68).
505 Interviews with English local officers, May 2012 and July 2012, and former English local officers,
June 2012 (Int. 13; Int. 15; Int. 18; Int. 24; Int. 34; Int. 39; Int. 52).
506 Interviews with French regional officers, September 2012 (Int. 61; Int. 62). Some of the staff who
had been working on transnational networking had been transferred to other departments within
the council.
507 Interview with English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 11).
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Local authority Status of European officers / departments
Kent Corporate European department present. Approx. six staff.
Medway No corporate European department. Transnational networking
managed by a ‘European Funding Officer’ in the Economic
Development and Social Regeneration department.
East Sussex Corporate European department closed. Transnational
networking now managed by an ‘External Funding Manager’ in
the Community Services department.
Brighton and Hove Corporate European department present. Approx. five staff.
West Sussex Corporate European department closed. Transnational
networking now managed by a ‘External Funding Accountant’
in the Finance department.
Hampshire No corporate European department. Transnational networking
managed by a ‘European Policy Officer’ in the Chief
Executive’s department and an ‘Economic Development
Project Officer’ in the Economy, Transport and Environment
department.
Portsmouth No corporate European department. Transnational networking
managed by a ‘European Funding Officer’ in the City
Development and Cultural Services department and a part-
time ‘Local Democracy Assistant’ in the Democratic Services
department.
Southampton Corporate European department closed. Transnational
networking now managed by a ‘Project Manager’ and a
‘Regeneration Officer’ in the Skills, Economy and Housing
Renewal department. Some responsibilities devolved to other
departments in the council.
Isle of Wight No corporate European department. Transnational networking
managed by a ‘Economic Project Development Officer’ in the
Economy and Environment department.
Nord-Pas de Calais Corporate European department present, but recently reduced
to one member of staff. Some responsibilities devolved to other
departments in the council.
Picardie Corporate European department present.
Haute-Normandie Corporate European department present.
Basse-Normandie Corporate European department present.
Bretagne Corporate European department present.
Table 6.3: Status of European officers / departments in the councils studied (as of 2012, based on
document and interview analysis)
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These budget cuts and the resulting closure of European departments and reduction
in dedicated staff had a number of knock on effects for how well councils engaged in
LGTN. As one report acknowledged:
The resulting reduction in staffing levels has involved a reconfiguration of the
European workload so that activities continue to match available resources.
Budget review has meant that progressing a lot of the recommendations [for
transnational networking as advised by the scrutiny committee] has been more
difficult than would otherwise be the case as people cut their budget to the
bare essentials. (West Sussex County Council, 2004a)
Local authorities often struggled to effectively reallocate responsibility for LGTN.
As one participant observed:
sometimes organizations can’t identify a member of staff that would be the
right person to do this.508
Typically, where local authorities wished to continue participating in LGTN, but
without dedicated staff support, the role of managing engagement was passed to other
existing staff, usually those with an economic development or external funding role.
This was the case with East Sussex, West Sussex and Southampton, for example. This
situation was not only confined to the councils studied, but was more representative
of English local government in general509. Consequently, there has been a trend of
devolving LGTN from centralized corporate European departments to single members
of staff within departments throughout the organization510. This meant many staff now
working on LGTN were often doing this in addition to their existing workloads511. In
the words of one participant:
We’re doing the same work, if not more, but with a lot less people.512
508 Interview with English local officer, August 2012 (Int. 58).
509 Interview with Interreg staff, December 2012 (Int. 69).
510 Interview with English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 24).
511 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 11; Int. 21; Int. 22; Int. 26; Int. 39; Int. 43; Int. 49;
Int. 54; Int. 56; Int. 61).
512 Interview with English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 39).
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Because staff were undertaking multiple workloads, less time was being dedicated
to LGTN. As explained by one participant:
I started my current role . . . in January 2012, and that is a role that covers
both UK policy and European policy. Previously that was done by two separate
people, but I’m covering EU and UK policy. My involvement is less than what
my predecessor would have covered.513
This often had a detrimental impact on the effectiveness of networking as an insufficient
amount of time had been dedicated to working on it. As observed by one participant
with experience of working on transnational projects:
What I see from my experience is a lot of my partners . . . put a lot of time for
officers to participate in projects, but actually this is additional work to the
current workload of officers . . . As a result partners don’t spend the time they
should spend on projects, especially because their usual activity is a priority.514
Even where European departments had not been disbanded, a reduction in staff meant
councils found it difficult to dedicate enough time to all of their transnational links.
As noted by one participant:
It was a whole service with 15 officers and now with different cuts . . . I’m the
only one in charge of European co-operation issues . . . it is very difficult to
manage at the same time the relationship with Kent, with Wallonia, Flanders,
etc. It’s not so easy, so maybe sometimes you have a lack of time or you have to
make some priorities. For example, now I’m very involved in the co-operation
with Kent . . . and it’s very long, very hard to put in place and to elaborate.
While you’re organizing or trying to organize some meetings, technical or
political meetings, with Kent, you lose time on the others.515
The consequence of this, as observed by multilateral network staff, was that local
authorities lacked the capacity to take full advantage of LGTN and were therefore
often not receiving the full benefit from their participation516. One officer admitted:
513 Interview with English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 21).
514 Interview with French regional officer, September 2012 (Int. 49).
515 Interview with French regional officer, September 2012 (Int. 61).
516 Interviews with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 09; Int. 17; Int. 23).
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we probably don’t use them as much as we should do. I know other local
authorities use them a lot more than we do, but then they’re set up completely
differently.517
The limited number of officers working on LGTN also made it susceptible to staff
turnover. As noted by a member of multilateral network staff:
when they step off because they win the lottery, they retire, they get promoted
or whatever, then the commitment within the network of the region might
decrease.518
Additionally, staff who had been allocated the task of managing and co-ordinating
LGTN often lacked sufficient status within organizations. One participant felt that:
often Europe is delegated down to a relatively low level within an organization
and that person simply doesn’t have the clout or power to go round and
actually get buy in from people higher up, the decision makers within the
departments, to enable these things to go forward. And that’s where some of
the problems arise.519
This lack of status meant staff working on LGTN following the disbandment of
European departments and officers could not provide the corporate co-ordination
recommended in the practitioner guidance.
6.3.2 Local factors: agency
Leadership and support for LGTN: politicians
The need for political support and leadership was recognized by participants520. Two
noted that:
Political support is absolutely paramount.521
517 Interview with English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 39).
518 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 09).
519 Interview with English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 11).
520 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 45; Int. 51; Int. 52; Int. 67).
521 Interview with English local officer, August 2012 (Int. 51).
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There’s not much point in a local authority getting involved if there’s no
political leadership.522
Its importance was further recognized in scrutiny reviews (Hampshire County Council,
2003a; Portsmouth City Council, 2009c; West Sussex County Council, 2004b). Political
backing and involvement was crucial because it gave officers working on LGTN a sense
of direction in what they should be working to achieve, and confidence that they
would have the support to achieve it. In this way, political support enabled officers
to undertake their roles without impediment. As two explained:
If you have the support at elected member level, it’s easier to get everything
through.523
[political support] makes a real difference to me feeling able to have the time
to put into the project.524
While participants agreed about the importance of political leadership and support,
the empirical data presents a mixed picture as to whether such support exists in councils
studied. Among local and regional officers, some felt there was strong political support
for LGTN525. Others, however, gave more conditioned responses or noted political
support was limited526.
As noted above, the LGA advises designating a councillor responsible for European
and international affairs (Handley, 2006, p. 13). This advice was explicitly recognized
in one Brighton & Hove City Council (2007c) report, and by local authorities in
general. Indeed, all but three of the councils studied—West Sussex, Southampton
and the Isle of Wight—had a designated councillor in place at the time of fieldwork;
all of these councillors sat on the council’s cabinet or had executive responsibility
(see Table 6.4). West Sussex did have a councillor responsible for LGTN—the cabinet
522 Interview with English councillor, November 2012 (Int. 67).
523 Interview with English local officer, September 2012 (Int. 45).
524 Interview with English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 52).
525 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 12; Int. 13; Int. 14; Int. 21; Int. 43; Int. 45 Int. 48;
Int. 58; Int. 61; Int. 62)
526 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 04; Int. 08; Int. 15; Int. 19; Int. 24; Int. 39; Int. 40;
Int. 51; Int. 52).
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Local authority Councillor / local politician responsible for
transnational networking
Kent Deputy council leader.
Medway Portfolio holder for strategic development and economic
growth.
East Sussex Deputy council leader.
Brighton and Hove Lead councillor for European and international affairs.
West Sussex No designated councillor appointed.
Hampshire Deputy council leader.
Portsmouth Deputy council leader.
Southampton No designated councillor appointed.
Isle of Wight No designated councillor appointed.
Nord-Pas de Calais 14th vice president for citizenship, decentralized co-operation
and international relations.
Picardie 4th vice president for economic development, agriculture,
research, innovation, higher education, Europe and
co-development.
Haute-Normandie Deputy president and regional councillor for research and
European affairs.
Basse-Normandie 10th vice president for international and inter-regional
co-operation and Europe.
Bretagne 7th vice president for international and 8th vice president for
Europe, the sea and the coast.
Table 6.4: Nominated councillors responsible for LGTN (as at 2012, based on documents and
interviews)
member for communications and public relations—but this post was abolished following
a reshuﬄe527. In Southampton at the time of fieldwork the council had just held an
election which led to a change in administration, and it was unclear how the new
political leadership would be structured528. It was unclear if the Isle of Wight ever
had a designated councillor responsible for LGTN. The absence of designated political
leaders for LGTN in these authorities had a negative impact on how well officers in
these councils were supported in their work529. For example, one participant felt:
527 Interview with English councillor, April 2012 (Int. 02).
528 Interviews with English local officers, May 2012 (Int. 15; Int. 24).
529 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 39; Int. 52).
271
6. Factors determining effective engagement in LGTN
There isn’t really . . . any steer from above that we should be doing this.530
This contrasted with those councils who had nominated politicians responsible for
LGTN. Here officers were generally confident in the support they had from councillors
and this gave them a clear mandate to work on LGTN and achieve benefits from it.
However, even where political support and leadership was present, it was rarely
unanimous. While key politicians might lend their support to LGTN, this did not
mean councillors as a whole were supportive531. As noted by one officer:
Our president is very active in Brussels, but talking about the other elected
members, it’s sometimes quite hard to know if they really want to get involved
at the European level. So our difficulty is to everyday feel the political support
of the regional council.532
Even within governing cabinets opinion often varied. One participant highlighted how
the only political supporter of LGTN was the council’s deputy leader, with other
cabinet members having an “ambivalent” attitude533. Councillors likewise confirmed
they were sometimes lone supporters of LGTN in cabinets534. For many councillors,
participation in any form international engagement activity was seen as politically
sensitive535. As one participant put it:
there is something about Europe that makes politicians nervous.536
Too often, then, political support and leadership for LGTN—where it existed—was
confined to and dependent on a small number of enthusiastic councillors who held key
positions in the council’s political leadership. One participant noted their authority
was only effective because of:
530 Interview with English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 39).
531 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 02; Int. 04; Int. 19; Int. 40; Int. 68).
532 Interview with French regional officer, July 2012 (Int. 19).
533 Interview with English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 04).
534 Interviews with English councillors, April 2012 and December 2012 (Int. 02; Int. 68).
535 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 01; Int. 04; Int.18; Int. 25; Int. 26; Int. 47; Int. 50;
Int. 51; Int. 69).
536 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 26).
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the very strong support of our elected portfolio holder. Without the portfolio
holder we would not be able to do it, because she’s been there since eight years,
maybe even longer, and it’s because of her we managed to have stronger links
with all the local authorities in France.537
This made LGTN susceptible to high political turnover, which had several negative
effects. Firstly, it meant stable, continuous political leadership driving LGTN—as
recommended in the best practice guidance—was lacking. As one member of
multilateral network staff noted:
it’s nice to have continuity with people, but you never get that. It’s a false
hope in local and regional government because they’re always changing.538
Personalities would change, and so too would their goals. This meant that officers
working on LGTN were regularly having to adapt to new objectives. This is illustrated
in the Isle of Wight case. The change in administration following the 2005 election
led to a new political leadership, whose motivations for LGTN were based around
obtaining funding. This marked a significant shift from the previous leadership, who
were more focused on policy transfer and lobbying539. A similar process was observed
in Southampton at the time of the fieldwork. While the structure and policies of the
new leadership following the election were unclear, officers were nevertheless preparing
for a significant shift in priorities. As one explained:
we have just had a change of political administration, as you’re probably
aware, and it’s been substantial. . . . That in itself means the future has got to
be unpicked and mapped. Prior to that we had four years of a Conservative
administration and the two administrations, setting aside political ideology and
policy, are in terms of business affairs fundamentally different, their approaches
are often very different.540
Secondly, political turnover meant that politicians who were enthusiastic about
LGTN and would actively engage might be replaced by those who were less interested.
537 Interview with English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 40).
538 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 26).
539 Interviews with English local officers, May 2012 and August 2012, and former English local officer,
May 2012 (Int. 08; Int. 29; Int. 51).
540 Interview with English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 15).
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As noted by one participant:
with all these things it can very much depend on individual people. So if you’ve
got quite a charismatic political individual in one authority who is prepared to
engage that will often enable things to happen, that’s the catalyst if you like.
That person then might move on or be deselected or whatever, and then you
suddenly find you’ve got quite a dreary individual who’s not very interesting
. . . you can’t just assume these sorts of things will run forever.541
This was the case with West Sussex, where the councillor who provided leadership for
LGTN was replaced by another in a cabinet reshuﬄe who lacked enthusiasm for this
activity; this led to West Sussex’s gradual disengagement from a number of networks542.
Indeed changes in political administration—for example following an election—were
seen as particularly risky for effective engagement in LGTN. This was not necessarily
because an incoming political party might be opposed to LGTN543, but because it led
to a change in personnel among a council’s leadership who might not share previous
individual politicians’ enthusiasm544. This meant officers had to regularly convince
incoming politicians of the value of LGTN. As noted by one participant:
Politicians change. So any time there is a new majority the officers need to
convince the politicians that what their predecessor did was not bad.545
Thirdly, the risk of political turnover meant politicians were focused on securing
benefits within a short electoral cycle to ensure any results were visible during their
term of office. However, LGTN requires long-term investment. Consequently, there was
a mismatch between what some political leaders expected to achieve and what LGTN
was able to deliver in short periods546. As explained by one participant:
541 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 26).
542 Interview with English councillor, April 2012 (Int. 02).
543 As noted in the previous chapter, engagement in transnational networking was rarely affected by
party politics.
544 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 08; Int. 09; Int. 10; Int. 15; Int. 24; Int. 38; Int. 51;
Int. 69).
545 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 09).
546 Interview with French regional officer, September 2012 and Interreg staff, December 2012 )(Int. 46;
Int. 69).
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Making co-operation is a long process, to learn together, to know how out
neighbour is working and after a while have the final results. So sometimes our
politicians want results very quickly, but it’s not always possible.547
Councils were therefore at risk of placing unrealistic expectations of what benefits could
be delivered from LGTN within a short period.
While the level of political support varied, councils nevertheless attempted
to maintain interest in LGTN among their councillors. As discussed above, local
authorities regularly produced update reports highlighting what was being achieved
(for example Hampshire County Council, 2005a; Isle of Wight Council, 2003, 2004b;
Kent County Council, 2007a, 2008, 2009b, 2010b, 2011; Southampton City Council,
2007b). While these reports provide a justification for continued participation in
LGTN, they also serve as an important communication tool to keep councillors
informed. While most councils studied lacked the capacity, a small number also
produced regular newsletters. Brighton and Hove, for example, produced regular
International Update newsletters (for example Brighton & Hove City Council, 2013,
2014)548.
Leadership and support for LGTN: officers
The need for leadership and support from officers—in addition to politicians—was also
recognized and regarded as an important factor by participants549. As noted by one
member of Interreg staff, councils which effectively engage in LGTN have:
got someone who’s driving it from internally, whether that a top level or even
at a lower officer level, there is also a driver within the organization.550
However, as with political support, there were mixed responses among participants
as to whether this was present among officers; some noted there was a high level
547 Interview with French regional officer, September 2012 (Int. 46).
548 Such newsletters also serve to communicate transnational networking activities to officers and
the wider local community.
549 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 13; Int. 23; Int. 38; Int. 39; Int. 40; Int. 41; Int. 45;
Int. 47; Int. 57; Int. 58).
550 Interview with Interreg staff, September 2012 (Int. 47).
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of officer support551, while others felt there was little or no support present552.
Some felt that support varied among staff within councils, usually between different
departments553.
There was a perception that senior management within councils often adopted a
risk averse attitude and this placed limits on their willingness to engage in LGTN554.
One former participant spoke of a meeting where:
the chief executive wheeled in the county secretary, the lawyer, the county
treasurer, the finance guys and me, and they gave all the reasons why we
couldn’t do anything. Basically no legal power, no money, too risky. And it
was all about avoiding risk.555
Another participant noted that:
it took about a year of reports, albeit informal ones, to management team
on a twice-monthly basis to almost try and just culture some interest in EU
funding, and there were lots of negatives: ‘it’s never going to happen, we’ll
never get any money, we’ll never get the match funding’.556
It was only after officers were permitted by management to take risks that they felt
they could successfully engage557.
While the support of senior officers was important, councils recognized that this
was also required among all local authority staff. Indeed it was staff at lower levels
who were usually the ones working on LGTN on a daily basis. It often required travel
and working unsociable hours, a prospect which was often unattractive. As two officers
explained:
not everybody wants to do that sort of work, because it does involve a lot of
travelling and time out of the office and substantial hours.558
551 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 01; Int. 38; Int. 40; Int. 48; Int. 58; Int. 67).
552 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 13; Int. 39).
553 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 34; Int. 45; Int. 68).
554 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 25; Int. 26; Int. 34; Int. 38; Int. 43; Int. 56).
555 Interview with former English local officer, June 2012 (Int. 34).
556 Interview with English local officer, August 2012 (Int. 56).
557 Interview with English local officer, August 2012 (Int. 56).
558 Interview with English local officer, August 2012 (Int. 58).
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you need the director’s support, but you also need to officers’ support. Even
though some people think it’s granted, actually it’s not, because European
work means out of hours, means additional work that people are not used to
doing, it means flexibility and open-mindedness. If the officers are not willing
to do that, the partnership won’t work.559
Furthermore, some staff were daunted by the prospect of working on LGTN.
This was often the case where, following the disbandment of dedicated European
departments and officers, staff were given the responsibility for this activity in addition
to their existing workload. Referring to a colleague’s experience, one participant felt:
she’s found it quite difficult I think to fit the work in part-time hours when
she’s doing other work anyway and that’s really put her off. I think it’s really
been quite a scary process for her.560
This often meant staff were reluctant to undertake these additional duties and viewed
LGTN negatively561. In such cases it was seen as a secondary add on and was rarely
given priority by staff assigned to work on it.
More broadly there was a perception among some participants that local authority
staff within departments often lacked a vision or willingness to engage beyond their
departmental remit or adopt an authority-wide approach as was required for effective
engagement in LGTN. As noted by one participant:
we have colleagues that are very good at the technical level regarding their
own competency, for example spatial planning or research or culture or
environment, but they do not have a cross-sectoral way of thinking and at the
EU level you do have to think like that . . . Our colleagues are too sectorally
orientated.562
Staff attitudes, therefore, could exacerbate the structural problems associated with
‘silo working’ discussed above.
559 Interview with English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 40).
560 Interview with English local officer, August 2012 (Int. 56).
561 Interview with Interreg staff, September 2012 and December 2012 (Int. 54; Int. 69).
562 Interview with French regional officer, July 2012 (Int. 19).
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The above discussion on the leadership and support of local politicians and staff
confirms the impact of the agency of individual local level actors on effective
engagement in LGTN. Indeed, many participants outlined how success often depended
upon the enthusiasm and willingness of individuals within authorities563.
While politicians and officer support were both factors involved in effective LGTN,
both were required simultaneously. This is illustrated in the examples of East Sussex
and Picardie. In both councils participants felt they had the support of political
leaders, but were unable to effectively engage in LGTN because they were not
supported by senior officers564.
Personal relationships
The role of personal relationships was also acknowledged by local authorities. Indeed,
it was recognized that councillors often had a number of informal links and personal
relationships, which councils seeking benefits from LGTN could capitalize on. This
was particularly the case with lobbying and influencing policy. Councillors with links
to MEPs, Committee of the Regions (CoR) members and Commission officials were
seen as particularly valuable because it offered those involved in LGTN direct links to
those involved in the EU policy process565. As noted by one participant:
we certainly encourage as much political input as possible because that is
a very important dimension if you are looking at lobbying, trying to get a
change of policy at the EU level. Politicians are listened to, they can talk to
other politicians in a different way than say the way officers might engage
with Commission officials, that sort of thing. So it’s very important to have
people who are members of the Committee of the Regions in Brussels or who
know their local MEPs and have a personal relationship with them. That is
extremely important.566
563 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 02; Int. 12; Int. 20; Int. 21; Int. 34; Int. 47; Int. 56;
Int. 57; Int. 58; Int. 68).
564 Interview with English local officer, May 2012, and French regional officer, July 2012 (Int. 13;
Int. 19).
565 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 01; Int. 06; Int. 16; Int. 19; Int. 26)
566 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 26).
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French local politicians were regarded as particularly adept at this because they
often developed personal links with national government officials; indeed through the
tradition of the cumul des mandats it was not uncommon for regional councillors and
other local politicians to have simultaneous roles in the national government, and thus
be in a position of influence, or at least know those who are567.
Again, such relationships were susceptible to turnover and could be easily lost when
individual councillors and officers left. As one participant acknowledged:
Personal relationships are important, so when people leave or move on to new
jobs this hinders the building of those personal relationships.568
Staff and politicians’ skills and knowledge
Participants agreed with the practitioner guidance, recognizing that politicians and,
in particular, staff responsible for LGTN required a specialized set of skills, including
technical knowledge of the EU, its institutions and policy process, an understanding and
appreciation of informal ‘Brussels politics’, project management and language skills569.
Indeed, where good quality staff with the necessary skills and experience were present,
engagement in LGTN was perceived as successful570. Yet such skills and knowledge
were not always present.
A lack of EU knowledge was particularly prevalent among councillors and affected
their willingness to engage. As noted by one participant:
I think that is the root of the problem, the root difficulty, that people don’t
understand how Europe works. They see it as complex and rather devious and
they’re suspicious therefore of getting involved.571
567 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 34; Int. 36; Int. 61; Int. 62). Although there have been
ongoing efforts to limit the cumul des mandats and the number of simultaneous positions that
can be held (Balme & Le Gale`s, 1997, p. 150).
568 Interview with English councillor, May 2012 (Int. 05).
569 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 04; Int. 05; Int. 07; Int. 08; Int. 11; Int. 38; Int. 40).
570 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 05; Int. 07; Int. 08; Int. 38; Int. 40; Int. 58).
571 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 26). This participant went on to say
this lack of knowledge affected politicians’ willingness to engage because they did not want to
appear ill-informed or ignorant among their transnational colleagues.
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Participants also identified a lack of knowledge and understanding of the EU among
officers, in addition to other skills shortages572. A lack of awareness of funding
programmes and the opportunities available through LGTN were also cited by
participants573. This lack of knowledge meant in some cases politicians and officers
did not recognize the impact the EU had on local government, and took for granted
the potential benefits LGTN could bring local authorities574.
Again austerity measures adopted by councils exacerbated this problem. Following
the closure of European departments, the staff who were subsequently assigned to work
on LGTN often lacked the necessary skills, knowledge and expertise. This often took a
long time to develop, but was lost when dedicated European officers left or were made
redundant. As one participant experienced:
the officer in charge moved on and with him went a lot of the expertise, so
that whole area retrenched back in terms of where they are.575
Indeed, it was identified during fieldwork that those working on LGTN were often
not experienced or skilled enough576. For example, participants identified a lack of
knowledge and understanding of the EU within many councils, among other skills
shortages. As noted by one participant:
it can be an issue of we’ve got someone dealing with Europe and actually it’s
Joe in the corner, who’s very young, and just starting off in his career, but
actually doesn’t have the understanding of how to push these things through
and doesn’t have the credibility to do that, and just becomes a stumbling
block.577
Some participants openly admitted to their own lack of experience and skills578:
572 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 22; Int. 26; Int. 33; Int. 40; Int. 45).
573 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 02; Int. 08; Int. 43; Int. 55; Int. 56).
574 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 01; Int. 07; Int. 23; Int. 26; Int. 38).
575 Interview with English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 08).
576 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 08; Int. 11; Int. 22; Int. 26; Int. 29; Int. 31; Int. 37;
Int. 45; Int. 52; Int. 54; Int. 61).
577 Interview with English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 11).
578 Interviews with English local officers, May 2012 and July 2012 (Int. 15; Int. 21; Int. 52).
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I think for my defence I should say that I have only been working in this team
for the last year, and I do not have any European background or experience.579
One of the skills discussed by participants was language580. Despite a number of
English participants being apologetic for their lack of second language abilities581, most
felt they were advantaged by the use of English as a lingua franca in the EU (discussed
further in Section 6.3.3). French authorities, however, admitted they had traditionally
struggled to engage in LGTN because of this582. As identified by one French participant:
We, with other departments in the regional council, really identified the
language as a big problem, since quite many years actually.583
Nevertheless, participants felt this situation had recently improved. French councils
had invested in language training for their officers584, and a younger generation of staff
were generally more competent using English585.
There was also a disparity between the language skills of officers and politicians.
Indeed, while staff involved in LGTN were usually proficient in language skills, this was
not always the case with local politicians586. This presented a challenge for achieving
benefits from this activity as—although policy transfer activities usually took place
between staff—input from politicians was required when seeking influence. As noted
by one member of multilateral network staff:
Another slight barrier can be the language, especially when it comes to get
political involvement, so trying to get the involvement of the elected officials,
the councillors, whatever you like to call them. We’re mainly a technical
network but we do have a political group and when it comes to talking with
the Commission, at high level, we like politicians to be there to present the
POLIS viewpoint, and that can be a barrier, the language.587
579 Interview with English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 15).
580 Language also represents a structural constraint above the level of local authorities. This aspect
is discussed in more detail in Section 6.3.3.
581 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 02; Int. 15; Int. 48; Int. 59).
582 Interviews with French regional officers, August 2012 and September 2012 (Int. 37; Int. 46).
583 Interview with French regional officer, August 2012 (Int. 37).
584 Interviews with French regional officers, August 2012 (Int. 27; Int. 66).
585 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 22; Int. 23; Int. 27; Int. 62).
586 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 06; Int. 23; Int. 37; Int. 49).
587 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 23).
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While participants largely focused on their experience in using English and
French—in part due to the case studies chosen—the role of other lesser used European
languages was also highlighted. Staff at Nord-Pas de Calais, for example, noted how
they faced a barrier in co-operating with their Flemish cross-border colleagues because
there was a limited capacity to speak Dutch among both staff and politicians588. One
participant from Picardie felt that a general lack of language skills across the authority
meant there was a heavy focus on working with French speaking Walloon colleagues589.
Indeed one member of Interreg staff cautioned that relying only on the three main
languages spoken in the EU—English, French and German—limited the potential for
networking to only those who could speak those languages590.
6.3.3 External factors
While participants largely reflected on local level factors, there was also a recognition
of external factors which could affect effective engagement in LGTN.
Organization of transnational networks
Local authorities recognized the impact the organization and transnational networks
could have. The need to formalize co-operation and establish joint management
structures was highlighted. In terms of bilateral networks, Kent’s agreements with
Nord-Pas de Calais and the de´partement of Pas-de-Calais and Bretagne’s agreement
with Saxony recognize the need to co-ordinate their partnerships, establishing joint
committees for councillors and officers to oversee the work of the networks (Kent
County Council & Conseil re´gional du Nord-Pas de Calais, 1987; Kent County
Council & Conseil ge´ne´ral du Pas-de-Calais, 2005; Conseil re´gional de Bretagne
& Freistaat Sachsen, 1995)591. However, the majority of the bilateral agreements
588 Interviews with French regional officers, September 2012 (Int. 61; Int. 62).
589 Interview with French regional officer, September 2012 (Int. 47).
590 Interview with Interreg staff, December 2012 (Int. 69).
591 The bilateral agreement between Kent and Nord-Pas de Calais is the most detailed in this regard,
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signed by the councils studied do not outline such arrangements (for example Conseil
re´gional de Basse-Normandie & Hordaland Fylkeskommune, 2013; Conseil re´gional
de Basse-Normandie & Regione Toscana Consiglio Regionale, 2005; Conseil re´gional
de Bretagne & Welsh Assembly Government, 2004)592. In this way, although these
documents make a commitment to co-operate in various policy areas—and in some
cases this has led to detailed action plans for what the co-operation should aim to
achieve (Conseil re´gional de Basse-Normandie & Regione Toscana Consiglio Regionale,
2006; Conseil re´gional de Bretagne & Welsh Assembly Government, 2005; Conseil
re´gional de Bretagne & Województwo Wielkopolskie, 2005b)—they do not provide an
overall method for co-ordinating the activities of the partnership.
Participants also felt co-ordination was also required within multilateral networks.
To this end the majority of the multilateral networks identified in this study had
centralized secretariats with specialized staff to organize and manage their activities.
Participants felt this was crucial to the effectiveness of these organizations593. One
participant highlighted the benefits of such structured co-ordination:
if you have a very structured network, like ERRIN for example, I think they’ve
got four or five people working there with different working groups on different
topics, then it works pretty well. And in that case the members are more active
because they see that things are going on and it’s beneficial for them, so then
they want to be very active. And at the end these networks can be also very
active in lobbying for the European Commission and Parliament, and then
they are seen as a credible actor and this is quite important in a network.594
In this way, co-ordination through central secretariats not only facilitated the active
participation of member councils, but also increased networks’ effectiveness in securing
dedicating three pages to the composition, competences and working methods of various joint
committees (Kent County Council & Conseil re´gional du Nord-Pas de Calais, 1987).
592 Other examples of bilateral agreements where governance arrangements are not outlined include
East Sussex County Council and Conseil re´gional de Haute-Normandie (1993); East Sussex
County Council and Conseil ge´ne´ral de Seine-Maritime (1996); East Sussex County Council
and Kreis Pinneberg (n.d.); East Sussex County Council and Veszpre´m Megye O¨nkorma´nyzata
(1996); Hampshire County Council and Conseil re´gional de Basse-Normandie (1989); Kent County
Council and Ba´cs-Kiskun County General Assembly (2004).
593 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 06; Int. 09; Int. 33; Int. 44; Int. 45; Int. 70).
594 Interview with French regional officer, July 2012 (Int. 44).
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benefits for their members, such as lobbying and influence.
The impact of poor co-ordination and not having a secretariat is illustrated with
the example of the Arc Manche. While some participants noted the Arc Manche’s
lack of secretariat kept membership costs down595, others felt the network lacked
co-ordination and was too heavily dependent upon its two founding members—West
Sussex and Haute-Normandie—for direction. This particularly became a problem when
West Sussex left the network in 2011. As explained by one participant:
I think the problem with that network was that it was left to just two regions
to manage it really, which was Upper Normandy and West Sussex, and West
Sussex have pulled out of European activity completely, so their involvement
ended basically, and the Upper Normandy region, it kind of just tailed off with
them.596
Some participants felt that without adequate centralized co-ordination networks
were at risk of becoming talking shops, at which point there would be no benefit to
participating597. As one participant stated:
the networks risk being talking shops without any concrete action or outcome,
and then it is just a jolly for travel.598
Another participant’s experience of network meetings was that they merely provided a
platform for local politicians to talk and promote themselves, rather than working on
tangible outcomes599.
The size of networks was also highlighted, and—in line with the existing academic
literature (for example Bulkeley et al., 2003; Heinelt & Niederhafner, 2008; Ward
& Williams, 1997)—participants drew attention to the dilemma they faced. On the
595 Interview with English councillor, April 2012 (Int. 02).
596 Interview with English local officer, September 2012 (Int. 45).
597 Interviews with English local officer, May 2012, and former English local officers, June 2012
(Int. 13; Int. 18; Int. 34).
598 Interview with former English local officer, June 2012 (Int. 18).
599 Interview with former English local officer, June 2012 (Int. 34). This is similar to Payre’s (2010,
p. 271) observation of the Eurocities network, where annual conference provided local politicians
with a platform to promote themselves in a “big speech”, rather than engage in meaningful policy
transfer.
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one hand it was felt they should join the large multilateral networks. As noted in
Section 5.3.3, such networks offered representativeness and credibility in the eyes of
the EU600. The fear was that by not being members of these big organizations councils
would be isolated and marginalized in Brussels601. As one participant put it:
Some that are very big, very legitimate, are sort of self-fulfilling prophecies. If
you’re not in those big networks, you are nothing.602
However, local authorities often viewed these networks as inefficient, lacking flexibility
and overly bureaucratic. For example, in leaving the Assembly of European Regions
(AER), West Sussex County Council (2000) noted that:
The County Council had originally joined the Assembly of European Regions
believing it to be a forum where the County Council’s voice could be heard at
a European level and where strength could be found in working with numbers
of like-minded authorities. Unfortunately the Assembly of European Regions
became increasingly bureaucratic, and a number of other member authorities
have left.
To this end, councils felt the smaller, more policy focused networks were more
attractive. Indeed, in the same report where the bureaucratic nature of the AER is
criticized, smaller networks such as the Airport Regions Conference (ARC) are praised
as being “particularly effective” (West Sussex County Council, 2000). Multilateral
network staff in those smaller networks put this attractiveness down to the fact they
were able to offer a more ‘personal’ and flexible relationship with their in how their
members engaged. This encouraged active participation by local government, which led
to authorities getting more out of their engagement and in turn a greater perception
of receiving benefits603. Nevertheless, these smaller networks lacked the broader profile
of the larger networks could offer. To this extent one member of multilateral network
staff noted networks needed to have sufficient “critical mass” to be effective604.
600 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 01; Int. 11; Int. 17; Int. 29; Int. 35; Int. 36; Int. 44).
601 Interviews with multilateral network staff, July 2012 and French regional officer, July 2012
(Int. 09; Int. 44).
602 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 09).
603 Interviews with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 09; Int. 33).
604 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 06).
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This dilemma had become more pronounced in the context of the financial crisis.
As local authorities sought to reduce their membership of multilateral networks to cut
costs, they had to decide between participating in large networks offering credibility in
Europe but would potentially be bureaucratic and inefficient, or in smaller networks
which through being more focused encouraged active engagement but lacked the
presence of the larger networks. One member of multilateral network staff noted that:
[being a small network] has its advantages and it has its drawbacks. It’s
advantageous that it can be flexible. The drawback is, one of my members,
one of the officers was saying ‘well we’re in five networks, my politicians asked
me to withdraw one for financial reasons. I want to stay within the ARC, so
there is no question for us. But then there is this network and this network . . .
if we withdraw from PURPLE, we are nothing in Brussels afterwards’ . . . We
are small so flexible, but the risk is that members decide they don’t need us.
In large networks they base membership to be there, but they are not super
active.605
The perceived transparency of transnational networks was also a factor. This was
recognized by multilateral network staff who noted how their organizations went
to great lengths to communicate with their members to ensure they were kept
well informed606. These efforts to ensure transparency were not always felt by local
authorities, however. Hampshire, for example, left the CPMR because a lack of
transparency over the network’s account meant the council felt it was subsidizing
the membership of several regions who had not paid their subscriptions607. The
transparency and accessibility of joint technical secretariats (JTSs)—who administered
the various Interreg programmes—was also called into question608:
The JTS when I’ve been to conferences and stuff, it just feels like they’re
elevating themselves over all of this. The JTS are very untouchable. . . . They’re
just very much at arm’s length and it’s just them and us. Definitely them and
us.609
605 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 09).
606 Interviews with multilateral network staff (Int. 09; Int. 10; Int. 23).
607 Interview with English councillor, July 2012 (Int. 25).
608 Interviews with English councillor, June 2012 and English local officer, August 2012 (Int. 36;
Int. 56).
609 Interview with English local government officer, August 2012 (Int. 56).
286
6. Factors determining effective engagement in LGTN
The way networks marketed themselves was also cause for concern among some
councils, as it affected their wider reputation. Hampshire acknowledged that while the
CPMR was a large and influential network, its name did suggest its members were
‘peripheral’ by definition. As argued by one councillor:
I don’t particularly want Hampshire to be characterized as a peripheral region,
I think we’re a core, central region.610
This partly explains why some networks underwent rebranding exercises, as earlier
observed in Section 4.4.2.
The ‘frontier effect’
As highlighted by the practitioner guidance, LGTN inevitably means co-operating
across different legal, administrative and bureaucratic systems. Participants were
acutely aware of these differences, noting it often made co-operating with transnational
partners difficult611. As two acknowledged:
Externally the difficulty that we have is to find a partner, or partners, with the
same kind of objectives and with the same kind of political power. Basically
I’m between the UK and Germany. As a French region we do not have enough
political power to work on some topics with the German people. And a UK
county council does not have enough political power to work with us on other
topics, and this non-symmetric situation is not helping us.612
even where there is a spirit of partnership you still do get national differences
. . . for instance I know that we seem to work pretty well with the French here,
but my experience is that French local government is so complicated. Dieppe,
for instance, there are four tiers of local government in Dieppe, and here of
course we have one because we’re a unitary authority . . . you don’t have like
for like administration, which can be a problem.613
610 Interview with English councillor, April 2012 (Int. 01).
611 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 02; Int. 08; Int. 14; Int. 15 Int. 32; Int. 37; Int. 40;
Int. 41; Int. 49; Int. 50; Int. 52; Int. 55; Int. 59; Int. 61; Int. 66 Int. 68; Int. 70)
612 Interview with French regional officer, September 2012 (Int. 50).
613 Interview with English councillor, September 2012 (Int. 59).
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Decision making processes was one area of difference. An example of this was the
role of local leaders. One participant noted that the tradition in English councils was
to involve mayors and council chairmen in LGTN. However these positions in England
did not hold executive power, unlike their European counterparts; these politicians
only had civic responsibility, so had no power to enact decisions at home614. This was
confirmed by one French participant:
I’ve seen it in Britain, the mayor has no power in the city, it’s not the leader
of the city council, and the mayor changes every year in England.615
As conceded by one English councillor:
They really don’t understand why Mr Mayor can’t make a decision and get on,
or the director of whatever has these powers because they’re so different.616
Generally speaking, it was recognized that English officers had much more delegated
authority compared with France, where local politicians exercised more control and
were more actively involved617.
The difference in policy competences between authorities was also highlighted as
a potential barrier, as it could limit the policy areas councils could co-operate on618.
Indeed, it was for this reason that local authorities had to ensure they carefully selected
their transnational networks and partners.
Local actors also commented on the difficulties in building consensus with
transnational partners, who often had different policy priorities or objectives619. As
discussed in Section 5.7.2, local authorities co-operate in transnational networks, but
do so to pursue their own individual aims and to ensure competitive advantage, and
this places limits on common positions. As noted by two:
614 Interview with LGA representative, April 2012 (Int. 03).
615 Interview with French regional officer, September 2012 (Int. 61).
616 Interview with English councillor, June 2012 (Int. 32).
617 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 15; Int. 32; Int. 62; Int. 55; Int. 61).
618 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 02; Int. 37; Int.49; Int,. 55; Int. 70).
619 Multiple interview with participants (Int. 18; Int. 36; Int. 41; Int. 44; Int. 45; Int. 52).
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one of the main barriers would be that different European counties and indeed
regions want different things out of the networks.620
there can be some difficulties because in the networks or the European
co-operation there are other regions that don’t have necessarily the same
strategy, the same interests, the same projects, the same priorities. So you
have the benefit if you work with them, but you can also have the constraints
of the other regions’ positions if they have another priority or if they want
to do something else through the networks or through a specific project. You
have to deal with all of this to ensure that co-operation if efficient.621
This was also recognized by multilateral network staff, with one admitting:
it isn’t always easy to find a consensus on issues, the issues we represent our
members on, because issues aren’t necessarily viewed the same way across
Europe.622
As a result, some local authorities preferred to work with the smaller networks as this
made building consensus easier. In the words of one participant:
it’s easier to work with 22 regions in Brussels than maybe 250, as we mostly
all share the same views.623
The difficulties in building consensus were further exacerbated by the risk that
not all network members made an equal contribution624. One member of multilateral
network staff observed that:
I think in all networks, we have 34 members, maybe ten are really active, 14
are sleeping members.625
This was particularly the case with transnational projects which depended on all
members participating. There was always the risk that partners may drop out or not
pull their weight626.
620 Interview with English local officer, September 2012 (Int. 45).
621 Interview with French regional officer, August 2012 (Int. 36).
622 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 17).
623 Interview with French regional officer, July 2012 (Int. 44).
624 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 09; Int. 11; Int. 45).
625 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 09).
626 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 08; Int. 15; Int. 56; Int. 69).
289
6. Factors determining effective engagement in LGTN
One practical way in which the frontier effect could affect participation in LGTN was
when it came to travel. As discussed above, in order for councils to take full advantage of
their engagement in LGTN they had to attend meetings and meet their counterparts
abroad. However, the cost of foreign travel was often viewed as prohibitive627. This
had recently been exacerbated by the financial crisis which had placed pressure on the
resources local authorities could spend on engagement in LGTN (see Section 6.3.1);
in some cases councils placed restrictions on foreign travel or banned it altogether628.
Besides the cost of travel, distance was another factor. Indeed, lengthy travel times
often put officers and councillors off attending meetings629. As one participant noted:
it’s being able to actually attend meetings sometimes and having to take time
out from their diaries and to attend meetings in different locations. So I think
perhaps some of the networks, in an attempt to be inclusive, have meetings
which are in far-flung corners of the EU and sometimes that isn’t particularly
helpful in terms of just being able to physically turn up. If it’s a two day trip
or if it’s a one day meeting with two days either side that can make it quite
difficult.630
While language was partly a question of staff and politicians’ skills (as discussed in
Section 6.3.2), it also presented councils with a structural barrier. However, while the
academic literature highlights the potential for language differences to hinder LGTN
(Kern & Bulkeley, 2009, p. 317; Lawrence, 2000, p. 68; Phelps et al., 2002, p. 221),
the results of this study present a more positive picture. While language differences
were highlighted by councils as a potential barrier, it was not regarded as particularly
significant. Indeed, several participants noted that differences in language did not
appear to be a barrier, and at the very most it just slowed the communication process
627 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 06; Int. 09; Int. 23; Int. 25; Int. 33; Int. 40; Int. 45;
Int. 56).
628 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 06; Int. 09; Int. 23; Int. 33; Int. 40; Int. 45). One
participant noted that some officers were still prohibited from foreign travel even when the
network offered to cover the cost (Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 [Int. 23]).
An English councillor recognized that “you can jump on a train and go up to Edinburgh and
spend three or four times the amount you would if you go to Brussels”, but despite being cheaper
foreign travel was still restricted (Interview with English councillor, July 2012 [Int. 25]).
629 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 01; Int. 04; Int. 06; Int. 32; Int. 40; Int. 52; Int. 61).
630 Interview with English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 21).
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down631. As put by one:
I wouldn’t say it was a barrier, I would say it just slows things down.632
In most cases, speaking English was seen as an advantage. Participants from
local authorities observed that the majority of transnational networks—including
multilateral networks and transnational projects—predominantly operated in English,
and that English had largely established itself as a lingua franca in the EU633.
This was further confirmed by staff working for multilateral networks and Interreg
programmes who noted that English was the de facto standard for communication in
their organizations634. This included major multilateral networks such as Eurocities
and the Promoting Operatinal Links through Integrated Systems (POLIS) network. In
this context English local authorities were obviously advantaged635. As one participant
felt:
we’re lucky in the UK, they tend to be often working in English. All the
projects I’ve been involved in have been English as a main language.636
Participants also noted that the provision of translation and interpretation services
at LGTN events was the norm637. This was further observed by the researcher638.
Where resources permitted, multilateral networks also employed multilingual staff to
ensure effective communication with their members639.
As a result of this, participants felt the language barrier was not particularly
significant. Indeed Interreg and multilateral network staff noted that because of the
631 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 05; Int. 07; Int. 15; Int. 27; Int. 52).
632 Interview with English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 15).
633 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 07; Int. 24; Int. 25 Int. 48).
634 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 06; Int. 09; Int. 23; Int. 30; Int. 54).
635 Despite this a number of English participants were apologetic over their lack of second language
skills (Multiple interviews with participants [Int. 02; Int. 15; Int. 48; Int. 59]).
636 Interview with English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 24).
637 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 02; Int. 09; Int. 48; Int. 52; Int. 60).
638 Participant observation, cross-Channel forums, September 2012 and March 2013, EU open
days, October 2012 and October 2013, and Interreg IVa France–Channel–England conference,
November 2012 (Obs. 3; Obs. 4; Obs. 5; Obs. 6; Obs. 9).
639 Interviews with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 09; Int. 23).
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translation support offered, any barriers that existed were largely perceived rather than
actual640. Nevertheless, although English was used as the de facto standard in LGTN,
participants referred to difficulties occurring through key points in conversation being
‘lost in translation’641. As explained by one:
When you go to these things in Europe, because people are often speaking
English and it’s not their native tongue, and so you think that you’ve followed
something when actually your interpretation of how they’ve expressed it is
different to how they actually wanted to express it.642
This often led to misunderstandings, particularly over the commitments of those
involved in LGTN.
More significant than the language barrier to many participants, however, was a
fundamental difference in working cultures643. As one participant explained:
Another obstacle of difficulty to face . . . is that we have different cultures,
different organizations, different skills, different ways of working and prejudices
about the partners. It makes it usually difficult . . . We don’t work the same
way. This is an obstacle because this requires some time to understand how
the partner works and if you are not used to co-operating, you can have some
difficulties.644
Many of these differences were evident when local actors met their transnational
colleagues645. One participant noted that:
We can generalize about it, but we know that the British will be very pragmatic
and want to make a decision quickly, and the French would like to sit around
and talk about things a bit, and sometimes working with the Germans or
Scandinavians you can see some of those national stereotypes coming out.646
Another participant’s experience was that:
640 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 09; Int. 47; Int. 54).
641 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 25; Int. 49; Int. 54; Int. 56; Int. 60; Int. 69).
642 Interview with English councillor, September 2012 (Int. 60).
643 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 09; Int. 14; Int. 15; Int. 22; Int. 24; Int. 27; Int. 30;
Int. 32; Int. 34; Int. 37; Int. 40; Int. 41; Int. 46; Int. 48; Int. 49; Int. 52; Int. 55; Int. 59; Int. 61;
Int. 70).
644 Interview with French regional officer, September 2012 (Int. 49).
645 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 27; Int. 41; Int. 52).
646 Interview with UK civil servant, July 2012 (Int. 41).
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the French are very bad at workshops. They’re not used to sitting down and
speaking their mind and having an open discussion because they’re quite
politically, I’d say more politically astute than us probably and it makes it
very difficult for them to open up . . . Whereas we Brits are much more free
when we’re in a non-formal environment.647
To this end participants noted LGTN was most effective when co-operating with those
who shared similar working cultures; in England co-operation with Dutch authorities
was productive because of similarities in working cultures648, whereas in France it was
felt they shared a similar working culture with Belgian colleagues649.
National barriers
To a limited extent, barriers at the national level were discussed by participants650.
In particular, it was recognized that both English and French local authorities were
operating in centralized states651. One member of multilateral network staff felt that
LGTN was more suited to subnational authorities in decentralized and federal states,
because those in centralized countries lack the capacity and credibility to engage at
the European level652. One English participant noted:
Britain has been centralizing, and if you’ve ever worked in local government
you’ll have seen how difficulty it is for the British to do anything outside of
what they have to do. It is very difficult to take the initiative, there’s no money
and very little legal scope.653
French participants also felt greater decentralization and devolution would provide
authorities with more scope to become more actively engaged in LGTN654.
The attitude of national governments was also a potential barrier highlighted.
One English participant felt in some cases the British government were actively
647 Interview with English local officer, July 2012 (Int. 52).
648 Interview with English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 24).
649 Interview with French regional officer, September 2012 (Int. 46).
650 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 04; Int.19; Int. 34; Int. 35; Int. 61; Int. 62; Int. 70).
651 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 19; Int. 34; Int. 35; Int. 47).
652 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 35).
653 Interview with former English local officer, June 2012 (Int. 34).
654 Interviews with French regional officers, July 2012 and September 2012 (Int. 19; Int. 61; Int. 62).
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seeking to undermine local authority efforts to engage internationally655. A French
councillor similarly noted how the central government in Paris viewed regional councils’
engagement in Europe with suspicion (Tanburn, 2013, p. 36)656.
Participants discussed the role of regional structures above the local level in
England. While the abolition of regional assemblies and regional development agencies
was broadly welcomed as they were viewed them as top–down structures imposed by
central government, there was nevertheless a recognition they had provided support to
councils engaged in LGTN, such as technical expertise or match funding to facilitate
participation in transnational projects. As one participant highlighted:
it’s been at times a difficult relationship between the local authorities and
some of the regional organizations. Having said that though I think there
was a pragmatic recognition that where the issue was the right issue, having
that regional collective approach was sometimes beneficial . . . It’s not a bad
thing it’s gone because localism is welcome, but it may lead some to do things
differently or otherwise miss out.657
Indeed, following their abolition in 2010, English participants admitted much of the
support had disappeared658. As one participant observed:
that expertise in some ways was lost when we lost SEEDA. SEEDA had
quite a successful team for looking after various aspects of European funding,
particularly things like the Interreg and ERDF, and that whole approach and
that support network has disappeared and it does mean you’ve got to start
from fresh.659
To confirm the supporting role played by the regional structures in England, French
participants and Interreg staff had also noticed it had become difficult to co-operate
with English authorities since the regional tier had been abolished660. The regional
structures have since been replaced by Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs). While at
655 Interview with former English local officer, June 2012 (Int. 34).
656 Participant observation, Europeanising devolution conference, May 2013 (Obs. 7).
657 Interview with English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 16).
658 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 08; Int. 15; Int. 16; Int. 21; Int. 31; Int. 52).
659 Interview with English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 08).
660 Interviews with French regional officer, September 2012, and Interreg staff September 2012
(Int. 47; Int. 50; Int. 55).
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the time of fieldwork it was unclear what role LEPs would perform, some participants
saw these new bodies as a potential new location for these support structures661.
However, while LEPs have taken on some of the former regions’ competences in terms
of developing European investment strategies, they have faced several challenges,
including a lack of capacity, poor resourcing and control by central government (see
Huggins, 2014a).
Media and public support
Several participants—representing both English and French authorities—noted that
participation in LGTN often received a negative reaction from their local public
and the press (Hampshire County Council, 2002, 2003a)662. There was a perception
that local citizens did not understand what engaging with local authorities abroad
could achieve663, and that—especially in a context of local authority budget
reductions—spending money on non-statutory activities such as LGTN was hard to
justify to local tax payers664. As admitted by one participant:
I mean where is a council’s remit for, you know if these kinds of activities
weren’t funded, how do you justify to your council tax paying public why you
should go and visit a service in another country?665
Consequently, local citizens were seen as largely against participation in LGTN.
Participants felt the root of this problem lay with the local press. The main focus of
local press attention were the costs associated with LGTN, and in particular the cost
of travel666; articles regularly scrutinized and reported how much councils spent on
661 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 08; Int. 11; Int. 12; Int. 15; Int. 25; Int. 31; Int. 41;
Int. 51; Int. 58).
662 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 11; Int. 12; Int. 13; Int. 18; Int. 21; Int. 23; Int. 24;
Int. 25; Int. 40; Int. 45; Int. 50; Int. 51; Int. 57; Int. 61). Indeed, one participant was so concerned
that the content of the interview might be ‘leaked’ to the press that they sought additional
reassurances that the researcher was not in fact working for a local newspaper.
663 Interviews with French regional officers, September 2012 (Int. 50; Int. 61).
664 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 07; Int. 18; Int. 24).
665 Interview with English local officer, May 2012, (Int. 24).
666 Local government transnational networking also attracted the attention of the national press in
England. This was more concerned with the implications for the UK’s relationship with the EU.
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sending officers and councillors abroad (for example KentOnline, 2005, 2008a, 2008b;
Marzouk, 2006; Southern Daily Echo, 2009; The Argus, 2003). Often this was reported
as unnecessary and frivolous spending, as two local news headlines—“Council row
over Riviera ‘jolly’ ”(KentOnline, 2002) or “Now’s ‘not the time’ for European jolly
Southampton councillors told after trips” (Smith, 2009)—illustrate.
The main complaint from participants regarding press reporting of LGTN was that
it focused entirely on the cost of participation, rather than the benefits it brought back
to their authority667. As noted by one participant:
local papers can be quite keen to highlight the costs of participation and not
necessarily the benefits.668
While in some cases local authorities attempted to manage this by producing press
releases which focused on the benefits and funding acquired through LGTN (for
example Brighton & Hove City Council, 2007d; West Sussex County Council, 2003b,
2004b), the potential negative reaction of the press was viewed as a potential barrier:
I think whatever one does now to do with Europe, one has to be ultra careful
that you know how it’s going to be interpreted and I think in its own right that
probably inhibits people, certainly in England . . . from playing as full part as
they might do in events across the Channel.669
Multilateral network staff also recognized this situation, feeling it impacted engagement
in LGTN. Indeed, politicians and officers were often wary of the ‘jolly’ perception
attached to foreign travel, and this played a major role in deciding to attend meetings,
regardless of the benefits670. As noted by one:
One Daily Mail article (Owen, 2011), for example, focuses on the Arc Manche network and a
number of transnational Interreg projects in the English Channel region, which it argues are “part
of a Europe-wide attempt by Brussels to break down national barriers”, amounting to “trying to
wipe England off the map”.
667 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 12; Int. 21; Int. 40; Int. 45).
668 Interview with English local officer, May 2012 (Int. 12).
669 Interview with English councillor, July 2012 (Int. 25).
670 Multiple interviews with participants (Int. 04; Int. 09; Int. 16; Int. 25; Int. 38; Int. 41; Int. 51;
Int. 68). Most of these participants pointed out that foreign travel was often time-consuming and
rarely entertaining.
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[they] won’t travel because the local press will get wind of it and portray it as
another jolly.671
6.4 LGTN and local level Europeanization
The empirical analysis in this chapter has shown that a range of structural and agency
factors—predominantly located at the local level—determine effective engagement in
LGTN. Applying a Europeanization framework allows this analysis to be deepened by
conceptualizing them as ‘mediating factors’. This further explains the differentiated
engagement in LGTN witnessed in Chapter 4.
As discussed in Chapter 2, mediating factors represent the final stage in Risse
et al.’s (2001) three-step model of the Europeanization process. They identify both
structural and agency factors which serve to mediate the effects of Europeanization
at the domestic level (Risse et al., 2001, pp. 9–12) (see also Bo¨rzel & Risse, 2003). It
is the effect of these mediating factors which accounts for the differential impact of
Europeanization and the lack of convergence. As Risse et al. (2001, p. 9) argue: “the
presence or absence of mediating factors is crucial for the degree to which domestic
change adjusting to Europeanization should be expected”.
Caporaso (2007, pp. 30–32) distills mediating factors into two broad categories:
‘formal and informal institutions’ and ‘veto points and veto groups’. The first refers
to mediating factors which act as ‘facilitating institutions’, which “provide actors with
material and ideational resources to induce structural change” (Risse et al., 2001, p. 9).
In other words they provide the resources and capacity necessary for Europeanization
processes to take place. Parallels can be drawn here with the local level structural
factors identified above (see Section 6.3.1). For example, the presence of a European
strategy, adequate investment and dedicated staff to co-ordinate participation all
ensured councils had the necessary capacity to effectively engage in LGTN. Veto points
671 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 23).
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and veto groups refer to those who have “a right of power or refusal”, or who have “the
capacity to obstruct, slow down, or amend legislation or implementation” (Caporaso,
2007, p. 31). Here the agency of individuals within councils was shown to be crucial
(see Section 6.3.2). Where councillors and local officers lacked leadership, willingness
or the necessary personal relationships and skills to encourage participation in LGTN,
they acted as veto players, effectively stalling engagement. The findings of this chapter
therefore support the assertion made by Bauer and Bo¨rzel (2010, p. 259): “the capacity
of regions to form issue-specific coalitions depends on their ability and willingness to
invest organizational and political resources”.
It was shown throughout the analysis that the presence or absence of these
mediating factors varied between the local authorities studied. For example, not all
councils had European strategies or dedicated staff in place, and the leadership and
support of local politicians and officers differed greatly. Taken with the strategic
approach local authorities take—identified in Chapter 5—the presence and absence
of different mediating factors in each council serves to account for the differential
engagement in LGTN observed in Chapter 4. Indeed, the absence of local level
structures—or ‘facilitating formal institutions’—explains why some local authorities
have a more limited engagement in LGTN, despite acknowledging the benefits available.
As Bo¨rzel and Risse (2003, p. 65) explain, without these structures in place, local
authorities lack the capacity to take advantage of the opportunities offered through
LGTN:
The European political opportunity structure may offer domestic actors
additional resources. But many are unable to exploit them when they lack
the necessary action capacity. Direct relations with European decision-makers
provide regions with the opportunity to circumvent their central government in
European policy making. But many regions do not have the sufficient resources
(manpower, money, expertise) to be permanently present at the European level
and to exploit the new opportunities.
Likewise, without the agency of local politicians and officers—who have the potential
to act as veto players—participation in LGTN can be stalled.
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The identification of these local level factors in this study informs the wider
debate on local level Europeanization. While previous studies have drawn attention
to mediating factors at the national level (for example Kettunen & Kungla, 2005), the
findings in this chapter also emphasize the role of mediating factors at the level of
individual local authorities (see also de Rooij, 2002). In identifying what those factors
are, this chapter informs the sparse literature on how Europeanization processes are
mediated at the local level.
6.5 Summary
The rationalist and strategic approach local authorities take to LGTN (identified in
Chapter 5) led to a question surrounding the ‘effectiveness’ of this activity. Indeed,
according to the rationalist approach, how local authorities perceive the effectiveness
of LGTN will inform their decision to participate or not. In addition, the differential
engagement in LGTN (observed in Chapter 4) led to a question about the factors which
account for this variation. Furthermore, the issue of effectiveness of LGTN represented
a relative lacuna in the existing literature. For these reasons, this issue warranted
investigation and led to the following research question which this chapter sought to
address:
• RQ3: What factors determine effective engagement in LGTN?
By once again focusing on local actors and how they perceive effectiveness, this chapter
has made a contribution to the literature, which has so far focused on the network level
rather than the actors within.
The chapter began by drawing on the public administration literature on networks,
which emphasizes the need to assess a range of factors as determinants of effectiveness.
Coupled with Rowe’s (2011) approach—which stresses the need to survey effectiveness
from the perspective of local actors—an innovative analytical framework was advanced
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to identify relevant structural and agency factors, present at both the ‘local’ and
‘external’ levels.
A review of the practitioner ‘best practice’ guidance drew attention to a number
of factors which affect successful participation in LGTN. At the local level these could
be divided between structure and agency. The structural factors included the need to
put in place a European strategy, the selection of suitable transnational partners and
networks, the provision of adequate resourcing and investment and the establishment
of internal co-ordination structures such as dedicated staff or European departments.
In terms of agency, the leadership and support offered by local politicians and officers,
as well as their personal relationships and skills, were shown to be important. External
factors, such as how transnational networks are organized, the effects of co-operating
across national frontiers, national barriers and media and public support, were also
highlighted. Of the factors that were identified, most were located at the local level,
and so were within local authorities’ control.
Insight from the data analysis showed councils broadly recognized what constituted
‘best practice’. Yet the empirical evidence showed implementation of these factors
was mixed. In terms of the local structures which should be put in place, councils
were largely aware of the best practice guidance; themes identified in the practitioner
literature—such as having a clearly defined strategic vision, investment and resources
and internal co-ordination—were regularly repeated during interviews. However, the
extent to which local authorities implemented these structures varied. Not all councils
had a European or international strategy in place, nor was LGTN consistently
co-ordinated within authorities by dedicated staff and departments. Investment and
resourcing in LGTN was often limited. In terms of the agency of local actors, local
authorities were equally aware of the importance of politicians and officers, their skills
and the personal relationships they built. But again experiences here were mixed.
Indeed, the discussion highlighted that while local authorities might put in place
adequate structures to ensure effective engagement in LGTN, much of the success
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depended on the attitudes of individuals, both at political and officer levels.
The varied presence and absence of these factors among the councils studied has
parallels with the differentiated engagement in LGTN observed in Chapter 4. Indeed, by
borrowing the concept of ‘mediating factors’ from Risse et al.’s (2001) three-step model
of Europeanization, it was shown that the presence or absence of these factors accounted
for the heterogeneity of local authorities participation in LGTN. Here the chapter
makes a contribution to the literature on local level Europeanization, by emphasizing
the presence of and identifying mediating factors at the local in addition to those at
wider domestic level.
While most of the factors determining effective engagement in LGTN were at
the local level, one wider structural constraint was observed throughout the analysis
which hampered local authorities’ efforts here: an adverse financial climate. While
local government finance in both England and France has been restricted for many
years—partly a symptom of the centralized nature of these systems—the financial
crisis has exacerbated the problem. This presents local authorities with a paradox.
LGTN offers several benefits which local authorities believe can make them more
resilient in this context (see Chapter 5). However, to be effective participation requires
an up front investment, particularly in the local level structures and agency of local
government staff and politicians. The fact this adverse financial context exists means
local authorities are limited in the extent to which they can make the necessary
investment in LGTN to ensure participation is effective. In other words local authorities
participate in LGTN to better place themselves in this adverse financial context, but
their effectiveness in securing benefits and engaging in this activity is hindered by the
very context they are trying to address. This theme is picked up in the concluding
chapter of this thesis.
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Conclusion
This thesis has investigated the local government transnational networking (LGTN)
activities of 14 local authorities in two unitary and centralized European Union (EU)
polities. Two things motivated this research focus.
First was a recognition that local authorities are important actors in EU governance.
They are responsible for implementing much of the EU’s legislative output. They play
a key role in the delivery of EU regional policy, accounting for a third of the EU’s
spending. They are actively engaged in the EU’s policy process, either formally through
institutional recognition in the Committee of the Regions (CoR) or informally through
subnational Brussels offices and LGTN.
Second was an interesting empirical puzzle. Local authorities in unitary and
centralized polities have no clearly defined legal authority or competence to engage
beyond their territorial limits. At the same time they are facing increasing budgetary
pressures as central governments respond to the financial crisis with austerity
programmes. Why, then, do councils invest in LGTN when they lack the mandate
and when resources to deliver core statutory services are limited?
Despite the importance of local authorities in the EU and the relevance of the puzzle
surrounding their engagement in LGTN, the local dimension is often overlooked in EU
studies. Local authorities are often regarded as incidental actors in EU governance. This
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criticism holds true with many existing studies on LGTN, which focus on transnational
networks rather than the local authorities participating. This study of LGTN was
therefore relevant, timely and warranted.
Throughout this thesis, the analysis has focused on the perceptions of the local
authorities engaged in this activity. In adopting this focus, this study addresses the
gaps present in the literature and makes an empirical contribution to knowledge on
LGTN and, more broadly, on the role of local government in the EU.
7.1 Summary of empirical findings and
contribution to knowledge
This thesis advanced three research questions to address the empirical puzzle set out
above and the gaps present in the existing literature:
• RQ1: What is the current extent of LGTN in south-east England and northern
France?
• RQ2: What benefits do local authorities seek from their involvement in LGTN?
• RQ3: What factors determine effective engagement in LGTN?
The answers to these questions constitute the core of this thesis’s contribution to
knowledge, and are now summarized.
RQ1: What is the current extent of LGTN in south-east England and
northern France?
RQ1 was addressed in Chapter 4. To aid in its analysis of LGTN, this chapter
began by advancing a three-fold categorization, distinguishing between bilateral
networks, multilateral networks and transnational projects. The chapter then provided
an historical overview of the transnational links developed by local government in
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south-east England and northern France from the late 1980s. This showed early cases
LGTN emerged in response to a number of contextual factors. These included the
building of the Channel Tunnel, but also wider trends in European integration such as
the completion of the Single European Market and establishment of EU regional policy
programmes such as Interreg. However, it was shown that while a body of scholarship
charted the development of LGTN during the 1990s (for example Church & Reid,
1995, 1996, 1999), little was known about the current picture. It was this gap in our
understanding of contemporary LGTN activities that RQ1 sought to address.
Drawing on document analysis, interviews and website searches, the empirical
analysis in this chapter showed that all 14 of the local authorities studied participate in
LGTN. Indeed, a total of 302 links were observed between 2001 and 2011 (see Table 4.3).
During the 1990s, when LGTN was still in its infancy, Benington and Harvey (1998)
asked whether LGTN was a “passing fashion or new paradigm”. The contemporary
empirical analysis highlights the continued prevalence of LGTN, and therefore points
towards the ‘new paradigm’ characterization.
Two supplementary questions sought to elaborate this overall finding. RQ1a asked
how contemporary engagement in LGTN compared with that undertaken during the
1990s. A number of trends were identified here. Firstly, the level of engagement in
LGTN has increased overall. A number of factors explain this increase. The expansion
of the eligibility areas for Interreg funding schemes helped foster a greater number
of transnational projects. EU enlargement to central and eastern Europe saw local
authorities pursue bilateral networking with councils in these countries. An increase
in the EU’s policy competences saw a number of policy-specific multilateral networks
emerge in response. Secondly, while bilateral networks were the most common form
of LGTN during the 1990s, multilateral networking is now the norm. In many cases
bilateral networking provided the basis for wider multilateral networks. Thirdly, while
the initial emphasis in LGTN during the 1990s was on cross-border co-operation,
inter-regional networking is now more prevalent. This has partly been driven by
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local authorities’ preferences to now pursue thematically focused over general purpose
networks.
RQ1b sought to explore the differential engagement of local authorities in LGTN.
This manifested itself in a number of ways. Firstly, the number of transnational
links councils participated in differed. Some local authorities—such as Kent, Medway,
Nord-Pas de Calais and Bretagne—engaged in several links, while others—such as
West Sussex, Portsmouth and Picardie—only engaged in a handful. Secondly, councils
vary in the approach they take to LGTN. For example, some councils preferred
pursuing bilateral partnerships, while others preferred participation in multilateral
networks or transnational projects. Crucially, this variation in both the extent and
method of engagement in LGTN occurred within national borders, rather than across
them, suggesting that local level factors play more of a role than national level factors
in determining participation. These empirical findings confirm the conclusions of
earlier studies which suggested variation in local government’s European engagement
activities (for example Balme & Le Gale`s, 1997; Goldsmith & Sperling, 1997). This
also challenges Leve`vre and d’Albergo’s (2007, p. 318) suggestion that local authorities
would become more uniform in their international engagement activities.
RQ2: What benefits do local authorities seek from their involvement in
LGTN?
The continued prevalence of LGTN observed in Chapter 4 reinforced the need to
tackle the empirical puzzle outlined in the thesis’s introduction. This was done by
addressing RQ2 in Chapter 5. A review of the existing literature confirmed that while
previous research has uncovered the function of transnational networks, little remained
understood about local authorities’ motivations for engaging in them. This study’s
focus on local level actors and its use of document analysis and interviews with local
government officers and councillors facilitated access to these motivations, and therefore
allowed this chapter to make a contribution to knowledge.
305
7. Conclusion
The chapter drew attention to three main motivations which almost all local
authorities studied held for participating in LGTN. Firstly, LGTN was used to obtain
funding. Transnational co-operation was often a requirement of EU funding schemes
and participation in LGTN offered councils ready made partnerships while reducing
the risks of having to identify and work with unfamiliar partners. Secondly, LGTN
was used to seek influence in the EU policy process. Here local authorities recognized
the challenges they faced in implementing EU policy, but also saw opportunities to
shape it. LGTN provided a means to access EU decision making by pooling resources,
aggregating local interests and presenting local authorities as credible stakeholders.
Thirdly, local authorities sought policy transfer opportunities through LGTN. Here
LGTN provided a platform to access policy knowledge and best practices as well as
showcase their own policy innovations. In addition to these three main motivations, it
was shown that local authorities also engage in LGTN seeking economic development,
an enhanced profile, intelligence on EU policy developments and opportunities for
professional and organizational development.
In addition to identifying the main motivations for engagement in LGTN, the
chapter also made three general observations. Firstly, local authorities sought a number
of different benefits simultaneously. This confirmed Betsill and Bulkeley’s (2004, p. 490)
assertion that LGTN needs to offer multiple benefits to make participation worthwhile
for councils. It further reinforced criticisms made by some scholars (for example John,
2000, p. 881; Kern & Bulkeley, 2009, p. 310) that studies on local government’s role in
the EU should look beyond the narrow focus of regional policy. Secondly, motivations
varied between councils. This suggested that local authorities take a strategic approach
to their LGTN activities, pursuing objectives in line with their broader corporate
aims. Thirdly, local authorities’ motivations for participating in LGTN were not static
but changed over time. Sometimes this was because exposure to LGTN led councils to
recognize they could achieve more than their initial objectives. More often, however,
this change reflected a shift in councils’ broader strategic aims.
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RQ3: What factors determine effective engagement in LGTN?
The question of effective engagement represented a lacuna in the existing literature on
LGTN. Yet it warranted investigation. Firstly, local authorities’ strategic approach
to LGTN (identified in Chapter 5) meant they assessed the effectiveness of their
engagement. Indeed, it was shown that councils regularly conducted investigations into
how successful their participation in LGTN was and whether they secured returns from
their investment. This assessment went on to inform continued engagement. Secondly,
the differential engagement in LGTN (observed in Chapter 4) posed questions about
the factors which affect participation. This was addressed by RQ3 in Chapter 6. It
began by conceptualizing effective networking. Drawing on the public administration
literature, this was achieved by identifying the various factors which determine
effective engagement. However, while this provided a useful starting point, the public
administration model restricts itself to the network level, overlooking the actors
within networks and their agency. Drawing on Rowe’s (2011) conceptualization of
effectiveness—which emphasizes the assessment of it from the perspective of local
authorities themselves—addressed this and allowed for the identification of factors
present at the local level in addition to those external to councils.
A review of the practitioner ‘best practice’ guidance confirmed that many of the
determinants of effective engagement in LGTN are located at the local level. Two gaps,
however, were identified in the academic literature. Firstly, local level factors have
largely been neglected in favour of those at the national or network levels. Secondly,
much of the focus is on transnational networks themselves, rather than the perceptions
of local authorities within them. This study’s focus on the perceptions of local actors
overcame this and therefore allowed this chapter to make a contribution to knowledge.
Combining the themes in the practitioner best practice guidance and academic
literature allowed an analytical framework to be developed. This identified a range
of factors present predominantly at the local level, but also external to councils. At
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the local level these could be divided between the structures local authorities put in
place and the agency of councillors and officers within councils. In terms of structures,
it was shown local authorities needed a European strategy which sets out what is to
be achieved from LGTN, select appropriate transnational partners and networks to
engage with, provide adequate resourcing and investment—both in terms of budget
and staff time—and set up internal co-ordination structures such as dedicated staff or
European departments to manage participation in LGTN. A number of agency factors
drew attention to the important role played by local government politicians and officers.
Here their role in providing leadership and support, building personal relationships and
their skills and knowledge were all key factors. In terms of external factors, councils had
to contend with how transnational networks were organized, the effects of participating
across national borders—the so-called ‘frontier effect’—national barriers and media and
public support.
7.2 Linking to MLG and Europeanization
The findings presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 have allowed this thesis to make
an empirical contribution to knowledge on LGTN. Chapter 2 argued LGTN can be
characterized as a feature of multi-level governance (MLG) in the EU, brought about
through the process of local level Europeanization. These findings therefore additionally
link to conceptual debates surrounding EU MLG and local level Europeanization.
Chapter 2 explained how MLG provides a useful characterization of the EU as
an already functioning political system, which recognizes the involvement of and
interaction between actors at different jurisdictional levels. Scholars recognize that
LGTN is a feature of MLG in the EU (Hooghe & Marks, 2001a; Kern, 2010; Kern &
Bulkeley, 2009). The continued and increased prevalence of LGTN observed in Chapter
4 therefore reinforced this, and in particular showed that LGTN was a case of Type
II MLG: functionally specific governance arrangements which transcend jurisdictional
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boundaries and are marked by flexible designs which come and go (Hooghe & Marks,
2003). Indeed, most cases of LGTN identified were functionally specific. It was shown
that multilateral networks have become increasingly focused around specialist policy
areas. Bilateral links likewise target co-operation in a small number of policy sectors
and transnational projects set out to achieve specific deliverables. By its very nature
LGTN transcends local and national borders, providing a means for local authorities
to co-operate and share policy ideas with councils in other countries and to access
EU decision making. It was also shown that transnational networks are not static,
permanent features, but fluctuate in terms of how active they are and sometimes
disband.
One of the weaknesses of the MLG approach—as identified by Jordan (2001,
p. 201)—is that while it recognizes the role subnational government plays in EU politics,
its research focus has remained fundamentally top–down; local authorities are assumed
to be “inconsequential and passive players” (Jeffery, 2000, p. 8). This has led Jeffery
(2000) and de Rooij (2002) to call for an examination of the ‘bottom–up drive’ behind
MLG. By adopting a focus on the perceptions of local authorities throughout, this
thesis has responded to this call, and therefore made a contribution to the literature
here. Furthermore, the thesis’s focus on LGTN addresses concerns held by Blatter et
al. (2008, pp. 464–465) and Kern (2014, p. 115) that much MLG research on the EU
remains too heavily focused on the vertical relationships between the local, national
and EU levels (Type I MLG), rather than ‘horizontal’ links (Type II MLG).
While MLG provided a useful way to describe the presence of LGTN as part of
the EU’s functioning political system, it could not offer an explanation for how or why
LGTN developed (see Jordan, 2001, p. 201). In line with Kern and Bulkeley (2009) and
Kern (2010), Chapter 2 argued that Europeanization “complements the analysis of the
European multi-level system by providing a sense of the means by which multi-level
governance is accomplished” (Kern & Bulkeley, 2009, p. 312).
Chapter 2 surveyed the Europeanization approach and characterized it as the
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process of domestic adaptation to European integration. In the case of LGTN,
participation was argued to be an adaptive response by local authorities to the reality of
the EU. Indeed, scholars noted early LGTN by local authorities in south-east England
and northern France emerged as a result of wider events in European politics: namely,
the completion of Single European Market and the availability of EU community
initiative funding programmes, such as Interreg (Barber, 1997; Church & Reid, 1995,
1996, 1999; Sinclair & Page, 1993; Sparke, 2000). The empirical evidence in Chapter
4 confirmed this holds true with contemporary engagement in LGTN. For example,
it was shown that participation in policy-specific multilateral networks reflected the
EU’s growing policy competence, bilateral links with authorities in central and eastern
Europe developed in response to the opportunities created by EU enlargement in 2004,
and participation in transnational projects was partly driven by increased availability
and eligibility of financial support through Interreg and other EU regional policy
programmes.
While the Europeanization approach conceptualizes participation in LGTN as
an adaptive response by local authorities to the EU, Chapter 2 also outlined its
usefulness as an analytical framework to explore aspects of its directionality, the
extent and expected differentiation of engagement in LGTN, and—through new
institutionalism—the underlying logic driving participation.
Directionality was tackled in Chapter 5. The Europeanization literature points to
three directional dynamics: top–down (or ‘downloading’), bottom–up (or ‘uploading’)
and horizontal (or ‘crossloading’). LGTN was shown to encompass all three
simultaneously. Top–down Europeanization was observed in the case of engaging in
LGTN to obtain funding. Here LGTN was an EU requirement, and the membership of
networks—particularly transnational projects—reflected eligibility criteria determined
by the EU. Local authorities therefore ‘downloaded’ and adopted these EU rules
in order to access financial support, leading to this motivation being characterized
as ‘hierarchical Europeanization’ (Kern, 2010). A bottom–up dynamic was observed
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in the case of seeking to lobby and influence the EU policy process. Here local
authorities used LGTN to ‘upload’ their preferences to the European level. The
involvement of the local level was shown to be welcomed by the EU, which required local
authorities’ expertise to inform policy development and their propinquity to citizens
to legitimize proposals. Here Europeanization was shown to be a cyclical process,
and characterized as ‘co-operative’ (Kern, 2010). Policy transfer illustrated the case
of horizontal Europeanization. Here the EU was not actively involved, but provided
a point of reference for local authorities to co-operate and share policy information
directly with each other.
The questions of extent and differentiation were addressed in Chapter 4. Firstly
it was argued that the increased level of participation in LGTN—relative to the
1990s—has meant local authorities have become increasingly Europeanized. John
(2001, pp. 72–73) provides a useful tool for assessing the degree of local level
Europeanization by conceptualizing the process as a nine step ladder which local
authorities climb. The fact all of the councils studied participate in LGTN places
them on the sixth and seventh steps of this ladder: “linking with other local
organizations participating in the EU” and “participating in EU international networks
and co-operating in joint projects” (John, 2001, p. 72). Furthermore the use of
LGTN to influence EU policy—observed in Chapter 5—moves local authorities to
step eight of nine: “advising the EU on implementation issues” (John, 2001, p. 72).
To summarize, this thesis’s findings suggest local authorities participating in LGTN
have undergone a high degree of Europeanization. Secondly, it was noted in Chapter
2 that Europeanization does not imply convergence. Indeed differentiation is to be
expected (Bo¨rzel, 2005; Ladrech, 2010; Radaelli, 2003; Risse et al., 2001). The findings
presented in Chapter 4 confirm this expectation. While all local authorities were
engaged in LGTN, this was to different extents. Councils also varied in their approach
to LGTN; some preferred participation in transnational projects, while others gave
priority to multilateral or bilateral networks. This variation occurred predominately
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within national borders, rather than across them, and thus supports Le Gale`s’s (2002,
p. 110) characterization of a “ ‘variable geometry’ Europe”.
The logic driving participation in LGTN was explored in Chapter 5. By applying
new institutionalism, local level Europeanization can be conceived as rationalist
or sociological. In the case of the former, local authorities adopt the ‘logic of
consequentialism’, seeking to improve their own positions. In the case of the latter,
the ‘logic of appropriateness’ prevails (Bo¨rzel & Risse, 2003; Hamedinger & Wolffhardt,
2010). Existing literature on local level Europeanization has yet to apply this analytical
tool (except Dąbrowski, 2012, 2013), and so this thesis offers a contribution here. The
motivations held for engaging in LGTN showed councils were rationally driven. There
were six reasons for this. Firstly, local authorities were goal oriented. Participation
in LGTN was seen as a way to achieve pre-existing corporate aims. Secondly,
local authorities saw LGTN as a means to improve their own positions and secure
competitive advantage vis-a`-vis other actors. Thirdly, participation in LGTN followed
an assessment of several contextual factors which acted as potential constraints or
opportunities. Fourthly, in deciding to engage in LGTN, local authorities conducted a
cost–benefit analysis, and only participated if a clear return on investment could be
made. The effect of this was such that it overrode local politicians’ ideological views
on LGTN, effectively depoliticizing councils’ involvement. Fifthly, in conducting their
cost–benefit analysis, local authorities were well aware of the limitation to LGTN.
Finally, there was a notable absence of sociological drivers motivating participation
in LGTN. Indeed, none of the motivations identified went beyond local authority
self-interest.
This rationalist, strategic approach to LGTN went someway to explain the
differentiated engagement identified in Chapter 4. Each local authority pursues its own
objectives and so the extent of participation in LGTN and the approach taken will
vary according to each council’s individual aims. Differentiation was further accounted
for in Chapter 6, which borrowed the concept of ‘mediating factors’ from Risse et al.’s
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(2001) three-step model of Europeanization. A range of local level structural factors
acted as facilitating institutions and provided local authorities with the capacity to
engage. The local level agency of councillors and officers within councils highlighted
their potential impact as veto players, stalling participation in LGTN if they were
unsupportive or lacked the necessary skills or personal relationships. As the presence
and absence of these mediating factors varied between local authorities, so too did the
level of participation in LGTN and the benefits each council received.
7.3 Limitations and avenues for future research
It is important to recognize three limitations this study. The first relates to case
selection. This study focuses on local authorities in unitary and centralized polities,
using a cross-national case selection made up of 14 local authorities from south-east
England and northern France. As a result local authorities in federal and decentralized
states have not been investigated, despite their engagement in LGTN being recognized
elsewhere in the literature (for example Benz & Eberlein, 1999; Conzelmann, 1995;
Happaerts, 2008; Happaerts et al., 2010, 2011; Keating, 1999). This focus was
necessitated by the empirical puzzle the thesis sought to address. This pointed to
councils’ limited capacity and questionable competence to engage externally, which are
inherent features of local government of in centralized systems, whereas local authorities
in federal systems have much more room for manoeuvre. The perceptions of local
authorities in federal systems therefore warrants further investigation. This also opens
up avenues for large scale comparative research—utilizing the ‘numerosity’ of local
government (John, 2006, 2009)—which will be able to assess the impact of the division
of state power as an independent variable672.
The second limitation relates to the units of analysis adopted. Throughout, this
672 Research on the role of subnational Brussels offices making use of the regional authority index
(see Hooghe et al., 2010) sets an interesting precedent here (for example Donas & Beyers, 2013;
Tatham & Thau, 2014).
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thesis has sought to address a substantive gap in the literature by focusing on the
perceptions of the local authorities involved in LGTN. In doing this, the thesis has
necessarily treated councils as single entities. However, it is important to recognize local
authorities are not unitary actors and that there are a range of intra-organizational
dynamics, competing interests and political contestations at play within them (see
Stoker & Wilson, 1986). Indeed, the findings of this study highlighted this in places.
For example, Chapter 5 illustrated how one of the benefits sought from participation in
LGTN was to improve the co-ordination between internal council departments. Chapter
6 showed how a range of factors at the local level affect participation in LGTN. This
included a lack of internal co-ordination and departmental ‘silo working’, which were
shown to hamper local authorities’ engagement in LGTN. Furthermore, while LGTN
was largely depoliticized, the agency of individual councillors and officers was shown to
impact effective participation. This points future research on LGTN towards examining
these internal dynamics.
The third limitation relates to research design and method. To tackle the empirical
puzzle and address the gaps in the existing literature, this thesis adopted an inductive
research design and a qualitative empirical approach. This raises two issues in
particular. Firstly, by adopting an inductive research design, this study has relied
on the perceptions of the local actors engaged in LGTN. Indeed, this was deliberate
as it provided the foundation for this thesis’s contribution to knowledge. However it
raises questions regarding the reliability of participants—and indeed the documents
analysed—to offer truthful accounts and interpretation bias on the researcher’s part.
This was mitigated through the practice of triangulation. No single method was used in
isolation, and while the data analysis relied heavily on the interviews, a large number
of participants (68) were included and drawn from a diverse range of backgrounds
(for example officers, councillors, multilateral network staff, and active and retired
participants). The presentation of findings in this thesis also drew directly upon the
rich data gathered. Nevertheless, this issue leads to a second: that generalizing the
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findings from qualitative research in one setting to another is difficult (Firestone, 1993).
It was made clear in Chapter 3 that this thesis’s intention was never to generalize, but
to ensure the transferability of its findings to other cases (see Firestone, 1993; Lincoln
& Guba, 1985). The findings of this study, however, could prove useful for developing
a series of testable hypotheses which could be applied to larger scale quantitative
comparative research. Again, making use of the ‘numerosity’ of local government offers
a promising research avenue (John, 2006, 2009).
7.4 Concluding remarks: LGTN and austerity
Throughout, this thesis has emphasized the agency of local authorities engaging in
LGTN. In this way assertions by Bulkeley et al. (2003, p. 237) that LGTN “has not
been a strategy simply imposed on local government” and by Lefe`vre and d’Albergo
(2007, p. 317) that “the political internationalisation of intercity relationships occurs
as a result of deliberate activities carried out by actors operating within a city’s
political and governance system”, rather than being “mere leaves in the wind of
internationalisation”, are found to hold true. Indeed, Chapter 4 showed that LGTN
was a local authority response to a number of contextual factors, and Chapter 5 showed
this response to be rationally driven.
These findings allow the empirical puzzle—outlined in Chapter 1—to be directly
addressed. Local authorities use LGTN as a way to tackle what is perceived to be an
adverse context, marked by increased austerity and public finance pressures. LGTN
therefore constitutes an opportunity structure which allows councils to address this
context, or at least mitigate some of its adverse effects. Nevertheless, this context of
austerity presents a double-edged sword here. While it has on the one hand encouraged
participation in LGTN by prompting local authorities to actively address the adverse
financial climate, it also places significant limits on councils’ ability to dedicate the
necessary investment and resources required for LGTN to be successful. This was
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illustrated throughout Chapter 6. Despite being aware of the factors determining
successful engagement in LGTN and recognizing what constituted best practice, as
councils’ core budgets have been cut and staff have been lost, engagement in LGTN
has suffered.
Looking to the future, then, local authorities’ engagement in LGTN looks set
to continue. The benefits to be gained from participation are such that many local
authorities would believe it to be against their interests not to. However ensuring
successful engagement, and for participation to be more than a mere symbolic gesture,
will require a long term strategy and adequate upfront investment in staff and financial
resources. Given the adverse context in which local authorities currently operate,
this will require the commitment, leadership and support of local councillors and
officers within councils. This presents local authorities with an overall choice. As one
participant put it:
there’s two ways of responding to the difficulties we face at the moment. One is
to hunker down, cut everything back and stick to the knitting as it were and a
very lean approach and perhaps don’t take the political risks that are involved
in international activity. The other is to acknowledge that successful cities have
to be outward looking . . . you’ve got to look outward and international work
and connecting to others and learning from that experience and being up there
with the best in class across the world and across Europe I think is part of
that and it reflects the ambition of the place that you’re leading.673
673 Interview with multilateral network staff, July 2012 (Int. 06).
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Appendix A: Multilateral networks
identified in the literature
The following table lists the transnational multilateral local government networks
identified in the literature and illustrates the extent and diversity of this phenomenon.
Note: this list includes some organizations which do not conform to this thesis’s
definition of a local government transnational network (see Section 1.4). It also includes
networks which have a global, rather than a purely European focus.
Multilateral network Identified by
Aerospace Industry Regional & Local
Authority Network (AIRLINE)
Benington (1994)
Airport Regions Conference Heeg et al. (2003)
Alliance in the Alps Bulkeley et al. (2003); Kern and Bulkeley
(2009)
Alps-Adriatic Working Community Ercole et al. (1997); Happaerts (2008);
Happaerts et al. (2011)
Arc Manche Barber (1997); Church and Reid (1996,
1999)
Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience
Network (ACCCRN)
Bouteligier (2013)
Association de Villes de la Grande Europe
pour la Culture
Karvounis (2011)
Association Internationale de Re´gions
Francophone (AIRF)
Happaerts (2008); Happaerts et al. (2011)
Association Internationale des Maires
Francophone (AIMF)
van der Heiden (2010)
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Association of European Regions of
Industrial Technology / Association of
Traditional Industrial Regions of Europe
(RETI)
Benington (1994); Ercole et al. (1997);
Goldsmith (1993, 2003, 2011); Hooghe
(1995); Hooghe and Marks (2001a); John
(2000, 2001); Keating (2000); Keating and
Hooghe (2006); Lawrence (2000); Le Gale`s
(2002); McAleavey and Mitchell (1994);
Sodupe (1999)
Association of Significant European
Cemeteries
Karvounis (2011)
Assembly of European Regions (AER) Benington (1994); Ercole et al. (1997);
Goldsmith (2011); Hamedinger (2011);
Happaerts (2008); Happaerts et al. (2010,
2011); Hooghe (1995); Hooghe and Marks
(2001a); John (2000); Karvounis (2011);
Keating (1999, 2000); Keating and Hooghe
(2006); Payre (2010); Sodupe (1999)
Association of European (Frontier) Border
Regions (AEBR)
Happaerts (2008); Happaerts et al. (2011);
Hooghe (1995); Hooghe and Marks
(2001a); Keating (1999); Keating and
Hooghe (2006); Sodupe (1999)
Atlantic Arc Commission Balme and Le Gale`s (1997); Benington
(1994); Ercole et al. (1997); Goldsmith
(1993, 2003, 2011); Happaerts (2008);
Keating (1999); Le Gale`s (2002); Poussard
(1997); Sodupe (1999); Wise (2000b,
2000a)
Balienes d’Europe van der Heiden (2010)
Balkan/Black Sea Commission Happaerts (2008)
Balkan Cities Network Karvounis (2011)
Baltic Sea Commission Happaerts (2008)
Capital Regions Network Bouteligier (2013)
Car Free Cities Ward and Williams (1997)
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCI) van der Heiden (2010)
CITELEC Ward and Williams (1997)
Cities & Regions of the Automobile
Industry (CAR)
Ward and Williams (1997)
Cities for Children Karvounis (2011); van der Heiden (2010)
Cities for Climate Protection (CCP) Betsill and Bulkeley (2004); Bulkeley
(2005); Kern (2014); Kern and Bulkeley
(2009); Lee and van de Meene (2012)
Cities for Cyclists Ward and Williams (1997)
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Cities for Local Integration Policy of
Migrants (CLIP)
Hamedinger (2011); van der Heiden (2010)
Cities for Mobility van der Heiden (2010)
Cities for Recycling (Association of Cities
& Regions for Recycling)
Bulkeley et al. (2003); Ward and Williams
(1997)
Cities without Slums Bouteligier (2013)
Citynet van der Heiden (2010)
CIVITAS Pflieger (2014); van der Heiden (2010)
Climate Alliance Kern (2014); Kern and Bulkeley (2009);
van der Heiden (2010)
Climate Task Force of European Local
Government
Kern and Bulkeley (2009)
Club of Eurome´tropoles Ercole et al. (1997); Le Gale`s (2002); Ward
and Williams (1997)
Coal Communities Campaign Benington (1994); Bogdanor (1992);
Goldsmith (1993); Ercole et al. (1997)
Communaute´ des Villes Ariane (CVA) van der Heiden (2010)
Conference of European Regional
Legislative Assemblies (CALRE) /
Conference of European Regions with
Legislative Power (REGLEG)
Hamedinger (2011); Happaerts (2008);
Happaerts et al. (2010, 2011)
Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions
(CPMR)
Benington (1994); Happaerts (2008);
Happaerts et al. (2010, 2011); Hooghe
(1995); Hooghe and Marks (2001a); John
(2000, 2001); Karvounis (2011); Keating
(1999, 2000); Keating and Hooghe (2006);
Le Gale`s (2002); Murphy (2007); Sodupe
(1999); Wise (2000b, 2000a)
Co-ordinated Action for Seaside Towns
(COAST)
Benington (1994); Church and Reid (1999)
Council of Europe: Congress of Local &
Regional Authorities
Keating (2000); Sodupe (1999)
Council of European Municipalities &
Regions (CEMR)
Benington (1994); Bogdanor (1992);
Bulkeley et al. (2003); Ercole et al. (1997);
Goldsmith (1993); Hamedinger (2011);
Happaerts (2008); Happaerts et al. (2011);
Heinelt and Niederhafner (2008); Hooghe
(1995); Hooghe and Marks (2001a); John
(2000, 2001); Karvounis (2011); Keating
(2000); Kern (2014); Kern and Bulkeley
(2009); Payre (2010); Van Bever et al.
(2011a); van der Heiden (2010); Ward and
Williams (1997)
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Covenant of Mayors Hamedinger and Wolffhardt (2010);
Karvounis (2011); Kern (2014)
C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group Bouteligier (2013); Karvounis (2011); Lee
and van de Meene (2012)
DC&D Hamedinger (2011)
ECOS Ercole et al. (1997)
Edge Cities Network Phelps et al. (2002)
EIC Middle Sized Cities Network Benington (1994)
Energy Cities Bouteligier (2013); Bulkeley et al. (2003);
Karvounis (2011); Kern (2014); Kern and
Bulkeley (2009); Pflieger (2014); van der
Heiden (2010); Ward and Williams (1997)
Environmental Conference of the European
Regions (ENCORE)
Happaerts (2008); Happaerts et al. (2010,
2011)
EnviroNet Ward and Williams (1997)
Eurocities Baycan-Levent et al. (2008); Balme and
Le Gale`s (1997); Benington (1994);
Bouteligier (2013); Bulkeley et al. (2003);
Ercole et al. (1997); Goldsmith (1993,
2003, 2011); Griffiths (1995); Hamedinger
and Wolffhardt (2010); Hamedinger (2011);
Happaerts (2008); Heeg et al. (2003);
Heinelt and Niederhafner (2008); John
(2000, 2001); Karvounis (2011); Kern and
Bulkeley (2009); Lefe`vre and d’Albergo
(2007); Le Gale`s (2002); Payre (2010);
Pflieger (2014); Sampaio (1994); Schultze
(2003); Van Bever et al. (2011a); van der
Heiden (2010); Ward and Williams (1997)
EUROLINKAGE Benington (1994)
Euromed Karvounis (2011)
European Association of Development
Agencies (EURADA)
van der Heiden (2010)
European Capitals of Culture Karvounis (2011)
European Cities Against Drugs Karvounis (2011); van der Heiden (2010)
European Cities Marketing Karvounis (2011)
European Cities on Drug Policy (ECDP) van der Heiden (2010)
European Clusters & Regions for
Eco-innovation & Eco-investments
Network (ECREIN)
Happaerts (2008); Happaerts et al. (2011)
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European Local Authorities Research &
Study Centre (CERLLE)
Goldsmith (1993)
European Metropolitan Transport
Authorities (EMTA)
van der Heiden (2010)
European Network of Cities for Local
Integration Policy
Karvounis (2011)
European Social Action Network (ESAN) Benington (1994)
European Sustainable Cities & Towns
Network (or Campaign)
Bulkeley (2005); Bulkeley et al. (2003);
Hamedinger and Wolffhardt (2010); Ward
and Williams (1997)
European Urban Observatory Ercole et al. (1997); Ward and Williams
(1997)
Eurotowns Balme and Le Gale`s (1997)
EUROSYSNET Benington (1994)
EXCHANGE Goldsmith (1993)
FMVJ-UTP Ward and Williams (1997)
Forum of Adriatic & Ionian Cities Karvounis (2011)
Four Motors for Europe Balme and Le Gale`s (1997); Bogdanor
(1992); Goldsmith (1993, 2003); Happaerts
(2008); Happaerts et al. (2010, 2011);
Hooghe (1995); Hooghe and Marks
(2001a); Keating (1999, 2000); Murphy
(1993); Sodupe (1999)
Global Cities Dialogue Network (GCD) /
Global Digital Solidarity Fund (GDS)
Bouteligier (2013); van der Heiden (2010)
Glocal Forum Karvounis (2011)
Green Links Benington (1994); Goldsmith (1993)
Healthy Cities Network Bulkeley et al. (2003); Karvounis (2011)
HORIZON Goldsmith (1993)
I Kapodistrias Network Karvounis (2011)
Innovating Regions in Europe (IRE) Happaerts (2008); Happaerts et al. (2011);
van der Heiden (2010)
Integration, Endogenous Development &
Employment (IDEE)
Benington (1994); Ward and Williams
(1997)
Intelligent Port System (iPORTS) Karvounis (2011)
Inter-Mediterranean Commission Happaerts (2008); Sodupe (1999)
International Association of Educating
Cities (IAEC)
van der Heiden (2010)
International Association of Peace
Messenger Cities (IAMPC)
van der Heiden (2010)
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International Black Sea Club (IBSC) Karvounis (2011)
International Coalition Against Racism Karvounis (2011)
International Council for Local
Environmental Initiatives / Local
Governments for Sustainability (ICLEI)
Betsill and Bulkeley (2004); Bouteligier
(2013); Bulkeley (2005); Bulkeley et al.
(2003); Karvounis (2011); Kern (2014); Lee
and van de Meene (2012); van der Heiden
(2010); Ward and Williams (1997)
International Federation of Green Regions
Association
van der Heiden (2010)
International Union of Local Authorities
(IULA)
Benington (1994); Betsill and Bulkeley
(2004); Bouteligier (2013); Bulkeley et al.
(2003); Payre (2010); van der Heiden
(2010)
Islands Commission Happaerts (2008); Sodupe (1999)
League of Canaanite, Phoenician & Punic
Cities
Karvounis (2011)
League of Historical Cities Karvounis (2011)
Les Rencontres Karvounis (2011); van der Heiden (2010)
Lighting Urban Community International
Network (LUCI)
van der Heiden (2010)
Lisbon Regions Network (LRN) Happaerts (2008); Happaerts et al. (2011)
MedCities Bulkeley et al. (2003); Ward and Williams
(1997)
Medium Sized Cities Commission Church and Reid (1999); Ercole et al.
(1997)
Mega-Cities Project Bouteligier (2013)
Metropolis Bouteligier (2013); Happaerts (2008);
Karvounis (2011); Ward and Williams
(1997)
Motor Industry Local Authority Network
(MILAN)
Benington (1994); Goldsmith (1993, 2003);
Hamedinger and Wolffhardt (2010); John
(2000, 2001)
Network of Balkan Cities with Historic
Centres
Karvounis (2011)
Network of European Metropolitan
Regions and Areas (METREX)
Heeg et al. (2003); van der Heiden (2010)
Network of European Regions on
Education for Sustainability (RES)
Happaerts (2008); Happaerts et al. (2011)
Network of European Regions using Space
Technologies (NEREUS)
Hamedinger (2011)
Network of Regional Governments for
Sustainable Development (nrg4SD)
Happaerts (2008); Happaerts et al. (2010,
2011)
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North Sea Commission Happaerts (2008); Sodupe (1999)
Ouverture Ward and Williams (1997)
Organization of World Heritage Cities
(OWHC)
van der Heiden (2010)
Organization of World Historical Cities
(WHC)
van der Heiden (2010)
Peri-Urban Regions Platform Europe
(PURPLE)
Happaerts (2008); Happaerts et al. (2011)
Promoting Operational Links through
Integration Systems (POLIS)
Goldsmith (1993); Karvounis (2011);
Pflieger (2014); van der Heiden (2010);
Ward and Williams (1997)
Public Transport Interchange Ward and Williams (1997)
Q-Cities Karvounis (2011)
Quartier en Crise Benington (1994); Hooghe (1995); Le Gale`s
(2002); Ward and Williams (1997)
Recycling of Business and Industrial Sites
(ROBIS)
Ward and Williams (1997)
Regio Basiliensis Duchacek (1984)
Renewable Energies for Buildings in
European Cities with Historical Centres
(REBUILD)
Ward and Williams (1997)
Re´seau des Villes Gourmandes du Monde
(De´lice)
van der Heiden (2010)
Re´seau Europe´en de villes de vin
(RECEVIN)
Karvounis (2011)
SEALINK Ercole et al. (1997); Ward and Williams
(1997)
Sister Cities International Baycan-Levent et al. (2008); Bouteligier
(2013)
Strategic Plan for Small & Medium Sized
Cities (SPSMSC)
Ward and Williams (1997)
Summit Conference of Major Cities
(SCMC)
Ward and Williams (1997)
Sustainable Cities and Towns Campaign Bouteligier (2013)
Sustainable European Regions Network
(SER)
Happaerts (2008); Happaerts et al. (2011)
Telecities Church and Reid (1999); Go¨tzel (2002);
Serra (2005)
Transmanche Euroregion Balme and Le Gale`s (1997); Barber (1997);
Benington (1994); Church and Reid (1995,
1996, 1999); Heddebaut (2001, 2004);
Sinclair and Page (1993); Thomas, (2006)
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Transport in the Mediterranean Ward and Williams (1997)
Union Mondiale des Villes Olympiques
(UMVO)
van der Heiden (2010)
Union of Baltic States Bulkeley et al. (2003); Heeg et al. (2003);
Kern and Bulkeley (2009)
Union of Central & Southeastern European
Capitals
Karvounis (2011)
Union of the Capitals of the EU Hamedinger (2011); Karvounis (2011)
United Cities & Local Governments
(UCLG)
Bouteligier (2013); Karvounis (2011);
Payre (2010); van der Heiden (2010)
United Cities Against Poverty (UCP) van der Heiden (2010)
United Towns Organization (UTO) van der Heiden (2010)
URB-AL van der Heiden (2010)
WHO Healthy Cities Bouteligier (2013)
Working Communities of the Alps Balme and Le Gale`s (1997); Hooghe
(1995); Hooghe and Marks (2001a);
Sodupe (1999)
Working Community of the Jura Hooghe (1995); Hooghe and Marks (2001a)
Working Community of the Pyrenees Balme and Le Gale`s (1997); Hooghe
(1995); Hooghe and Marks (2001a);
Sodupe (1999)
Working Group of the Danube Countries Hamedinger (2011)
World Assembly of Cities and Local
Authorities (WACLA)
Bouteligier (2013)
World Federation of Cities (United Towns
Organization)
Bulkeley et al. (2003); Payre (2010)
World Health Cities Ward and Williams (1997)
350
Appendix B: French and English
local government structures
351
Appendix B
French re´gions and de´partements
352
Appendix B
English local government structure
353
Appendix C: Documents analysed
Arc Manche. (2003). Arc Manche declaration. Retrieved through personal
communication.
Brighton and Hove City Council. (2003). Arc Manche Network (Policy and Resources
Committee, 16 July 2003). Retrieved from http://present.brighton-hove
.gov.uk/Data/Policy%20&%20Resources%20Committee/20030716/Agenda/
$Item%2044%20-%20Arc%20Manche%20report.doc.pdf.
Brighton and Hove City Council. (2005). Arc Manche Assembly (Policy and Resources
Committee, 7 December 2005). Retrieved from http://present.brighton-hove
.gov.uk/Data/Policy%20&%20Resources%20Committee/20051207/Agenda/
$Item%20147.%20Arc%20Manche%20P&R%20Part%201.doc.pdf.
Brighton and Hove City Council. (2006). Review of the City Council’s European
Strategy within an International and Corporate Bidding Context (Policy
and Resources Committee, 27 July 2006). Retrieved from http://present
.brighton-hove.gov.uk/Data/Policy%20&%20Resources%20Committee/
20060727/Agenda/$Item%2054.%20EU%20Strategy%20review P&R%20July%
202006.doc.pdf.
Brighton and Hove City Council. (2007). New International Focus for Brighton
& Hove. Retrieved from http://www.brighton-hove.gov.uk/index.cfm
?request=b1149084&action=show pr&id=179125.
Brighton and Hove City Council. (2007). A European & International Strategy
for Brighton & Hove City Council: 2007–2013. Retrieved from http://www
.brighton-hove.gov.uk/index.cfm?request=b1000147.
Brighton and Hove City Council. (2007). European & International Strategy (Policy and
Resources Committee, 28 June 2007). Retrieved from http://present.brighton
-hove.gov.uk/Data/Policy%20&%20Resources%20Committee/20070628/
Agenda/$item%2013.%20european%20&%20international%20strategy.doc
.pdf#search=%22Europe%22.
Brighton and Hove City Council. (2007). Capturing the “knowledge economy”.
Retrieved from http://www.brighton-hove.gov.uk/index.cfm?request=
b1149084&action=show pr&id=185686.
Brighton and Hove City Council. (2008). Application for Membership of Eurocities
(Culture, Recreation and Tourism Cabinet Member Meeting, 9 December 2008).
Retrieved from http://present.brighton-hove.gov.uk/mgConvert2PDF.aspx
?ID=5187.
354
Appendix C
Brighton and Hove City Council. (2008). Acceptance of CIVITAS Funding for Stage 1
Research (Cabinet Meeting, 16 October 2008). Retrieved from http://present
.brighton-hove.gov.uk/mgConvert2PDF.aspx?ID=3509.
Brighton and Hove City Council. (2011). Application for the Interreg IVa
called “Supporting Young and Unemployed People in Port Cities” (Planning,
Employment, Economy and Regeneration Cabinet Member Meeting, 3
November 2011). Retrieved from http://present.brighton-hove.gov.uk/
mgConvert2PDF.aspx?ID=34363.
Brighton and Hove City Council. (2012). Interreg IVa Learning Cities Bid (Housing
Cabinet Member Meeting, 18 January 2012). Retrieved from http://present
.brighton-hove.gov.uk/mgConvert2PDF.aspx?ID=37192.
Conseil re´gional de Basse-Normandie. (2012). La Basse-Normandie e´largit ses frontie`res
en Europe avec Interreg. Caen: Conseil re´gional de Basse-Normandie.
Conseil re´gional de Basse-Normandie, & Hordaland Fylkeskommune. (2013). Accord
de cooperation decentralise´e entre le Comte´ du Hordaland et la Re´gion
Basse-Normandie. Retrieved through personal communication.
Conseil re´gional de Basse-Normandie, & Regione Toscana Consiglio Regionale. (2005).
Protocole d’accord entre le conseil re´gional de Toscane et le conseil re´gional de
Basse-Normandie. Retrieved through personal communication.
Conseil re´gional de Basse-Normandie, & Regione Toscana Consiglio Regionale. (2006).
Avenant au protocole d’accord du 12 mai 2005. Retrieved through personal
communication.
Conseil re´gional de Basse-Normandie, & Regione Toscana Consiglio Regionale.
(2006). Programme d’action biannuel 2007–2008 entre le conseil re´gional de
Toscane et le conseil re´gional de Basse-Normandie. Retrieved through personal
communication.
Conseil re´gional de Basse-Normandie, & Regione Toscana Consiglio Regionale. (2006).
Declaration relative a` l’institut international de droits de l’homme et de la paix.
Retrieved through personal communication.
Conseil re´gional de Bretagne. (2011). Mission IX – Pour le de´veloppement
des actions europe´ennes & internationales: Projet de budget primitif
2011. Retrieved from http://www.bretagne.fr/internet/jcms/c 13544/
cooperation-internationale-et-reseaux.
Conseil re´gional de Bretagne. (2012). Coope´rer avec le re´gions d’Europe: Programmes
et projets de cooperation territorial europe´enne en Bretagne (2007–2013). Rennes:
Conseil re´gional de Bretagne.
Conseil re´gional de Bretagne, & Freistaat Sachsen. (1995). Declaration commune
de coope´ration entre l’Etat libre de Saxe et la Re´gion de Bretagne.
Retrieved from http://www.bretagne.fr/internet/jcms/c 13544/
cooperation-internationale-et-reseaux.
Conseil re´gional de Bretagne, & Freistaat Sachsen. (2005). Memorandum pour
une coope´ration approfondie entre l’Etat libre de Saxe et la Re´gion
Bretagne. Retrieved from http://www.bretagne.fr/internet/jcms/c 13544/
cooperation-internationale-et-reseaux.
Conseil re´gional de Bretagne, & Welsh Assembly Government. (2004). Protocole
355
Appendix C
d’accord Entre la Re´gion Bretagne et l’Assemble´e Nationale pour le Pay
de Galles. Retrieved from http://www.bretagne.fr/internet/jcms/preprod
46536/cooperer-avec-le-pays-de-galles.
Conseil re´gional de Bretagne, & Welsh Assembly Government. (2006). Coope´ration
entre le Pay de Galles et la Bretagne: plan d’action. Retrieved from
http://www.bretagne.fr/internet/jcms/preprod 46536/cooperer-avec
-le-pays-de-galles.
Conseil re´gional de Bretagne, & Województwo Wielkopolskie. (2005). Coope´ration
entre la Re´gion Bretagne et la Vo¨ıvodie de Wielkopolska: plan d’action.
Retrieved from http://www.bretagne.fr/internet/jcms/c 13544/
cooperation-internationale-et-reseaux.
Conseil re´gional de Bretagne, & Województwo Wielkopolskie. (2005). Accord
de coope´ration entre la Re´gion Bretagne et la Vo¨ıvodie de Wielkopolska.
Retrieved from http://www.bretagne.fr/internet/jcms/c 13544/
cooperation-internationale-et-reseaux.
Conseil re´gional de Haute-Normandie. (2012). La coope´ration Haute-Normandie /
Basse-Saxe. Retrieved from http://www.hautenormandie.fr/Mediatheque/
Europe-International/Europe/Documents/La-Cooperation-entre-la
-Haute-Normandie-et-la-Basse-Saxe.
Conseil re´gional de Haute-Normandie. (2012). La Re´gion Haute-Normandie et
l’Europe. Retrieved from http://www.hautenormandie.fr/content/download/
27694/404433/file/plaquette europe web.pdf.
Conseil re´gional de Haute-Normandie. (2012). Avenir du programme de coope´ration
transfrontalie`re France-Manche-Angleterre de l’objectif de coope´ration territoriale
europe´enne (Interreg). Retrieved through personal communication.
Conseil re´gional de Picardie. (n.d.). The Picardie Brussels Office to the European
Union: A Bridge between the Region and Europe. Retrieved from http://www
.picardie.fr/IMG/pdf/f/b/7/Plaquette Bruxelles ang-2.pdf.
Conseil re´gional de Picardie, & Freistaat Thu¨ringen. (2003). Declaration commune /
Gemeinsame Erkla¨rung. Retrieved from http://www.picardie-thuringe.eu/
fr/thpi/histoire/declarations/2003/content.html.
Conseil re´gional de Picardie, & Freistaat Thu¨ringen. (2007). Declaration commune /
Gemeinsame Erkla¨rung. Retrieved from http://www.picardie-thuringe.eu/
fr/thpi/histoire/declarations/2007/content.html.
Conseil re´gional de Picardie, & Freistaat Thu¨ringen. (2009). Declaration commune /
Gemeinsame Erkla¨rung. Retrieved from http://www.picardie-thuringe.eu/
fr/thpi/histoire/declarations/.
East Sussex County Council. (2000). European Strategy 2000/2006 (Cabinet
Committee, 4 July 2000). Retrieved from http://www.eastsussex.gov.uk/
yourcouncil/agendasreportsminutes/cabinet/reports/European%
20Strategy%202000%20-%202006.pdf.
East Sussex County Council. (2001). Cabinet Response to the Scrutiny Review
of the Europe Office (Cabinet Committee, 20 March 2001). Retrieved from
http://www.eastsussex.gov.uk/yourcouncil/agendasreportsminutes/
cabinet/reports20002001.aspx.
356
Appendix C
East Sussex County Council. (2001). Europe Office (Cabinet Committee, 20
March 2001). Retrieved from http://www.eastsussex.gov.uk/yourcouncil/
agendasreportsminutes/cabinet/reports20002001.aspx.
East Sussex County Council. (2001). INTERREG III (Cabinet, 20 November
2001). Retrieved from http://www.eastsussex.gov.uk/yourcouncil/
agendasreportsminutes/cabinet/reports20002001.aspx.
East Sussex County Council. (2001). Preparations for INTERREG III (Cabinet
Committee, 16 January 2001). Retrieved from http://www.eastsussex.gov.uk/
yourcouncil/agendasreportsminutes/cabinet/reports20002001.aspx.
East Sussex County Council. (2004). Developing Relations with Countries Joining the
European Union (EU) from 1 May 2004 (Cabinet, 4 May 2004). Retrieved from
http://www.eastsussex.gov.uk/yourcouncil/agendasreportsminutes/
cabinet/reports2004.aspx.
East Sussex County Council, & Conseil ge´ne´ral de Seine-Maritime. (1996). East
Sussex–Seine-Maritime Accord. Retrieved through personal communication.
East Sussex County Council, & Conseil re´gional de Haute-Normandie. (1993). Accord
entre le East Sussex et la Haute Normandie. Retrieved through personal
communication.
East Sussex County Council, & Kreis Pinneberg. (n.d.). Declaration of Partnership.
Retrieved through personal communication.
East Sussex County Council, & Veszpre´m Megye O¨nkorma´nyzata. (1996). Accord
/ Egyezme´ny. Retrieved from http://www.sussexineurope.org/leweslinks/
accord.htm.
Hampshire County Council. (2002). Options Report on the International Relations
Best Value Review (Policy and Resources Policy Review Committee,
5 December 2002). Retrieved from http://www.hants.gov.uk/decisions/
decisions-docs/021205-prprec-R0225162357.html.
Hampshire County Council. (2003). Outcome Report of the International Relations
Best Value Review (County Council, 15 May 2003). Retrieved from http://
www.hants.gov.uk/decisions/decisions-index/index-docs-5435.html.
Hampshire County Council. (2003). Outcome Report of the International Relations
Best Value Review (Policy and Resources Policy Review Committee,
27 March 2003). Retrieved from http://www.hants.gov.uk/decisions/
decisions-index/index-docs-5410.html.
Hampshire County Council. (2005). International Links (Cabinet, 19 December 2005).
Retrieved from http://www.hants.gov.uk/decisions/decisions-docs/
051219-cabine-R1209145016.html.
Hampshire County Council. (2005). International Links: Report by the Chief Executive
of Hampshire County Council (Hampshire and Isle of Wight Local Government
Association Meeting, 27 January 2006). Retrieved from http://www.hiow.gov
.uk/agendas/2006/International%20Links%20annex%201.pdf.
Hampshire County Council. (2006). International Links (County Council, 22
February 2006). Retrieved from http://www.hants.gov.uk/decisions/
decisions-index/index-docs-6316.html.
Hampshire County Council. (2007). South East England House in Brussels
357
Appendix C
(Executive Member for Community Development and External Affairs,
22 March 2007). Retrieved from http://www.hants.gov.uk/decisions/
decisions-index/index-docs-6602.html.
Hampshire County Council. (2008). Proposed European Cooperation Project (Executive
Member for Recreation, Heritage and Communities, 13 November 2008).
Retrieved from http://www.hants.gov.uk/decisions/decisions-index/
index-docs-6950.html.
Hampshire County Council. (2011). Liberation Route Europe (Executive
Member for Economic Development and Rural Affairs, 16 September
2011). Retrieved from http://www3.hants.gov.uk/councilmeetings/
meetingsummary.htm?sta=0&currentpage=1&tab=1&date ID=763.
Hampshire County Council, & Conseil re´gional de Basse-Normandie. (1989).
Hampshire–Lower Normandy Accord. Retrieved through personal communication.
Isle of Wight Council. (2002). Petition to the European Parliament (Executive,
25 and 26 February 2002). Retrieved from http://www.iwight.com/council/
committees/Mod-Executive/26-2-02/agenda.htm.
Isle of Wight Council. (2002). Update on Hampshire – Isle of Wight – West Sussex
Office in Brussels (Economic Development, Planning, Tourism and Leisure
Services Select Committee, 13 December 2002). Retrieved from http://www
.iwight.com/council/committees/Mod-Econmic/13-12-02/agenda.htm.
Isle of Wight Council. (2002). Attendance at the XXII Conference of the CPMR Island
Commission and the CPMR UK Members Meeting (Economic Development,
Planning, Tourism and Leisure Services Select Committee, 24 June 2002).
Retrieved from http://www.iwight.com/council/committees/Mod-Econmic/
24-6-02/agenda.htm.
Isle of Wight Council. (2002). Attendance at the XXX General Assembly of
the Conference of Peripheral and Maritime Regions (Economic Development,
Planning, Tourism and Leisure Services Select Committee, 28 October 2002).
Retrieved from http://www.iwight.com/council/committees/Mod-Econmic/
28-10-02/agenda.htm.
Isle of Wight Council. (2003). Update on Activities of the Hampshire, Isle of Wight,
West Sussex Brussels Office (Economic Development, Planning, Tourism and
Leisure Services Select Committee, 23 June 2003). Retrieved from http://www
.iwight.com/council/committees/Mod-Econmic/23-6-03/papere.htm.
Isle of Wight Council. (2004). A Programme of Action – EU Expansion and Cohesion
Post 2006 (Executive, 11 August 2004). Retrieved from http://www.iwight
.com/council/committees/Mod-Executive/11-8-04/agenda.htm.
Isle of Wight Council. (2004). Update on European Issues – to Consider Objectives
(Executive, 3 November 2004). Retrieved from http://www.iwight.com/
council/committees/Mod-Executive/3-11-04/agenda.htm.
Isle of Wight Council. (2004). Update on Activities of the Hampshire, Isle of Wight,
West Sussex Brussels Office (Economic Development, Planning, Tourism and
Leisure Services Select Committee, 8 January 2004). Retrieved from http://
www.iwight.com/council/committees/Mod-Econmic/8-1-04/Paper%20B.htm.
Isle of Wight Council. (2005). Proposed Withdrawal from the Hampshire, Isle of
358
Appendix C
Wight and West Sussex Brussels Office and from the Conference of Peripheral
and Maritime Regions (Cabinet, 11 October 2005). Retrieved from http://
www.iwight.com/council/committees/cabinet/11-10-05/agenda.htm.
Kent County Council. (2007). KCC International Activities Annual Report 2006/7
(Cabinet, 3 December 2007). Retrieved from http://democracy.kent.gov.uk/
ieListDocuments.aspx?CId=115&MID=2378.
Kent County Council. (2007). International Agenda – European Affairs (Corporate
Policy Overview Committee, 26 April 2007). Retrieved from http://democracy
.kent.gov.uk/ieListDocuments.aspx?CId=158&MID=2363.
Kent County Council. (2007). European Affairs Update (Corporate Policy Overview
Committee, 8 November 2007). Retrieved from http://democracy.kent.gov
.uk/ieListDocuments.aspx?CId=158&MID=2261#AI4669.
Kent County Council. (2008). KCC International Activities Annual Report 2007/8
(Corporate Policy Overview Committee, 26 September 2008). Retrieved from
http://democracy.kent.gov.uk/ieListDocuments.aspx?CId=158&MID=360.
Kent County Council. (2009). KCC International Activities Annual Report 2008–09
(Corporate Policy Overview and Scrutiny Committee, 13 November 2009).
Retrieved from http://democracy.kent.gov.uk/ieListDocuments.aspx?CId=
158&MID=2239.
Kent County Council. (2009). European Affairs Update (Corporate Policy Overview
Committee, 26 March 2009). Retrieved from http://democracy.kent.gov.uk/
ieListDocuments.aspx?CId=158&MID=2136.
Kent County Council. (2010). KCC International Activities Annual Report 2009 –
10 (Corporate Policy Overview and Scrutiny Committee, 24 September 2010).
Retrieved from http://democracy.kent.gov.uk/ieListDocuments.aspx?CId=
158&MID=2996.
Kent County Council. (2010). International Affairs Group Update (Corporate Policy
Overview and Scrutiny Committee, 8 April 2010). Retrieved from http://
democracy.kent.gov.uk/ieListDocuments.aspx?CId=158&MID=2994.
Kent County Council. (2011). KCC International Activities Annual Report 2010 – 11
(Corporate Policy Overview and Scrutiny Committee, 6 July 2011). Retrieved
from http://democracy.kent.gov.uk/ieListDocuments.aspx?CId=158&MID=
3478.
Kent County Council, & Ba´cs-Kiskun County General Assembly. (2004). Cooperation
Agreement. Retrieved through personal communication.
Kent County Council, & Conseil ge´ne´ral du Pas-de-Calais. (2005). Partnership
Agreement. Retrieved through personal communication.
Kent County Council, & Conseil re´gional du Nord-Pas de Calais. (1987). Cooperation
Agreement / Protocole d’Accord. Retrieved through personal communication.
Medway Council. (1999). Medway corporate European strategy 2000–2006. Retrieved
through personal communication.
Medway Council. (2002). EU Funding & Projects: Current Activities & Targets
for 2002/2003 (Regeneration and Community Overview and Scrutiny
Committee, 28 May 2002). Retrieved from http://democracy.medway.gov.uk/
Data/Regeneration%20&%20Community%20Overview%20and%20Scrutiny%
359
Appendix C
20Committee/20020528/Agenda/Report%20(Agenda%20item%207)%205.pdf.
Medway Council. (2003). Review of Brussels Office Representation (Regeneration
and Community Overview and Scrutiny Committee, 1 April 2003).
Retrieved from http://democracy.medway.gov.uk/Data/Regeneration%
20&%20Community%20Overview%20and%20Scrutiny%20Committee/20030401/
Agenda/Report%20(Agenda%20item%205)%203.pdf.
Portsmouth City Council. (2009). Caen Interreg IV Project (Cabinet Member for
Culture and Leisure, 19 March 2009). Retrieved from http://www.portsmouth
.gov.uk/media/cl20090319r4.pdf.
Portsmouth City Council. (2009). Interreg IVa Project (Cabinet Member for Culture
and Leisure, 5 November 2009). Retrieved from http://www.portsmouth.gov
.uk/media/cl20091105r05.pdf.
Portsmouth City Council. (2009). Review of the Council’s Twinning Arrangements
(Economic Development, Culture and Leisure Scrutiny Panel, 10 November 2009).
Retrieved from http://www.portsmouth.gov.uk/yourcouncil/16933.html.
Portsmouth City Council. (2010). External Funding – Culture & Leisure (Cabinet
Member for Culture and Leisure, 18 March 2010). Retrieved from http://
www.portsmouth.gov.uk/media/cl20100318r11.pdf.
Portsmouth City Council. (2010). Interreg Project -– Mysteries of Our Neighbour’s
Culture (Cabinet Member for Culture, Leisure and Sport, 16 September 2010).
Retrieved from http://www.portsmouth.gov.uk/media/cls20100916r9.pdf.
Portsmouth City Council. (2011). Interreg Project – Mysteries of Our Neighbour’s
Culture (Cabinet Member for Culture, Leisure and Sport, 5 August 2011).
Retrieved from http://www.portsmouth.gov.uk/media/cls20110805r6.pdf.
SEERA. (2002). Interreg IIIB (Joint Europe Committee, 18 October 2002).
Retrieved from http://www.seeda.org.uk/european initiatives/
joint europe committee/Meetings/Minutes/october2002.asp.
SEERA. (2002). Membership and Remit of Joint Committee (Joint Europe
Committee, 18 October 2002). Retrieved from http://www.seeda.org.uk/
european initiatives/joint europe committee/Meetings/Minutes/
october2002.asp.
SEERA. (2002). European Strategy for the South East Action Plan (Joint Europe
Committee, 18 October 2002). Retrieved from http://www.seeda.org.uk/
european initiatives/joint europe committee/Meetings/Minutes/
october2002.asp.
SEERA. (2002). Interreg IIIC (Joint Europe Committee, 18 October 2002).
Retrieved from http://www.seeda.org.uk/european initiatives/
joint europe committee/Meetings/Minutes/october2002.asp.
SEERA. (2003). Bringing Together a Bigger Europe – Article for the
Regional Assembly’s Publication VOICE, Autumn 2002 (Joint Europe
Committee, 17 January 2003). Retrieved from http://www.seeda.org.uk/
european initiatives/joint europe committee/Meetings/Minutes/
January2003.asp.
SEERA. (2003). South East England House Report and Business Plan (Joint Europe
Committee, 7 April 2003). Retrieved from http://www.seeda.org.uk/european
360
Appendix C
initiatives/joint europe committee/Meetings/Minutes/April2003.asp.
SEERA. (2004). Peri-Urban Regions PLatform Europe: A Call for Europe’s Regional
and Rural Policy Agenda: Short Note to the Joint Europe Committee
(Joint Europe Committee, 30 September 2004). Retrieved from http://
www.seeda.org.uk/european initiatives/joint europe committee/
Meetings/Minutes/September2004.asp.
SEERA. (2005). Update on the Dynamo Regions Network (Joint Europe
Committee, 22 July 2005). Retrieved from http://www.seeda.org.uk/european
initiatives/joint europe committee/Meetings/Minutes/July2005.asp.
SEERA. (2005). Update on PURPLE (Peri-Urban Platform Europe) (Joint Europe
Committee, 22 July 2005). Retrieved from http://www.seeda.org.uk/european
initiatives/joint europe committee/Meetings/Minutes/July2005.asp.
SEERA. (2005). Future Ways of Working (Joint Europe Committee, 22 July
2005). Retrieved from http://www.seeda.org.uk/european initiatives/
joint europe committee/Meetings/Minutes/July2005.asp.
SEERA. (2006). Update on PURPLE (Peri-Urban Regions Platform Europe)
(Joint Europe Committee, 17 February 2006). Retrieved from http://
www.seeda.org.uk/european initiatives/joint europe committee/
Meetings/Minutes/February2006.asp.
SEERA. (2007). The Channel Arc Manche Assembly (Joint Europe Committee,
7 November 2006). Retrieved from http://www.seeda.org.uk/
european initiatives/joint europe committee/Meetings/Minutes/
October2007.asp.
Southampton City Council. (n.d.-a). NEW EPOC: reNEWing Economic Prosperity for
pOrt Cities. Southampton: Southampton City Council.
Southampton City Council. (n.d.-b). NEW EPOC: reNEWing Economic Prosperity
for pOrt Cities: Final response to EU green paper towards a future maritime
policy for the Union: A European vision for the oceans and seas. Southampton:
Southampton City Council.
Southampton City Council. (2003). New Economic Prosperity for Port Cities
(NEW EPOC): Contract with the European Commission – Authorisation
to Sign Contracts (Cabinet, 20 October 2003). Retrieved from http://
www.southampton.gov.uk/modernGov/CeListDocuments.aspx?CommitteeId=
126&MeetingId=389&DF=20%2f10%2f2003&Ver=2.
Southampton City Council. (2004). Authority for the City Council to Progress a
European Funding Bid – City Identity & Image Proposal (Cabinet, 19 April
2004). Retrieved from http://www.southampton.gov.uk/thecouncil/upload/
2003-2004/cabinet/Reports/20040419 013.pdf.
Southampton City Council. (2005). Update on European Activities and Funding
for Hampshire & Isle of Wight LGA (Hampshire and Isle of Wight
Local Government Association Meeting, 27 January 2006). Retrieved from
http://www.hiow.gov.uk/agendas/2006/Annex%20to%20paper%2010%2027%
20Jan%20HIOW%20agenda.pdf.
Southampton City Council. (2006). NEW EPOC – Renewing the Economic Prosperity
of Port Cities – Project Extension (Cabinet, 31 July 2006). Retrieved
361
Appendix C
from http://www.southampton.gov.uk/modernGov/CeListDocuments.aspx
?CommitteeId=126&MeetingId=441&DF=31%2f07%2f2006&Ver=2.
Southampton City Council. (2007). Corporate Report on European and
International Activities (Cabinet, 5 February 2007). Retrieved from
http://www.southampton.gov.uk/modernGov/CeListDocuments.aspx
?CommitteeId=126&MeetingId=453&DF=05%2f02%2f2007&Ver=2.
Southampton City Council. (2007). Cities in Balance Project (Cabinet, 10 December
2007). Retrieved from http://www.southampton.gov.uk/modernGov/
CeListDocuments.aspx?CommitteeId=126&MeetingId=1587&DF=10%2f12%
2f2007&Ver=2.
Southampton City Council. (2009). Acceptance of Grant Award from EU
INTERREG 2 Seas Programme (Cabinet, 19 January 2009). Retrieved
from http://www.southampton.gov.uk/modernGov/CeListDocuments.aspx
?CommitteeId=126&MeetingId=1606&DF=19%2f01%2f2009&Ver=2.
West Sussex County Council. (2000). European Regional Association (Cabinet Member
for Strategic Environmental Services, 6 September 2000). Retrieved from http://
www.westsussex.gov.uk/cs/mis/1010env33.pdf.
West Sussex County Council. (2001). Strategy for Securing European Funding
(Cabinet, 6 November 2001). Retrieved from http://www.westsussex.gov.uk/
cs/cabinet/cab061101I4.pdf.
West Sussex County Council. (2002). West Sussex County Council Europe Strategy
2002 – 2004 (Resources, Information and Liaison Services Select Committee,
11 September 2002). Retrieved from http://www.westsussex.gov.uk/cs/
committee/rils/rils1109I5.pdf.
West Sussex County Council. (2002). Self-Generated Project on Europe – Sub-Group’s
Detailed Project Plan and Terms of Reference (Resources, Information and
Liaison Services Select Committee, 10 July 2002). Retrieved from http://
www.westsussex.gov.uk/cs/committee/rils/rils1007I5.pdf.
West Sussex County Council. (2003). Draft Final Report of the Sub-Group –
Europe Project (Resources, Information and Liaison Services Select Committee,
19 February 2003). Retrieved from http://www.westsussex.gov.uk/cs/
committee/rils/rils1902i7.pdf.
West Sussex County Council. (2003). A Voice for West Sussex in Europe.
Retrieved from http://webserver01.westsussex.gov.uk/wscc/
Assistant%20Chief%20Exec/Communications/Press%20Releases.nsf/
6492a0d60c58db4680256a02003b9d99/d4db497362760cc680256cf50038a182
?OpenDocument.
West Sussex County Council. (2004). Joining Forces to Fight for EU
Funding. Retrieved from http://webserver01.westsussex.gov.uk/wscc/
Assistant%20Chief%20Exec/Communications/Press%20Releases.nsf/
e34922f7930f944d80256a02003bab64/7f904396f103381f80256f2400284619
?OpenDocument.
West Sussex County Council. (2004). Europe Self Generated Project – One
Year Monitoring Report (Resources, Information and Liaison Services Select
Committee, 26 May 2004). Retrieved from http://www.westsussex.gov.uk/
362
Appendix C
CS/committee/rils/rils260504i5.pdf.
West Sussex County Council. (2006). Corporate Europe Strategy 2006 – 2009 (Policy
and Resources Select Committee, 10 May 2006). Retrieved from http://www
.westsussex.gov.uk/CS/committee/PR/pr100506i7.pdf.
West Sussex County Council. (2006). County Euro Team Faces Tougher Fight for
Brussels Cash. Retrieved from http://webserver01.westsussex.gov.uk/
wscc/Assistant%20Chief%20Exec/Communications/Press%20Releases.nsf/
e34922f7930f944d80256a02003bab64/a3140c0412c58e99802571840052b5ec
?OpenDocument.
West Sussex County Council. (2006). Relocation of South East England House (Cabinet
Member for Communications and External Affairs, 30 May 2006). Retrieved from
http://www.westsussex.gov.uk/CS/MIS/300506cea2.pdf.
West Sussex County Council. (2007). Brussels Office Partnership Merger (Cabinet
Member for Communications and External Affairs, 23 January 2007). Retrieved
from http://www.westsussex.gov.uk/CS/MIS/230107cae3.pdf.
West Sussex County Council. (2011). Withdrawal from Channel Arc Manche Assembly
[Letter to Chairman of Channel Arc Manche Assembly]. Retrieved through
personal communication.
363
Appendix D: Document search
terms
• “Transnational network”, “transnational networks”, “transnational
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“international activities”.
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“cross-border cooperation”, “cross border co-operation”, “cross border
cooperation”.
• “European relations”, “international relations”, “external relations”.
• “Europe strategy”, “European strategy”, “international strategy”.
• “Europe policy”, “European policy”, “international policy”.
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and interview information
Participants
The researcher is grateful to the following participants who freely gave their time to
be interviewed as part of this research project.
Name Organization Date Interview
location
Cllr Roy Perry Hampshire County Council 19-Apr-2012 Winchester
Cllr Brad Watson
OBE
West Sussex County Council 27-Apr-2012 Chichester
Cllr Dave Wilox
OBE
LGA: European & International Board 30-Apr-2012 Telephone
interview
Dr Chris
Brammall
Isle of Wight Council 8-May-2012 Newport
Ron Moys Kent County Council 11-May-2012 Maidstone
Rachel Williams Brighton and Hove City Council 23-May-2012 Hove
Nick Woolfenden South East England Councils 24-May-2012 Kingston-upon-
Thames
Julien Tognetti Interreg IVa Channel 25-May-2012 Chichester
Professor Robin
McInnes
Formerly Isle of Wight Council 28-May-2012 Ventnor
Cllr Alex King
MBE
Kent County Council 29-May-2012 London
Nick Porter Local Government Association 29-May-2012 London
Ve´ronique
Poutrel
East Sussex County Council 30-May-2012 Lewes
Kerrie Prowting Southampton City Council 31-May-2012 Southampton
Elizabeth Smith Southampton City Council 31-May-2012 Southampton
Detlef Golletz Formerly South East England Regional
Development Agency
13-Jun-2012 London
Sietske de Groot Formerly West Sussex County Council 13-Jun-2012 London
Cllr Keith
Glazier
East Sussex County Council 20-Jun-2012 Lewes
Continued on next page
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Name Organization Date Interview
location
Anita Bungaroo Interreg IVa 2 Seas 22-Jun-2012 Hove
David Grace Formerly East Sussex County Council 5-Jul-2012 London
Pascal Goergen Assembly of European Regions 9-Jul-2012 Brussels
Suzanne Hoadley POLIS 9-Jul-2012 Brussels
Romain Nivelle Conseil re´gional de Picardie 10-Jul-2012 Brussels
Carlos Rul-lan
Rabassa
NECSTouR 10-Jul-2012 Brussels
Le´a Bodossian Airport Regions Conference 10-Jul-2012 Brussels
Roya Ayazi NEREUS 11-Jul-2012 Brussels
John Fitzgibbon SELP 11-Jul-2012 Brussels
Flavia Buiarelli EARLALL 11-Jul-2012 Brussels
Paul Bevan Eurocities 11-Jul-2012 Brussels
Dafydd Pugh Kent County Council 12-Jul-2012 Brussels
Re´mi Praud Conseil re´gional de Basse-Normandie 12-Jul-2012 Brussels
Richard Kitt Local Government Association 13-Jul-2012 Brussels
Carol Thomas CPMR 13-Jul-2012 Brussels
Jennie Pell Hampshire County Council 16-Jul-2012 Winchester
Cllr Keith Mans Hampshire County Council 16-Jul-2012 Winchester
Sue Mullan Formerly Southampton City Council 17-Jul-2012 Southsea
Gary Jefkins West Sussex County Council 18-Jul-2012 Chichester
Glen Westmore West Sussex County Council 18-Jul-2012 Chichester
Hilary Lowson PURPLE 19-Jul-2012 Cambridge
Sam Lucas Communities and Local Government 19-Jul-2012 London
Sole`ne Ferreira Medway Council 20-Jul-2012 Chatham
Tim Ward Hampshire County Council 30-Jul-2012 Winchester
Laurrie Barriol Portsmouth City Council 1-Aug-2012 Portsmouth
Ashley Curzon Isle of Wight Council 2-Aug-2012 Newport
Florian Lebeau Conseil re´gional de Bretagne 6-Aug-2012 Rennes
He´le`ne Marlot Conseil re´gional de Basse-Normandie 8-Aug-2012 Caen
Elodie Marc Conseil re´gional de Basse-Normandie 8-Aug-2012 Caen
Katie Neal Adur District Council and Worthing
Borough Council
14-Aug-2012 Worthing
Kevin Stower Hastings Borough Council 16-Aug-2012 Hastings
Phillipe Rycek Conseil ge´ne´ral de la Somme 21-Aug-2012 Telephone
interview
Daniel Garnier Basingstoke and Deane Borough Council 22-Aug-2012 Basingstoke
Continued on next page
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location
Helen Cutler Hampshire County Council 7-Sep-2012 Southampton
Cllr Bill Randall Brighton and Hove City Council 19-Sep-2012 Brighton
David Zaoui Conseil re´gional de Haute-Normandie 24-Sep-2012 Rouen
Gre´gory Hoareau Interreg IVa Channel 24-Sep-2012 Rouen
Barbara Leplivier Interreg IVa Channel 24-Sep-2012 Rouen
Bruno Thenail Conseil re´gional de Haute-Normandie 24-Sep-2012 Rouen
Julien Hernandez Conseil re´gional de Picardie 25-Sep-2012 Amiens
Guillaume
Lecoque
Conseil re´gional de Picardie 25-Sep-2012 Amiens
Julia Eripret Interreg IVb North West Europe 26-Sep-2012 Lille
Tim Caulfield Interreg IVa 2 Seas 26-Sep-2012 Lille
Gianluca Ferreri Interreg IVa 2 Seas 26-Sep-2012 Lille
Sina Belafkih Conseil re´gional du Nord-Pas de Calais 26-Sep-2012 Lille
Thomas Spriet Conseil re´gional du Nord-Pas de Calais 26-Sep-2012 Lille
Cllr Alex Phillips Brighton and Hove City Council 30-Sep-2012 Brighton
Cllr Richard
Williams
Southampton City Council 7-Nov-2012 Telephone
interview
Cllr High Mason Portsmouth City Coucnil 4-Dec-2012 Portsmouth
Jean Peyrony Mission Ope´rationnelle Transfrontalie`re 17-Dec-2012 Telephone
interview
Paula
MacLachlan
Interreg IVb North West Europe 18-Dec-2012 Bristol
Country represented
Country representing Number of participants
England 38
France 13
Representing transnational body 17
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Participant category
Participant category Number of participants
Local government administrative staff / officer 34
Local government politician / councillor 10
Transnational network staff 9
Interreg programme staff 8
Others 7
Status of participants
Status of participant Number of participants
Currently in post 63
Retired, changed job or otherwise inactive 5
Interview requests
Number of potential participants contacted 119
Participants who agreed to be interviewed 68
Participants who agreed to be interviewed but later withdrew 2
Unobtainable contacts 31
Interviews refused or referred to another colleague 19
Interviews not arranged as contact not relevant to study 2
Total positive response rate 57.14%
Format of interviews
Format of interview Number of interviews
Face to face 59
Telephone 4
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Method of collecting interview data
Method of collecting data Number of interviews
Recorded and transcribed 55
Detailed notes taken 8
Interview length
Longest interview 56:54
Shortest interview 14:03
Average interview length 30:40
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Appendix F: Interview questions
The following were the core questions posed to participants. Question wording and
order changed slightly depending on the participant’s background, for example if they
worked for a local authority or for a multilateral network.
• Please briefly outline your experience in transnational networking.
• What transnational networking activity does your authority participate in?
• Do you see transnational networking as an important part of your authority’s
strategy?
• Do you think this view is shared by others within your authority, both among
officers and politically?
• What benefits does your authority aim to achieve through its participation in
transnational networks?
• Are any of these aims more important to you or your authority than others? If
so, which and why?
• Do you think any of the transnational networks your authority participates in
achieve your aims better than others? If so, which and why?
• Do you think there are any problems—either network-wide or specific to your or
another authority—which act as a hindrance to you achieving your aims? If so,
can you explain these?
• What do you think could be done to overcome these difficulties?
• Do you have any examples of best practice where your or another authority
participates in transnational networking effectively?
• What are the characteristics of an authority which is effective at transnational
networking?
• Is there anyone else—in this organization or another—who you think it would be
useful to talk to?
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invitation
From: christopher.huggins@port.ac.uk
Subject: Local government transnational networking [or similar]
Dear [NAME],
I am a doctoral researcher at the University of Portsmouth currently working towards
a PhD. I am conducting research into local government networking and co-operation
across national borders. Specifically I am looking at the reasons why local authorities
participate in this international activity and how they can gain greater benefits
from it. I am particularly interested in the European activity carried out by local
government in south-east England and northern France. In order to gain an insight
into this activity I am interested to hear the experiences of those involved.
I understand you are [POSITION/INVOLVEMENT IN TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKING] at
[ORGANIZATION]. I would therefore be extremely grateful if you would participate in a
short interview to discuss your thoughts and experiences in this area. The information
you provide will be used to help inform my research project. I am happy to meet at a
time and place at your convenience.
I look forward to hearing from you.
Yours sincerely, Christopher Huggins.
Centre for European and International Studies Research
University of Portsmouth
Park Building, King Henry I Street
Portsmouth, PO1 2DZ
United Kingdom
E: christopher.huggins@port.ac.uk
T: +44 (0)2392 846157
W: www.port.ac.uk/cesir
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[NAME] 
[ADDRESS] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[DATE] 
Ref: [REFERENCE] 
Dear [NAME], 
 
Many thanks for agreeing to meet with me on [INTERVIEW DATE] at [TIME] to be 
interviewed about local government involvement in transnational European networks as 
part of my research project. As agreed, I will meet you at [INTERVIEW LOCATION]. 
 
I have enclosed an information sheet which outlines in more detail what my research 
project is about and what the interview process involves. Please take some time to read 
through this before the interview and get back to me with any questions or concerns. 
 
I look forward to meeting you on [INTERVIEW DATE]. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
 
Christopher Huggins. 
 
 
Centre for European and International Studies Research 
University of Portsmouth 
Park Building 
King Henry I Street 
Portsmouth 
PO1 2DZ 
United Kingdom 
 
T: +44 (0)23 9284 6157 
E: christopher.huggins@port.ac.uk 
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1  25 April 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Participant information sheet 
Local government involvement in 
European transnational networks 
 
 
I would like to invite you to take part in a research study. Before you decide, I would like you 
to understand why the research is being carried out and what it would involve for you. This 
information sheet outlines this. Please feel free to talk to others about the study if you wish. 
Do not hesitate to contact me if anything is not clear or you have any other questions. 
 
 
What is the study about? 
 
Many councils engage with local government in other—particularly European—countries. 
This is often called ‘transnational networking’. This can take a number of forms, including: 
 
 Being a partner in an international, European or cross-border project (for example an 
EU-funded or INTERREG project). 
 
 Being a member of a networking organization representing local government 
interests whose membership is drawn from more than one country (examples 
include the Assembly of European Regions, Eurocities or the Arc Manche). 
 
 Having direct links with local authorities abroad (not including town / city twinning). 
 
The aim of this study is to gain an insight into this activity. Specifically, the study aims to 
answer the following questions: 
 
• What is the rationale behind local government participation in transnational 
networking? 
 
• What benefits do councils gain from their involvement in transnational 
networks? 
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2  25 April 2012 
 
• What problems hinder transnational networking or the benefits local 
government get from it? 
 
• Can greater benefits be gained by local government authorities through 
transnational networking, and if so, how? 
 
This study focuses on the transnational networking activity undertaken by ‘top-tier’ local 
authorities in south-east England and northern France. It also seeks to understand wider 
trends in this activity. 
 
It is being undertaken as part of a programme of research towards fulfilment of a PhD 
award. 
 
 
Why have I been invited? 
 
You have been invited because of your position within your council or your role in local 
government transnational networking. Councillors, officers and representatives from several 
other local authorities and relevant organizations are also being invited to participate in this 
study. 
 
 
Do I have to take part? 
 
Your participation is entirely voluntary. It is up to you to decide whether to participate in the 
study or not. The study will be described to you and any questions you have will be 
answered. If you agree to take part, you will then be asked to formally consent at the 
beginning of the interview. 
 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
 
If you agree to take part, you will be asked to participate in an interview. A mutually 
convenient time and place will be arranged for this. The interview will be audio recorded. 
This ensures all information is captured and means an accurate record of the interview can 
be produced. Notes will also be taken during the interview. Before any questions are asked 
your consent to participate in the study will be sought and recorded. 
 
Following the interview a transcript of the audio recording will be produced. You will be sent 
a copy—usually by email—within two months and asked to confirm it. 
 
Following this, your interview transcript, along with other participants’ interviews, will be 
analysed to help inform the research. During this process you may be contacted to clarify 
certain points in the interview. 
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The findings of the research will be presented as part of a PhD thesis. The results are also 
likely to be published elsewhere too, for example in academic journals or at conferences. 
You, along with the other participants, will also be given an overview report of the findings. 
 
 
What are the benefits of taking part? 
 
By taking part you will be contributing your own and your organization’s views on this topic 
to the research. Your and others’ insights into this area will help to gain an understanding 
into transnational networking by local authorities. As well as an academic benefit, the 
results of this study will have an applied aspect too. For example, the results could be used 
to help local authorities gain greater benefits from their participation. You and the other 
participants will be given an overview report of the results. 
 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
 
As part of this study hopes to identify best practice within local government transnational 
networking and ways of improving the effectiveness of this activity, results will not be made 
confidential. This is so that people can learn from examples where local authorities do well. 
This will mean the research has potential benefits for practitioners as well as academics. Of 
course, if any part of your interview is to be quoted verbatim or your name or organization 
mentioned in any published material your full consent will be sought first. 
 
The only personal data—in other words that which identifies you as an individual—this 
study collects is your name, organization and position within your organization. No other 
personal details will be collected from you as this is not required for this study. Any personal 
data you provide will be kept safe and secure. Your information will be stored on the 
university’s network which is password protected; only myself and my supervisor will have 
direct access to it. Your details will only be used in connection with this study and not for 
any other purpose. 
 
If you have any concerns about confidentiality or would like discuss it further please do not 
hesitate to get in touch. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
 
The findings of the research will be presented as part of a PhD thesis. The results are also 
likely to be published elsewhere too, for example in academic journals or conference 
presentations. You, along with the other participants, will also be given an overview report 
of the findings. 
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Can I withdraw from the study? 
 
If you wish, you can withdraw at any point until you have agreed the interview transcript. 
After this, all interviews will be analysed together. It will become impractical to remove a 
single participant’s interview once the analysis process has started. 
 
If you do wish to withdraw from the study please get in touch. Anything you have already 
contributed—including interview recordings and transcripts—will be destroyed. You do not 
have to give any reasons for your withdrawal. 
 
 
Who is organizing and funding the research? 
 
This research project is supported and funded by the Centre for European and International 
Studies Research at the University of Portsmouth as part of a PhD project. Information 
about the university and research centre can be found at www.port.ac.uk and 
www.port.ac.uk/ceisr respectively. 
 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
 
Research at the University of Portsmouth is looked at by an independent group of people, 
called a research ethics committee, to protect your interests. This study has been reviewed 
and given a favourable opinion by Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics 
Committee at the university. 
 
 
What if I have any problems or concerns? 
 
If you have any problems, issues or concerns please feel free to contact me to talk through 
them. If you wish to check my credentials then please feel free to contact the senior 
secretary at the Centre for European and International Studies Research at the University of 
Portsmouth. Her contact details are below: 
 
Donna Ferrand 
Senior Secretary 
Centre for European and International Studies Research 
University of Portsmouth 
Park Building 
King Henry I Street 
Portsmouth 
PO1 2DZ 
 
Telephone: +44 (0)23 9284 6033 
Email: donna.ferrand@port.ac.uk 
Web: www.port.ac.uk/ceisr 
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What if I have further questions? 
 
Please do not hesitate to get in touch if you have any questions. My contact details are 
below: 
 
Christopher Huggins 
Centre for European and International Studies Research 
University of Portsmouth 
Park Building 
King Henry I Street 
Portsmouth 
PO1 2DZ 
 
Telephone: +44 (0)23 9284 6157 
Email: christopher.huggins@port.ac.uk 
Web: www.port.ac.uk/ceisr 
 
 
Many thanks for taking the time to read through this information sheet and consider 
participating in this research study. 
378
Appendix I: Interview notes form
379
Appendix I
1 
 
Interview details 
Interview with 
 
 
 
Local authority / organization 
 
 
 
Date and time 
 
 
 
 
Location 
 
 
Interview ID 
 
 
 
 
Interview notes 
BRIEFLY OUTLINE STUDY AND 
SEEK CONSENT 
 
Can you confirm you happy 
to be interviewed as part of 
this study? 
 
Please briefly outline your 
experience in transnational 
networking. 
 
What transnational networks 
does your authority 
participate in? 
 
(If examples already known 
check this is still valid) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
380
Appendix I
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Do you see transnational 
networking as an important 
part of your authority’s 
strategy? 
 
Supplementary: do you think 
this view is shared by others 
within your authority, both 
among officers and politically 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What benefits does your 
authority aim to achieve 
through its participation in 
transnational networks? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Are any of these aims more 
important to you or your 
authority than others? 
 
Supplementary: if so which 
and why? 
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Do you think any of the 
transnational networks your 
authority participates in 
achieve your aims better 
than others? 
 
Supplementary: if so which 
networks and why? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Do you think there are any 
problems—either network-
wide or specific to your or 
another authority—which act 
as a hindrance to you 
achieving your aims? 
 
Supplementary: if so can you 
explain these? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What do you think could be 
done to overcome these 
issues? 
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4 
 
Do you have any examples of 
best practice where your or 
another authority 
participates in transnational 
networking effectively? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What are the characteristics 
of an authority which is 
effective at transnational 
networking? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Is there anyone else who you 
think it would be useful to 
talk to? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank for participation and 
outline what will happen 
next 
 
Other notes 
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[NAME] 
[ADDRESS] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[DATE] 
Ref: [REFERENCE] 
Dear [NAME], 
 
Many thanks for taking time to meet with me on [DATE OF INTERVIEW] to discuss 
your experiences in local government transnational networking. It was a pleasure to meet 
you and the interview was extremely useful and insightful. 
 
As discussed I will send you a transcript of the interview within the next two months for 
your confirmation. 
 
If you have any questions or concerns in the mean time, please do not hesitate to contact 
me. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
 
Christopher Huggins. 
 
 
Centre for European and International Studies Research 
University of Portsmouth 
Park Building 
King Henry I Street 
Portsmouth 
PO1 2DZ 
United Kingdom 
 
T: +44 (0)23 9284 6157 
E: christopher.huggins@port.ac.uk 
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Appendix K: Ethics report and
favourable opinion
Introduction
The purpose of this document is to outline the ethical implications of the research
project ‘local government involvement in transnational European networks’.
Aims and research questions
The overall aim of this study is to gain an insight into local government involvement
in transnational networks and in so doing have a better understanding of how local
government authorities could improve their networking activity so in turn to improve
the benefits they receive from it. Specifically, it aims to achieve the following outcomes:
• Identify contemporary examples of transnational networking by local government
in south-east England and northern France.
• Establish the rationale, from a local government perspective, for participation in
transnational networks.
• Examine the effectiveness of local authorities in securing benefits from
participation in transnational networking.
These aims have helped to shape, and form the basis of, the study’s main research
questions:
• What is the rationale behind local government participation in transnational
networking?
• What benefits do participants gain from their involvement in transnational
networks?
• What problems hinder transnational networking or the benefits local government
get from it?
Beyond this, there is a wider aim in so far as broadening academic debate in
this area. Local government transnational networking has largely been overlooked by
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political scientists and European integration scholars. While there was an increase
in literature during the 1990s, contemporary literature—save for a small number of
cases—is scarce. Of the literature that does exist there are a number of issues. For
example, there is often a heavy focus on networks’ role in obtaining European funding
at the cost of policy areas. This study therefore aims to overcome some of these
shortcomings by providing a contemporary analysis of local government transnational
networking.
Overview of method
This research project aims to understand the reasons local government authorities take
part in transnational networks. In this context it is important to gain an understanding
from the point of view of those involved in these networks. Interviews are a useful
and appropriate method for studies which focus on phenomena from participants’
perspectives. Therefore by interviewing local government officials who are involved
in transnational networks, a better understanding of the rationale for participating in
networks can be gained. This is where the bulk of this research project’s data will
be collected from. This method is common among studies in this field (for example
Benington & Harvey, 1998; Lawrence, 2000; Payre, 2010; Salskov-Iversen, 2006a).
The interviews will be carried out in what Robson (2002, p. 270) defines as a
semi-structured way; that is an interview that “has predetermined questions, but
the order can be modified based upon the interviewer’s perception of what seems
most appropriate. Question wording can be changed and explanations given” (Robson,
2002, p. 270). The flexibility of this approach allows insight to be gained, while also
allowing specific issues to be explored in depth should certain issues come up during the
interview itself. The interview questions will be drawn from and based on the study’s
research questions. Careful consideration needs to be given to this. Kvale (1996, p. 130)
notes that the study’s “research questions need to be translated into an easy-going,
colloquial form to generate spontaneous and rich descriptions”. In other words, the
interviews questions need to be aimed at the participant, not the researcher, so they
can adequately provide data which will assist in addressing the research questions.
While it is considered that semi-structured interviews are the most appropriate
method in order to address the study’s aims and research questions, the approach has
some inherent challenges which will need to be overcome. Firstly, interviews obviously
involve gathering data directly from human participants. Consequently, there are
ethical considerations to take into account. These are outlined in more detail below.
Another challenge is presented in terms of language, particularly when interviewing
French participants. This will require the use of translation services. The impact of
this and the challenges it presents are discussed further below.
Questions
Before any questions are asked participants will receive an explanation of what the
research project entails. Participants’ verbal consent will then be sought. Participants
will also be given a brief explanation of what is meant by “transnational networking”,
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along with some examples, to avoid confusion in terminology.
The precise questions participants will be asked during interviews have yet to be
finalized, so the following list is a working draft:
• What transnational networks does your authority participate in?
• Do you see transnational networking as an important part of your authority’s
strategy? (Is this view shared by others within your authority?)
• What resources does your authority invest into transnational activity?
• What does your authority aim to achieve through its participation in
transnational networks?
• Are any of these aims more important to you or your authority than the others?
(If so, which and why?)
• Do you think any of the transnational networks your authority participates in
achieve your aims better than others? (If so, which networks and why?)
• Do you think there are any problems (either network-wide or specific to your or
another authority) which act as a hindrance to your achieving your aims? (If so,
can you explain these?)
• What do you think could be done to overcome these issues?
• Do you have any examples of best practice where your or another authority
participates in transnational networking effectively?
As noted above, the interviews will be semi-structured so these questions are
flexible in wording and the order they are presented in. This will allow each interview
to be tailored to the participant or their context. It also allows supplementary
questions to be asked in response to interesting answers from participants which may
benefit from further exploration.
Sampling
This study will utilize a snowball sampling method, defined as using known
participants as informants to identify further potential participants. Given that
much of networking is about forming relationships with counterparts in other local
authorities or organizations, participants can be used as informants, highlighting other
potential participants who will be relevant to the study.
Ethical considerations
This section outlines some of the ethical considerations the research project needs to
acknowledge and address. As this study involves gathering data directly from human
participants via interviews, a favourable ethical opinion will need to be sought from
the university’s Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee
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before data collection starts. It is hoped this will be obtained by the end of August
2011.
This research project will abide by the Economic and Social Research Council’s
(2010) Framework for Research Ethics. The six key principles of this are as follows:
• “Research should be designed, reviewed and undertaken to ensure integrity,
quality and transparency.”
• “Research staff and participants must normally be informed fully about the
purpose, methods and intended possible uses of the research, what their
participation in the research entails and what risks, if any, are involved.”
• “The confidentiality of information supplied by research participants and the
anonymity of respondents must be respected.”
• “Research participants must take part voluntarily, free from any coercion.”
• “Harm to research participants must be avoided in all instances.”
• “The independence of research must be clear, and any conflicts of interest or
partiality must be explicit.”
Kvale (1996, pp. 119–120) also sets out a number of ethical issues which researchers
planning to interview should consider. These are:
• “What are the beneficial consequences of the study?”
• “How can the informed consent . . . be obtained?”
• “How can confidentiality . . . be protected?”
• “What are the consequences of the study for the participating subjects?”
• “How will the researcher’s role affect the study?”
Benefit
As well as making an academic contribution this research project also has an applied
dimension by seeking to understand ways in which local government could improve
their transnational networking activity in order to improve the benefits they derive
from it. In this way the results of the study have the potential to have an impact among
the participants themselves. These potential benefits are explained to participants
in the information sheet which they will receive before agreeing to participate. All
participants will receive a report giving an overview of the results, whether positive
or negative. This will ensure the results are disseminated among those it will have an
impact with.
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Transparency and informed consent
This research project will be carried out in an open and transparent way, while being
careful not to compromise participants’ personal details. To this end an information
sheet has been created, aimed primarily at participants. This outlines:
• The project’s focus, aims and main research questions.
• Who is organizing, carrying out and funding the research, along with contact
details.
• What will happen to participants and what they can expect during the research
process.
• How the study has been reviewed.
• Information about withdrawing from the study.
• Issues around confidentiality and storage of data.
• What will happen to the results of the study.
• Who to contact for further information, or if there are any problems.
This information sheet will form the basis of participants’ informed consent to take
part, which will be sought before data will be collected from them. All participants
will be invited to take part in the research project. An invitation letter on university
headed paper will be sent to each potential participant where it will be made clear
their participation is entirely voluntary. The information sheet will also be written on
university headed paper.
As all interviews will be audio recorded, participants’ consent will be captured on
the recording—rather than using a paper consent form—before the actual interview
begins.
Confidentiality and anonymity
One of the key aims of this study is to identify ways in which local government
might be able to improve their transnational networking activity and thus increase
the benefits they gain. To facilitate this, examples of best practice might be identified
and experiences shared. Consequently, results will not be made confidential so they
can have an impact among practitioners through the use of examples, ensuring the
results of the research have an impact beyond academia. This situation will be clearly
communicated to participants, both on the information sheet and when consent is being
sought. If any part of an interview is to be quoted verbatim, or a participant’s name
or organization mentioned in any published material, the participant’s full consent will
be sought first. Again, participants will be informed of this.
Participants’ data—including personal details and interview recordings and
transcripts—will be kept on the university’s network which is password protected. All
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participants will be informed about how their information and the data gathered from
them will be kept. At the end of the research project data provided by participants
will be held for future research if required. Again, participants would be informed of
this and their consent sought before their data is accessed and used for any additional
research.
Consequences for participants
Participation in the study is completely voluntary and this is made explicitly clear
to potential participants. A participant’s decision to take part in the research or not
will be completely respected and they will not be asked to provide a reason for their
decision. At no point will any form of pressure be applied to participants to persuade
them to take part. Furthermore, this study will strictly uphold the principle of no harm
to participants.
Participation will obviously involve some minor consequences for participants.
Firstly, participants will be asked to take part in an audio recorded interview, to
be arranged at a mutually convenient time and place. Following the interview,
participants will be asked to confirm a transcript. During the analysis, participants
may be contacted in order to clarify certain points, to seek permission to reproduce
parts of the interview verbatim or to seek permission to mention the participant’s
name or organization. As noted above, all participants will receive an overview report
on the study’s main findings. Participation is completely voluntary and participants
are free to withdraw from the study without giving a reason up to the point where data
analysis begins. After this point it may become unfeasible to remove an individual’s
data from everyone else’s. Again, this whole process will be set out in the information
sheet so participants have a clear idea about what to expect from their participation
in the project before agreeing to take part.
Researcher’s role
As with the participant’s role, the researcher’s role will also be made clear in the
information sheet before any participant agrees to take part in the study. The interests
of the researcher and the motives behind data collection will be made clear. Specifically
that the research is being carried out as part of a programme of research culminating
in a PhD award for the researcher. Further, for the purposes of transparency, clear
information will be provided in the information sheet about who is funding the
research, in this case the Centre for European and International Studies Research at
the University of Portsmouth as part of a PhD bursary.
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Chris Huggins 
PhD Student 
FHSS Research Centre 
Park Building 
 
Cc Karen Heard-Laureote 
 
REC reference number:  11/12:03 
Please quote this number on all correspondence 
 
19th October 2011 
 
Dear Chris, 
 
Full Title of Study:  Local government involvement in transnational European networks: ethical 
considerations. 
 
Documents reviewed: 
Ethical considerations - summary 
Participant Information Sheet 
Invitation letter 
 
Following the advice I provided en route, your proposal was reviewed by a virtual 
sub-committee of FHSS Research Ethics Committee. 
 
I am delighted to write to you formally and confirm the Committee’s favourable 
opinion. 
 
 
I wish you every success with your research. 
 
 
David Carpenter 
Chair:  FHSS REC 
 
Review undertaken by: 
 
David Carpenter 
Richard Hitchcock 
Jane Winstone 
Jill Dealey 
392
Appendix L: Visualizations of
transnational networking by local
authorities
The following figures show the transnational networking activity undertaken by the 14
councils studied. These visualizations were carried out using social network analysis
software. Transnational links engaged in by the councils in the case study areas were
entered into this software which then visually mapped them. The purpose here was to
visualize the prevalence of local government transnational networking activity rather
than to carry out any quantitative social network analysis.
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Kent County Council
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Medway Council
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East Sussex County Council
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Brighton and Hove City Council
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West Sussex County Council
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Hampshire County Council
399
Appendix L
Portsmouth City Council
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Southampton City Council
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Isle of Wight Council
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Conseil re´gional du Nord-Pas de Calais
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Conseil re´gional de Picardie
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Conseil re´gional de Haute-Normandie
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Conseil re´gional de Basse-Normandie
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Conseil re´gional de Bretagne
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